THE RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED.

Ἔνιοι φίυγοντες τὴν Δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐμπίπλωσιν εἰς Ἀθεότητα τραχεῖαι ἢ ἀντίτυποι, ὑφηνιόσαντες ΕΝ ΜΕΣΩ κειμένην τὴν Εὐσέβειαν. Plut.

Χαίρειν ἔν ἐάσας τὰς Τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΝ σκοπῶν, σκοπήσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύναμαι βέλτιστ' ἂν ἢ ζῶν, ἢ ἐτελεύτων ἀποθνήσκω, ἀποθνήσκειν. Plato.

DUBLIN:
Printed by and for GEORGE GRIERSON, in *Essex-Street*, and for GEORGE EWING, in *Dames-Street*.

M, DCC, XXVI.

THE BOOKSELLER TO THE READER.

THE great applauſe with which the *Religion of Nature delineated* has been received, both in *England* and *Ireland*, anticipates all Characters and Encomiums that can poſſibly be given of it. The admiration of all good Judges, muſt neceſſarily attend a book calculated for the benefit of Mankind. For to deduce all the obligations of *Natural Religion*, from one ſimple and evi-

dent Principle, in the moſt demonſtrative and perſpicuous manner; and inculcate them on men with the greateſt ſtrength of reaſon and ſtyle, is a work ſo adapted to promote the happineſs of Society, and to raiſe Rational Beings to that rectitude and perfection, the dignity of their nature, and the commands of their Creator require of them; that it could not poſſibly miſs of ſucceſs; without ſuppoſing a far greater degree of corruption and infatuation in the world, than, 'tis hoped, will ever be found in it. For the rendring this Book, which is ſo much the admiration of the preſent, and will without doubt, continue ſo of future ages, of more univerſal uſe; the Notes which, tho' not abſolutely requiſite to underſtand, yet contribute very much to confirm and illuſtrate the Text (being the opinions of the moſt celebrated of the *Jews*, *Greeks* and *Romans*, upon the points there treated of) are made much more eaſy and intelli-

intelligible than in the former Editions, by an *Engliſh* Tranſlation of all the Quotations out of the Oriental Languages; with which the Rev^d. Mr. St. *Paul* condeſcended to oblige the Publick: Having performed it to the higheſt Satisfaction of ſome of the greateſt Critics in that Kind of Learning; and with ſo much Strictneſs and Elegance, that thoſe who do, and thoſe who do not underſtand the Originals, muſt both equally joyn in applauding and thanking him for it, as well as the Gentleman, who was pleaſed to reviſe the whole, Word for Word, from the Originals, with the ſaid Mr. St. *Paul.*

Ad-

Advertiſement.

Few copies of this book, tho not originally intended to be publiſhed, were printed off in the Year 1722. but, it being tranſcribed for the preſs haſtily, and corrected under great diſadvantages, many *errata* and miſtakes got into it, which could not all be preſently obſerved. With a great part of them therefore ſtill remaining four or five of the copies were afterwards given away;

away; and ſome more, taken from the printing-houſe, paſſed through hands unknown to the author, and he ſuppoſes were ſold privately. There has, beſide, been ſome talk of a piratical deſign upon it: and if that ſhould take effect, both it and he might ſuffer extremely. For theſe reaſons he has thought fit to reprint it himſelf, more correctly, with ſome ſmall alterations (*a*) (in things not eſſential to the main deſign) and ſome additions. Tho he cannot but be apprehenſive, that ſtill there may be many things, which have eſcaped his eye, or his attention.

(*a*) Some more of the ſame kind were made by the author a few days before his death, which are inſerted in this impreſſion.

THE

THE RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED.

To *A. F.* Esq;

I WAS much surprised, *SIR*, when (some time ago) you so importunately desired *my thoughts* upon these questions,

I. *Is there really any such thing as* natural religion, *properly and truly so called?*

II. *If there is, what is it?*

III. *How may a man qualify himself, so as to be able to judge, for himself, of the other religions profest in the world; to settle his own opinions in disputable matters; and then to enjoy tranquility of mind, neither disturbing others, nor being disturbed at what passes among them?*

With what view you did this; whether in expectation of some little degree of satisfaction; or merely to try my abilities; or (which I rather think) out of kind-

neſs to amuſe me at a time, when I wanted ſomething to divert melancholy reflexions, I ſhall not venture to gueſs. I ſhall only ſay, that could I have foreſeen in due time, that ſuch a task was to be impoſed upon me, I might have been better prepared for it. I might have marked what was ſuitable to my purpoſe in thoſe books, which I have red, but ſhall ſcarce ever return to read any more: many more I might have red too, which, not wanting them for my own conviction, I have neglected, and now have neither leiſure nor patience to peruſe: I might have noted what the various occurrences and caſes, that happen in life, ſuggeſted: and, in general, I might have placed more of my time on ſuch parts of learning, as would have been directly ſerviceable to me on the preſent occaſion.

However, as I have not ſpent my days without *thinking* and reflecting ſeriouſly within my ſelf upon the articles and duties of *natural religion*, and they are *my thoughts* which you require, I have attempted, by recollecting old meditations, and conſulting a few ſcattered papers, in which I had formerly for my own uſe ſet down ſome of them (briefly, and almoſt ſoleciſtically), to give an anſwer to the *two firſt* of your queſtions, *together:* tho I muſt own, not without trouble in adjuſting and compacting looſe ſentiments, filling up vacuities, and bringing the *chaos* into the ſhape of ſomething like a ſyſtem.

Notwithſtanding what I have ſaid, in a treatiſe of *natural religion*, a ſubject ſo beaten and exhauſted in all its parts, by all degrees of writers, in which ſo many notions will inevitably occur that are no one's property, and ſo many things require to be proved, which can ſcarce be proved by any other but the old arguments (or not ſo well), you muſt not expect to find *much* that is new: Yet *ſomething* perhaps you may. That, which is advanced in the following papers, concerning the nature of *moral good and evil*, and is the prevailing thought that runs through them all, I never met with any where. And even as to thoſe matters, in which I have been prevented by others, and which perhaps may be common, you have them, not as I took them from any body, but as they uſed to appear to me in my walks and ſolitudes. So that they are indeed *my thoughts*, ſuch as have been *long mine*, which I ſend you; without any regard to what others have, or have not ſaid: as I perſuade my ſelf you will eaſily perceive. It is not hard to diſcern, whether a work of this kind be all of a piece; and to diſtinguiſh the genuine hand of an author from the falſe wares and patch-work of a plagiary. Tho after all, it would be madneſs in a man to go out of his right way, only becauſe it has been frequented by others, or perhaps is the high road.

Senſible how unfiniſhed this performance is, I call it only a *Delineation*, or rude draught. Where I am defective, or trip, I hope you will excuſe a friend, who has

now

now paſſed the threſhold of old age; and is, upon that and other accounts, not able to bear much ſtudy or application. And thus I commit to your candor what follows: which, for the ſake of order and perſpicuity, I have divided into *ſections* and *propoſitions*.

SECT. I. *Of Moral* Good *and* Evil.

THE foundation of religion lies in that difference between the acts of men, which diſtinguiſhes them into *good*, *evil*, *indifferent*. For if there is ſuch a difference, there muſt be religion; & *contra*. Upon this account it is that ſuch a long and laborious inquiry hath been made after ſome general *idea* (*a*), or ſome rule (*b*), by comparing the aforeſaid acts with which it might appear, to which kind they reſpectively belong (*c*). And tho men have not yet agreed upon any one, yet one certainly there muſt be (*d*). That, which I am going to propoſe, has always ſeemd to me not only evidently true, but withal ſo obvious and plain, that perhaps for this very reaſon it hath not merited the notice of authors: and the uſe and application of it is ſo eaſy, that if things are but fairly permitted to ſpeak for themſelves their own natural language, they will, with a moderate attention, be found *themſelves* to proclaim their own rectitude or obliquity; *that is*, whether they are diſagreeable to it, or not. I ſhall endeavour by degrees to explain my meaning.

I. *That act, which may be denominated morally good or evil, muſt be the act of a being capable of diſtinguiſhing, chooſing, and acting for himſelf* (*e*): or more briefly, *of an intelligent and free agent*. Becauſe in proper ſpeaking no act at all can be aſcribed to that, which is not indued with theſe capacities. For that, which cannot diſtinguiſh,

(*a*) So, in *Plato*, *Socrates* requires of *Euthyphro* not ἓν τι ἢ δύο διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ εἶδος, ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστι, κτλ. And again, ταύτῃ τίθημι με αὐτὸν διδάξειν τὴν Ἰδέαν τῆς πόλεως. ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων, καὶ χρώμενον αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ᾖ, οὐκ ἂν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττῃ, φῶ εἶναι. ὃ δ' ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ. *Poſce* exemplar *honeſti*, Luc. (*b*) Οἶδε τό γ' ἀνίσχειν, καὶ νέμειν τῷ καλῷ μαθών. *Eurip.* *Adſit* Regula, *peccatis quæ pœnas irroget æquas*, ſays *Horace*. Now by the ſame *rule*, by which puniſhments are juſtly proportion'd, crimes muſt be diſtinguiſh'd among themſelves; and therefore much more, crimes from no-crimes, and crimes from good actions. So that it is at bottom a *rule* which can do this, that is required. (*c*) *Formula quædam conſtituenda eſt, quam ſi ſequemur in comparatione rerum, ab officio nunquam recedemus*, Cic. (*d*) Πῶς οὖν τι ἀντίκειται ἓν καὶ ἀνύσιλα τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἀνθρώποις; ἔστιν ἄν [κακόν τις] Arrian. (*e*) *Ubi vitæ, ſi nihil ſitum eſt in ipſis nobis?* Cic. There is a power given to every man, if he will but apply himſelf to the right way. *Maim.* That is the foundation of the law and of the commandment. That power is free-will. *Nahh. Ab.*

 ſtinguiſh,

ſtinguiſh, cannot chooſe: and that, which has not the opportunity, or liberty of chooſing for it ſelf, and acting accordingly, from an internal principle, acts, if it acts at all, under a neceſſity incumbent *ab extra*. But that, which acts thus, is in reality only *an inſtrument* in the hand of ſomething which impoſes the neceſſity; and cannot properly be ſaid *to act*, but *to be acted*. The act muſt be the act of an agent: therefore not of his inſtrument.

A being under the above-mentioned inabilities is, as to the morality of its acts, in the ſtate of inert and paſſive matter, and can be but a *machine*: to which no language or philoſophy ever aſcribed ἦθη, or *mores*.

II. *Thoſe propoſitions are true, which expreſs things as they are: or, truth is the conformity of thoſe words or ſigns, by which things are expreſt, to the things themſelves*, Defin.

III. *A true propoſition may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are, by deeds, as well as by expreſs words or another propoſition.* It is certain there is a meaning in many acts and geſtures. Every body underſtands weeping (*a*), laughing, ſhrugs, frowns, &c. theſe are a ſort of univerſal language. Applications are many times made and a kind of dialogue maintaind only by caſts of the eye and motions of the adjacent muſcles (*b*). And we read of feet that *ſpeak* (*c*); of a philoſopher, who *anſwerd* an argument by only getting up and walking (*d*); and of one who pretended to *expreſs* the ſame ſentence as many ways by geſticulation, as even *Cicero* himſelf could by all his *copia* of words and eloquence (*e*). But theſe inſtances do not come up to my meaning. There are many acts of *other* kinds, ſuch as conſtitute the character of a man's conduct in life, which have *in nature*, and would be taken by any indifferent judge *to have a ſignification*, and *to imply ſome propoſition*, as plainly to be underſtood as if it was declared in words: and therefore if what ſuch acts declare to be, is not, they muſt *contradict truth*, as much as any falſe propoſition or aſſertion can.

If a body of ſoldiers, ſeeing another body approach, ſhould fire upon them, would not this action declare that they were enemies; and if they were *not* enemies, would not this military language declare what was *falſe*? No, perhaps it may be ſaid; this can only be called a miſtake, like that which happened to the *Athenians* in the

(*a*) *Lacryma pondera vocis habent.* Ov. (*b*) *Oculi, ſupercilia, frons, vultus denique totus, qui* ſermo *quidam tacitus mentis eſt*, &c. Cic. *Nutu ſignifque* loquuntur. Ov. *Eſt actio quaſi* ſermo *corporis.* Cic. & ſim. paſſ. (*c*) A wicked man ſpeaketh with his feet. *Prov.* (*d*) Τὸν κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν λόγον σιωπῶν, ἀπειπάτησε. *Sext. Emp.* So *Menedemus* reproved luxury by eating only olives. *Diog. L.* And others are mentiond by *Plutarch*, who did ἀνὺ φωνῆς ἃ δεῖ ἐρᾶζειν. (*e*) *Macrob.*

attack

attack of *Epipolæ* (*a*), or to the *Carthaginians* in their laſt incampment againſt *Agathocles* in *Africa* (*b*). Suppoſe then, inſtead of this firing, ſome officer to have *ſaid* they were enemies, when indeed they were friends: would not that ſentence affirming them to be enemies be falſe, notwithſtanding he who ſpoke it was miſtaken? The truth or falſhood of this affirmation doth not depend upon the affirmer's knowledge or ignorance: becauſe there is a *certain* ſenſe affixt to the words, which muſt either agree or diſagree to that, concerning which the affirmation is made. The thing is the very ſame ſtill, if into the place of *words* be ſubſtituted *actions*. The ſalute here was in *nature* the ſalute of an enemy, but ſhould have been the ſalute of a friend: therefore it implied a falſity. Any *ſpectator* would have underſtood this action as I do; for a declaration, that the other were enemies. Now what is to be underſtood, has a meaning: and what has a meaning, may be either *true* or *falſe*: which is as much as can be ſaid of any verbal ſentence.

When *Popilius Lænas* ſolicited to have *Cicero* proſcribed, and that he might find him out and be his executioner (*c*), would not his *carriage* have ſufficiently *ſignified* to any one, who was ignorant of the caſe, that *Tully* either was ſome very bad man, and deſerved capital puniſhment; or had ſome way grievouſly injured this man; or at leaſt had not ſaved his life, nor had as much reaſon to expect *his* ſervice and good offices upon occaſion, as he ever had to expect *Tully*'s? And all theſe things being falſe, were not his behaviour and actions *expreſſive* of that which was falſe, or *contradictions to truth*? It is certain he *acted as if* thoſe things had been true, which were not true, and as if thoſe had not been true which were true (i. this conſiſted the fault of his ingratitude): and if he in words had *ſaid* they were true or not true, he had done no more than *talk as if* they were ſo: why then ſhould not to *act* as if they were true or not true, when they were otherwiſe, contradict truth as much as to *ſay* they were ſo, when they were not ſo (*d*)?

A pertinacious *objector* may perhaps ſtill ſay, it is the buſineſs of ſoldiers to *defend* themſelves and their country from enemies, and to annoy them as opportunity permits; and ſelf-preſervation requires all men not only barely to defend themſelves againſt aggreſſors, but many times alſo to *proſecute* ſuch, and only ſuch, as are wicked and dangerous: therefore it is *natural* to conclude, that they are enemies againſt whom we ſee ſoldiers defending themſelves, and thoſe men wicked and dangerous, whom we ſee proſecuted with zeal and ardour. Not that thoſe acts of defending and proſecuting *ſpeak* or ſignify ſo much: but conjectures are raiſed upon the *com-*

(*a*) Where we find φίλυς τὶ φίλοις, ἢ πολίτας πολίτης ἢς χεῖρας ἀλλήλοις ἰλθόντας. *Thucyd.* (b) Τὰς ὁμίλιας ὡς πολεμίας ἠμύνοντο. *Diod. S.* (*c*) *Val. Max.* (d) Ἀνθρώποισιν οὐκ ἰχρῆν ποτὲ τ' πραγμάτων τὴν γλῶσσαν ἰχύειν πλέον. *Eurip. Quaſi interſit, audiam, an videam.* Cic.

mon-

mon ſenſe, which mankind has of ſuch proceedings. *Anſw.* If it be *natural* to conclude any thing from them, do they not *naturally* convey the notice of ſomething to be concluded? And what is conveying the *notice* of any thing but *notifying* or ſignifying that thing? And then again, if this ſignification is *natural* and founded in the *common* principles and ſenſe of mankind, is not this more than to have a meaning which reſults only from the uſe of ſome *particular* place or country, as that of language doth?

If *A* ſhould enter into a compact with *B*, by which he *promiſes* and ingages never to do ſome certain thing, and after this he does that thing: in this caſe it muſt be granted, that his act *interferes* with his promiſe, and is *contrary* to it. Now it cannot interfere with his promiſe, but it muſt alſo interfere with the truth of that *propoſition*, which ſays there was ſuch a promiſe made, or that there is ſuch a compact ſubſiſting. If this propoſition be true, A *made ſuch a certain agreement with* B, it would be denied by this, A *never made any agreement with* B. Why? Becauſe the truth of this latter is *inconſiſtent* with the agreement aſſerted in the former. The formality of the denial, or that, which makes it to be a denial, is this *inconſiſtence*. If then the behaviour of *A* be *inconſiſtent* with the agreement mentioned in the former propoſition, that propoſition is as much denied by A's *behaviour*, as it can be by the latter, or any other *propoſition*. Or thus, If one propoſition imports or contains that which is *contrary* to what is contained in another, it is ſaid to *contradict* this other, and denies the exiſtence of what is contained in it. Juſt ſo if one act imports that which is *contrary* to the import of another, it *contradicts* this other, and *denies its exiſtence*. In a word, if *A* by his actions denies the ingagements, to which he hath ſubjected himſelf, his actions deny them; juſt as we ſay, *Ptolomy* by his writings denies the motion of the earth, or his writings deny it. (*a*)

When the queſtion was asked, *Whoſe ſheep are theſe*? the anſwer was, *Ægon's: for he committed them to my care* (*b*) (he uſes and diſpoſes of them as his). By this act *Damætas* underſtood them to be *his*; and if they had *not* been his, but *Alphonſus's* or *Melibæus's*, *Ægon*, by an *act* very intelligible to *Damætas*, had expreſſed what was not true. What is ſaid here is the ſtronger, becauſe he who has the *uſe* and *diſpoſal* of any thing, has *all* that he can have of it; and *v. v.* he who has the *all* (or property) of any thing, muſt have all the *uſe* and *diſpoſal* of it. So that a man cannot more fully proclaim any thing to be *his*, than by *uſing* it, *&c.* But of this ſomething more hereafter.

(*a*) Ἡμεῖς τὸν αὐτόμολον βιβλία Πλάτωνος αὐτίκα φαμὲν Πλάτωνα. κλ. *Plut.* (*b*) *Virg.* & *Theocr.*

In

In the *Jewiſh* hiſtory we read, that when *Abimelek* ſaw *Iſaac* ſporting (*a*) with *Rebekah*, and taking conjugal liberties (*b*), he preſently knew her to be *Iſaac*'s wife; and if ſhe had not been his wife, the caſe had been as in the preceding inſtance. If it be *objected*, that ſhe might have been his miſtreſs or a harlot; I *anſwer*, that ſo ſhe might have been, tho' *Iſaac* had told him by *words* that ſhe was his wife. And it is ſufficient for my purpoſe, and to make acts capable of contradicting truth, if they may be allowed *to expreſs things as plainly and determinately as words can*. Certainly *Abimelek* gave greater credit to that information which paſſed through his eye, than to that which he received by the ear (*c*); and to what *Iſaac* did, than to what he *ſaid*. For *Iſaac* had told him, that ſhe was not his wife, but his ſiſter (*d*).

A certain Author (*e*) writes to this purpoſe, "If a ſoldier, who had taken the oath "to *Cæſar*, ſhould run over to the enemy, and ſerve him againſt *Cæſar*, and after that "be taken; would he not be puniſhed as a deſerter, and a perjured villain? And if "he ſhould plead for himſelf, that he never denied *Cæſar*; would it not be anſwered, "*That with his tongue he did not deny him, but with his actions* (or by facts) *he did*?" And in another place, "Let us, *ſays he*, ſuppoſe ſome tyrant command a Chriſtian "to burn incenſe to *Jupiter*, without adding any thing of a verbal abnegation of "*Chriſt*: if the Chriſtian ſhould do this, would it not be manifeſt to all, that *by that* "*very act he denied him*;" (and I may add, conſequently denied thoſe *propoſitions* which affirm him to be the *Chriſt*, a teacher of true religion, and the like *(f)*?

When a man lives, as if he had the eſtate which he has not, or *was* in other regards (all fairly caſt up) what he *is not*, what judgment is to be paſſed upon him? Doth not his whole conduct breathe untruth? May we not ſay (if the propriety of language permits), that he *lives a lye* (*g*)?

In common ſpeech we ſay ſome actions are *inſignificant*, which would not be ſenſe if there were not ſome that are *ſignificant*, that have a tendency and meaning. And this is as much as can be ſaid of articulate ſounds, that they are either *ſignificant* or *inſignificant* (*h*).

(*a*) *Cum eâ coeuntem.* Raſhi. (*b*) Only kiſſing and embracing according to *Alſhek*. (*c*) Ὥστε δὲ τυγχάνει ἀνθρώποισιν ἰδίη ἀπιστότερα ὀφθαλμῶν. *Herod.* (*d*) That inſtance of *Menelaus* and his gueſt *Alexander*, in *Arrian*, might be ſubjoind to this. Εἰ τὶς αὐτέ ἐδὴ φιλοφρονεμένως ἀλλήλως, ἀπίστως ἂν τῷ λέγονλι ὡς εἶναι φίλως αὐτέ. (*e*) *De Dupl. mart.* (*f*) Something like this is that in one of *Greg. Naz.*'s orations. When ſome Chriſtians, who had been inſnared by *Julian*, asked, πῶς Χρισὸν ἠρνήμεθα; they were anſwerd, ὅτι κατὰ τῦ πυρὸς ἐθυμιάσαλε. (*g*) Τὰ ψευδῆ πραγμαλα διώκων. *Chryſ.* Καὶ σολισμὸς ἀνδρὸς, καὶ γέλως, ἡ βῆμα ποδὸς ἀναγέλλ ἀρεῖ αὐτῦ, as *Baſil* ſpeaks: and therefore greater things muſt do it more. (*h*) As that Βλίτει *ap. Diog. L. in v. Zen.*

It

It may not be improperly obſerved by the way, that the *ſignificancy* here attributed to mens acts, proceeds not always from nature, but ſometimes from cuſtom and agreement among people (*a*), as that of words and ſounds moſtly doth. Acts of the latter kind may in different times and places have different, or even contrary ſignifications. The generality of *Chriſtians*, when they pray, take off their hats: the *Jews*, when they pray (*b*) or ſay any of their *Berakoth*, put them on. The ſame thing which among Chriſtians denotes reverence, imports irreverence among the *Jews*. The reaſon is, becauſe covering the head with a hat (if it has no influence upon one's health) is in it ſelf an *indifferent* thing, and people by uſage or conſent may *make* it interpretable either way. Such acts ſeem to be adopted into their language, and may be reckoned part of it. But acts of the former kind, ſuch as I chiefly here intend, have an *unalterable* ſignification, and can by no agreement or force ever be made to expreſs the contrary to it. *Ægon*'s treating the flock, and diſpoſing of it as if it was his, can by no torture be brought to ſignify, *that it was not his*. From whence it appears, that *facts* expreſs more ſtrongly, even than *words* themſelves (*c*); or to contradict any propoſition by facts is a fuller and more effectual contradiction, than can poſſibly be made by words only (*d*). *Words* are but *arbitrary ſigns* (*e*) of our ideas, or indications of our thoughts (that word, which in one language denotes *poverty* (*f*), in another denotes *riches* (g):) but *facts* may be taken as the effects of them, or rather as the *thoughts themſelves produced into act*; as the very conceptions of the mind brought

(*a*) Αἰγύπλιοι---τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ἐμπαλιν τοῖσι ἄλλοισι ἀνθρώποισι ἐστήκασι ἤθεά τε καὶ νόμους, κτλ. *Herod.*
(*b*) He that prayeth, ſhall not ſtand, While he prayeth, with his head uncovered. *Maim. & al. paſſ.*
(*c*) Θεὸν ὁμολογοῦσι εἰδέναι, τοῖς δὲ ἔργοις ἀρνοῦνται. *Epiſt. ad Tit.* And τὸ ἔργοις ἀρνεῖσθαι Θεὸν ταὐτὸν ἐστὶ τῷ εἰπεῖν οὐκ εἶναι. *Chryſ.* (*d*) Λόγος ἔργῳ σκιά. Plut. *Res loquitur ipſa: quæ ſemper valet plurimum.* Cic. *Quid verba audiam, cum facta videam?* Id. Αὐτὰ βοᾷ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ σιωπᾷς. *Baſ.* (*e*) This we know. For they are different to different nations; we coin them, as we pleaſe, *&c.* Φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν ἔστι, ἀλλ' ὅταν γένωνται σύμβολον. *Ariſt.* And tho *Plato* ſeems to be of another mind, yet when *Cratylus* ſays, Ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα εἶναι ἱκανὸν τῶν ὄντων φύσει πεφυκυῖαν, it is much to be queſtiond whether any thing more be meant than this, that ſome names of things are more natural or proper than others. For he ſays, that this rectitude of names is the ſame ἐν Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις; that it is [only] ſuch as is ſufficient, ὅπως ἂν ἡμῖν ᾖ σημεῖον ἐκεῖ τῶν ὄντων; ſuch as may render them κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ὅμοια---τοῖς πράγμασιν, &c. That *lepidum & feſtivum argumentum*, which *P. Nigidius*, *ap. A. Gell.* makes uſe of to ſhew, *cur videri poſſint verba eſſe naturalia magis quam arbitraria*, deſerves only to be laughd at. (*f*) Poverty *Hebr.* (*g*) Riches *Arab.* So *Ab. Ezra* obſerves that *Abbah* in *Heb.* is to will, in *Arab.* to nill (tho in *Arab.* the word is written *Abbi*): and in another place, that the *ſame* word even in the *ſame* language ſometimes ſignifies a thing and its contrary. And every one knows, that the greater part of our words have different ſenſes and uſes. *Ejjon* in Arabic, according to *Giggeius* and *Golius*, has 70 or 80, and ſome (two at leaſt) contrary the one to the other.

forth

forth, and grown to maturity; and therefore as the most natural and expreſs repreſentations of them. And, beſide this, they bear certain *reſpects* to things, which are not arbitrary, but as determinate and immutable as any *ratio's* are in mathematics. For the facts and the things they reſpect are *juſt what they are*, as much as any two given quantities are; and therefore the reſpects intercoding between thoſe muſt be as *fixt*, as the *ratio* is which one of theſe bears to the other: that is, they muſt remain the ſame, and always ſpeak the ſame language, till things ceaſe to be what they are.

I lay this down then as a fundamental maxim, *That whoever acts as if things were ſo, or not ſo, doth by his acts declare, that they are ſo, or not ſo*, as plainly as he could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwiſe, his acts contradict *thoſe propoſitions*, which aſſert them to be as they are (*a*).

IV. *No act* (whether word (*b*) or deed) *of any being, to whom moral good and evil are imputable, that interferes with any true propoſition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be right.* For,

1. If that propoſition, which is falſe, be wrong (*c*), that act which *implies* ſuch a propoſition, or is founded in it, cannot be right; becauſe it is the very propoſition itſelf in practice.

2. Thoſe propoſitions, which are true, and expreſs things as they are, expreſs the *relation* between the ſubject and the attribute as it is: that is, this is either affirmed or denied of that according to the nature of *that relation*. And further, this relation (or, if you will, the nature of this relation) is determind and fixt by the natures of the things themſelves. Therefore nothing can interfere with any propoſition that is true, but it muſt likewiſe interfere with nature (the nature of the relation, and the natures of the things themſelves too), and conſequently be *unnatural*, or *wrong in nature*. So very much are thoſe gentlemen miſtaken, who by *following nature* mean only complying with their bodily inclinations, tho in oppoſition to truth, or at leaſt without any regard to it. Truth is but a conformity to nature: and to follow nature cannot be to combat truth (*d*).

(*a*) This is ποιεῖν ψεῦδος. Apocal. *Plato* uſes the ſame way of ſpeaking. Ψεῦδος, ſays he, μηδεὶς μηδὲν---μήτε λόγῳ μήτε ἔργῳ πράξει. The contrary to this is in Ἀληθεία ἀληθίζειν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις ἢ πράξεσι; and ἐν βίῳ ἀληθίνειν. And in *S. B.* To walk in the truth, and the way of truth. (*b*) Actum *generale verbum eſt, ſive* verbis *ſive* re *quid agatur*. Juſtin, Dig. (*c*) As it muſt be, becauſe Ὀρθὸν ἡ ἀλήθεια δεῖ. *Soph.* (*d*) Τῷ λογικῷ ζάω ἀκόλουθα πράξας καὶ ἀφ' ὧν ἂν καὶ καθὰ λόγον (that is, according to truth, which it is the office of reaſon to diſcover). Anton. *Nunquam aliud* natura, *aliud* ſapientia *dicit*. Juv.

3. If there is a ſupreme being, upon whom the exiſtence of the world depends; and nothing can be in it but what He either cauſes, or permits to be; then to own things *to be as they are* is to own what He cauſes, or at leaſt permits, *to be thus cauſed or permitted*: and this is to take things as He gives them, to go into His conſtitution of the world, and to ſubmit to His will, reveald in the books of nature (*a*). To do this therefore muſt be agreeable to *His will*. And if ſo, the contrary muſt be diſagreeable to it; and, ſince (as we ſhall find in due time) there is a perfect rectitude in His will, certainly *wrong*.

I deſire that I may not be miſunderſtood in reſpect to the actings of wicked men. I do not ſay, it is agreeable to the will of God, that what is *ill* done by them, ſhould be *ſo* done; *i. e.* that they ſhould uſe their liberty ill: but I ſay, when they *have* done this and committed ſome evil, it is agreeable to his will, that we ſhould allow it to *have been* committed: or, it would be diſagreeable to his will, that we ſhould *deny* it to have been committed.

As the owning of things, in all our conduct, *to be as they are*, is direct obedience (*b*): ſo the contrary, not to own things *to be* or *to have been* that are or have been, or not *to be what they are*, is direct rebellion againſt Him, who is the Author of nature. For it is as much as to ſay, "God indeed cauſes ſuch a thing to be, or at leaſt "permits it, and it is; or the relation, that lies between this and that, is of ſuch a "nature, that one may be affirmed of the other, &c. this is true: but yet *to me* it "ſhall *not* be ſo: I will not indure it, or act as if it were ſo: the laws of nature are "ill framed, nor will I *mind* them, or what follows from them: even exiſtence ſhall "be non-exiſtence, when my pleaſures require". Such an impious declaration as this attends every *voluntary* infraction of truth.

4. Things cannot be denied to be what they are, in *any inſtance* or *manner whatſoever*, without contradicting axioms and truths eternal. For ſuch are theſe: *every thing is what it is*; *that which is done, cannot be undone*; and the like. And then if thoſe truths be conſiderd as having always ſubſiſted in the Divine mind, to which they have always been true, and which differs not from the Deity himſelf, to do this is to act not only in oppoſition to His *government* or *ſoveraignty* but to His

(*a*) Εἶναι [ὁ Θεὸς] ἀντὶ δίκτυ ἢ κίσμου. *Chryſ.* (*b*) What *Hierocles* ſays of his ἐγκόσμιοι Θεοὶ, is true in reſpect of every thing. Τῷ Θείῳ νόμῳ καλακολουθοῦντων ἐστὶ——τοῦτο αὐτὸς εἶναι πίδιδε, ἃ γεγόνασι. There is a paſſage ſomewhere in *S. Iqoar.* much like this: where it is ſaid (as I remember) that he, who worſhips an Angel (*as being what he is, the meſſenger of God*) is not guilty of idolatry.

nature,

nature (*a*), alſo: which, if He be perfect, and there be nothing in Him but what is moſt right, muſt alſo upon this account be moſt *wrong*.

Pardon theſe inadequate ways of ſpeaking of God. You will apprehend my meaning: which perhaps may be better repreſented thus. If there are ſuch things as *axioms*, which are and always have been immutably true, and conſequently have been always *known to God to be ſo* (*b*), the truth of them cannot be denied any way, either directly or indirectly, but the truth of the *Divine knowledge* muſt be denied too.

5. Deſignedly to treat things as being what they are not is the greateſt *poſſible* abſurdity. It is to put bitter for ſweet, darkneſs for light, crooked for ſtreight, &c. It is to ſubvert all ſcience, to renounce all ſenſe of truth, and flatly to deny the exiſtence of any thing. For nothing can be true, nothing does exiſt, *if things are not what they are*.

To talk to a *poſt*, or otherwiſe treat it as if it was a *man*, would ſurely be reckond an abſurdity, if not *diſtraction* (*c*). Why? becauſe this is to treat it *as being what it is not*. And why ſhould not the converſe be reckond as bad; that is, to treat a man as a poſt (*d*); as if he had no ſenſe, and felt not injuries, which he doth feel; as if to him pain and ſorrow were not pain; happineſs not happineſs. This is what the cruel and unjuſt often do.

Laſtly, to deny things to be as they are is a tranſgreſſion of the great *law of our nature*, the law of reaſon. For truth cannot be oppoſed, but reaſon muſt be violated. But of this more in the proper place.

Much might be added here concerning the *amiable* nature (*e*), and great *force* (*f*) of truth. If I may judge by what I feel within my ſelf, the leaſt truth cannot be

(*a*) God for ever bleſſed is called Truth. In *Reſh. hhokm.* & *al.* And S. *Chryſoſtom* defines *truth* in the ſame words, which philoſophers apply to the Deity. Ἀλήθεια τὸ ὄντως ὄν. (*b*) Ἀλήθεια γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐπιστὴ Θεοῦ. *Ph. Jud.* (*c*) Πότμωτε------ὡς ἀνδρὸς------ ἴχων is in *Soph.* the character of *Ajax*, when his head was turned, in a fit of raving. And among the monſtrous and mad extravagances of C. Caligula one is, that he treated his horſe *Incitatus* as a man. *Suet.* (*d*) *Horace* argues after the ſame manner. *Si quis lectica nitidam geſtare amet* agnam; *Huic veſtem, ut* natæ, *parat*, &c. *Interdicto huic omne adimat jus Prætor*, &c. *Quid, ſiquis* natam *pro mutâ devovet* agnâ. Integer eſt animi? ne dixeris. If it be againſt truth and nature to uſe a lamb as a daughter, it will be as much againſt truth to uſe a daughter as a lamb. (*e*) Καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν φύσει φαύλου ἡ ψεύδη· τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν. Ariſt. *Eſt quiddam, quod ſuâ vi nos allicit ad ſeſe, non emolumento captans aliquo, ſed trahens ſuâ dignitate: quod genus virtus, ſcientia,* veritas *eſt.* Cic. Γλυκὺ ἡ ἀλήθεια a feſtival ſaying in *Plut.*

(*f*) *O magna vis veritatis*, &c. Cic. A good man does truth, becauſe it is truth. *Maim.*

contradicted without much reluctance: even to ſee other men diſregard it does ſomething more than diſpleaſe; it is *ſhocking*.

V. *What has been ſaid of acts inconſiſtent with truth, may alſo be ſaid of many omiſſions, or neglects to act: that is, by theſe alſo true propoſitions may be denied to be true; and then thoſe omiſſions, by which this is done, muſt be wrong for the ſame reaſons with thoſe aſſigned under the former propoſition.*

Nothing can be aſſerted or denied by any act with regard to thoſe things, to which it bears no relation: and here no truth can be affected. And when acts *do* bear ſuch relations to other things, as to be declaratory of ſomething concerning them, this commonly is viſible; and it is not difficult to determin, whether truth ſuffers by them, or not. Some things cannot poſſibly be done, but truth muſt be *directly* and poſitively denied; and the thing will be clear. But the caſes ariſing from omiſſions are not always ſo well determind, and plain: it is not always eaſie to know *when* or *how far* truth is violated by omitting. Here therefore more latitude muſt be allowd, and much muſt be left to every one's own judgment and ingenuity.

This may be ſaid in general, that when any truth would be denied by acting, the omitting to act can deny no truth. For no truth can be contrary to truth (*a*). And there may be omiſſions in other caſes, that are ſilent as to truth. But yet there are *ſome neglects* or refuſals to act, which are manifeſtly inconſiſtent with it (or, with ſome true propoſitions).

We before (*b*) ſuppoſed *A* to have engaged *not to do* ſome certain thing, *&c.* if now, on the other ſide, he ſhould by ſome ſolemn promiſe, oath, or other act undertake *to do* ſome certain thing before ſuch a time, and he *voluntarily* (*c*) omits to do it, he would behave himſelf as if there had been no ſuch promiſe or engagement; which is equal to denying there was any: and truth is as much contradicted in this as in the former inſtance.

Again, there are ſome ends, which the nature of things and truth require us to aim at, and at which therefore if we do not aim, *nature* and *truth* are denied. If a man does not deſire to prevent evils, and to be happy, he denies both his *own* nature and the nature and definition of *happineſs* to be what they are. And then further, willingly to neglect the *means*, leading to any ſuch end, is the ſame as not to propoſe that end, and muſt fall under the ſame cenſure. As retreating from any end commonly attends the not advancing towards it, and that may be conſidered as

(*a*) *Plura vera diſcrepantia eſſe non poſſunt.* Cic. (*b*) p. 10. (*c*) *Oblivione voluntaria.* Cic.

an

an act, many omiſſions of this kind may be turned over to the *other ſide* (*a*), and brought under the foregoing propoſition.

It muſt be confeſt there is a *difficulty* as to the means, by which we are to conſult our own preſervation and happineſs; to know what thoſe are, and what they are with reſpect to us: For our abilities and opportunities are not equal; ſome labor under diſadvantages invincible: and our ignorance of the true natures of things, of their operations and effects in ſuch an irregular diſtemperd world, and of thoſe many incidents, that may happen either to further or break our meaſures, deprive us of certainty in theſe matters. But ſtill we may judge as well as we can, and do what we can (*b*); and the neglect *to do this* will be an omiſſion within the reach of the propoſition.

There are omiſſions of other kinds, which will deſerve to be annumerated to theſe by being either *total*, or *notorious*, or upon the ſcore of ſome other *circumſtance*. It is certain I ſhould not deny the *Phœniſſæ* of *Euripides* to be an excellent *drama* by not reading it: nor do I deny *Chihil-menâr* to be a rare piece of antiquity by not going to ſee it. But ſhould I, having leiſure, health, and proper opportunities, read nothing, nor make any inquiries in order to improve my *mind*, and attain ſuch knowledge as may be *uſeful* to me, I ſhould then deny my mind to be what it is, and that knowledge to be what it is. And if it doth not appear preciſely, into what kind of ſtudies this reſpect to truth will carry a man preferably to all others, how far it will oblige him to continue his purſuit after knowledge, and where the diſcontinuance begins to be no offence againſt truth, he muſt conſult his own opportunities and genius, and judge for himſelf *as well as he can* (*c*). This is one of thoſe caſes which I ſaid before were not ſo well determind.

If I give nothing to this or that poor body, to whom I am under no particular obligation, I do not by this deny them to be *poor*, any more than I ſhould deny a man to have a ſqualid beard by not ſhaving him, to be naſty by not waſhing him, or to be lame by not taking him on my back.

Many things are here to be taken into conſideration (according to the next propoſition): perhaps I might intrench upon truth by *doing* this; and then I cannot by *not doing* it (*d*). But if I, being of ability to afford now and then ſomething in charity to the poor, ſhould yet *never* give them any thing at all, I ſhould *then*

(*a*) In the Civil Law he is ſaid to *act*, who *does* omit. *Qui non facit quod facere debet, videtur facere adverſus ea quæ non facit.* Dig. (*b*) *Eſt quodam prodire tenus.* Hor. (*c*) *Diſces quamdiu velis: tamdiu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non pœnitebit,* ſays *Cicero* to his ſon. (*d*) *Nulla virtus virtuti contrariatur.* Sen.

certainly

certainly deny the condition of the poor to be what it is, and my own to be what it is: and thus truth would be injured. So, again,

If I ſhould not ſay my prayers at ſuch a certain *hour*, or in ſuch a certain *place* and *manner*, this would not imply a denial of the exiſtence of God, His providence, or my dependence upon Him: nay, there may be reaſons perhaps againſt *that particular* time, place, manner. But if I ſhould *never* pray to Him, or worſhip Him at all, ſuch a *total* omiſſion would be equivalent to this aſſertion, *There is no God, who governs the world, to be adored*: which, if there is ſuch a being, muſt be contrary to truth. Alſo *generally* and *notoriouſly* to neglect this duty (permit me to call it ſo), tho not quite always, will *favour*, if not directly proclaim the ſame untruth. For certainly to worſhip God after this manner is only to worſhip him *accidentally*, which is to declare it a great accident that he is worſhipd at all, and this approaches as near as it is poſſible to a *total* neglect. Beſide, ſuch a ſparing and *infrequent* worſhiper of the Deity betrays ſuch an habitual diſregard of Him, as will render every religious act inſignificant and null.

Should I, in the laſt place, find a man grievouſly hurt by ſome accident, faln down, alone, and without *preſent* help like to periſh; or ſee his houſe on fire, no body being near to help, or call out: in this extremity if I do not give him my aſſiſtance immediately, I do not do it *at all*: and by this refuſing to do it according to my ability, I deny his caſe to be what it is; human nature to be what it is; and even thoſe deſires and expectations, which I am conſcious to my ſelf I ſhould have under the like misfortune, to be what they are.

VI. *In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it muſt be conſidered not only what it is in it ſelf or in one reſpect, but alſo what it may be in any other reſpect, which is capable of being denied by facts or practice: and the whole deſcription of the thing ought to be taken in.*

If a man ſteals a horſe, and rides away upon him, he may be ſaid indeed by riding him to uſe him as a *horſe*, but not as *the horſe of another man*, who gave him no licence to do this. He does not therefore conſider him as being what he is, unleſs he takes in the reſpect he bears to his true owner. But it is not neceſſary perhaps to conſider what he is in reſpect to his color, ſhape, or age: becauſe the thief's riding away with him may neither affirm nor deny him to be of any particular color, *&c.* I ſay therefore, that thoſe, and *all* thoſe properties, reſpects, and circumſtances, which may be contradicted by practice, are to be taken into conſideration. For otherwiſe the thing to be conſidered is but imperfectly ſurveyed; and the

the whole compaſs of it being not taken in, it is taken not as being what it is, but as what it is *in part* only, and in other reſpects perhaps as being *what it is not*.

If a *rich* man being upon a journey, ſhould be robbed and ſtript, it would be a ſecond robbery and injuſtice committed upon him to take from him part of his then character, and to conſider him only as a rich man. His character completed is a *rich man robbed and abuſed*, and indeed at that time a *poor* man (*a*) and diſtreſt, tho able to repay afterwards the aſſiſtance lent him.

Moreover a man in giving aſſiſtance of any kind to another ſhould conſider what *his own* circumſtances are, as well as what the *others* are (*b*). If they do not permit him to give it, he does not by his forbearance deny the other to want it: but if he ſhould give it, and by that deny his own or his family's circumſtances to be what they are, he would actually contradict truth. And ſince (as I have obſerved already) all truths are conſiſtent, nor can any thing be true any further than it is compatible with other things that are true; when both parties are placed in a *right* light, and the caſe *properly* ſtated for a judgment the latter may indeed be truly ſaid to want aſſiſtance, but not the aſſiſtance of the former: any more than a man, who wants a guide, may be ſaid to want a blind or a lame guide. By putting things thus may be *truly* known what the latter is with reſpect to the former.

The caſe becomes more difficult, when a man (A) is under ſome *promiſe* or *compact* to aſſiſt another (B), and at the ſame time bound to conſult his own happineſs, provide for his family, &c. and he cannot do theſe, if he does that, *effectually*. For what muſt A do? Here are not indeed oppoſite *truths*, but there are truths on oppoſite *ſides*. I anſwer: tho there cannot be two incompatible duties, or tho two inconſiſtent acts cannot be both A's duty at the ſame time (for then his duty would be an impoſſibility); yet an obligation, which I will call *mixt*, may ariſe out of thoſe *differing* conſiderations. A ſhould aſſiſt B; but *ſo*, *as* not to neglect himſelf and family, &c. and *ſo* to take care of himſelf and family, *as* not to forget the other ingagement, *as well and honeſtly as he can*. Here the *importance* of the truths on the one and the other ſide ſhould be diligently compared: and there muſt in ſuch caſes be always ſome *exception* or *limitation* underſtood. It is not in man's power to promiſe *abſolutely*. He can only promiſe as one, who may be *diſabled* by the weight and incumbency of truths not then exiſting.

(*a*) Afflicted at that time: according to that determination in a caſe ſomething like this, which occurs in *Talm. Maſſ. Phe.* (*b*) *Utrique ſimul conſulendum eſt. Dabo egenti; ſed ut* ipſe *non egeam*, &c. Sen. *Ita te aliorum miſereſcat, ne tui alios miſereat.* Plaut.

I could

I could here inſert many inſtances of *partial* thinking, which occur in authors: but I ſhall chooſe only to ſet down one in the margin (*a*).

In ſhort, when things are truly eſtimated, *perſons* concerned, *times*, *places* (*b*), *ends* intended (*c*), and *effects* that naturally follow, muſt be added to them.

VII. *When any act would be wrong, the forbearing that act muſt be right: likewiſe when the omiſſion of any thing would be wrong, the doing of it* (*i. e.* not omitting it) *muſt be right.* Becauſe *contrariorum contraria eſt ratio.*

VIII. *Moral good and evil are coincident with right and wrong.* For that cannot be good, which is wrong; nor that evil, which is right.

IX. *Every act* therefore *of ſuch a being, as is before deſcribed, and all thoſe omiſſions which interfere with truth* (*i. e.* deny any propoſition to be true, which is true; or ſuppoſe any thing not to be what it is, in any regard) (*d*) *are morally evil, in ſome degree or other: the forbearing ſuch acts, and the acting in oppoſition to ſuch omiſſions, are morally good: and when any thing may be either done, or not done, equally without the violation of truth, that thing is indifferent.*

I would have it to be minded well, that when I ſpeak of acts inconſiſtent with truth, I mean any truth; any true propoſition whatſoever, whether containing matter of ſpeculation, or plain fact. I would have every thing taken to be *what in fact and truth it is* (*e*).

(*a*) *Sextus Emp.* ſeems to be fond of that filthy ſaying of *Zeno*, in relation to what is ſtoried of *Jocaſta* and *Oedipus*: μὴ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μόριον τῆς μήτρας τρίψαι, κλ. any more, than to rub with the hand any other part of her, when in pain. Here only τρίψις is conſiderd; as if all was nothing more, but *barely* τρίψις: but this is an incomplete idea of the act. For τρίψις τῦ μορίου is more than τρίψις by it ſelf: and τρίψις τῦ μορίου τῆς μήτρας is ſtill more: and certainly τρίβειν τὴν χεῖρα τῇ χειρὶ is a different thing from τρίβειν τὸ μόριον τῷ μορίῳ, &c. He might as well have ſaid, that to rub a *red hot* piece of iron with one's bare hand is the ſame as to rub one that is *cold*, or any other innocent piece of matter: for all is but τρίψις. Thus men, affecting to appear free-thinkers, ſhew themſelves to be but half-thinkers, or *leſs*: they do not take in the whole of that which is to be conſiderd.
(*b*) *Sunt res quædam extempore, & ex conſilio, non ex ſua natura conſiderandæ.----Quid tempora petant, aut quid perſonis dignum ſit, conſiderandum eſt*, &c. Cic. (*c*) Οὐ λέγεις φιλόπονον τὸν διὰ παιδισκάριον ἀγχυπνῦντα. Arr. *Amico ægro aliquis aſſidet: probamus. at hoc ſi hereditatis cauſâ facit, vultur eſt, cadaver expectat.* Sen. (*d*) Οὐ γὰρ ἴσις ἀγνώτως ἐστι πρόπω. *Chryſ.* (*e*) Τὸ κράτιστον ἦν ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς λόγος τῆς ποιήσεως τὸ ψεῦδος. *Baſ.*

It

It may be of uſe alſo to remember, that I have added thoſe words in *ſome degree or other*. For neither all evil, nor all good actions are equal (*a*) Thoſe truths which they reſpect, tho they are equally true, may compriſe matters of very different importance (*b*); or more truths may be violated one way than another (*c*): and then the crimes committed by the violation of them may be equally (one as well as the other) ſaid to be crimes, but not *equal crimes* (*d*). If A ſteals a *book* from B which was pleaſing and uſeful to him, it is true A is guilty of a crime in not treating the book as being what it is, the book of B, who is the proprietor of it, and one whoſe happineſs partly depends upon it: but ſtill if A ſhould deprive B of a *good eſtate*, of which he was the true owner, he would be guilty of a much greater crime. For if we ſuppoſe the book to be worth to him one pound, and the eſtate 10000 *l.* that truth, which is violated by depriving B of his book, is in effect violated 10000 times by robbing him of his eſtate. It is the ſame as to repeat the theft of one pound 10000 times over: and therefore if 10000 thefts (or crimes) are more, and all together greater than one, one equal to 10000 muſt be greater too: greater than that, which is but the 10000th part of it, ſure. *Then*, tho the convenience and innocent pleaſure, that B found in the uſe of the *book*, was a degree of happineſs: yet the happineſs accruing to him from the *eſtate*, by which he was ſupplied not only with neceſſaries, but alſo with many other comforts and harmleſs injoyments, vaſtly exceeded it. And therefore the truth violated in the former caſe was, *B had a property in that, which gave him ſuch a degree of happineſs*: that violated in the latter, *B had a property in that, which gave him a happineſs vaſtly ſuperior to the other*. The violation therefore in the latter caſe is upon this account a vaſtly greater violation than in the former. *Laſtly*, the truths violated in the former caſe might end in B, thoſe in the latter may perhaps be repeated in them of his family,

(*a*) Notwithſtanding that paradox of the *Stoics*, Ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα, *Ap. Cic. Plut. Diog.* L. *&* *al.* which might eaſily be confuted from their own words in *Cicero*. For if ſinning be like paſſing a line, or limit; that is, going over or beyond that line: then, *to ſin* being equal to *going beyond that line*, to go more (or farther) beyond that line muſt be to ſin more. Who ſees not the falſity of that, *nec bono viro meliorem,*--------*nec forti fortiorem, nec ſapiente ſapientiorem poſſe fieri?* And ſo on. *Nullum inter ſcelus & erratum diſcrimen facere* (as S. *Hier.* expreſſes their opinion: if that epiſtle to *Celantia* be his) is to alter or deſtroy the natures of things. (*b*) Sure that Wiſeman was but a bad accountant, who reckon'd, τὴν μεγίστην οὐσίαν ὀκτωβαλὼν, ἑξακισμυρίας ἐκβιβλιαρίνας. *Ap. Plut.* (*c*) This is confeſt in Cic. *Illud intereſt, quod in ſervo necando, ſi adſit injuria, ſemel peccatur: in patris vita violanda multa peccantur*, &c. *Multitudine peccatorum præſtat*, &c. (*d*) This may ſerve for an anſwer to *Chryſippus*, and them who ſay, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἀληθοῦς μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστι, οὐδὲ ψευδὴς ψεύδους· ἔστιν οὖν ἀπάτη ἀπάτης οὐδὲ ἁμάρτημα ἁμαρτήματος κλ. *Ap. Diog. L.*

who ſubſiſt alſo by the *eſtate*, and are to be provided for out of it. And theſe truths are very many in reſpect of every one of them, and all their deſcendents. Thus the degrees of evil or guilt are as the *importance* and *number* of truths violated (*a*). I ſhall only add, on the other ſide, that the value of good actions will riſe at leaſt in proportion to the degrees of evil in the omiſſion of them: and that therefore they cannot be *equal*, any more than the oppoſite evil omiſſions.

But let us return to that, which is our main ſubject, the *diſtinction* between moral good and evil. Some have been ſo wild as to deny there is any ſuch thing: but from what has been ſaid here, it is manifeſt, that there is as certainly moral *good* and *evil* as there is *true* and *falſe*; and that there is as natural and immutable a difference between *thoſe* as between *theſe*, the difference at the bottom being indeed the ſame (*b*). Others acknowledge, that there is indeed moral good and evil; but they *want* ſome *criterion*, or mark, by the help of which they might know them aſunder. And others there are, who pretend to have *found* that rule, by which our actions ought to be ſquared, and may be diſcriminated; or that *ultimate end*, to which they ought all to be referred (*c*): but what they have advanced is either falſe, or not ſufficiently guarded, or not comprehenſive enough, or not clear and firm (*d*), or (ſo far as it is juſt reducible to *my* rule. For

They, who reckon nothing to be good but what they call *honeſtum* (*e*), may denominate actions according as that is, or is not the cauſe (*f*) or end (*g*) of them: but then what is *honeſtum* (*h*)? Something is ſtill wanting to meaſure things by, and to ſeparate the *honeſta* from the *inhoneſta*.

They, who place all in *following nature* (*i*), if they mean by that phraſe acting according to the natures of things (*that is*, treating things as being what they in na-

(*a*) *Queis paria eſſe ferè placuit peccata, laborant cùm ventum ad verum eſt: ſenſus moreſque repugnant, Atq; ipſa utilitas,* Hor. (*b*) Therefore they, who denied there was either *good* or *evil* (φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν), were much in the right to make thorough work, and to ſay there was nothing in nature either *true* or *falſe*. V. Sext. Emp. & Diog. L. (*c*) *Quod* [extremum, i. ultimum bonorum] *omnium philoſophorum ſententiâ tale debet eſſe, ut ad id omnia referri, oporteat: ipſum autem nuſquam.* Cic. (*d*) There was among the old Philoſophers ſuch an uncertainty and variety of opinions concerning the *fines bonorum & malorum*, that if *Varro* computes rightly, the number might be raiſed to 288. S. *Aug.* (*e*) *Quod honeſtum eſt, id bonum ſolum habendum eſt.* Cato ap. Cic. (*f*) *Qui* [*omnes*] *permulta ob eam unam* cauſam *faciunt-----quia honeſtum eſt.* Cic. (*g*) It is commonly placed among *ends*: and is conſidered as ſuch in thoſe ways of ſpeaking; *honeſtum eſſe propter ſe expetendum*, Cic. Finem *bonorum eſſe honeſtè vivere*, ib. and the like. (*h*) To ſay, *Quod laudabile eſt, omne honeſtum eſt*, or any thing like that, is to ſay nothing. For how ſhall one know what is truly *laudabile*? Τέλος εἶπε [Ζήνων] τὸ ὁμολογουμένως (al. ἀκολούθως) τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν. Ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις. Diog. L.

ture

ture are, or according to truth) ſay what is right. But this does not ſeem to be their meaning. And if it is only that a man muſt follow his own nature (*a*), ſince his nature is not purely rational, but there is a part of him, which he has in common with brutes, they appoint him a guide which I fear will miſlead him, this being commonly more likely to prevail, than the rational part. At beſt this talk is looſe.

They who make *right reaſon* (*b*) to be the law, by which our acts are to be judged, and according to their conformity to this or deflexion from it call them *lawful* or *unlawful*, good or bad, ſay ſomething more particular and preciſe. And indeed it is true, that whatever will bear to be tried by right reaſon, is right; and that which is condemned by it, wrong. And moreover, if by right reaſon is meant that which is found by the right uſe of our rational faculties, this is the ſame with truth: and what is ſaid by them, will be comprehended in what I have ſaid. But the manner in which they have deliverd themſelves, is not yet explicit *enough* (*c*). It leaves room for ſo many *diſputes* and *oppoſite right-reaſons*, that nothing can be ſettled, while every one pretends that *his* reaſon is right. And beſide, what I have ſaid, extends farther: for we are not only to reſpect thoſe truths, which we diſcover by reaſoning, but even ſuch *matters of fact*, as are fairly diſcoverd to us by our ſenſes. We ought to regard things as being what they are, which way ſoever we come to the knowledge of them.

They, who contenting themſelves with ſuperficial and tranſient views, deduce the difference between good and evil from the *common ſenſe* of mankind (*d*), and certain *principles* (*e*) that are born with us (*f*), put the matter upon a very *infirm* foot. For it is much to be ſuſpected there are no ſuch *innate* maxims as they pretend, but that the impreſſions of education are miſtaken for them: and beſides that, the ſentiments of mankind are not ſo *uniform* and *conſtant*, as that we may ſafely truſt ſuch an important diſtinction upon them (*g*).

(*a*) *Vivere ex hominis naturâ.* Cic. It is true he adds, *undique perfectâ & nihil requirente:* but thoſe words have either no meaning, or ſuch as will not much mend the matter. For what is *natura undique perfecta & nihil requirens?* Beſide, moral religion doth not conſiſt in following nature already perfect, but by the practice of religion we aim at the perfecting of our natures. (*b*) Celebrated every where. (*c*) Τὸ μὲν δὴ οὕτω διορίσασθαι τὰς ἀγαθὰς πράξεις, τὰς κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν γινομένας λόγον, καὶ τὰς φαυλοτέρας τούτων, ἁπλοῦς μέν, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν δὲ ἱκανὸν τὰς πράξεις σημαίνει. *Andr. Rh.* (*d*) *Nec ſolum jus & injuria à natura dijudicatur, ſed omnino omnia honeſta & turpia. Nam communis intelligentia nobis notas res efficit, eaſque in animis noſtris inchoavit, ut honeſta in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia.* Cic. Κριτήρια φύσιν [ὁ Χρύσιππος] εἶναι ἀποδίδωσιν ἐνίοτε καὶ πρόληψιν. Diog. L. (*e*) They are uſually called *principia naturæ, lex* (or *leges*) *naturæ*, προλήψεις, κοιναὶ, or φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι, νόμος φυσικὸς, &c. (*f*) The ſet of theſe practical principles (or a habit flowing from them) is what I think, goes by the name of *Synteresis.* (*g*) *Unaquæque gens hoc legem naturæ putat, quod didicit.* Hieron.

They, who own nothing to be good but *pleaſure*, or what they call *jucundum*, nothing evil but *pain* (*a*), and diſtinguiſh things by their tendencies to *this* or *that* (*b*), do not agree in what this pleaſure is to be placed (*c*), or by what methods and actings the moſt of it may be obtained. Theſe are left to be queſtions ſtill. As men have different taſts, different degrees of ſenſe and philoſophy, the ſame thing cannot be pleaſant to *all:* and if particular actions are to be proved by this teſt, the morality of them will be very uncertain; the ſame act may be of *one* nature to one man and of *another* to another. Beſide, unleſs there be ſome ſtrong *limitation* added as a fence for virtue, men will be apt to ſink into groſs voluptuouſneſs, as in fact the generality of *Epicurus*'s herd have done (*d*) (notwithſtanding all his talk of temperance, virtue, tranquility of mind, &c.); and the bridle will be uſurped by thoſe appetites which it is a principal part of all religion, *natural* as well as any other, to curb and reſtrain. So theſe men ſay what is intelligible indeed: but what they ſay is falſe. For not all pleaſures, but only ſuch pleaſure as is *true*, or happineſs (of which afterwards), may be reckoned among the *fines*, or *ultima bonorum*.

He, (*e*) who, having conſiderd the two extremes in mens practice, in condemning both which the world generally agrees, places virtue in the *middle*, and ſeems to raiſe an idea of it from its ſituation at an equal diſtance from the oppoſite *extremes* (*f*), could

(*a*) Under which word theſe delicate men comprehend *labor*. When *Epicurus* in *Lucian*, is asked, Καλὸν ἡγῇ τὸν πόνον; he anſwers, Ναὶ. And *Mindyrides* (Σμινδυρίδης, *ap Herod.* ὃς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὴ χλιδῶς ἦις ἀνὴρ ἀπίκετο) proceeded ſo far in his averſion to labor, that *ejus latus* alieno labore *condoluit*.----: *qui cum vidiſſet fodientem, & altiùs raſtrum allevantem, laſſum ſe* (fieri ῥῆγμα λαβεῖν, in *Athen.*) *queſtus vetuit illum opus in conſpectu ſuo facere*. Sen. (*b*) *Ad hac* [*voluptatem, & dolorem*] *& qua ſequamur, & qua fugiamus, refert omnia* [*Ariſtippus*]. Cic. (*c*) *Velim definias, quid ſit voluptas: de quo omnis hac quæſtio eſt*. Cic. The diſputes about pleaſure between the *Cyrenaics*, *Epicurus*, *Hieronymus*, &c. are well known: whether the end was pleaſure of body or mind: whether it was *voluptas in motu*, or *in ſtatu* (*ſtabilitate*); *qua ſuavitate aliqua naturam ipſam movet*, or *qua percipitur, omni dolore detracto*; ἡ ἐν κινήσει, or ἡ καταστηματικὴ, &c. Cic. Diog. L. & al. (*d*) *Negat Epicurus jucundè vivi poſſe, niſi cum virtute vivatur*. Cic. But for all that their pleaſures have not continued to be always like thoſe in the little gardens of *Gargettus*. Nor indeed do they ſeem to be very virtuous even there. For *Epicurus* not only had his *Leontium* (or, as he amorouſly called her, Λεοντάριον,) a famous harlot; but ſhe πᾶσί τι τοῖς Ἐπικουρείοις συνῆν ἐν τοῖς κήποις. *Athen.* And in his book περὶ τέλους he is ſaid to have written thus, Οὐ γὰρ ἐγαλίχω τι ποήσω τἀγαθὸν, ἀφαιρῶν μὴν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν (χειλῶν, *Athen.*) ἡδονὰς, ἀφαιρῶν δ' ἐν τὰς δι' ἀφροδισίων, κτλ. See this and more in *Diog. L.* (*e*) St. *Jerom* uſes the plural number, as if this was the prevailing notion in his time. *Philoſopherum ſententia eſt, μεσότητας ἀρετὰς, ὑπερβολὰς κακίας εἶναι*. (*f*) Ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται.-- ---Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικὴ, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα, κτλ. Μεσότης δὲ, δύο κακιῶν· τῆς μὲν κατ' ὑπερβολήν· τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν. Arist. Perhaps *Pythagoras* (and after him *Plato*, and others), when he ſaid (*ap. Diog. L.*) τὴν ἀρετὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι, might have ſome ſuch thought as this.

only

only deſign to be underſtood of ſuch virtues, as have extremes. It muſt be granted indeed, that whatever declines in any degree toward *either* extreme muſt be ſo far wrong or evil; and therefore that, which equally (or nearly) divides the diſtance, and declines *neither* way, *muſt be right*: *alſo*, *that this notion* ſupplies us with a good *direction* for common uſe in many caſes. But then there are ſeveral obligations, that can by no means be derived from it: ſcarce more than ſuch, as reſpect the virtues couched under the word *moderation*. And even as to theſe, it is many times difficult to diſcern, which is the *middle point* (*a*). This the author himſelf was ſenſible of (*b*).

And when his maſter *Plato* makes virtue to conſiſt in ſuch *a likeneſs to God* (*c*), as we are capable of (and God to be the great *exemplar*), he ſays what I ſhall not diſpute. But ſince he tells us not how or by what means we may attain this likeneſs, we are little the wiſer in point of practice: unleſs by it we underſtand the practice of truth, God being *truth*, and doing nothing contrary to it (*d*).

Whether any of thoſe other *foundations*, upon which morality has been built, will hold better than theſe mentiond, I much queſtion. But if the *formal ratio* of moral good and evil be made to conſiſt in a conformity of mens acts to the *truth of the caſe* or the contrary, as I have here explaind it, the *diſtinction* ſeems to be ſettled in a manner undeniable, intelligible, practicable. For as what is meant by *a true propoſition* and *matter of fact* is perfectly underſtood by every body; ſo will it be eaſie for any one, ſo far as he knows any ſuch propoſitions and facts, to compare not only *words*, but alſo *actions* with them. A very little skill and attention will ſerve to interpret even theſe, and diſcover whether they *ſpeak truth*, or not (*e*).

X. *If there be moral good and evil, diſtinguiſhed as before, there is religion*; *and ſuch as may moſt properly be ſtiled natural*. By *religion* I mean nothing elſe but an obligation to do (under which word I comprehend acts both of body and mind. I ſay, *to do*) what ought not to be omitted, and to *forbear* what ought not to be done. So

(*a*) when he ſays, it muſt be taken ὥτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ἐχθὸς λόγῳ προσάξῃ, it is not by that aſcertaind. See before. (*b*) Οὐ γὰς ῥᾴδιον διορισαι τὸ πῶς, ἢ τίσι, κλ. Therefore *R. Albo.* might have ſpared that cenſure, where he blames him for expreſſing himſelf too generally, when he ſays, How it ought to be done, and in what time it ought to be done, and in what place it ought to be done, without telling him what that *manner*, *time*, *place* is. (*c*) That man, ſays he, cannot be neglected, who endeavours δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι, ἢ ἐπιτηδίων ἀρετὴν, ἐις ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιῶσθαι θεῷ. And in another place, our φυγὴ ἀνθρώπε is ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν. St. *Auguſtin* ſeems to agree with him, in that ſentence of his, *Religionis ſumma eſt imitari quem colis.*
(*d*) Πυθαγόρας ἐρωτηθὲις, τί ποιοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι θεῷ ὅμοιον, ἔφη, ἐὰν ἀληθίνωσι. *Stob.* (*e*) There is certainly not that difficulty or perplexity in morality, which *Cicero* ſeems to ſuppoſe, when he ſays, *Conſuetudo exercitatioque capienda, ut boni ratiocinatores officiorum eſſe poſſimus.*

that

that there muſt be religion, if there are things, of which ſome ought not to be done, ſome not to be omitted. But that there are ſuch, appears from what has been ſaid concerning moral good and evil: becauſe that, which to omit would be evil, and which therefore being done would be good or well done, ought certainly by the terms *to be done*; and ſo that, which being done would be evil, and implies ſuch abſurdities and rebellion againſt the ſupreme being, as are mentioned under propoſition the IVth. ought moſt undoubtedly *not to be done*, And then ſince there is *religion*, which follows from the diſtinction between moral good and evil; ſince this diſtinction is founded in the reſpect, which mens acts bear to truth; and ſince no propoſition can be true, which expreſſes things otherwiſe than as they are in nature: ſince things are ſo, there muſt be religion, which is founded in nature, and may upon that account be moſt properly and truly called the *religion of nature* or *natural religion*; the great *law* of which religion, the law of nature, or rather (as we ſhall afterwards find reaſon to call it) of the Author of nature is,

XI. *That every intelligent, active, and free being ſhould ſo behave himſelf, as by no act to contradict truth*; or, *that he ſhould treat every thing as being what it is* (*a*).

Objections I am ſenſible may be made to almoſt any thing (*b*); but I believe none to what has been here advanced but ſuch as may be anſwerd. For to conſider a thing as being *ſomething elſe* than what it is, or (which is the ſame) not to conſider it as being what it is, is an abſurdity indefenſible. However, for a *ſpecimen*, I will ſet down a few. Let us ſuppoſe ſome gentleman, who has not ſufficiently conſiderd theſe matters, amidſt his freedoms and in the gaiety of humor, to talk after ſome ſuch manner as this. "If every thing muſt be treated as being what it is, what rare "work will follow? For, 1. to treat my *enemy* as ſuch is to kill him, or *revenge* "my ſelf ſoundly upon him. 2. To uſe a *creditor*, who is a ſpend-thrift, or one "that knows not the uſe of money, or has no occaſion for it, as *ſuch* is not to "pay him. Nay further, 3. If I *want money*, dont I act according to truth, if I take "it from ſome body elſe to ſupply my own wants? And more, do not I act con-"trary to truth, if I do *not*? 4. If one, who plainly appears to have a *deſign* of "killing another, or doing him ſome great miſchief, if he can find him, ſhould ask me "where he is, and I know where he is; may not I, to ſave life, ſay I do not know, "tho that be falſe? 5. At this rate I may not, in a *frolick*, break a glaſs, or burn "a book: becauſe forſooth to uſe theſe things as being what they are, is to drink

(*a*) What it is in nature. According to what it is, to uſe *Maim*'s words. And thus that in *Arrianus* is true, Νόμος βασιλικός ἐστιν ὅτου, τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῇ φύσει πρᾶξαι. *Omni in re quid ſit veri, videre & tueri decet.* Cic. This is indeed the way of truth. (*b*) Becauſe there is ſcarce any thing, which one or other will not ſay. *Quid enim poteſt dici de illo, qui nigram dixit eſſe nivem, &c.* Lact.

"out

" out of the one, not to break it; and to read the other, not burn it. *Laſtly*, how " ſhall a man *know* what is true: and if he can find out truth, may he not want " the *power* of acting agreeably to it?"

To the *firſt* objection it is eaſy to reply from what has been already ſaid. For if the objector's enemy, whom we will call E, was *nothing more* than his enemy, there might be ſome force in the objection; but ſince he may be conſiderd as ſomething elſe beſide that, he muſt be uſed according to what he is in other reſpects, as well as in that from which he is denominated the objector's (or O's) enemy. For E in the firſt place is a *man*; and as ſuch may claim the benefit of common humanity, whatever that is: and if O denies it to him, he wounds truth in a very ſenſible part. And then if O and E are *fellow-citizens*, living under the ſame government, and ſubject to laws, which are ſo many common covenants, limiting the behaviour of one man to another, and by which E is exempt from all private violence in his body, eſtate, &c. O cannot treat E as being what he is, unleſs he treats him alſo as one, who by common conſent is under ſuch a protection. If he does otherwiſe, he denies the exiſtence of the foreſaid laws and public compacts: contrary to truth. And beſide, O ſhould act with reſpect to *himſelf* as being what he is; a man himſelf, in ſuch or ſuch circumſtances, and one who has given up all right to *private revenge* (for that is the thing meant here). If truth therefore be obſerved, the reſult will be this: O muſt treat E as *ſomething compounded* of a man, a fellow-citizen, and an enemy, all three: *that is*, he muſt only proſecute him in ſuch a way, as is agreeable to the ſtatutes and methods, which the ſociety have obliged themſelves to obſerve. And even as to *legal proſecutions*, there may be many things ſtill to be conſiderd. For E may ſhew himſelf an enemy to O in things, that fall under the cognizance of law, which yet may be of moment and importance to him, or not. If they are ſuch things, as really affect the *ſafety* or *happineſs* of O or his family, then he will find himſelf obliged, in duty and ſubmiſſion to truth, to take refuge in the laws; and to puniſh E, or obtain ſatisfaction, and at leaſt ſecurity for the future, by the means there preſcribed. Becauſe if he does not, he denies the *nature* and *ſenſe* of happineſs to be what they are; the obligations, which perhaps we ſhall ſhew hereafter he is under to his *family* (*a*), to be what they are; a *dangerous* and *wicked* enemy to be dangerous and wicked; the *end* of laws, and ſociety itſelf, to be the ſafety and good of its members, by preventing injuries, puniſhing offenders, &c. which it will appear to be, when that matter comes before us. But

(*a*) *Conveniet cùm in dando munificum eſſe, tum in exigendo non acerbum :----à litibus verò quantùm liceat, & neſcio an paulo plus etiam quàm liceat, abhorrentem----Habenda eſt autem ratio rei familiaris, quam quidem dilabi ſinere flagitioſum eſt.* Cic.

if

if the enmity of E riſes not beyond *trifling*, or *more tolerable* inſtances, then O might act againſt truth, if he ſhould be at more charge or hazard in proſecuting E than he can afford, or the thing loſt or in danger is worth; ſhould treat one that is an enemy in little things, or a *little* enemy, as a *great* one; or ſhould deny to make ſome allowances, and *forgive* ſuch peccadillo's, as the common frailty of human nature makes it neceſſary for us mutually to forgive, if we will live together. *Laſtly*, in caſes, of which the laws of the place take *no notice*, truth and nature would be ſufficiently obſerved, if O ſhould keep a vigilant eye upon the ſteps of his adverſary, and take the moſt *prudent* meaſures, that are compatible with the character of a private perſon, either to aſſuage the malice of E, or prevent the effects of it; or perhaps, if he ſhould only *not* uſe him as a friend (*a*). For this if he ſhould do, notwithſtanding the rants of ſome men, he would cancel the natural differences of things, and confound truth with untruth.

The debtor in the *ſecond* objection, if he acts as he ſays there, does, in the firſt *place*, make himſelf the *judge* of his creditor, which is what he is not. For he lays him under a heavy ſentence, an incapacity in effect of having any eſtate, or any more eſtate. In the *next* place, he arrogates to himſelf more than can be true: that he perfectly *knows*, not only what his creditor and his circumſtances *are*, but alſo what they ever *will* be hereafter. He that is now weak, or extravagant, or very rich, may for ought he knows become otherwiſe. *And*, which is to be conſiderd above all, he directly denies the money, which is the creditor's, to be the creditor's. For it is *ſuppoſed* to be owing or due to him (otherwiſe he is no creditor): and if it be due to him, he has a right to it: and if he has a right to it, *of right* it is his (or, it is *his*). But the debtor by detaining it uſes it, as if it was his own, and therefore *not* the other's; contrary to truth. To pay a man what is *due* to him doth not deny, that he who pays may think him extravagant, &c. or any other truth; that act has no ſuch ſignification. It only ſignifies, that he who pays *thinks* it due to the other, or that it is his: and *this* it naturally doth ſignify. For he might pay the creditor without having any other thought relating to him, but would not *without this*.

Anſ. to *objection* the 3d. Acting according to truth, as that phraſe is uſed in the objection, is not the thing required by my rule; but, ſo to act that *no truth* may be *denied* by any act. Not taking from another man his money by violence is a forbearance, which does not ſignify, that I do not want money, or which denies any truth. But taking it *denies* that to be his, which (by the ſuppoſition) *is his*.

(*a*) Τὸν φιλέοντ' ἐπὶ δαῖτα καλεῖν, ἢ δὶ ἐχθρὸν ἰᾶσαι. *Heſ.*

The

The former is only as it were ſilence, which denies nothing; the latter a direct and loud aſſertion of a falſity; the former what can contradict no truth, becauſe the latter does. If a man wants money through his own extravagance and vice, there can be no *pretence* for making another man to pay for his wickedneſs or folly. We will ſuppoſe therefore the man, who wants money, to want it for *neceſſaries*, and to have incurred this want through ſome *misfortune*, which he could not prevent. In this caſe, which is put as ſtrong as can be for the objector, there are ways of expreſſing this want, or acting according to it, without treſpaſſing upon truth. The man may by honeſt *labor* and induſtry ſeek to ſupply his wants; or he may apply as a *ſupplicant* (*a*), not as an enemy or robber, to ſuch as can afford to relieve him; or if his want is very preſſing, to the firſt perſons he meets, whom truth will oblige to aſſiſt him according to their abilities: or he may do any thing but violate truth (*b*); which is a privilege of a vaſt ſcope, and leaves him many reſources. And ſuch a behaviour as *this* is not only agreeable to his caſe, and expreſſive of it in a way that is natural; but he would deny it to be what it is, if he did not act thus. If there is no way in the world, by which he may help himſelf without the violation of truth (which can ſcarce be ſuppoſed. If there is no other way) he muſt e'en take it as his fate (*c*). Truth will be truth, and muſt retain its character and force, let his caſe be what it will. Many things might be added. The man, from whom this money is to be taken, will be proved Sect. vi. to have a right to *defend* himſelf and his, and not ſuffer it to be taken from him; perhaps he may ſtand as much in need of it, as the other, *&c.*

Anſ. to *obj.* the 4th. It is certain, in the *firſt* place, that nothing may willingly be done, which in any manner promotes *murder:* whoever is acceſſary to that, offends againſt *many* truths of *great* weight. 2. You are not obliged to anſwer the *furioſo*'s queſtion. Silence here would contradict no truth. 3. No one can tell, in ſtrict ſpeaking, where another is, if he is not within his view. Therefore you may *truly* deny, that you know where the man is. *Laſtly*, if by not diſcovering him you ſhould endanger your life (and this is the hardeſt circumſtance, that *can* be taken into the objection), the caſe then would be the ſame, as if the inquirer ſhould ſay, " If you do not murder ſuch a one, I will murder you. " And then be ſure you muſt not commit murder; but muſt defend your ſelf againſt this, as againſt other dangers, againſt Banditi, *&c. as well as you can.* Tho merely to deny truth by *words* (I mean, when they are not productive of facts to follow; as in

(*a*) Τὸ πένεσθαι ἀνομολογεῖν τινὶ αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἰσχίον, *Thucyd.* (*b*) For ἔργων γ' ἄδην ὄνησθαι. *Heſ.* (*c*) *Suum cuique incommodum ferendum eſt potius, quàm de alterius commodis detrahendum.* Cic. According to *Plato*, a man ſhould chooſe to die πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

judicial tranſactions, bearing witneſs, or paſſing ſentence) is not equal to a denial by *facts*; tho an *abuſe* of language is allowable in this caſe, if ever in any; tho all ſins againſt truth are not equal, and certainly a little treſpaſſing upon it in the preſent caſe, for the good of all parties (*a*), as *little* a one as any; and tho one might look on a man in ſuch a fit of rage as mad, and therefore talk to him not as a *man* but a *mad man*: yet truth is *ſacred* (*b*), and there are other ways of coming off with innocence, by giving timely notice to the man in danger, calling in aſſiſtance, or taking the advantage of ſome ſeaſonable incident.

The 5th *Objection* ſeems to reſpect *inanimate* things, which if we muſt treat according to what they are, it is inſinuated we ſhall become obnoxious to many *trifling* obligations; ſuch as are there mentiond. To this I *anſwer* thus. If the *glaſs* be nothing elſe but an uſeful drinking-glaſs, and theſe words fully expreſs what it is, to treat it accordingly is indeed to drink out of it, when there is occaſion and it is truly uſeful, and to *break* it deſignedly is to do what is wrong (*d*). For that is to handle it, as if it neither was uſeful to the objector himſelf, nor could be ſo to any one elſe; contrary to the deſcription of it. But if there be any *reaſon* for breaking the glaſs, then ſomething is wanting to declare fully what it is. As, if the glaſs be poiſoned: for then it becomes a *poiſoned drinking-glaſs*, and to break or deſtroy it is to uſe it according to this *true* deſcription of it. Or if by breaking it any thing is to be obtaind, which more than countervails the loſs of it, it becomes a *glaſs with that circumſtance:* and then for the objector to break it, if it be his own, is to uſe it according to what it is. And if it ſhould become by ſome circumſtance *uſeleſs* only, tho there ſhould be no reaſon for breaking it, yet if there be none againſt it, the thing will be indifferent and matter of liberty. This anſwer, *mutatis mutandis*, may be adapted to other things of this kind; *books*, or any thing elſe. As the uſefulneſs or excellence of ſome books render them worthy of immortality, and of all our care to ſecure them to poſterity (*e*); ſo ſome may be uſed more like what they are, by tearing or burning them, than by preſerving or reading them: the num-

(*a*) Οὕτω καὶ ἰατρὸς νοσοῦντα ἐξαπατᾷ.----καὶ δικαίου κρίνει. *Max. Tyr.* (*b*) To that queſtion, *Si quis ad te confugiat, qui mendacio tuo poſſit a morte liberari, non ei mentiturus?* *S. Auſtin* anſwers in the negative, and concludes: *Reſtat ut nunquam boni mentiantur.--- Quanto fortius, quanto excellentius dicam, nec prædam, nec mentiar.* (*c*) In ſuch preſſing caſes, under imminent danger, the world is wont to make great allowances. Οὐκ ἀργὸν ἡγεῖ δεῖται τὰ λεγόμενα; ---. Οὐκ, ὃ τὸ ψεύδεσθαι, τὸ ἀληθῆ φίλον. *Soph.* Even they, who ſay, He that ſpeaks an idle word, treſpaſſeth in ſo doing, and he that will have a man to ſpeak truth even in common converſation, and he that lies, is like him that offers ſtrange ſacrifice, ſay alſo, but to procure peace, is allowable; *S. Hhared* (*& al. paſſ.*) And *Ab. Ezra* ſays of *Abraham*, He deluded *Abimelech* in words, according to the neceſſity of the time. In ſhort, ſome have permitted in deſperate caſes, *mendacio tanquam veneno uti.* Sext. Pythag. (*d*) It is unlawful for a man to break the ſmalleſt veſſel in a Paſſion. *S. Hhaſ.* (*e*) Who doth not deteſt that thought of Caligula *de Homeri carminibus abolendis*, &c? Suet.

ber

ber of which, *large* enough already, I wiſh you may not think to be increaſed by this, which I here ſend you.

Here *two* things ought to be regarded. 1. That tho to act againſt truth in any caſe is wrong, yet, the degrees of guilt varying with the importance of things, in ſome caſes the importance one way or t'other may be ſo little as to render the crime *evaneſcent* or *almoſt* nothing (*a*). And, 2. that *inanimate* beings cannot be conſiderd as capable of wrong treatment, if the reſpect they bear to living beings is ſeparated from them. The drinking-glaſs before mentiond could not be conſiderd as ſuch, or be what it *now* is, if there was no drinking animal to own and uſe it. Nothing can be of any importance to that thing it ſelf, which is void of all life and perception. So that when we compute what ſuch things are, we muſt take them as being what they are *in reference* to things that have life.

The laſt and moſt material *objection*, or *queſtion* rather, ſhall be *anſwerd* by and by. In the mean time I ſhall only ſay, that if in any particular caſe truth is inacceſſible, and after due inquiry it doth not appear *what*, or *how* things are, then this will be true, *that the caſe* or thing under conſideration is *doubtful*: and to act agreeably unto this truth is to be not opinionative, nor obſtinate, but modeſt, cautious, docile, and to endeavour to be *on the ſafer ſide*. Such behaviour ſhews the caſe to be as it is. And as to the want of *power* to act agreeably to truth, that cannot be known till trials are made: and if any one doth try, and do his endeavour, he may take to himſelf the ſatisfaction, which he will find in ſect. IV.

SECT. II. *Of* Happineſs.

THAT, which demands to be next conſiderd, is *happineſs*; as being in it ſelf moſt conſiderable; as abetting the cauſe of truth; and as being indeed ſo nearly allied to it, that they cannot well be parted. We cannot pay the reſpects due to one, unleſs we regard the other. Happineſs muſt not be denied to be what it is: and it is by the practice of truth that we aim at that happineſs, which is true.

In the few following propoſitions I ſhall not only give you my *idea* of it, but alſo ſubjoin ſome *obſervations*, which tho perhaps not neceſſary here, we may ſometime hereafter think no loſs of time or labor to have made *en paſſant*: ſuch as

(*a*) The *Stoics* muſt certainly therefore be much too ſcrupulous, when they affirm (if they were in earneſt), that ὐδὲ ἓ δάκτυλον ἂν ἕνεκα σαλεύειν τὸν σοφὸν ὁ λόγος ἐπιτρέπει. *Clem. Alex.* Eſpecially ſince this is, at leaſt ordinarily, a thing perfectly indifferent by pr. ix.

men of ſcience would call, ſome of them *poriſmata*, or corollaries, and ſome *ſcholia*, I ſhall take them as they fall in my way promiſcuouſly.

I. *Pleaſure is a conſciouſneſs of ſomething agreeable, pain of the contrary:* & v. v. *the conſciouſneſs of any thing agreeable is pleaſure, of the contrary pain.* For as nothing, that is agreeable to us, can be painful at the ſame time, and as ſuch; nor any thing diſagreeable pleaſant, *by the terms*; ſo neither can any thing agreeable be *for that reaſon* (becauſe it is agreeable) not pleaſant, nor any thing diſagreeable not painful, in ſome meaſure or other.

Obſ. 1. *Pleaſures and pains are proportionable to the perceptions and ſenſe of their ſubjects, or the perſons affected with them.* For conſciouſneſs and perception cannot be ſeparated: becauſe as I do not perceive what I am not conſcious to my ſelf I do perceive, ſo neither can I be conſcious of what I do not perceive, or of more or leſs than what I do perceive. And therefore, ſince the degrees of pleaſure or pain muſt be anſwerable to the conſciouſneſs, which the party affected has of them, they muſt likewiſe be as the degrees of perception are.

Obſ. 2. *Whatever increaſes the power of perceiving, renders the percipient more ſuſceptive of pleaſure or pain.* This is an immediate conſequence; and to add more is needleſs: unleſs, that among the means, by which perceptions and the inward ſenſe of things may in many caſes be heightend and *increaſed*, the principal are *reflexion*, and the practice of thinking. As I cannot be conſcious of what I do not perceive: ſo I do not perceive that, which I do not advert upon. That which makes me feel, makes me advert. Every inſtance therefore of conſciouſneſs and perception is attended with an act of advertence: and as the more the perceptions are, the more are the advertences or reflections; ſo *v. v.* the more frequent or intenſe the acts of advertence and reflexion are, the more conſciouſneſs there is, and the ſtronger is the *perception*. *Further*, all perceptions are produced in time: time paſſes by moments: there can be but one moment preſent at once: and therefore all preſent preception conſiderd without any relation to what is paſt, or future, may be lookd upon as momentaneous only. In this kind of perception the percipient perceives, as if he had not perceived any thing before, nor had any thing perceptible to follow. But in reflexion there is a repetition of what is paſt, and an anticipation of that which is apprehended as yet to come: there is a *connexion* of paſt and future, which by this are brought into the ſum, and ſuperadded to the preſent or momentaneous perceptions. *Again*, by reflecting we practiſe our capacity of apprehending: and this practiſing will increaſe, and as it were *extend* that capacity, to a certain degree. *Laſtly*, reflexion doth

doth not only accumulate moments paſt and future to thoſe that are preſent, but even in their paſſage it ſeems to *multiply* them. For time, as well as ſpace, is capable of indeterminate diviſion: and the finer or nicer the advertence or reflexion is, into the more parts is the time divided; which, whilſt the mind conſiders thoſe parts as ſo many ſeveral moments, is *in effect* renderd by this ſo much the longer. And to this experience agrees.

Obſ. 3. *The cauſes of pleaſure and pain are relative things: and in order to eſtimate truly their effect upon any particular ſubject they ought to be drawn into the degrees of perception in the ſubject.* When the cauſe is of the ſame kind, and acts with an equal force, if the perception of one perſon be equal to that of another, what they perceive muſt needs be *equal.* And ſo it will be likewiſe, when the forces in the producing cauſes and the degrees of perception in the ſentients are *reciprocal.* For (which doth not ſeem to be conſiderd by the world, (and therefore ought the more particularly to be noted) if the cauſe of pleaſure or pain ſhould act but half as much upon A, as it does upon B; yet if the perceptivity of A be double to that of B, the ſum of their pleaſures or pains will be *equal.* In other caſes they will be *unequal.* As, if the *cauſa dolorifica* ſhould act with the ſame *impetus* on C with which it acts upon D; yet if C had only two degrees of perception, and D had three, the pain ſuſtaind by D would be half as much more as that of C: becauſe he would perceive or feel the acts and impreſſions of the cauſe more by ſo much. If it ſhould act with twice the force upon D which it acts with upon C, then the pain of C, would be to that of D as 2 to 6: *i. e.* as one degree of force multiplied by two degrees of preception to two degrees of force multiplied by three of perception. And ſo on.

Obſ. 4. *Mens reſpective happineſſes or pleaſures ought to be valued as they are to the* perſons themſelves, *whoſe they are; or according to the thoughts and ſenſe, which* they *have of them*: not according to the eſtimate put upon them by other people, who have no authority to judge of them, nor *can* know what they are; may compute by different rules; have leſs ſenſe; be in different circumſtances (*a*); or ſuch as guilt has renderd partial to themſelves. If that prince, who having plenty and flocks many, yet raviſhd the poor man's ſingle ewe lamb out of his boſom, reckond the poor man's loſs to be not greater, than the loſs of one of his lambs would have been to him, he muſt be very defective in moral arithmetic, and little underſtood the doctrine of proportion. Every man's happineſs is *his* happineſs, what

(*a*) *Tu ſi hic ſis, aliter ſentias.* Ter.

it

it is to him; and the loſs of it is anſwerable to the degrees of his preception, to his manner of taking things, to his wants and circumſtances (*a*)

Obſ. 5. *How judicious and wary ought princes, lawgivers, judges, juries, and even maſters to be!* They ought not to conſider ſo much what a ſtout, reſolute, obſtinate, hardend criminal may bear, as what the weaker ſort, or at leaſt (if that can be known) the perſons immediately concernd can bear: *that is*, what any puniſhment would be to them. For it is certain, all criminals are not of the former kind; and therefore ſhould not be uſed as if they were. Some are drawn into crimes, which may render them obnoxious to public juſtice, they ſcarce know how themſelves: ſome fall into them through neceſſity, ſtrength of temptation, deſpair, elaſticity of ſpirits and a ſudden eruption of paſſion, ignorance of laws, want of good education, or ſome natural infirmity or propenſion: and ſome, who are really innocent, are oppreſt by the iniquity or miſtakes of judges, witneſſes, juries, or perhaps by the power and zeal of a faction, with which their ſenſe or their honeſty has not permitted them to join. What a difference muſt there be between the ſufferings of a poor wretch ſenſible of his crime, or misfortune, who would give a world for his deliverance, if he had it, and thoſe of a ſturdy *veteran* in roguery; between the apprehenſions, tears, faintings of the one, and the brandy and oaths of the other; in ſhort, between a tender nature and a brickbat!

Obſ. 6. *In general, all perſons ought to be very careful and tender, where any other is concernd.* Otherwiſe they may do they know not what. For no man can tell, by himſelf, or any other way, how another may be affected.

Obſ. 7. *There cannot be an equal diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments by any ſtated human laws* (*b*). Becauſe (among other reaſons) the ſame thing is rarely either the ſame gratification, or the ſame puniſhment to different perſons.

Obſ. 8. *The ſufferings of brutes are not like the ſufferings of men.* They perceive by moments, without reflexion upon paſt or future, upon cauſes, circumſtances, &c. (*c*).

Time and life without thinking are next neighbours to *nothing*, to no-time and no-life (*d*). And therefore to kill a brute is to deprive him of a life or a remain-

(*a*) *Felicitas cui præcipua fuerit homini, non eſt humani judicii: cum proſperitatem ipſam alius alio modo, & ſuopte ingenio quiſque terminet.* Pliny. (*b*) It is not poſſible (in *Albo*'s words) to return to a man according to his ways, like for like, nor to proportion puniſhments by weight and meaſure. (*c*) *Inter hominem & belluam hoc maximè intereſt, quod hæc----ad id ſolum quod adeſt, quodque præſens eſt, ſe accommodat, paululum admodum ſentiens præteritum aut futurum*, &c. Cic. *Nos & venture torquemur & præterite. Timuit enim tormentum memoria reduxit, providentia anticipat. Nemo tantum præſentibus miſer eſt.* Sen. (*d*) *Præſens tempus breviſſimum eſt, adeo quidem, ut quibuſdam nullum videatur*, &c. Sen. Ὅταν γὰρ ἀυτοὶ μηθὲν μεταβάλλωμεν τὴν διάνοιαν, ἢ λάθωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, ἓ δοκεῖ ἡμῖν γεγονέναι ὁ χρόνος. *Ariſt.*

der

der of time, that is equal to little more than nothing: tho this may perhaps be more applicable to ſome animals than to others. That, which is chiefly to be taken care of in this matter, is, that the brute may not be killed unneceſſarily; when it is killed, that it may have as few moments of pain as may be (*a*); and that no young be left to languiſh. So much by the way here.

II. *Pain conſiderd in it ſelf is a real evil, pleaſure a real good.* I take this as a *poſtulatum*, that will without difficulty be granted. Therefore,

III. *By the general idea of good and evil the one* [pleaſure] *is in it ſelf deſireable, the other* [pain] *to be avoided* What is here ſaid, reſpects mere pleaſure and pain, abſtracted from all circumſtances, conſequences, &c. But becauſe there are ſome of theſe generally adhering to them, and ſuch as enter ſo deep into their nature, that unleſs theſe be *taken in*, the full and true character of the other cannot be had, nor can it therefore be known what *happineſs* is, I muſt proceed to ſome other propoſitions relating to this ſubject.

IV. *Pleaſure compared with pain may either be equal, or more, or leſs: alſo pleaſures may be compared with other pleaſures* (*b*), *and pains with pains.* Becauſe all the moments of the pleaſure muſt bear ſome reſpect or be in ſome *ratio* to all the moments of pain: as alſo all the degrees of one to all the degrees of the other: and ſo muſt thoſe of one pleaſure, or one pain, be to thoſe of another. And if the degrees of intenſeneſs be multiplied by the moments of duration, there muſt ſtill be ſome *ratio* of the one product to the other.

That this propoſition is true, appears from the general conduct of mankind; tho in ſome particulars they may err, and wrong themſelves, ſome more, ſome leſs. For what doth all this hurry of buſineſs, what do all the labors and travels of men tend to, but to gain ſuch advantages, as they think do exceed all their trouble? What are all their abſtinences and ſelf denials for, if they do not think ſome pleaſures leſs than the pain, that would ſucceed them? Do not the various methods of life ſhew, that men prefer one ſort of pleaſure to another, and ſubmit to one ſort of pain rather than to have another? And within our ſelves we cannot but find an in-

(*a*) God is not pleaſed, that a beaſt ſhould die without a cauſe. *Ab. Ez.* He that hurts a beaſt without a cauſe comes into judgment, *i. e.* is liable to puniſhment. *S. Hhas.* (*b*) The rants of thoſe men, who aſſert, μὴ διαφέρειν ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς, μηδὲ ἡδύτον τι εἶναι: nay, φύσει ἐυδὲν ἀδὺ, ὃ ἀδύς, ap. *Diog. L.* can ſurely affect no body, who has ſenſe, or is alive. Not that of the *Stoici* in *Plut.* ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ὁ χρόνος καὶ ἀυξει προσγινόμενος, κτλ. As if an age was not more than a moment, and (therefore) an age's happineſs more than a moment's

difference

difference as to many things, not caring, whether we have the pain with the pleaſure obtaind by it, or miſs the pleaſure, being excuſed from the pain.

V. *When pleaſures and pains are equal, they mutually deſtroy each other: when the one exceeds, the exceſs gives the true quantity of pleaſure or pain.* For nine degrees of pleaſure, leſs by nine degrees of pain, are equal to nothing: but nine degrees of one, leſs by three degrees of the other, give ſix of the former *net* and *true*.

VI. *As therefore there may be true pleaſure and pain: ſo there may be ſome pleaſures, which compared with what attends or follows them, not only may vaniſh into nothing, but may even degenerate into pain, and ought to be reckond as pains* (*a*); *and* v. v. *ſome pains, that may be annumerated to pleaſures.* For the *true quantity of pleaſure* differs not from that *quantity of true pleaſure*; or it is ſo much of that kind of pleaſure, which is *true* (clear of all diſcounts and future payments): nor can the *true quantity of pain* not be the ſame with that *quantity of true* or mere *pain*. Then, the man who injoys three degrees of ſuch pleaſure as will bring upon him nine degrees of pain, when three degrees of pain are ſet off to balance and ſink the three of pleaſure, can have remaining to him only ſix degrees of pain: and into theſe therefore is his pleaſure finally reſolved. And ſo the three degrees of pain, which any one indures to obtain nine of pleaſure, end in ſix of the latter. By the ſame manner of computing ſome pleaſures will be found to be the loſs of pleaſure, compared with greater: and ſome pains the alleviation of pain; becauſe by undergoing them greater are evaded (*b*). Thus the natures of pleaſures and pains are varied, and ſometimes tranſmuted: which ought never to be forgot.

Nor this neither. As in the ſenſe of moſt men, I believe, a *little* pain will weigh againſt a *great deal* of pleaſure (*c*): ſo perhaps there may be ſome pains, which exceed all pleaſures; *that is*, ſuch pains as no man would chooſe to ſuffer for any pleaſure *whatever*, or at leaſt any that we know of in this world. So that it is poſſible the difference, or exceſs of pain, may riſe ſo high as to become immenſe: and then the pleaſure to be ſet againſt that pain will be but a point, or cypher; a quantity of no value.

VII. *Happineſs differs not from the true quantity of pleaſure, unhappineſs of pain.* Or, *any being may be ſaid to be ſo far happy, as his pleaſures are true*, &c. That cannot

(*a*) *Nocet* ſit noxa) *empta dolore voluptas.* Hor. And--*multo corrupta dolore voluptas.* Id. (*b*) As when that *Pompey* mentiond by *Val. Max.* by burning his finger eſcaped the torture. (*c*) *Bona malis paria non ſum, etiam pari numero: nec lætitia ulla minimo mœrore penſanda.* Plin.

be

be the happineſs of any being, which is bad for him: nor can happineſs be diſagreeable. It muſt be ſomething therefore, that is both *agreeable* and *good* for the poſſeſſor. Now preſent pleaſure is for the preſent indeed agreeable; but if it be not true, and he who injoys it muſt pay more for it than it is worth, it cannot be for his good, or good for him. This therefore cannot be his *happineſs* Nor, again, can that pleaſure be reckond happineſs, for which one pays the full price in pain: becauſe theſe are quantities, which mutually deſtroy each other. But yet ſince happineſs is ſomething, which, by the general idea of it, muſt be deſirable, and therefore agreeable, it muſt be ſome kind of pleaſure (*a*): and this, from what has been ſaid, can only be ſuch pleaſure as is true. That only can be both agreeable and good for him. And thus every one's happineſs will be as his true quantity of pleaſure.

One, that loves to make *objections*, may demand here, whether there may not be happineſs without pleaſure: whether a man may not be ſaid to be happy in reſpect to thoſe evils, which he eſcapes, and yet knows nothing of: and whether there may not be ſuch a thing as *negative* happineſs. I *anſwer*, an exemption from misfortunes and pains is a high privilege, tho we ſhould not be ſenſible what thoſe misfortunes or dangers are, from which we are deliverd, and in the larger uſe of the word may be ſtyled a happineſs. Alſo, the abſence of pain or unhappineſs may perhaps be called negative happineſs, ſince the meaning of that phraſe is known. But in proper ſpeaking happineſs always includes ſomething poſitive. For *mere* indolence reſulting from inſenſibility, or joind with it, if it be happineſs, is a happineſs infinitely diminiſhd: *that is*, it is no more a happineſs, than it is an unhappineſs; upon the confine of both, but neither. At beſt it is but the happineſs of ſtocks and ſtones (*b*): and to theſe I think happineſs can hardly be in ſtrictneſs allowd. 'Tis the privilege of a ſtock to be what it is, rather than to be a miſerable being: this we are ſenſible of, and therefore, joining this privilege with our own ſenſe of it, we call it happineſs; but this is what it is in our manner of apprehending it, not what it is in the ſtock itſelf. A ſenſe indeed of being free from pains and troubles is attended with happineſs: but then the happineſs flows from the *ſenſe* of the caſe, and is a *poſitive* happineſs. Whilſt a man reflects upon his negative happineſs, as it is called, and injoys it, he makes it poſitive: and perhaps a ſenſe of immunity from the afflictions and miſeries every where ſo obvious to our obſervation is one of the *greateſt* pleaſures in this world.

(*a*) Ὁμολογεῖται δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμίχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. Ariſt.

(*b*) Or ἴσως καθ' ὑπόστασιν κατάστασις, *Ariſtip. ap. Diog. L.*

VIII *That being may be ſaid to be ultimately happy, in ſome degree or other, the ſum total of whoſe pleaſures exceeds the ſum of all his pains:* or, *ultimate happineſs is the ſum of happineſs, or true pleaſure, at the foot of the account.* And ſo on the other ſide, *that being may be ſaid to be ultimately unhappy, the ſum of all whoſe pains exceeds that of all his pleaſures.*

IX. *To make itſelf happy is a duty, which every being, in proportion to its capacity, owes to itſelf; and that, which every intelligent being may be ſuppoſed to aim at, in general* (*a*). For happineſs is ſome quantity of true pleaſure: and that pleaſure, which I call true, may be conſiderd by itſelf, and ſo will be juſtly deſirable (according to prop. II, and III). On the contrary, unhappineſs is certainly to be avoided: becauſe being a quantity of mere pain, it may be conſiderd by itſelf, as a real, mere evil, &c. and becauſe if I am obliged to purſue happineſs, I am at the ſame time obliged to recede, as far as I can, from its contrary. All this is ſelf evident And hence it follows, that,

X. *We cannot act with reſpect to either our ſelves, or other men, as being what we and they are, unleſs both are conſiderd as beings ſuſceptive of happineſs and unhappineſs, and naturally deſirous of the one and averſe to the other.* Other animals may be conſiderd after the ſame manner in proportion to their ſeveral degrees of apprehenſion.

But that the nature of happineſs, and the road to it, which is ſo very apt to be miſtaken, may be better underſtood; and true pleaſures more certainly diſtinguiſhd from falſe; the following propoſitions muſt ſtill be added.

XI. *As the true and ultimate happineſs of no being can be produced by any thing, that interferes with truth, and denies the natures of things: ſo neither can the practice of truth make any one ultimately unhappy.* For that, which contradicts nature and truth, oppoſes the will of the Author of nature (whoſe exiſtence, &c. I ſhall prove afterwards); and to ſuppoſe, that an inferior being may in oppoſition to His will *break through* the conſtitution of things, and by ſo doing make himſelf happy, is to ſuppoſe that being more potent than the Author of nature, and conſequently more potent than the author of the nature and power of that very being himſelf, which is abſurd. And as to the other part of the propoſition, it is alſo abſurd to think, that, by the conſtitution of nature and will of its author, any being ſhould be finally miſerable

(*a*) This is truly *Bonum ſummum, quò tendimus omnes.* Lucr. Ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς ἐπεῖν, ἑνέκα χάριν αἱρούμεθα, πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὐτη. Ariſt.

ſerable only for *conforming* himſelf to truth, and owning things and the relations lying between them to be what they are. It is much the ſame as to ſay, God has made it natural to contradict nature; or unnatural, and therefore puniſhable, to act according to nature and reality. If ſuch a blunder (excuſe the boldneſs of the word) could be, it muſt come either through a defect of *power* in Him to cauſe a better and more equitable ſcheme, or from ſome *delight*, which he finds in the miſery of his dependents. The former cannot be aſcribed to the Firſt cauſe, who is the fountain of power: nor the latter to Him, who gives ſo many proofs of his goodneſs and beneficence. Many beings may be ſaid to be happy; and there are none of us all, who have not many injoyments (*a*): whereas did he delight in the infelicity of thoſe beings, which depend upon Him, it muſt be natural to Him to make them unhappy, and then not one of them would be otherwiſe in any reſpect. The world in that caſe inſtead of being ſuch a beautiful, admirable ſyſtem, in which there is only a *mixture* of evils, could have been only a ſcene of *mere* miſery, horror, and torment.

That either the enemies of truth (*wicked men*) ſhould be ultimately happy, or the religious obſervers of it (*good men*) ultimately unhappy, is ſuch injuſtice, and an evil ſo great, that ſure no *Manichean* will allow ſuch a *ſuperiority* of his evil principle over the good, as is requiſite to produce and maintain it.

XII. *The genuine happineſs of every being muſt be ſomething, that is not incompatible with or deſtructive of its nature* (*b*), *or the ſuperior or better part of it, if it be mixt.* For inſtance, nothing can be the true happineſs of a *rational* being, that is inconſiſtent with *reaſon*. For all pleaſure, and therefore be ſure all clear pleaſure and true happineſs muſt be ſomething agreeable (pr. I. and nothing can be agreeable to a reaſoning nature, or (which is the ſame) to the reaſon of that nature, which is repugnant and diſagreeable to reaſon. If any thing becomes agreeable to a rational being, which is not agreeable to reaſon, it is plain his reaſon is loſt, his nature depreſt, and that he now liſts himſelf among *irrationals*, at leaſt as to that particular. If a being finds pleaſure in any thing *unreaſonable*, he has an *unreaſonable* pleaſure: but a rational nature can like nothing of that kind without a contradiction to it ſelf. For to do this would be to act, as if it was the contrary to what it is. Laſtly, if we find hereafter, that whatever interferes with reaſon, interferes with truth, and to contradict either of them is the ſame thing; then what has been ſaid under the former propoſition, does alſo confirm this: as what has been ſaid in proof of this, does alſo confirm the former.

(*a*) *Non dat Deus beneficia. Unde ergo qua poſſides? qua*------Sen. (*b*) Παντὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ κακία ἢ κακοδαιμονία ἐστί. Arr.

XIII. *Thoſe pleaſures are true, and to be reckond into our happineſs, againſt which there lies no reaſon.* For when there is no reaſon againſt any pleaſure, there is always one for it (*a*), included in the term. So when there is no reaſon for undergoing pain (or venturing it), there is one againſt it.

Obſ. There is therefore no neceſſity for men to torture their inventions in finding out arguments to juſtify themſelves in the purſuits after worldly advantages and injoyments, provided that neither theſe injoyments, nor the means by which they are attaind, contain the violation of any truth, by being unjuſt, immoderate, or the like (*b*). For in this caſe there is no reaſon why we ſhould not deſire them, and a direct one, why we ſhould; *viz.* becauſe they are injoyments.

XIV. To conclude this ſection, *The way to happineſs and the practice of truth incur the one into the other* (*c*). For no being can be ſtyled happy, that is not ultimately ſo: becauſe if all his pains exceed all his pleaſures, he is ſo far from being happy, that he is a being unhappy, or miſerable, in proportion to that exceſs. Now by *prop.* XI. nothing can produce the ultimate happineſs of any being, which interferes with truth: and therefore whatever doth produce that, muſt be ſomething which is conſiſtent and *coincident* with this.

Two things then (but ſuch as are met together, and embrace each other), which are to be religiouſly regarded in all our conduct, are *truth* (of which in the preceding ſect.) and *happineſs* (*that is*, ſuch pleaſures, as accompany, or follow the practice of truth, or are not inconſiſtent with it: of which I have been treating in this). And as that religion, which ariſes from the diſtinction between moral good and evil, was called *natural*, becauſe grounded upon truth and the natures of things: ſo perhaps may that too, which propoſes happineſs for its end, in as much as it proceeds upon that difference, which there is between true pleaſure and pain, which are phyſical (or *natural*) good and evil. And ſince both theſe unite ſo amicably, and are at laſt the ſame, here is *one* religion which may be called natural upon *two* accounts.

(*a*) Τίνων λόγων ἢ κατὰ λόγον ὅ ἐστιν μετανοεῖσθαι. Simpl. *Recte facit, animo quando obſequitur ſuo: quod omnes homines facere oportet, dum id modo ſiat bono.* Plaut. (*b*) *Habent philoſophi amplas opes; ſed nulli detractas,* &c. Sen. Here he ſeems to confeſs the folly of the *Stoics*, who denied themſelves many pleaſures, that were honeſt and almoſt neceſſary; living in tubs, feeding upon raw herbs and water, going about in a ſordid garment, with a rough beard, ſtaff and ſatchel, &c. (*c*) *Quid rectum ſit, apparet; quid expediat, obſcurum eſt: ita tamen, ut----dubitare non poſſimus, quin ea maxime conducant, quæ ſunt rectiſſima.* Cic.

SECT.

SECT. III. *Of* Reaſon, *and the* ways *of diſcovering truth.*

MY manner of thinking, and an *objection* formerly (*a*) made, oblige me in the next place to ſay ſomething concerning the means of knowing, what is *true*: whether there are any, that are *ſure*, and which one may ſafely rely upon. For if there be not, all that I have written is an amuſement to no purpoſe. Beſides, as this will lead me to ſpeak of *reaſon*, &c. ſome truths may here (as ſome did in the former ſection) fall in our way, which may be profitable upon many occaſions; and what has been already aſſerted, will alſo be further confirmed.

I. *An intelligent being, ſuch as is mentioned before* (b), *muſt have ſome immediate objects of his underſtanding; or at leaſt a capacity of having ſuch.* For if there be no object of his intellect, he is intelligent of nothing, or not intelligent. And if there are no immediate objects, there can be none at all: becauſe every object muſt be ſuch (an object) either in it ſelf immediately; or by the intervention of another, which is immediate: or of ſeveral, one of which muſt at leaſt be immediate.

II. *An intelligent being among the immediate objects of his mind may have ſome, that are abſtract and general.* I ſhall not at preſent inquire, how he comes by them (it matters not *how*), ſince this muſt be true, if there is any ſuch thing as a rational being. For that reaſon is ſomething different from the knowledge of particulars may appear from hence; becauſe it is not confined to particular things or caſes. What is reaſon in one inſtance, is ſo in another. What is reaſonable with reſpect to *Quinctius*, is ſo in reſpect of *Nævius* (*c*). Reaſon is performed in *ſpecies*. A rational being therefore muſt have ſome of theſe *ſpecies* (I mean ſpecific and abſtract *ideas*) to work with; or ſome ſuperior method, ſuch as perhaps ſome higher order of reaſoners may have, but we have not.

The knowledge of a particular *idea* is only the particular knowledge of that *idea* or thing: there it ends. But *reaſon* is ſomething univerſal, a kind of general inſtrument, applicable to particular things and caſes as they occur. We reaſon about particulars, or from them; but not *by* them.

(*a*) The laſt objection, *p.* 27. (*b*) Sect. I. prop. I. (*c*) *Quis hoc ſtatuit, quod æquum ſit in Quinctium, id iniquum eſſe in Nævium?* Cic.

In

In fact we find within our ſelves many *logical*, *metaphyſical*, *mathematical ideas*, no one of which is limited to any particular, or individual thing: but they comprehend whole *claſſes* and kinds. And it is by the help of theſe that we reaſon, and demonſtrate. So that we know from within our ſelves, that intelligent beings not only may have ſuch abſtract *ideas*, as are mentiond in the propoſition, but that ſome *actually have* them: which is enough for my purpoſe.

III. *Thoſe ideas or objects, that are immediate, will be adequately and truly known to that mind, whoſe ideas they are.* For *ideas* can be no further the *ideas* of any mind, than that mind has (or may have) a perception of them: and therefore that mind muſt perceive the whole of them; which is to know them *adequately*.

Again, theſe *ideas* being immediate, nothing (by the term) can intervene to increaſe, diminiſh, or any way alter them. And to ſay the mind does not know them truly, implies a contradiction: becauſe it is the ſame as to ſay, that they are miſrepreſented; *that is*, that there are intervening and miſrepreſenting *ideas*.

And *laſtly*, there cannot be an immediate perception of that, which is not; nor therefore of any immediate object otherwiſe, than as it is. We have indeed many times wrong notions, and miſperceptions of things: but then theſe things are not the immediate objects. They are things, which are notified to us by the help of organs and *media*, which may be vitiated, or perhaps are defective at beſt and incapable of tranſmitting things as they are in themſelves, and therefore occaſion imperfect and falſe images. But then, even in this caſe, thoſe images and *ideas* that are immediate to the percipient, are perceived as they are: and that is the very reaſon, why the originals, which they ſhould exhibit truly, but do not, are not perceived as *they* are. In ſhort, I only ſay the mind muſt know its own *immediate ideas*.

IV. *What has been ſaid of theſe ideas, which are immediate, may be ſaid alſo of thoſe relations or reſpects, which any of thoſe ideas bear immediately each to other: they muſt be known immediately and truly*, For if the relation be immediate, the ideas cannot ſubſiſt without it; it is of their nature: and therefore they cannot be known adequately, but this muſt be known too. They are in this reſpect like the *ideas* of whole and part. The one cannot be without the other: nor either of them not diſcover that relation, by which the one muſt be always bigger and the other leſs.

To ſay no more, we may ſatisfy our ſelves of the truth of this, as well as of the foregoing propoſitions, from the experiences of our own minds: where we find many,

ny relations, that are immediately ſeen, and of which it is *not in our power* to doubt (*a*). We are conſcious of a knowledge, that conſiſts in the *intuition* of theſe relations. Such is the evidence of thoſe truths, which are uſually called *axioms*, and perhaps of ſome ſhort demonſtrations.

V. *Thoſe relations or reſpects, which are not immediate, or apparent, at the firſt view, may many times be diſcovered by intermediate relations; and with equal certainty.* If the *ratio* of B to D does not inſtantly ſhew itſelf; yet if the *ratio* of B to C (*b*), does, and that of C to D (*c*), from hence the *ratio* of B to D (*d*) is known alſo. And if the mean quantities were ever ſo many, the ſame thing would follow; provided the reaſon of every quantity to that, which follows next in the *ſeries*, be known. For the truth of this I vouch the *mathematicians* (*e*): as I might all, that know any ſcience, for the truth of the propoſition in general. For thus *theorems* and derivative truths are obtaind.

VI. *If a propoſition be true, it is always ſo in all the inſtances and uſes, to which it is applicable.* For otherwiſe it muſt be both true and falſe. Therefore

VII *By the help of truths already known more may be diſcoverd.* For

1. Thoſe *inferences*, which ariſe *preſently* from the application of general truths to the particular things and caſes containd under them, muſt be juſt. Ex. gr. *The whole is bigger than a part: therefore* A (ſome particular thing) *is more than half A.* For it is plain that *A* is containd in the *idea* of whole, as half *A* is in that of part. So that if the antecedent propoſition be true, the conſequent, which is included in it, follows immediately, and muſt alſo be true. The former cannot be true, unleſs the other be ſo too. What agrees to the *genus*, *ſpecies*, *definition*, *whole*, muſt agree to the *ſpecies*, *individuals*, *thing defined*, *the part*. The exiſtence of an *effect* infers directly that of a *cauſe*; of one *correlate* that of the other; and ſo on. And what is ſaid here holds true (by the preceding propoſition) not only in reſpect of axioms and firſt truths, but alſo and equally of theorems and other general truths, when they are once known. Theſe may be capable of the like applications: and the truth of ſuch conſequences, as are made by virtue of them, will always be as evident as that of thoſe theorems themſelves.

(*a*) That queſtion in *Plato*, Τί ἂν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδεῖξαι, ἢ τιο ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντως ἐν τῇ παρούσῃ, πότερον καθεύδομεν, ἢ πάντα ἃ διανοούμεθα. ὑπαρτόμεν, κτλ. may have place among the velitations of philoſophers: but a man can ſcarce propoſe it ſeriouſly to himſelf. If he doth, the anſwer will attend it. b—a. c—e d—ae. (*c*) V. *Tacq.* El. Geom. l. 5. p. 3. n. XII. But the thing appears from the bare inſpection of theſe quantities: *b*, *ab*, *acb*, *acib*, *aciob*, &c.

2. All

2 All thoſe *concluſions*, which are derived through mean propoſitions, that are true, and by juſt inferences, will be as true as thoſe, from which they are derived. My meaning is this: every juſt conſequence is *founded in ſome known truth*, by virtue of which one thing follows from another, after the manner of ſteps in an *algebraic* operation: and if inferences are ſo founded, and juſt, the things inferred muſt be true, if they are made from true premiſſes.

Let this be the form of an argument. M = P : S = M : *ergo* S = P. Here if S = M be falſe, nothing is concluded at all: becauſe the middle propoſition is in truth not S = M, but perhaps S = M*a*, which is foreign to the purpoſe. If S = M be true, but M = P falſe, then the concluſion will indeed be a right concluſion from thoſe premiſſes: but they cannot ſhew, that S = P, becauſe the firſt propoſition if it was expreſt according to truth would be M*e* = P, which is another thing, and has no place in the argument. But if theſe two propoſitions are both true, M = P, S = M, then it will not only be rightly concluded, but alſo true, that S = P. For the ſecond or middle propoſition does ſo connect the other two, by taking in due manner a term from each of them (or to ſpeak with the *logicians*, by ſeparately comparing the predicate or *major* term of the concluſion with the *medium* in the firſt propoſition, and the ſubject or *minor* term with it in the ſecond), that if the firſt and ſecond are true, the third muſt be ſo likewiſe: all being indeed no more than this, P = M = S. For here the inference is juſt by what goes before, being founded in ſome ſuch truth as this, and reſulting immediately from the application of it, *Quæ eidem æqualia ſunt, & inter ſe ſunt æqualia*; or *Quæ conveniunt in eodem tertio, etiam inter ſe conveniunt*; or the like (*a*). Now if an inference thus made is juſtifiable, another made after the ſame manner, when the truth diſcovered by it is made one of the premiſſes, muſt be ſo too; and ſo muſt another after that; and ſo on. And if the laſt, and all the intermediate inferences be as right, as the firſt is ſuppoſed to be, it is no matter to what length the proceſs is carried. All the parts of it being locked together by truth, the laſt reſult is derived through ſuch a ſucceſſion of mean propoſitions, as render its title to our aſſent not worſe by being long.

Since all the forms of true *ſyllogiſms* may be proved to conclude rightly, all the advances made in the *ſyllogiſtic* method toward the diſcovery or confirmation of truth, are ſo many inſtances and proofs of what is here aſſerted. So alſo are the performances of the *mathematicians*. From ſome ſelf-evident truths, and a few eaſie

(*a*) If men in their illations, or in comparing their *ideas*, do many times not actually make uſe of ſuch maxims; yet the thing is really the ſame. For what theſe maxims expreſs, the mind ſees without taking notice of the words.

theorems,

theorems, which they ſet out with at firſt, to what immenſe lengths, and through what a train of propoſitions have they propagated knowledge! How numerous are their theorems and diſcoveries now, ſo far once out of human ken!

I do not enter ſo far into the province of the *logicians* as to take notice of the difference there is between the *analytic* and *ſynthetic* methods of coming at truth, or proving it; whether it is better to begin the diſquiſition from the ſubject, or from the attribute. If by the uſe of proper *media* any thing can be ſhewd to be, or not to be, I care not from what term the demonſtration or argument takes its riſe. Either way propoſitions may beget their like, and more truth be brought into the world.

VIII. *That power, which any intelligent being has of ſurveying his own ideas, and comparing them; of forming to himſelf out of thoſe, that are immediate and abſtract, ſuch general and fundamental truths, as he can be ſure of* (a); *and of making ſuch inferences and concluſions as are agreeable to them, or to any other truth, after it comes to be known; in order to find out more truth, prove or diſprove ſome aſſertion, reſolve ſome queſtion, determin what is fit to be done upon occaſion*, &c. *the caſe or thing under conſideration being firſt fairly ſtated and prepared, is what I mean by the faculty of reaſon, or what entitles him to the epithet rational*, Or in ſhort, *Reaſon is a faculty of making ſuch inferences and concluſions, as are mentiond under the preceding propoſition, from any thing known, or given.*

The Supreme being has no doubt a direct and perfect intuition of things, with their natures and relations, lying as it were all before Him, and pervious to His eye: or at leaſt we may ſafely ſay, that He is not obliged to make uſe of our operoſe methods by *ideas* and inferences; but knows things in a manner infinitely above all our conceptions. And as to ſuperior finite natures, what other means of attaining to the knowledge of things they may have, is a thing not to be told by me; or how far they may excell us in this way of finding truth. I have an eye here chiefly to our own circumſtances. Reaſon muſt be underſtood, when it is aſcribed to God, to be the *Divine* reaſon; when to other beings above us, to be *their* reaſon; and in all of them to tranſcend *ours*, as much as their natures reſpectively do our nature (*b*).

(*a*) Under the word *reaſon* I comprehend the *intuition* of the truth of axioms. For certainly to diſcern the reſpect, which one term bears to another, and from thence to conclude the propoſition *neceſſarily* true, is an act of *reaſon*, tho' performed quick, or perhaps all at once. (*b*) If many believed, according to Socrates *ap. Lus.* that ὅσην ἴχει τὸ μέγεθος τῦ κόσμυ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν πρὸς τὸ Σωκράτες

It can not be amiſs to note *further*, that tho a man who truly uſes his rational powers, has abſtract and univerſal ideas obtaind by reflection; out of theſe frames to himſelf general truths, or apprehends the ſtrength of ſuch, and admits them, when they occur to him; by theſe, as by ſo many ſtandards, meaſures and judges of things; and takes care to have the materials, which he makes uſe of in reaſoning, to be rivetted and compacted together by them: yet by a *habit* of reaſoning he may come to ſerve himſelf of them and apply them ſo quick, that he himſelf ſhall ſcarce obſerve it. Nay, moſt men ſeem to reaſon by virtue of a habit acquired by converſation, practice in buſineſs, and examples of others, without knowing what it is, that gives the ſolidity even to their own juſt reaſonings: juſt as men uſually learn rules in arithmetic, govern their accounts by them all their days, and grow very ready and topping in the uſe of them, without ever knowing or troubling their heads about the *demonſtration* of any one of them. But ſtill tho this be ſo, and men reaſon without adverting upon general ideas and abſtract truths, or even being aware that there are any ſuch, as it were by rule or a kind of rote; yet ſuch there are, and upon *them* reſts the weight of reaſon as its foundation.

This, *by the way*, helps us to detect the cauſe, why the generality of people are ſo little under the *dominion* of reaſon; why they ſacrifice it to their intereſts and paſſions ſo eaſily; are ſo obnoxious to prejudices, the influence of their company, and din of a party; ſo apt to change, tho the caſe remains the very ſame; ſo unable to judge of things, that are ever ſo little out of the way; and ſo conceited and poſitive in matters, that are doubtful, or perhaps to diſcerning perſons manifeſtly falſe. Their reaſoning proceeds in that track, which they happen to be got into, and out of which they know not one ſtep, but all is to them *Terra incognita*; being ignorant of the ſcientific part, and thoſe univerſal, unalterable principles, upon which true reaſoning depends, and to find which and the true uſe of them are required *cool* hours and an *honeſt* application, beſide many *preparatives*.

In the *next place* it muſt be noted, that one may reaſon truly from that, which is only probable, or even falſe (*a*). Becauſe juſt inferences may be made from propoſitions of theſe kinds: *that is*, ſuch inferences may be made as are founded in certain truths, tho thoſe propoſitions themſelves are not certainly true. But then what follows, or is concluded from thence, will be only probable, or falſe, according to

πράτις ἢ χαιρεφῶντος ἴδιος τηλικοῦτον ἢ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν, ἢ διάνοιαν ἀνάλογον διαφέρειν τῆς περὶ ἡμᾶς διανοίας, what may we think of the *God* of the *world*? Therefore *Tully* ſeems to expreſs himſelf too boldly where he writes, *Eſt---homini cum Deo rationis ſocietas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eoſdem etiam recta ratio communis eſt.*

(*a*) Upon this account it is, that I add the word *given* at the end of my deſcription of reaſon.

the

the quality of that propoſition, or thoſe propoſitions, from which the inference is made.

Again; it ſhould be obſerved, that what I have ſaid of reaſoning, chiefly belongs to it as it is an *internal* operation. When we are to repreſent our reaſonings to others, we muſt transfer our thoughts to them by ſuch ways as we can. The caſe is to be ſtated in a manner ſuitable to their capacities; a fair narration of matters of fact, and their circumſtances, to be made; many times perſons and things to be deſcribed by proper *diatypoſes*, and the like: all which are additional labor, and take up much room in diſcourſes and books, and are performed by different authors, upon different ſubjects, and in different kinds of writing, with an infinite variety of methods and forms, according to mens different views and capacities; and many times not without a neceſſity of ſome condeſcenſions, aſcititious advantages, and even applications to the paſſions. But notwithſtanding this, in ſtrict reaſoning nothing is required, but to lay ſteps in a due order, firmly connected, and expreſt properly, without flouriſh (*a*); and to arrive at truth by the *ſhorteſt* and *cleareſt* gradation we are able.

Once more; perhaps diſputacious men may ſay I aſcribe the inveſtigation of truth to one faculty, when it is in reality the joint buſineſs of ſeveral. For when we go about this work, we are forced to make uſe of ſubordinate powers, and even external helps; to draw *diagrams*, and put caſes in our own imagination; to correct the images there, compound them, divide them, abſtract from them; to turn over our memory, and ſee what has been entred and remains in that regiſter; even to conſult books, and uſe pen and ink. In ſhort, we aſſemble all ſuch axioms, theorems, experiments and obſervations, as are already known, and appear capable of ſerving us, or preſent themſelves upon the opening an *analyſis* of the queſtion, or caſe before us. And when the mind has thus made its *tour*, fetched in materials from every quarter, and ſet them in its own view; then it contemplates, compares, and methodizes them; gives the firſt place to this, the ſecond to that, and ſo on; and when trials do not ſucceed rightly, rejects ſome, adopts others, ſhifts their order, *&c.* till at laſt the *ſeries* is ſo diſpoſed, that the thing required comes up reſolved, proved, or diſproved by a *juſt* concluſion from proper premiſſes. Now in this proceſs there ſeem to be many faculties concerned; in theſe acts of circumſpection, recollection, invention, reflection, comparing, methodizing, judging. But what if all this be ſo? I do not *exclude* the uſe of ſuch ſubſervient powers, or other helps, as are neceſſary to the exerting this faculty of reaſon; nor deny the mind matter to work upon.

(*a*) *Simplex & nuda veritas eſt luculentior; quia ſatis ornata per ſe eſt: adeoque ornamentis extrinſecus additis fucata corrumpitur: mendacium verò ſpecie placet alienâ, &c.* Lactant.

I may allow all the intellectual faculties their proper offices, and yet make reaſon to be what I have deſcribed it to be.

IX. *There is ſuch a thing as right reaſon:* or, *Truth may be diſcoverd by reaſoning (a).* The word *reaſon* has ſeveral acceptations. *Sometimes* it is uſed for that power mentiond in the laſt propoſition; as when we ſay, *Man is a being indued with reaſon.* And then the ſenſe of this propoſition muſt be this; that there is ſuch a uſe to be made of this power, as is right, and will manifeſt truth. *Sometimes* it ſeems to be taken for thoſe general truths, of which the mind poſſeſſes it ſelf from the intimate knowledge of its own ideas, and by which it is governed in its illations and concluſions; as when we ſay, *Such a thing is agreeable to reaſon*: for that is as much as to ſay, it is agreeable to the ſaid general truths, and that authentic way of making deductions, which is founded in them. And then the ſenſe of this propoſition is, that there are ſuch general truths, and ſuch a right way of inferring. Again; *ſometimes* it ſeems to ſtand only for ſome particular truth, as it is apprehended by the mind with the cauſes of it, or the manner of its derivation from other truth: *that is*, it differs not from truth except in this one reſpect, that it is conſiderd not barely in itſelf, but as the effect and reſult of a proceſs of reaſoning; or it is truth with the arguments for our aſſent, and its evidences about it; as when it is ſaid, *that ſuch or ſuch an aſſertion is reaſon.* And then the ſenſe of the propoſition is, that there are truths ſo to be apprehended by the mind. So all comes to this at laſt; truth (or there are truths, which) may be diſcoverd, or found to be ſuch, *by reaſoning.*

If it were not ſo, our rational faculties, the nobleſt we have, would be vain.

Beſide, that it is ſo, appears from the foregoing propoſitions and what we know within our ſelves. 'Tis certain we have immediate and abſtract *ideas*: the relations of theſe are adequately known to the mind, whoſe *ideas* they are: the propoſitions expreſſing theſe relations are evidently known to be true: and theſe truths muſt have the common privilege and property of all truths, to be true in all the particulars and uſes, to which they are applicable. If then any things are notified to us by the help of our ſenſes, or preſent themſelves by any other way or means, to

(a) That way, which ſome *Sceptics* take to prove the inexiſtence of truth, has nothing in it, unleſs it be a contradiction. If any thing, *ſay they*, is demonſtrated to be true, how ſhall it be known, that the demonſtration is true? Εἰ ἐξ ἀποδείξεως, ζητηθήσεται, πάλιν, πῶς ὅτι ἡ τοῦτο ἀληθὲς ἐστί; ἢ ἔσται εἰς ἄπειρον. *Sext. Emp.* Nor do I well comprehend S. *Chryſoſtom*'s meaning, when he ſays, Τὸ λογισμοῖς ἀποδειχθὲν, κἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ, οὐδέπω πληροφορίαν τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει ἡ πίστιν ἱκανήν. For as no man truly believes any thing, unleſs he has a reaſon for believing it: ſo no reaſon can be ſtronger than demonſtration.

which

which theſe truths may be immediately applied, or from whence deductions may be made after the forementioned manner, new truths may be thus collected. And ſince theſe new truths, and the numerous deſcendents, that may ſpring from their loins, may be uſed ſtill in the ſame manner, and be as it were the ſeed of more truth, who can tell at what undeſcried fields of knowledge even men may at length arrive? At leſt no body can doubt, but that much truth, and particularly of that kind, which is moſt *uſeful* to us in our conduct here, is diſcoverable by this method.

They, who oppugn the force and certainty of reaſon, and treat *right reaſon* as a *Chimæra*, muſt argue againſt reaſon either with reaſon, or without reaſon. In the latter way they do nothing: and in the former they betray their own cauſe, and eſtabliſh that, which they labor to dethrone. To prove there is no ſuch thing as *right reaſon* by any good argument, is indeed impoſſible: becauſe that would be to ſhew there is ſuch a thing, by the manner of proving, that there is not.

And *further*, if this propoſition be not true, there is no right reaſoning in *Euclid*; nor can we be ſure, that what is there demonſtrated, is true. But to ſay this I am ſure is abſurd. Nor do I deſire, that this propoſition, which I here maintain, ſhould be eſteemed more certain than thoſe demonſtrated by him: and ſo *certain* it muſt be; becauſe there can be no certainty in them, if this be not true.

The great *objection* againſt all this is taken from the many inſtances of falſe reaſoning and ignorance, with which the practices, diſcourſes, writings of mankind are too juſtly taxed. But, in *anſwer* to it, I would have it minded, that I do not ſay, men may not by virtue of their freedom break off their meditations and inquiries prematurely, before they have taken a ſufficient ſurvey of things; that they may not be prepoſſeſſed with inveterate errors, biaſſed by intereſt, or carried violently down with the ſtream of a ſect or faction, or dazled by ſome darling notion or bright name (*a*); that they may not be unprovided of a competent ſtock of *præcognita* and preparative knowledge; that (among other things) they may not be ignorant of the very nature of reaſoning, and what it is that gives ſinews to an inference, and makes it juſt; that they may not want philoſophy, hiſtory, or other learning requiſite to the underſtanding and ſtating of the queſtion truly; that they may not have the confidence to pretend to abilities, which they have not, and boldly to judge of things, as if they were qualified, when they are not; that they may not be impotent in their elocution, and miſrepreſent their own thoughts, by expreſſing themſelves ill, even when within themſelves they reaſon well; that many underſtandings may not be naturally groſs, good heads often indiſpoſed, and the ableſt judges ſometimes overſeen, through

(*a*) *Haud alio fidei proniore lapſu, quàm ubi falſæ rei gravis autor exiſtit.* Pliny.

inadver-

inadvertence or haſte: I ſay none of theſe things. The contrary I confeſs is manifeſt: and it is in oppoſition to thoſe errors, which appear in theſe caſes under the name of reaſon, that we are forced to add the epithet *right*, and to ſay *right reaſon* inſtead of *reaſon* only; to diſtinguiſh it from that, which wrongfully aſſumes that appellation. Nor, moreover, do I ſay, that by reaſoning the truth is to be diſcoverd in *every* caſe: that would imply an extent of knowledge, which we cannot pretend to. I only ſay, that there is ſuch a thing as right reaſon, and truth diſcoverable by it.

I might add, that he, whoſe faculties are intire and ſound, and who by a proper exerciſe of his mind in ſcientific ſtudies firſt opens and enlarges its capacity, and renders his intellectuals active and penetrating; takes care to furniſh himſelf with ſuch leading truths, as may be uſeful to him, and of which he is aſſured in his own breſt; and in treating any ſubject keeps them ſtill in his eye, ſo that his diſcourſe may be agreeable to them: I ſay, ſuch a one is not in much danger of concluding falſely. He muſt either determin rightly, or ſoon find, that the ſubject lies out of his reach However he will be ſenſible, that there are many things within his ſphere, concerning which he may reaſon; and that there are truths to be found by this uſe of his faculties, in which he may ſecurely acquieſce.

Thus that queſtion ſuppoſed to be asked p. 27. *How ſhall a man know, what is true?* is in part anſwerd. More ſhall be added by and by: only a propoſition or two, which ought not to be omitted, muſt be firſt inſerted.

X. *To act according to right reaſon, and to act according to truth are in effect the ſame thing.* For in which ſenſe ſoever the word *reaſon* is taken, it will ſtand either for truth itſelf, or for that, which is inſtrumental in diſcovering and proving it to be ſuch: and then, with reſpect to this latter ſenſe, whoever is guided by that faculty, whoſe office conſiſts in diſtinguiſhing and pointing out truth, muſt be a follower of truth, and act agreeable to it. For to be governed by any faculty or power is to act according to the genuin deciſions and dictates of it.

That reaſon, which is *right* (by the meaning of the words) muſt conclude *rightly*: but this it cannot do, if the concluſion is not true, or truth.

That is (for ſo I would be underſtood), if the principles and premiſſes from whence it reſults are true (*a*), and certainly known to be ſo, the concluſion may be taken as certain and abſolute truth: but otherwiſe the truth obtaind at the end of the argument is but hypothetical, or only this, that ſuch a thing is ſo, if ſuch another, or ſuch others are ſo or ſo.

(*a*) That manner of demonſtration, in which it has been pretended truth is deduced directly from that which is falſe, is only a way of ſhewing, that an aſſertion is true, becauſe its contradictory is falſe; founded in that known rule, *Contradictoria nec ſimul vera, nec ſimul falſa eſſe poſſunt*, &c.

XI. *To*

XI. *To be governed by reaſon is the general law impoſed by the Author of nature* (*a*) *upon them, whoſe uppermoſt faculty is reaſon: as the dictates of it in particular caſes are the particular laws, to which they are ſubject.* As there are beings, which have not ſo much as ſenſe, and others that have no faculty above it; ſo there may be ſome, who are indued with reaſon, but have nothing higher than that. It is ſufficient at preſent to ſuppoſe there may be ſuch. And then if reaſon be the *uppermoſt* faculty, it has a right to controll the reſt by being *ſuch*. As in ſenſitive animals ſenſe commands gravitation and mechanical motions in thoſe inſtances, for which their ſenſes are given, and carries them out into ſpontaneous acts: ſo in rational animals the gradation requires, that reaſon ſhould command ſenſe.

It is plain, that reaſon is of a commanding nature (*b*): it injoins this, condemns that, only allows ſome other things, and will be paramount (in an old word τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν (*c*) if it is at all. Now a being, who has ſuch a determining and governing power ſo placed in his nature, as to be eſſential to him, is a being certainly framed to be governed by that power. It ſeems to be as much deſigned by nature, or rather the Author of nature, that rational animals ſhould uſe their reaſon, and ſteer by it; as it is by the ſhipwright, that the pilate ſhould direct the veſſel by the uſe of the rudder he has fitted to it. The rudder would not be there, if it was not to be uſed: nor would reaſon be implanted in any nature only to be not cultivated and neglected. And it is certain, it cannot be uſed, but it muſt command: ſuch is its nature.

It is not in one's power deliberately to reſolve not to be governed by reaſon. For (here the ſame way of arguing may be uſed, that was lately) if he could do this, he muſt either have ſome reaſon for making that reſolution, or none. If he has none, it is a reſolution, that ſtands upon no foundation, and therefore in courſe falls; and if he has ſome reaſon for it, he is governed by reaſon. This *demonſtrates* that reaſon muſt govern.

XII. *If a rational being, as ſuch, is under an obligation to obey reaſon, and this obedience, or practice of reaſon, coincides with the obſervation of truth, theſe things plainly follow.*

(*a*) *Cujus* [*ſummi rectoris & domini*] *ad naturam apta ratio vera illa & ſumma lex à philoſophis dicitur.* Cic. Νόμος ἀψευδὴς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, ἀχύτα τῷ διΐνῳ ἢ τῷ διΐνῳ ὄντι θεσμὸς ἀθάρτος, ἐν χαρτίδιοις ἢ στήλαις ἀψυχος ἀψύχοις, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀθανάτε φύσιως ἀφθάρτῳ ἐν ἀθανάτῳ ψυχῇ τυποθείς. *Philo Jud.* More to this purpoſe might be eaſily collected. (*b*) Λόγος ἰσχυρὸν θεῖ. *Ph. Jud.* (*c*) Τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἢ κυριεῦον τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος. *M. Anton.* Or as it is in *Plutarch*, τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνώτατον μέρος. *Principatus* in Tully, *Summus in anima gradus.* Tert.

1. That

1. That what is ſaid *ſect.* I. *prop.* IV. muſt be true with reſpect to ſuch a being for this further cauſe; becauſe to him nothing can be right, that interferes with reaſon, and nothing can interfere with truth, but it muſt interfere with reaſon. Such a harmony there is between them. For whatever is known to be true, reaſon either finds it, or allows it to be ſuch. Nothing can be taken for true by a rational being, if he has a reaſon to the contrary. 2. That there is to a rational being ſuch a thing as *religion* which may alſo upon this further account properly be called *natural*. For certainly to obey the law, which the Author of his being has given him, is religion: and to obey the law, which He has given or reveald to him by making it to reſult from the right uſe of his own natural faculties, muſt be to him his *natural religion*. 3. A careful obſervation of truth, the way to happineſs, and the practice of reaſon are in the iſſue the ſame thing. For, of the two laſt, each falls in with the firſt, and therefore each with other. And ſo, at laſt, natural religion is grounded upon this triple and ſtrict alliance or union of *truth*, *happineſs*, and *reaſon*; all in the ſame intereſt, and conſpiring by the ſame methods, to advance and perfect human nature: and its trueſt definition is, *The purſuit of happineſs by the practice of reaſon and truth.*

Permit me here again to inſert an obſervation *obiter.*

Obſ. The κριτήριον of right reaſon and truth, or that which is to be regarded in judging of right and truth is *private: that is*, every one muſt judge for himſelf. For ſince all reaſoning is founded originally in the knowledge of one's own private *ideas*, by virtue of which he becomes conſcious of ſome firſt truths, that are undeniable; by which he governs his ſteps in his purſuits after more truths, *&c.* the *criterion*, or that by which he tries his own reaſonings, and knows them to be right, muſt be the *internal* evidence he has already of certain truths, and the agreeableneſs of his inferences to them. One man can no more diſcern the objects of his own underſtanding, and their relations, by the faculties of another, than he can ſee with another man's eyes, or one ſhip can be guided by the helm of another. They muſt be his *own* faculties and conſcience, that muſt determin him. Therefore to demand another man's aſſent to any thing without conveying into his mind ſuch reaſons, as may produce a ſenſe of the truth of it, is to erect a tyranny over his underſtanding, and to demand a tribute which it is *not poſſible* for him to pay (*a*), It is true indeed, tho I cannot ſee with another man's eyes, yet I may be aſſiſted by another, who has better eyes, in finding an object and the circumſtances of it; and ſo men may be *aſſiſted* in making their judgments of things. They may be informed of things, which they did not know before, and which yet require a place among thoſe that are to be

(*a*) *Religio cogi non poteſt, verbis potius quàm verberibus res agenda eſt, ut ſit voluntas.* Lact.

conſiderd

conſider'd: and they may be directed what to advert principally upon; how to ſtate the queſtion; how to methodize their thoughts, and in general how to reaſon: eſpecially if they want learning, or have only that part of it, which is little converſant in cloſe reflections, and doth not teach them to reaſon, or (as the caſe too often is) teaches them not to reaſon. But ſtill this is all in order to produce ſuch a light in them, that by it they may ſee and judge for themſelves. An opinion, tho ever ſo true and certain to one man, cannot be transfuſed into another as true and certain by any other way, but by opening his underſtanding, and aſſiſting him ſo to order his conceptions, that he may find the reaſonableneſs of it *within himſelf.*

To prevent miſtakes I pray take notice here, that, tho I ſay men muſt judge for themſelves, I do not ſay they muſt in all caſes *act* according to their private and ſingle judgments. In reſpect of ſuch things, as are private, and concern themſelves *only*, or ſuch as are left open and ſubject to every man's own ſenſe, they may and ought; only preſerving a due deference to them, who differ from them, and are known upon other occaſions to have more knowledge and literature than themſelves: but when a ſociety is concerned, and hath determind any thing, it may be conſiderd as one perſon, of which he, who diſſents from the reſt, is only perhaps a ſmall particle; and then his judgment will be in a manner abſorbed and drownd in that of the majority, or of them to whom the power of judging is intruſted. But I muſt not digreſs too far from the main buſineſs, the ways of coming at *truth.*

XIII. *The reports of ſenſe are not of equal authority with the clear demonſtrations of reaſon, when they happen to differ.* It is true, the *ideas* cauſed by the impreſſion of ſenſible objects are real ideas, and truly known to the mind as they are in themſelves; and the mind may uſe them, and reaſon truly upon them: *that is*, the mind may make a right uſe of the *ideas*, which it finds in itſelf. But then whether theſe are the true ectypes of their originals, and drawn to the life, is many times a queſtion; and many times it is evident they are not. For that which has been anticipated under pr. III. but properly belongs to this, muſt be acknowledged. They are conveyd through *media* and by inſtruments ſuſceptive of different diſpoſitions and alterations, and may conſequently produce different repreſentations: and theſe cannot all be right. But ſuppoſe thoſe inſtruments and *media* to be as intire and pure, as when intireſt and pureſt; yet ſtill there may be in many reſpects an incapacity in the faculty to notify things juſt as they are. How mightily are the ſhape and ſize of a viſible object varied upon us according to its diſtance, and the ſituation of the place, from whence the proſpect is taken? Now theſe things cannot be ſaid of the reports, or rather determinations of reaſon. For in pure reaſoning we uſe our own ideas for *themſelves*, and ſuch as the mind knows them to be, not as repreſentatives

of things, that may be falsely exhibited. This *internal* reasoning may indeed be wrongly applied to *external* things, if we reason about them as being what they are not: but then this is the fault not of reason, but of sense, which reports the case wrong; or perhaps of the person, who has not been sufficiently industrious to inform himself.

That same familiar instance of vision proves further, that reason may be applied to *over-rule* and *correct* sense. For when the pictures of objects are pricked out by the pencils of rays upon the *retina* of the eye, and do not give the true figure of those objects (as they not always do, being diversly projected, as the lines proceeding from the several points happen to fall upon that concave surface;) this, tho it might impose upon a being, that has no faculty superior to sense, doth not impose upon our reason, which knows how the appearance is alter'd, and *why*. To think the sun (*a*) is not bigger, than it appears to the eye to be (*b*), seems to be the last degree of stupidity. He must be a brute (so far from being a philosopher), who does not know, that the same line (*v.g.* the diameter of the sun) at different distances subtends different angles at the eye. A small matter of reason may serve to confute sense in this and the like cases.

Obj. How can *reason* be more certain than *sense*, since reason is founded in abstractions, which are originally taken from sensible objects? *Ans.* Perhaps the mind may by being exercised at first about particular objects by degrees find in itself this *capacity* of considering things by their *species*, making abstractions, &c. which it would not have done, had it never known any of these particulars. But then after it has found this capacity in itself, and attaind to the knowledge of abstract and general *ideas*, I do not see why this capacity of reasoning by the help of them may not be used, upon this proficience, to censure and correct the advices of sense concerning even such particulars, as first gave occasion to the mind to exert this capacity and raise itself. Is it a new thing for a scholar to make such a progress in learning, as to be able *afterward* to teach the master, from whom he received his first rudiments? May not the modern philosophers correct the ancients, because these first shewd them the way, and led them into the study of nature? If we look impartially into the history of learning, and even of religion, we shall find that truth has generally advanced by degrees, and many times (very many; as if that was the method of introducing knowledge among men) risen out of *fable* and *error*, which gave occasion to those inquiries, by which themselves were detected. Thus blind ignorance was succeeded by a twilight of sense: this brightend by degrees: at last

(*a*) *Tantulus ille----sol.* Lucr. Poor creature! (*b*) *Nec nimio solis major rota----Esse potest, nostris quàm sensibus esse videtur.* Lucr. *Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse, quam videatur,* &c. Cic.

the

the ſun as it were roſe upon ſome parts of the commonwealth of learning, and cleard up many things: and I believe many more will in time be cleard, which, whatever men think, are yet in their *dark* and *uncultivated* ſtate. The underſtanding, tho it ſtarts from *particulars*, in time makes a further progreſs, taking in *generals*, and ſuch notions logical, metaphyſical, &c. as never could poſſibly come in by the ſenſes (*a*). Beſide, further, the *capacity* itſelf of admitting and conſidering general *ideas* was originally in the mind, and is not derived from without. The intelligences communicated by ſenſe are only an occaſion of uſing what it had before. Juſt as a maſter may, by the exerciſes he ſets, excite the ſuperior capacity of his ſcholar.

In a word, no man doth, or can pretend to believe his ſenſes, when he has a reaſon againſt it: which is an irrefragable proof, that reaſon is above ſenſe and controlls it. But,

XIV. *The reports of ſenſe may be taken for true, when there is no reaſon againſt it* (b). Becauſe when there is *no* reaſon *not* to believe, that alone is a reaſon for believing them. And therefore,

XV. *In this caſe to act according to them* (*i. e.* as taking the informations of ſenſe to be true) *is to act according to reaſon and the great law of our nature.*

Thus it appears that there are *two* ways, by which we may aſſure our ſelves of the truth of *many* things (*d*); or at leaſt may attain ſuch a degree of certainty, as will be ſufficient to determin our *practice*: by *reaſon*, and by *ſenſe under the government of reaſon*; *that is*, when reaſon ſupports it, or at leaſt doth not oppoſe it. By the former we diſcover ſpeculative truths; by the latter, or both together matters of fact.

XVI. *Where certainty is not to be had* (e), *probability muſt be ſubſtituted into the place of it*: that is, *it muſt be conſiderd, which ſide of the queſtion is the more probable.*

(*a*) *Natura etiam nullo docente profecta ab ijs, quorum, ex prima & inchoata intelligentia, genera cognovit, confirmat ipſa per ſe rationem, & perficit.* Cic. (*b*) *Semina nobis ſcientiæ dedit* [*natura,*] *ſcientiam non dedit.* Sen. (*c*) *Si ſani ſunt* [*ſenſus,*] *& valentes, & omnia removentur, qua obſtant & impediunt.* Cic. (*d*) *Socrates*'s ſaying, *ap. Cic. nihil ſe ſcire, niſi id ipſum*, ſavours of an affected humility, and muſt not be underſtood ſtrictly. But they, who followd, went further (*-----omnes pene veteres: qui nihil cognoſci, nihil percipi, nihil ſciri poſſe dixerunt*): and particularly Arceſilas *negabat eſſe quidquam quod ſciri poſſet*, ne illud quidem ipſum, *quod Socrates ſibi reliquiſſet.* And thus the abſurdity grew to a ſize, that was monſtrous. For no man can act, or even be alive, if he knows nothing at all. Beſide, to know that one knows no thing, is a contradiction: and not to know, that he knows even that, is not to know, whether he knows any thing, or not; and that is to know for ought he knows. (*e*) *Nec ſcire fas eſt omnia.* Hor.

Probability, or that, which in this caſe may incline one to believe any propoſition to be true rather than falſe, or any thing *to be* rather than *not to be*, or the contrary, will generally ſhew itſelf upon the application of theſe and ſuch like rules. 1. That may be reckond probable, which, in the eſtimation of reaſon, appears to be more agreeable to the *conſtitution* of nature. No body can certainly foretell, that *ſice-ace* will come up upon two dies fairly thrown before *ambs-ace*: yet any one would chooſe to lay the former, becauſe in nature there are twice as many chances for that as for the other. If a ſtrolling wolf ſhould light upon a lamb, it is not evidently known, that he will tear the lamb: but there is ſuch a natural propenſion in that kind to do it, that no body would much queſtion the event. (This inſtance might have been taken from amongſt men, who are generally as far as they can be, wolves one to another.) If a parent cauſes his child to be inſtructed in the foundations of uſeful learning, educates him virtuouſly, and gives him his firſt impulſe and direction in the way to true happineſs, he will be more likely to proceed and continue in it; than he would be to hit upon it, and continue in it too, if he was left to himſelf to be carried away by his own paſſions, or the influence of thoſe people, into whoſe hands he might fall, the bias of the former lying towards vice, and miſery in the end, and the plurality of the latter being either wicked or ignorant or both. So that the advantage in point of probability is on the ſide of good education (*a*). When *Herodotus* writes, that the *Egyptian* prieſts reported the ſun had within the compaſs of 11340 years twice riſen where it now ſets, and ſet where it riſes (*b*), what is fit to be believed concerning the truth of this relation (as of many others), is eaſily diſcernible by this rule. *Herodotus*, poſſibly delighting in teratical ſtories, might tell what he never heard: or the paſſage may be an interpolation; or it may be alterd in tranſcribing: or the prieſts, who pretended much to a knowledge of great antiquities, might out of mere vanity, to ſhew what children the *Greeks* were in reſpect of them, invent ſuch a monſtrous relation, and impoſe it upon them, whom they thought to have not much ſcience among them: or it might be got into their memoirs before their time, who related it to *Herodotus*, and ſo paſs upon poſterity, as many other fictions and *legends* have done. Theſe are ſuch things, as are well known to have happend often. But that the diurnal rotation of the earth about her axis ſhould be in-

(*a*) This was the opinion of the wiſe-man. Train up a child in the way he ſhould go, and when he is old, he will not depart from it. *Prov.* For learning in the days of youth, is like ingraving upon ſtone, but learning in the days of old age, is like writing upon ſand. *Qab ven.* Οὐ μικρὸν διαφέρει τὸ ἔτως ἢ ἔτως ἐυθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ· μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν. Ariſt. (*b*) Τετράκις ἤλιγον ἐξ ἀθέων τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατεῖλαι· ἐνθά τε νῦν καταδύνται ἐνθεῦτεν δὶς ἐπαντεῖλαι. ἐξ ἐνθεν νῦν ἀνατέλλει, ἐνθαῦτα δὶς καταδῦναι.

verted,

verted, is a *phænomenon*, that has never been known to happen by any body elſe, either before or ſince; that is favord by no obſervation; and that cannot be without great alteration in the mundane ſyſtem, or thoſe laws by which the motions of the planets, and of our earth among the reſt, are governd. That this account then may be falſe is very conſiſtent with the humor and circumſtances of mankind, but that it ſhould be true is very inconſiſtent with thoſe laws, by which the motions of the celeſtial bodies ſeem to be regulated, and tend to preſerve in their preſent courſes and directions. It is therefore *in nature* much more probable, that this account is falſe. The odds are on that ſide. 2. When any *obſervation* hath hitherto *conſtantly* held true, or *moſt commonly* proved to be ſo, it has by this acquired an eſtabliſhd credit; the cauſe may be preſumed to retain its former force; and the effect may be taken as probable, if in the caſe before us there doth not appear ſomething particular, ſome reaſon for exception. No man can demonſtrate, that the ſun will riſe again, yet every one doth, and muſt act, as if that was certain (*a*): becauſe we apprehend no decay in the cauſes, which bring about this appearance, nor have any other reaſon to miſtruſt the event, or think it will be otherwiſe a few hours hence, than it has been hitherto. There is no apodictical argument to prove, that any particular man will die: but yet he muſt be more than mad, who can preſume upon immortality here, when he finds ſo many generations all gone to a man, and the ſame *enemies*, that have laid them proſtrate, ſtill purſuing their *victories*. Theſe and ſuch like, tho in ſtrictneſs perhaps not certainties, are juſtly current for ſuch. So great is their probability. There are other obſervations, which, tho not ſo infallible as thoſe, deſerve yet to be thought of, and to have a ſhare in the direction of our judgments. *Ex. gr.* There have been men in the world and no doubt ſtill are, who, having had opportunities of impoſing falſities upon mankind, of cheating, or committing other wickedneſs, have yet in ſpite of temptation preſerved their integrity and virtue: but, ſince opportunity has ſo ſeldom faild to corrupt them who have been in poſſeſſion of her, and men's intereſts and paſſions continue in general the ſame, it is more probable her charms will ſtill have the ſame power and effect, which they uſe to have; which whoever doth not mind, will be wofully obnoxious to be abuſed by frauds *pious* and *impious* (*b*). Briefly, when there is no particular reaſon for the contrary, what has oftneſt happend, may from experience moſt reaſonably be expected to happen again. 3. When neither nature nor other obſervations point out the probable conjecture to us, we muſt be determind (if it be neceſſary for us to be determind at all) by the reports, and

(*a*) The world ſtill goes on the ſame way. (*b*) The ſimple believes every word. *Prov.* (which ſure one may convert thus, He that believes every word is very ſimple.)

ſenſe

ſenſe of them, whom we apprehend, judging with the beſt skill we have (*a*), to be moſt *knowing* (*b*) and *honeſt* (*c*). Of all theſe rules the *firſt* is that which deſerves the principal regard: the other two are of uſe, when nature ſo utterly excludes us from her boſom, that no opportunity is allowd of making a judgment. *Laſtly*, when nature, the frequent repetition of the ſame event, and the opinion of the beſt judges concurr to make any thing probable, it is ſo in the higheſt degree.

It appears from what has been ſaid concerning the nature and foundations of *probability*, that the force of it reſults from obſervation and reaſon together. For here the one is not ſufficient without the other. Reaſon without *obſervation* wants matter to work upon: and obſervations are neither to be made juſtly by our ſelves, nor to be rightly choſen out of thoſe made by others, nor to be aptly applied, without the aſſiſtance of *reaſon*. Both together may ſupport opinion and practice in the abſence of knowledge and certainty. For thoſe obſervations upon the nature of men and things, which we have made our ſelves, we know; and our own reaſoning concerning them, and deductions from them we know: and from hence there cannot but ariſe in many caſes an internal obligation to give our aſſent to this, rather than that; or to act one way, rather than another. And as to the obſervations of others, they may be ſo cautiouſly and skilfully ſelected, as to become almoſt our own: ſince our own reaſon and experience may direct us in the choice and uſe of them. The remarks and advice of *old men* (*d*), who have gone through variety of ſcenes, lived long enough to ſee the conſequences of their own and other peoples actings, and can now with freedom (*e*) look back and tell where they erred, are ordinarily ſure to be preferred to thoſe of *young* and raw actors. The *gnomæ*, apologues, *&c.* of *wiſe men*, and ſuch as have made it their buſineſs to be uſeful ſpies upon nature and mankind, national *proverbs*, and the like (*f*), may be taken as maxims commonly true. Men in their ſeveral profeſſions and arts, in which they have been educated,

(*a*) *Statuere enim, qui ſit ſapiens, vel maximè videtur eſſe ſapientis.* Cic. (*b*) *Non numero hæc judicantur, ſed pondere,* as *Tully* ſpeaks upon another occaſion. Therefore I cannot without a degree of indignation find a ſort of writers pleaſing themſelves with having diſcoverd ſome uncivilized nations, which have little or no knowledge of the Deity, *&c.* and then applying their obſervations to the ſervice of atheiſm. As if *ignorance* could prove any thing, or alter its nature by being general! (*c*) *Ariſtotle*'s known rule is Ἔνδοξα, τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς· καὶ τούτοις, ἢ τοῖς πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις. But it is not applicable to all caſes. (*d*) Δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι παρ' ἑυτῶν [περισβυτῶν] πυνθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ τινα ὁδὸν προϊοντας ἀκριβῶς, ἣν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἴσως δεήσει πορεύεσθαι, ποία τις ἐστι. *Plato.* (*e*) When *Sophocles*, now grown old, was asked, Πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τ' ἀφροδίσια, he anſwered, Εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε· ἀσμενίζεσθαι μέν τοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ λυττῶντά τινα, καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ὑποφυγών.----παντάπασι γὰρ ἥ γε τοιαύτη ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ πολλὴ ἡσυχὴ γίνεται καὶ ἐλευθερία. *Plato*, & *al.* (*f*) Ἐν βραχεῖ σφυρήλατον νοῦν περιέχοντα. *Plut.*

and

and exerciſed themſelves all their days, muſt be ſuppoſed to have greater knowledge and experience, than others can uſually have: and therefore, if through want of capacity or honeſty they do not either loſe, or belie their opportunities and experience, they are in reſpect of thoſe things, to which they have been bred and inured, more to be relied upon. And, laſtly, *hiſtories* written by credible and induſtrious authors, and red with judgment, may ſupply us with examples, parallel caſes, and general remarks, profitable in forming our manners, and opinions too. And by the frequent peruſal of them, and meditation upon them a dexterity in judging of dubious caſes is acquired. Much of the temper of mankind, much of the nature and drift of their counſels, much of the courſe of Divine providence is viſible in them.

To conclude; that we ought to follow *probability*, when certainty leaves us, is plain: becauſe then it becomes the *only* light and guide we have. For unleſs it is better to wander and fluctuate in *abſolute* uncertainty than to follow ſuch a guide; unleſs it be reaſonable to put out our *candle*, becauſe we have not the light of the *ſun*, it muſt be reaſonable to direct our ſteps by probability, when we have nothing clearer to walk by. And if it be reaſonable, we are obliged to do it by prop. XI. When their is nothing above *probability*, it doth govern: when their is nothing in the oppoſite ſcale, or nothing of equal weight, this in the courſe of nature muſt turn the beam. Tho a man, to reſume the inſtance before, cannot demonſtrate that *ſice-ace* will come up before *ambs-ace*, he would find himſelf obliged (if he could be obliged to lay at all) to lay on that ſide: nor could he not chooſe to do it. Tho he would not be certain of the chance, he would be certain of his own obligation, and on which ſide it lay.

Here then is another way of diſcovering, if not *truth*, yet what in practice may be ſuppoſed to be truth. *That is*, we may by this way diſcover, whether ſuch propoſitions as theſe be true, *I ought to do this, rather than that*; or, *to think ſo, rather than the contrary.*

Obſ. I have done now what I cheifly intended here. But, over and above that, we may almoſt from the premiſſes collect,

Firſt, the principal cauſes of *error*, which I take to be ſuch as theſe. 1. Want of *faculties*; when men pretend to judge of things above them. As ſome (ſtraying out of their proper element, and falling into the dark, where they find no *ideas* but their own dreams, come to) aſſert what they have no reaſon to aſſert: ſo others deny what there is the higheſt reaſon to believe, only becauſe they cannot *comprehend it*. 2. Want of due *reflection* upon thoſe *ideas* we have, or may have: by which it comes to paſs, that men are deſtitute of that knowledge, which is gaind

by

by the contemplation of them, and their relations; misapply names, confusedly: and sometimes deal in a set of words and phrases, to which no *ideas* at all belong, and which have indeed no meaning. Of kin to this is, 3. Want of proper qualifications and προπαιδίυματα. As, when illiterate people invade the provinces of scholars; the half-letterd are forward, and arrogate to themselves what a *modest*, *studious* man dares not (*a*), tho he knows more; and scholars, that have confined themselves to one sort of literature, lanch out into another: unsuccessfully all. 4. Not understanding in what the nature and force of a just *consequence* consists. Nothing more common than to hear people assert, that such a thing follows from such a thing; when it doth not follow: *i. e.* when such a consequence is founded in no axiom, no theorem, no truth that we know of. 5. Defects of *memory* and *imagination*. For men in reasoning make much use of these: memory is upon many occasions consulted, and sometimes draughts made upon the *phantasy*. If then they depend upon these, and these happen to be weak, clouded, perverted any way, things may be misrepresented, and men led out of the way by mis-shappen apparitions. There ought to be therefore a little *distrust* of these faculties, and such proper helps ought to be used, as perhaps the *best judgments* want the most. 6. Attributing too much to *sense*. For as necessary as our senses are to us, there are certainly many things, which fall not within their notice; many, which cannot be exhibited after the manner of sensible objects, and to which no images belong. Every one, who has but just saluted the mathematics and philosophy, must be convinced, that there are many things in nature, which seem absurd to sense, and yet must be admitted. 7. Want of *retirement*, and the practice of thinking and reasoning by our selves (*b*). A rambling and irregular life must be attended with a loose and irregular head, ill-connected notions, and fortuitous conclusions. Truth is the offspring of *silence*, unbroken meditations, and thoughts often revised and corrected. 8. The strength of appetites, passions, prejudices. For by these the understanding may be corrupted, or overborn: or at least the operations of the mind must be much obstructed by the intrusion of such solicitors, as are no retainers to the rational powers, and yet strong, and turbulent. Among other prejudices there is one of a particular nature, which you must have observed to be one of the *greatest* causes of modern irreligion. Whilst some opinions and rites are carried to such an immoderate height, as exposes the absurdity of them to the view of almost every body but them who raise them, not only gentlemen of the *belles lettres*, but even men of common sense, many

(*a*) *Sicut ἀμαθία μὲν θρᾴσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει* (è Thucyd.) *ita recta ingenia debilitat verecundia, perversa confirmat audacia.* Plin. jun. (*b*) Ὅταν τι βυλόμεθα ἀκριβῶς νοῆσαι, εἰς ἐρημίαν ἀποδιδράσκομεν καταμύομεν τὰς ὄψεις, τὰ ἄτα ἐπιφράτλόμεν, ἀποτατλόμεθα τᾶις διαθήσεσι. *Ph. Jud.*

times

times ſee through them; and then out of indignation and an exceſſive renitence, not ſeparating that which is true from that which is falſe, they come to deny both, and fall back into the contrary extreme, a contempt of all religion in general (*a*). 9. Ill ſtating of a queſtion; when men either put it wrong themſelves, or accept it ſo put from others. A ſmall addition or falſity ſlipped into the caſe will ferment, and ſpread itſelf: an artificial color may deceive one: an incumberd manner may perplex one. The queſtion ought to be preſented before its judge clean, and in its natural ſtate, without diſguiſe or diſtortion. To this laſt may be ſubjoind another cauſe, nearly allied to it; not fixing the ſenſe of *terms*, and (which muſt often follow) not rightly underſtanding what it is, that is to be examind and reſolved.

Secondly, the reaſon why the *many* are commonly in the wrong and ſo wretchedly misjudge things. The generality of people are not ſufficiently prepared, by a proper education, to find truth by reaſoning. And of them, who have liberal education, ſome are ſoon immerſed and loſt in pleaſures, or at leaſt in faſhionable methods of living, rolling from one viſit or company to another (*b*), and flying from nothing ſo much as from themſelves and the quiet retreats proper for meditation and reaſoning: others become involved in buſineſs and the intricate affairs of life, which demand their attention, and ingroſs their time: others fall into a ſlothful neglect of their ſtudies and diſuſe of what they have learnt, or want help and means to proceed, or only deſign to deceive life and gratify themſelves with the amuſements and ſenſual parts of learning: and others there are, whoſe misfortune it is to begin wrong, to begin with the concluſion; taking their opinions from places, where they have been bred, or accommodating them to their ſituation in the world, and the conditions of that imployment, by which they are to get their bread, before they have ever conſiderd them; and then making the ſubſequent buſineſs of their lives to diſpute for them, and maintain them, right or wrong. If ſuch men happen to be in the right, it is luck, and part of their portion, not the effect of their improvements: and if they happen to be in the wrong, the more they ſtudy, and the more learning they get, the more they are confirmed in their errors; and having ſet out with their backs upon truth, the further they go, the more they recede from it. Their knowledge is a kind of negative quantity, ſo much worſe or leſs than no knowledge. Of this ſort there are many: and very few indeed (with reſpect to the bulk of mankind), whoſe determinations and *tenents* were ever in the form of queſtions: there could not otherwiſe be ſo many ſects and different denominations of men, as there are, upon the face of the earth. The ſum of all in a few words is this: many qualifica-

(*a*) *Aliis nullus eſt deorum reſpectus, aliis pudendus.* Plin. Sen. The former part of this obſervation is in truth the effect of the latter. (*b*) *Pudet dicere frequentiam ſalutandi*, &c. Hieron.

tions are requiſite in order to judge of ſome truths, and particularly thoſe which are of *greateſt importance*: proper learning and penetration, vacancy from buſineſs, a detachment from the intereſt of all parties, much ſincerity and a perfect *reſignation* to the government of reaſon and force of truth; which are things not to be reconcild with the uſual ignorance, paſſions, tumultuary lives, and other circumſtances which carry moſt men tranſverſe.

Sect. IV. *Of the* Obligations *of imperfect Beings with reſpect to their* power of acting.

THERE remains yet *another* queſtion, ſuppoſed alſo to be propoſed by an objector, which muſt not be forgot; and upon which I ſhall beſtow this very ſhort ſection. The queſtion was this, *If a man can find out truth, may he not want the power of acting agreeably to it?*

I. *Nothing is capable of no obligation.* For to oblige *nothing* is the ſame as *not* to oblige.

II. *So far as any being has no power, or opportunity of doing any thing, ſo far is that being incapable of any obligation to do it*: or, *no being is capable of any obligation to do that, which it has not power or opportunity to do.* For that being, which has not the faculties or opportunity neceſſary to the doing of any thing, is in reſpect of that thing a being utterly unactive, no agent at all, and therefore as to that act nothing at all.

To require or command one to do any thing is to require him to apply a power ſuperior to the reſiſtence to be met with in doing it. To require him to apply ſuch a power is the ſame as to require that his power of ſuch a kind and degree be applied. But if he has no ſuch power, then his power of that kind and degree is *nothing*: and it is nothing, that is required to be applied. Therefore nothing is required to be done. It is juſt the ſame, as if a man was commanded to do ſomething with his third hand, when he has but two: which would be the ſame as to bid him to do it with *no* hand, or *not* bid him do it.

Without more ado, it is a truth confeſt by every body, that no body is obliged to impoſſibilities.

From hence will follow, after the manner of *corollaries*, the two following propoſitions.

III. *Inani-*

III. *Inanimate and unactive beings are capable of no obligation: nor merely ſenſitive of any obligation to act upon principles, or motives above ſenſe.*

IV. *The obligations of beings intelligent and active muſt be proportionable to their faculties, powers, opportunities; and not more.*

V. *To endeavour may fitly expreſs the uſe of all the opportunities and powers, that any intelligent and active, but imperfect, being hath to act.* For to endeavour is to do what one can: and this as every ſuch being may do, where ever he ſtands in the ſcale of imperfects, ſo none can do more. One may exert his endeavours with greater advantage or ſucceſs, than another; yet ſtill they are but *endeavours*.

VI. *The imputations of moral good and evil to beings capable of underſtanding and acting muſt be in proportion to their endeavours:* or, *their obligations reach, as far as their endeavours may.* This follows again from what has been ſaid: and ſo does this,

VII. and laſtly, *They who are capable of diſcerning truth, tho not all truths, and of acting conformably to it, tho not always or in all caſes, are nevertheleſs obliged to do theſe, as far as they are able:* or, *it is the duty of ſuch a being ſincerely to* endeavour *to practiſe* reaſon; *not to contradict any* truth, *by word or deed; and in ſhort, to treat every thing as being* what it is.

Thus the general duties of rational beings, mentiond in or reſulting from the preceding ſections, are brought together, and *finally* fixt under the *correction* or *limitation* in this laſt propoſition. This is the ſum of their religion, from which no exemption or excuſe lies. Every one can endeavour: every one can do what he can. But in order to that every one ought to be in *earneſt*, and to exert himſelf *heartily*; not ſtifling his own conſcience, not diſſembling, ſuppreſſing, or neglecting his own powers.

And now *needleſs* to me ſeem thoſe diſputes about *human liberty*, with which men have tired themſelves and the world. The caſe is much the ſame, as if a man ſhould have ſome great reward or advantage offerd to him, if he would get up and go to ſuch a place to accept it, or do ſome certain thing for it, and he, inſtead of going or doing any thing, falls into a tedious diſquiſition about his own *freedom*; whether he has the power to ſtir, or whether he is not chaind to his ſeat, and neceſſitated to ſit ſtill. The ſhort way of knowing this certainly is to try. If he can do nothing, no labour can be loſt; but if he is capable of acting and doth not act, the conſequences and blame muſt be juſtly chargeable upon himſelf. And I am perſuaded

ſuaded, if men would be ſerious, and put forth themſelves (*a*), they would find by experience, that their wills are not ſo univerſally and peremptorily determind by what occurs, nor predeſtination and fate ſo rigid (*b*), but that *much* is left to their own conduct (*c*). Up and try (*d*).

Sure it is in a man's power to keep his hand from his mouth: if it is, it is alſo in his power to forbear exceſs in eating and drinking. If he has the command of his own feet, ſo as to go either this way or that or no whither, as ſure he has, it is in his power to abſtain from ill company and vicious places. And ſo on (*e*).

This ſuggeſts a very material thought: that *forbearances*, at leaſt in all ordinary caſes, are within our power (*f*); ſo that a man may if he will, forbear to do that which contradicts truth: but where acting is required, that very often is not in his power. He may want abilities, or opportunities; and ſo may ſeem to contradict truth by his omiſſion, which, if his infirmities and diſadvantages were taken into the account, and the caſe was rightly ſtated, he would be found not to do.

(*a*) Τὰ χρὴς ἐπισάμιδα, ἢ γιγνώσκομεν, Οὐκ ἐκφονεῦμεν δ'. εἰ μὴν ἀργίας ὕπο, κλ. Eurip. *Pat in Arabic is to die:* and from hence the word *fatum* ſeems to come (as many *Latin* words do from that and other *Eaſtern* languages), death, if any thing, being *fatal* and neceſſary. Yet it doth not follow, that therefore the time or manner of dying is unmoveably fixt. Οὐ πάντα καθαρῶς ἐυσὶ διαῤῥηδὴν ἃ εἱμαρμένη περιέχει, ἀλλ' ὅσα καθόλκ. *Plut. Chryſippus ap. A. Gell.* ſeems to explain himſelf much after the ſame manner. The ancients moreover ſeem many times to make fate conditional. *Simulis ſi cura fuiſſet, Nec pater omnipotens Trojam, nec fata vetabant Stare,* &c. Virg. (*c*) What the *Phariſees* ſay, according to *Joſephus*, ſeems to be right. Οἱ μὲν ὧν Φαρισαῖοι τινα ἢ ἃ πάντα τῆς εἱμαρμένης εἶναι λέγουσιν ἔργον, τινὰ δ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν, συμβαίνειν τε ἢ ἃ γίνεσθαι. *R. Albo*, in relation to human actions (and the conſequent events), explains this opinion thus. Some of them are free, ſome of them are neceſſary, and others partly free, and partly neceſſary. But for men to charge their own faults upon fate or fortune has been an old practice: ἐθιλοκακήσαντας ---ἐπὶ τὴν κοινὴν ἐκείνην ἀπολογίαν καταφυγεῖν, κλ. Luc. (*d*) *Dimidium facti, qui cœpit, habet. ſapere aude.* Hor. *Ariſtotle* goes further than that old adagial ſaying (ἀρχὴ ἥμισυ παντός). His words are Δοκεῖ πλεῖον ἢ τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή. (e) Οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτω κακῶς συντέτακται τῶν ψυχὴν ἐχόντων, ὥστε ἀδελφὸν μὲν δυσὶ ποσὶν πρόσθας, ἢ φθέγγεσθαι γλώττῃαν, κλ. *Plut.* That in *Tibullus*, *Cùm bene juravi, pes tamen ipſe redit*, is a little poetic ſally. (*f*) Ὅλως δὲ πᾶσα ἀργία ἢ τῆς τυχούσης παῤῥεξίας ἐστὶν ὑπαγωγή· ὅθεν ἢ φονεύσεις, οὐ μοιχεύσεις. κτλ. Baſ.

SECT.

SECT. V. *Truths relating to the* Deity. *Of his exiſtence, perfection, providence,* &c.

I Have ſhewn in what the nature of *moral good* and *evil* conſiſts; *viz.* a conformity or diſagreement to *truth*, and thoſe things that are coincident with it, *reaſon* and *happineſs*: alſo, how truth is diſcoverd; by *ſenſe*, *or reaſon*, or *both*. I ſhall now ſpecify ſome of thoſe *truths*, which are of greateſt importance and influence, and require more reaſoning to diſcover them; leaving the reſt (common matters of fact) to the common ways of finding them. They reſpect principally either the *Deity*, or *our ſelves*, or *the reſt of mankind*. The firſt ſort are the ſubject of *this* ſection.

1. *Where there is a ſubordination of cauſes and effects, there muſt neceſſarily be a cauſe in nature prior to the reſt, uncauſed.* Or thus, *Where there is a ſeries, in which the exiſtence of one thing depends upon another, the exiſtence of this again upon ſome other, and ſo upwards, as the caſe ſhall be, there muſt be ſome independent being, upon whom it doth originally depend.*

If Z (ſome body) be put into motion by Y, Y by X, and X by W, it is plain that X moves Y, and Y moves Z only as they are firſt moved, X by W, and Y by X: that Z, Y, X are *moveds*, or rather Z more Y more X, taken together (*a*), are *one moved*: that W ſtands here as the firſt mover, or author of the motion, unmoved by any other: that therefore without W there would be a *moved* without a *mover*, which is abſurd (*b*): and laſtly, that of what length ſoever the *ſeries* may be, the caſe will be ever the ſame; *i. e.* if there be no *Firſt mover* (*c*) unmoved, there muſt be a *moved* without a *mover*.

Further, if W, whom we will ſuppoſe to be an intelligent being, and to have a power of *beginning* motion, hath this power *originally* in himſelf and *independently* of all others, then here not only the firſt mover in this *ſeries*, but a *Firſt being* and original cauſe is found. Becauſe that, which has a power of beginning motion *independent* of any other, is a *mover independent*; and therefore *is independent*, or has an independent exiſtence, ſince nothing can be a mover without *being*. But if W has not

(*a*) $\overline{Z \dagger Y \dagger X}$. (*b*) One might with the Στασιῶται (ſo called by *Ariſtotle*, *ap. S. Emp.*) as well deny, that there is any ſuch thing as *motion*, as ſay there is *motion* without a *mover*; or, which is the ſame, a *firſt mover*. (*c*) Πρῶτον μὴ ἀκίνητον. *Plato*. Ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἀκίνητος. *Id.* Πρῶτον, κινοῦν, *Ariſt.*

this

this power independently in himſelf, then he muſt receive it from ſome other, upon whom he depends, and whom we will call V. If then V has a power of *conferring a faculty* of producing motion originally and independently in himſelf, here will be a *Firſt, independent cauſe*. And if it can be ſuppoſed, that he has it not thus, and that the *ſeries* ſhould riſe too high for us to follow it; yet however we cannot but conclude, that there *is ſome* ſuch *cauſe*, upon whom this train of beings and powers muſt depend, if we reaſon as in the former paragraph. For,

Univerſally, if Z be *any effect whatſoever*, proceeding from or depending upon Y as the *cauſe* of its exiſtence, Y upon X, X upon W, it is manifeſt that the exiſtence of all, Z, Y, X does *originally* come from W, which ſtands here as the Supreme cauſe, depending upon nothing: and that without it X could not be, and conſequently neither Y, nor Z. Z, Y, X, being all effects (or dependents), or rather Z more Y more X *one effect*, without W there would be an effect without a cauſe. Laſtly, let this retrogreſſion from effects to their cauſes be continued ever ſo far, the ſame thing will ſtill recur, and without ſuch a cauſe as is before mentiond the whole will be an effect without an efficient, or a dependent without any thing to depend upon; *i. e. dependent, and not dependent*.

Obj. The *ſeries* may aſcend infinitely (*a*), and for that reaſon have no *firſt* mover or cauſe. *Anſw.* If a *ſeries* of bodies moved can be ſuppoſed to be *infinite*, then taken together it will be equal to an *infinite body* moved: and this *moved* will not leſs *require* a mover than a finite body, but *infinitely more*. If I may not be permitted to place a firſt mover at the top of the *ſeries*, becauſe it is ſuppoſed to be infinite, and to have no beginning; yet ſtill there muſt of neceſſity be *ſome* cauſe or author

(*a*) The greateſt men among the ancients denied the poſſibility of ſuch an aſcent. Οὔτε γὰρ τόδ' ἐν τοῖς δυνατὸν εἶναι εἰς ἄπειρον. *Ariſt.* If there could be ſuch a proceſs, then all the parts of it but the laſt would be μέσα: and then εἰπερ μηδὲν ἔσται τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλως ἄτιον οὐδὲν ἔσται, κλ. To ſuppoſe one thing moved by another, this by another, and ſo εἰς ἄπειρον, is to ſuppoſe ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως οὔτε κινοῦν ἔσται ὅτε κινούμενον, μὴ ὄντος ἀρχῆς τῆς κινούσης, *Simpl.* Not only thoſe *Arabian* philoſophers called *Hebr. Medabberim*, Orators, *Arab. Almutecalmon*, Ready writers, but many of the elder *Jews* have agreed with the *Greeks* in this matter, and added arguments of their own. Of the former ſee *Mor. nebok. & al.* particularly *S. Kozri*: where their firſt argument ſeems to be ſtrong (and much the ſame with the fourth in *S. Emunoth*). If the time that runs on, has no beginning, then the men which exiſted in that time that runs on until now are infinite, and what is infinite, can never be in fact. For tho', as *Muſcatus* obſerves, theſe reaſonings of the *Medabberim* do not pleaſe the doctor; yet moſt certainly let the *ſeries* of cauſes and effects be what it will, it is juſt as long *downward* as *upward*; and if they are infinite and inexhauſtible one way, they muſt be ſo the other too: and then what *Saad. Ga.* ſays, takes place, if our exiſtence never begins, we ſhall never be. There is another argument of this kind in *Justin M.* which deſerves notice, what ſtreſs ſoever may be laid upon it. Εἰ τὰ μέλλοντα μίξει τοῦ χρόνου, ſays he, ἔστιν ἄν ἐπὶ τὸ γεγονὸς μίξει τοῦ χρόνου πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι μέλλον· ἦν ἄρα ὅτε οὐκ ἦν τὸ γεγονὸς μίξει τοῦ χρόνου.

of

of the motion (*a*), different from all theſe bodies, becauſe there being (*by the ſuppoſition*) no one body in the *ſeries*, that moves the next, but only in conſequence of its being moved firſt itſelf, there is no one of them that is not *moved*, and the whole can be conſiderd together but as an infinite body moved, and which muſt therefore be moved by *ſomething*.

The ſame kind of anſwer holds good in reſpect of *all* effects and their cauſes in general. An *infinite* ſucceſſion of effects will require an *infinite* efficient, or a cauſe *infinitely effective*. So far is it from requiring *none*.

Suppoſe a *chain* (*b*) hung down out of the heavens from an *unknown* height, and tho every link of it gravitated toward the earth, and what it hung upon was not viſible, yet it did not deſcend, but kept its ſituation; and upon this a queſtion ſhould ariſe, *What ſupported or kept up this chain*: would it be a ſufficient anſwer to ſay, that the *firſt* (or loweſt) link hung upon the ſecond (or that next above it), the *ſecond* or rather the *firſt and ſecond together* upon the *third*, and ſo on *ad infinitum*? For what holds up the *whole*? A *chain* of *ten* links would fall down, unleſs ſomething able to bear it hindred: one of *twenty*, if not ſtaid by ſomething of a yet greater ſtrength, in proportion to the increaſe of weight: and therefore one of *infinite* links certainly, if not ſuſtained by ſomething *infinitely* ſtrong, and capable to bear up an infinite weight. And thus it is in a *chain* of cauſes and effects (*c*) tending, or as it were *gravitating*, towards ſome end. The laſt (or loweſt) depends, or (as one may ſay) is *ſuſpended* upon the cauſe above it: this again, if it be not the firſt cauſe, is ſuſpended as an effect upon ſomething above it, *&c.* (*d*). And if they ſhould be in-

(*a*) *Ariſtotle* himſelf, who aſſerts the eternity of *motion*, aſſerts alſo the neceſſity of a firſt and eternal *mover*. (*b*) Σειρὰν χρυσείην ἐξ ὐρανόθεν------. Hom. *Aurea de cælo----funis* is mentiond too by *Lucr.* (*c*) It was poſſible, that a thing ſhould have an infinite concatenation (of cauſes) from eternity, then the effect would be infinite. *S. Iggar*, Where more may be ſeen of this Concatenation out of *Ibn. Sinai, Maim, &c.* (*d*) The chain muſt be faſtend ἀεὶ ἑτέρου Οὐλύμποιο. *Invenietur*, ſays *Macrobius*, *preſſius intuenti à ſummo Deo uſque ad ultimam rerum facturam connexio: & hac eſt Homeri* catena aurea, *quam pendere de cælo in terras Deum juſſiſſe commemorat.* This matter might be illuſtrated by other ſimilitudes (even the chain, or concatenation of the *Cabbala* might ſerve for one): but I ſhall ſet down but one more: and in that indeed the motion is inverted, but the thing is the ſame taken either way. It occurs in *Hoob. halleb.* and afterward in *Reſh. hhokm.* Suppoſe a row of blind men, of which the laſt laid his hand upon the ſhoulder of the man next before him, he on the ſhoulder of the next before him, and ſo on till the foremoſt grew to be quite out of ſight; and ſome body asking, what guide this ſtring of blind men had at the head of them, it ſhould be anſwerd, that they had no guide, nor any head, but one held by another, and ſo went on, *ad infin.* would any rational creature accept this for a juſt anſwer? Is it not to ſay, that infinite blindneſs (or blindneſs, if it be infinite) ſupplies the place of ſight, or of a guide?

finite

finite, unleſs (agreeably to what has been ſaid) there is ſome *cauſe* upon which all hang or depend, they would be but an infinite effect without an efficient: and to aſſert there is any ſuch thing, would be as great an *abſurdity*, as to ſay, that a finite or *little* weight wants ſomething to ſuſtain it, but an infinite one or the *greateſt* does not.

II. *A Cauſe or Being, that has in nature no ſuperior cauſe, and therefore* (by the terms) *is alſo unproduced, and independent, muſt be ſelf-exiſtent*: i. e. *exiſtence muſt be eſſential to him*; or, *ſuch is his nature, that he cannot but be* (*a*). For every being muſt either exiſt *of itſelf*, or *not of itſelf*: that which exiſts not of itſelf muſt derive its exiſtence from ſome other, and ſo be *dependent*: but the Being mentiond in the propoſition is ſuppoſed to be *independent* and *uncauſed*. Therefore he muſt exiſt, not *this* way, but the *other*. The root of His exiſtence can be ſought for no where, but in His own nature: to place it any where elſe is to make a cauſe *ſuperior* to the *ſupreme*.

III. *There muſt be ſuch a Being.* For, (beſide what has been ſaid already) if there was not at leaſt *one* ſuch Being, *nothing could be* at all (*b*). For the *univerſe* could not *produce it ſelf* (*c*); nor could any *part* of it produce itſelf, and then produce the *reſt*: becauſe this is ſuppoſing a thing to *act* before *it is*.

(*a*) So *Ariſtotle* ſays of the firſt mover, Οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν· ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστι, κλ. And after him the *Arabic* philoſophers, *Maimonides*, *Albo*, *&* *al. paſſ.* teach all that God exiſts *neceſſarily*. He is free from falſhood: to ſuppoſe him not to be implies a falſity; or, He cannot be ſuppoſed not to be. This ſeems to be the import of that name, by which God calls himſelf in *Moſes*'s hiſtory; I am that I am, or in one word, I am; which in the mouth of one who ſpeaks of Him in the third perſon is, He is, or the Lord. So *Philo* explains it; Ἔιναι πίφυκα. So *Abarbanel*; I am becauſe I am, For my exiſtence depends only on my ſelf; adding moreover, that it ſhewd God to be not, like other Beings, of a contingent, or only poſſible Being, but a neceſſary Being of Himſelf. And ſo *R. L. b. Gerſh.* He is God, becauſe he is thy Being, that exiſts of himſelf. I omit others, who write after the ſame manner. There have been even heathens, who ſeemd to think, that ſome ſuch name as this belongd to the Deity, and for the ſame reaſon. For as *Ehve* I am, and thence *Jehova* the Lord are uſed above, ſo *Plutarch* ſays, that in addreſſing to Him in the ſecond perſon Ἐι (Thou art) is ἀντοτελὴς τῦ Θεῦ προσαγόρευσις ἢ προσφώνησις: and that by this compellation we give Him ἀληθῆ ἢ ἀψευδῆ ἢ μόνην μόνῳ προσήκουσαν τὴν τῦ ἔιναι προσαγόρευσιν. Ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντως τῦ ἔιναι μέτεστιν ἰδίν· it is τὸ ἀΐδιον ἢ ἀγενητὸν ἢ ἄφθαρτον that is ὄντως ὄν. (*b*) Something muſt be a neceſſary Being, otherwiſe there would be no Being at all: every thing cannot be a contingent Being, *&c. Mor. neb. & al.* (*c*) This needs no demonſtration. But there is a very old one in *S. Emun.* and after in *Hhob. halleb.* He that makes himſelf, can't avoid one of theſe two things, that he made Himſelf, before he was, or after that he was, and thoſe two things are impoſſible.

IV. *Such*

IV. *Such a Being, as is before deſcribed, muſt not only be eternal, but infinite. Eternal* He muſt be, becauſe there is no way, by which ſuch a Being can either *begin* or *ceaſe* to be, exiſtence being of His eſſence. And *infinite* He muſt be, becauſe He can be *limited* by no other as to his exiſtence. For if there was any being able to limit Him, He muſt be *inferior* to that being. He muſt alſo in that caſe be *dependent*: becauſe he muſt be beholden to that being for his being *what He is*, and that He is not confined within *narrower* limits. Beſide, if His *preſence* (whatever the manner of it is) was any where excluded, He would not be *there*: and if *not there*, He might be ſuppoſed to be *not elſewhere*: and thus he might be ſuppoſed *not to be at all*. But ſuch a Being, as is deſcribed in the II. prop. cannot ſo much as be *ſuppoſed not to be*.

V. *Such a Being is above all things, that fall under our cognizance: and therefore his manner of exiſtence is above all our conceptions.* For He is a *neceſſary* exiſtent: but nothing within our comprehenſion is of this kind. We know no being, but what we can *imagine not to be* without any contradiction or repugnance to nature: nor do we know *of any* beſide this Supreme being himſelf. For with reſpect to Him indeed we know, *by reaſoning*, that there *muſt be* One being who cannot be ſuppoſed not to be; juſt as certainly as we know there is any thing at all: tho we cannot know *Him*, and how he exiſts. Adequate ideas of eternity (*a*) and infinity are above us, us finites (*b*).

(*a*) What relation or analogy there is between *time* (a flux of moments) and *eternal* (unchangeable) exiſtence; how any being ſhould be not older *now*, than he was 5000 years ago, *&c.* are ſpeculations attended with inſuperable difficulties. Nor are they at all cleard by that of *Timaus ap. Plat.* Ὡς ποτ' ἐίδιον παράδειγμα τὸν ἰδανικὸν κόσμον ὧδε ἀρτιος ἐγεννήθη, ὅυτως ὰς πρὸς παράδειγμα τὸν ἀιῶνα ὅδε χρόν@ σὺν κόσμῳ ἰδαμιουργήθη; or that in *Philo*, Ἀιὼν ἀναγράφεται τῷ νοητῷ θε@ κόσμῳ, ὡς ἀισθητῷ χρόν@. Many philoſophers therefore have thought themſelves obliged to deny, that God exiſts *in time*. Τό, τ' ἦν, τό, τ' ἔσται, χρόνε γεγονότ@ ἰδέα, φέροντες λαυθάνομεν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀίδιον ἰυσίαν, ὀυκ ὀρθῶς, κλ. Plato. Ἔστιν ὁ Θεὸς, χρὴ φάναι, ἦ ἦν κατ' ἰδέαν χρόνον ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν ἀιῶνα τὸν ἀκίνητον, ἦ ἄχρονον ἦ ἀνήκλιτον, ἦ οὖ πρότερον, ἰδὲν ἐστιν, ἰδὲ ὕστερον ἰδὲ νεώτερον· ἀλλ' ἕις ὢν ἐπὶ τῷ νῦν τὸ ἀεὶ πεπλήρωκε, κλ. *Plut.* God be praiſed, There is no proportion between Him, and between time. *Maim.* He does not exiſt in time. *Id. Albo* has a whole chapter to ſhew, that the bleſſed God does not fall under time. But then he owns, that their *Rabbi*'s do not mean definite time, or time abſolutely taken, or that which is not numbred, or meaſured, and that is the duration which was before the Creation, but the time which is meaſured by the motion of the Sphere, and which is called the order of times, not definite time. In ſhort, they reckon (to uſe *R. Gedal*'s words) that time, when it is not created, and duration, is not called time. And ſo what they ſay, doth not include all the preſent difficulty, *time* in their uſe of the word being confined to the duration of this world, which according to them is new. Yet ſee b. 2. c. 19. But as to God, it is impoſſible to ſay of him, that he has paſt more time now, than in the days of *David*, or than at the Creation of the world. (*b*) Οἶδα μὲν πολλὰ ἐκ ἐπιστάμεν@ δὶ ἀυτῶν τὸν τρόπον.---ὅτι ἀναρχός ἐστι [ὁ Θεὸς], ἦ ἀγένητ@, ἦ ἀΐδι@, οἶδα. τὸ δὲ πῶς ἐκ οἶδα. So *Chryſoſtom.*

In inquiring after the cauſes of things, when we find (or ſuppoſe) this to be the cauſe of that, another thing to be the cauſe of this again, and ſo on if we can proceed, it may always be demanded with reſpect to the laſt cauſe that we can comprehend, *What is the cauſe of that?* So that it is not *poſſible* for us to terminate our inquiries of this kind but in ſomething, which is to us *incomprehenſible*. And therefore the Supreme cauſe muſt certainly be ſuch (*a*). But tho it is impoſſible for us to have an adequate notion of his manner of exiſtence, yet we may be ſure that,

VI. *He exiſts in a manner, which is perfect.* For He, who exiſts of himſelf, depends in no regard upon any other, and (as being a Supreme cauſe) is the fountain of exiſtence to other beings, muſt exiſt in the *uppermoſt* and *beſt* manner of exiſting. And not only ſo, but (ſince He is *infinite* and *illimited*) He muſt exiſt in the beſt manner *illimitedly* and *infinitely*. Now to exiſt thus is infinite goodneſs of exiſtence; and to exiſt in a manner *infinitely good* is to be *perfect*.

VII. *There can be but One ſuch Being* (*b*). That is, as it appears by prop III. that there muſt be at leaſt *one* independent Being, ſuch as is mentiond in prop. I. ſo now, that in reality there is *but One* (*c*). Becauſe his manner of exiſtence being perfect and *illimited*, that manner of being (if I may ſpeak ſo) is *exhauſted* by Him, or belongs ſolely to Him (*d*). If any other could partake with him in it, He muſt want what that other had; be *deficient* and *limited*. Infinite and illimited incloſe all (*e*).

If there could be *two* Beings each by himſelf *abſolutely* perfect, they muſt be either of the *ſame*, or of *different* natures. Of the *ſame* they cannot be; becauſe thus, *both* being *infinite*, their exiſtences would be *coincident*: that is, they would be but the *ſame* or *one*. Nor can they be of *different* natures: becauſe if their natures were *oppoſite* or *contrary* the one to the other, being equal (infinite both and every where meeting the one with the other), the one would juſt *deſtroy* or be the *nega-*

(*a*) *Simonides* had good reaſon ſtill to double upon *Hiero* the number of days allowd for anſwering that queſtion, *Quid, ut quale ſit Deus?* Ap. Cic. (*b*) *Nec viget quidquam ſimile aut ſecundum.* Hor. (*c*) In *Mor. neb. Maimonides* having proved, that there muſt be ſome Being, who exiſts *neceſſarily*, or whoſe exiſtence is *neceſſary* conſidered in himſelf; proceeds from this neceſſity of exiſtence to derive *incorporeity*, abſolute *ſimplicity*, *perfection*, and particularly *unity*, It is not poſſible, that there ſhould be two neceſſary Beings: there is nothing like him, nor is He changeable. (*d*) Therefore by *Plato* He is called Ὁ ἕις, *the One*. (*e*) *Deus, ſi perfectus eſt,---ut eſſe debet, non poteſt eſſe niſi unus, ut in eo ſint omnia.* If there could be more Gods than one, *tantum ſingulis deerit, quantum in cæteris fuerit*, Lact.

tion

sion of the other (*a*): and if they are ſuppoſed to be only different, not oppoſite, then if they differ as *diſparates*, there muſt be ſome *genus* above them; which cannot be: and however they differ, they can only be ſaid at moſt to be beings perfect in their *reſpective kinds*. But this is not to be *abſolutely* perfect; it is only to be perfect in *this* or *that* reſpect: and to be only thus implies imperfection in *other* reſpects.

What has been here ſaid is methinks ſufficient to ruin the *Manichean* cauſe, and exclude the *independent principle of evil*. For if we cannot account for the exiſtence of that *evil*, which we find by experience to be in the world, it is but one inſtance out of many of our ignorance. There may be reaſons for it, tho we do not *know* them. And certainly no ſuch experience muſt make us deny *axioms* or *truths* equally certain (*b*). There are, beſide, ſome things relating to this ſubject, which deſerve our attention For as to *moral* good and evil, they ſeem to depend upon our ſelves (*c*). If we do but endeavour, *the moſt* we can, to do what we ought, we ſhall not be guilty of *not doing* it (ſect. IV.): and therefore it is our fault, and not to be charged upon any other being (*d*), if guilt and *evil* be introduced by *our* neglect, or abuſe of our own liberty and powers (*e*). Then as to *phyſical* evil; without it much phyſical *good* would be loſt, the one neceſſarily inferring the other (*f*). Some things *ſeem* to be evil, which would not appear to be ſuch, if we could ſee through the *whole* contexture of things (*g*). There are not *more* evil than good things in the world, but ſurely more of the *latter* (*h*). Many evils of *this* kind, as well as of the *former*, come by our own *fault*; ſome perhaps by way of *puniſhment*; ſome of *phyſic* (*i*); and ſome as the *means* to happineſs, not otherwiſe to be obtaind. And if there is a future ſtate, that which ſeems to be wrong *now* may be rectified *hereafter*. To all which more may yet be added. As, that *matter* is not capable of perfection; and therefore where that is concernd, there *muſt be* imperfections, and conſequently evils (*k*). So that to ask, why God permits evil, is

(*a*) As light and darkneſs are. Δύο γὰρ ἐξισάζοντα ἀλλήλοις κατ' ἐναντίωσιν φθαρτικὰ ἴσαι πάντως τῆς ἀλλήλων συστάσεως. *Baſ.* There can be no ſuch law between them, as is ſaid to be among the Heathen deities. Θεοῖσι δ' οὐδ' ἔχει νόμος. Οὐδὲν ἀπαντᾶν ἔλεγται πρόθυμόν τῷ τὸ θέλοντος, κλ. *Eurip.* (*b*) Ἀπόλωλεν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἐπεὶ σὺ δυσχεῖς: *Id.* (*c*) Ψυχὴν ἔχεις ἀντεξουσίαν.... ἡ γὰρ κατὰ γένεσιν ἁμαρτάνεις, ἅτε κατὰ τύχην προηγουμένως, κλ. *Cyr. Hier.* (*d*) Ὧν αὐτὸς ἔι κύριος, τούτων τὰς αἰτίας μὴ ζητήσῃς ἐτέρωθεν. *S. Baſ.* (*e*) *Muſt God extinguiſh ſun, moon, and ſtars, becauſe ſome people worſhip them?* Miſhn. Αὐτῷ τῷ ἑλομένῳ αἰτία, Θεὸς ἀναίτιος. *Max. T.* (*f*) Ἡ δίψα μὲν σώματι παρασκευάζει ἡδονὴν ποτοῦ, κλ. *Max. T.* This obſervation might be extended a great way. If there was, *v. g.* no ſuch thing as *poverty*, there could be no *riches*, or no great benefit by them; there would be ſcarce any arts or ſciences, *&c.* Ἂν γὰρ ἀνέλῃς τὴν πενίαν, οὐ ἔις τὴν σύστασιν ἀνεῖλες ἅπασαν, κλ. *Chryſ.* (*g*) Τὰ μέρη πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ σύμφωνα ἢ ἁρμόττοντα ἐκείνῳ (with more to this purpoſe). *Plot.* (*h*) V. Mor. nebok. 3. 12. (*i*) Πολυειδὴς ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἰατρική. *Simpl.* (*k*) Κακὰ ἔλαττώματα τῆς ὕλης. *Plut.*

to ask, why he permits a *material* world, or ſuch a being as *man* is (*a*); indowd indeed with ſome noble faculties, but incumberd at the ſame time with *bodily* paſſions and propenſions. Nay, I know not whether it be not to ask, why He permits any imperfect being; and that is, any being at all: which is a bold demand, and the anſwer to it lies perhaps too deep for us. If this world be deſignd for a *palæſtra*, where men (*b*) are to *exerciſe* their faculties and their virtues, and by that prepare themſelves for a ſuperior ſtate (*c*) (and who can ſay it is not?) there muſt be *difficulties* and *temptations*, occaſions and opportunities for this exerciſe. Laſtly, if there are evils of which men know not the true *origin*; yet if they would but ſeriouſly reflect upon the many marks of *reaſon*, *wiſdom* and *goodneſs* every where to be obſerved in inſtances which they *do* or *may* underſtand, they could ſcarce doubt but the ſame things prevaild in thoſe, which they *do not* underſtand. If I ſhould meet with a *book*, the author of which I found had diſpoſed his matter in beautiful order, and treated his ſubjects with reaſon and exactneſs; but at laſt, as I red on, came to a *few* leaves written in a language which I did not know: in this caſe I ſhould cloſe the book with a full perſuaſion, that the ſame vein of good ſenſe, which ſhewd itſelf in the former and much greater part of it, ran thro the other alſo: eſpecially having arguments *à priori*, which obliged me to believe, that the author of it all was the ſame perſon. This I ſhould certainly do, rather than deny the force of thoſe arguments, in order to aſſert *two* authors of the *ſame* book. But the evil principle has led me too far out of my way, therefore to return.

VIII. *All other beings depend upon that Being mentiond in the foregoing propoſition for their exiſtence.* For ſince there can be but one perfect and independent being, the reſt muſt be imperfect and dependent: and ſince there is nothing elſe, upon which they can, *ultimately*, depend beſide Him, upon Him, they *muſt* and *do* depend.

IX. *He is therefore the Author of nature: nor can any thing be, or be done, but what He either cauſes (immediately, or mediately), or permits.* All beings (by the laſt) depend upon Him for their exiſtence: upon whom depends their exiſtence, upon him alſo muſt depend the intrinſic manner of their exiſtence, or the *natures* of theſe beings: and

(*a*) To that queſtion, Why are we not ſo made, ὅτι μηδὲ ξελομένοις ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν; *S. Baſil* anſwers, Becauſe ἀρετὴ ἐκ προαιρέσεως ἐ ἐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται. And he who blames the Deity becauſe we are not impeccable, ἐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ τὴν ἄλογον φύσιν τῆς λογικῆς προτιμᾷ, ἐ τὴν ἀκίνητον ἐ ἀνόρμητον τ᾽ προαιρετικῆς ἐ ἐμπράκτε. (*b*) Ἀθληταὶ ἀρετῆς, as *Philo*. (*c*) In *Chryſoſtom*'s ſtyle, ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἐ καθάπερ ἐν παλαίστρᾳ ἐπὶ τῷ παρόντι βίῳ ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἵνα μετὰ τὸ λυθῆναι τὸ θέατρον λαμπρὸν ἀναδήσασθαι δυνηθῶμεν τ᾽ στέφανον.

again

again upon whom depend their being and nature, upon Him depend the *neceſſary effects* and *conſequences* of their being, and being ſuch as they are in themſelves. Then, as to the *acts* of ſuch of them as may be *free agents*, and the effects of them, He is indeed *not* the Author of thoſe; becauſe by the terms and ſuppoſition they proceed from agents, who have no neceſſity impoſed upon them by Him to act either this or that way. But yet however theſe *free agents* muſt depend upon Him *as ſuch:* from him they derive their power of acting: and it is He, who permits them to uſe their liberty; tho many times, through their own fault, they uſe it amiſs. And, laſtly, as to the nature of thoſe *relations*, which lie between ideas or things really *exiſting*, or which ariſe from facts already *done and paſt*, theſe reſult from the natures of the *things* themſelves: all which the ſupreme being either cauſes, or permits (as before). For ſince things can be but in one manner at once, and their mutual relations, ratio's, agreements, diſagreements, *&c.* are nothing but their manners of being with reſpect to each other, the natures of theſe *relations* will be determind by the natures of the *things*.

From hence now it appears, that whatever expreſſes the exiſtences or non-exiſtences of things, and their mutual relations *as they are*, is true by the *conſtitution* of nature: and if ſo, it muſt alſo be agreeable to His perfect *comprehenſion* of all truth, and to His *will*, who is at the head of it. Tho the act of A (ſome free agent) is the effect of his *liberty*, and can only be ſaid to be *permitted* by the Supreme being; yet when it is once *done*, the relation between the *doer* and the *deed*, the agreement there is between A and the idea of one who has committed ſuch a fact, is a *fixt* relation. From thenceforward it will *always* be predicable of him, that he was the doer of it: and if any one ſhould deny this, he would go counter to nature and that great Author of it, whoſe exiſtence is now proved. And thus thoſe arguments in ſect. I. prop. 4. which turned only upon a *ſuppoſition* that there was ſuch a Being, are here *confirmed* and *made abſolute*.

X. *The one ſupreme and perfect Being, upon whom the exiſtence of all other beings and their powers originally depend, is that Being, whom I mean by word the* GOD. There are other *truths* ſtill remaining in relation to the Deity, which we *may know*, and which are *neceſſary to be known* by us, if we would endeavour to demean our ſelves toward Him according to *truth* and what He is. And they are ſuch, as not only tend to rectify our opinions concerning His nature and attributes; but alſo may ſerve at the ſame time as *further proofs* of His exiſtence, and an amplification of ſome things touched perhaps too lightly. As,

XI. GOD.

XI. GOD *cannot be corporeal*: or, *there can be no corporeity in God.* There are many things in *matter* utterly inconſiſtent with the nature of ſuch a *Being*, as it has been demonſtrated God muſt be.

Matter exiſts in *parts*, every one of which, by the term, is *imperfect* (*a*): but in a Being abſolutely perfect there can be nothing that is imperfect.

Theſe *parts*, tho they are many times kept cloſely united by ſome occult influence, are in truth ſo many *diſtinct* bodies, which may, at leaſt in our imagination, be disjoind or placed otherwiſe: nor can we have any idea of matter, which does not imply a natural diſcerpibility and ſuſceptivity of various ſhapes and modifications: *i.e.* mutability ſeems to be *eſſential* to it. But God, exiſting in a manner that is perfect, exiſts in a manner that muſt be *uniform*, always one and the ſame, and in nature *unchangeable* (*b*).

Matter is incapable of *acting*, *paſſive* only, and *ſtupid:* which are defects, that can never be aſcribed to him who is the Firſt cauſe or Prime agent, the Supreme intellect, and altogether perfect.

Then, if He is *corporeal*, where ever there is a *vacuum*, He muſt be *excluded*, and ſo becomes a being bounded, finite, and as it were full of chaſms.

Laſtly, there is no *matter* or body, which may not be *ſuppoſed not to be*; whereas the idea of God, or that Being upon whom all others depend, involves in it exiſtence.

XII. *Neither infinite ſpace, nor infinite duration, nor matter infinitely extended, or eternally exiſting, nor any, nor all of theſe taken together, can be God.* For,

Space taken ſeparately from the things, which poſſeſs and fill it, is but an empty ſcene or *vacuum:* and to ſay, that infinite ſpace is God, or that God is infinite ſpace, is to ſay that He is an infinite *vacuum:* than which nothing can be more *abſurd* or *blaſphemous*. How can *ſpace*, which is but a vaſt void, rather the negation of all things, than poſitively any thing, a kind of *diffuſed nothing*; how can this, I ſay,

(*a*) Εἰ σῶμά ἐστι, φύσει ἢ σώματος μεριζομένη εἰς πλείω, ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. (f. ἴσαι) τῷ ὅλῳ, ſays *Plotinus* even of the Soul. (*b*) Διόπερ ἢ ἐξ ὅτι μάλιστ' ἰδίαν ἐνδέχεται ἴσχειν τάυτην οὐσίαν· ἀλλὰ ἀμιγὴς ἢ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν. *Ariſt.*

be

be the First cauſe, &c. or indeed any cauſe? What attributes beſide penetrability and extenſion, what excellencies, what perfections is it capable of (*a*)?

As *infinite ſpace* cannot be God, tho He be excluded from no place or ſpace; ſo tho He is eternal, yet *eternity* or infinite duration it ſelf is not God (*b*). For duration, abſtracted from all durables, is nothing actually exiſting by it ſelf: it is the *duration of a being*, not *a being*.

Infinite ſpace and *duration*, taken together, cannot be God: becauſe an interminable ſpace of infinite duration is ſtill nothing but eternal ſpace; and that is at moſt but an *eternal vacuum*.

Since it has been already proved, that corporeity is inconſiſtent with Divine perfection, tho *matter* ſhould be *infinitely extended*, or there ſhould be an infinite quantity of it, yet ſtill, where ever it is, it carries this *inconſiſtence* along with it.

If to *matter* be added *infinite duration*, neither does this alter the nature of it. This only ſuppoſes it to be eternally what it is, *i. e. eternally incapable* of Divine perfection.

And if to it you add the ideas of *both* infinite extenſion (or ſpace) and duration too; yet ſtill, ſo long as matter is matter, it muſt *always* and *every where* be incapable of Divinity.

Laſtly, not the *univerſe*, or ſum total of finite beings, can be God. For if it is, then *every thing* is divine, *every thing* God, or of God; and ſo *all things* together muſt make but *one* being (*c*) But the contrary to this we ſee, there being evidently many beings diſtinct, and ſeparable one from another, and independent each of other. Nay, this diſtinction and ſeparation of exiſtence, beſide what we ſee without us, we may even *feel* within our ſelves. We are *ſeverally* conſcious to our ſelves of the individuation and diſtinction of our own minds from all other: nor is there any thing, of

(*a*) They, who call God Space, do it, becauſe He is the place of the univerſe, and the univerſe is not the place of Him. *Thiſbbi.* Or, as *Phil. Aquin.* from the ancients, God bleſſed for ever, is the place of the world, but the world is not his place. Οὐ γὰρ περιέχεται [ὁ Θεὸς], ἀλλὰ περιέχει τὰ πάντα. *Ph. Jud.* By which ways of ſpeaking (tho there is a cabbaliſtic reaſon aſſignd too) they intend chiefly to expreſs His omnipreſence and immenſity. That in *Act. Ap.* ſeems to be of the ſame kind, Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν, καὶ κινούμεθα, καὶ ἐσμεν. (*b*) Such things as theſe, how incongruous and wild ſoever they are, have been affirmed; that God is infinite duration, ſpace, &c. What can be meant by that, Καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο ὁ αἰὼν θεὸς, in *Plotinus*? (*c*) Were not they, who converſe with books, accuſtomd to ſuch trials, it would be ſhocking to find *Balbus* in *Cicero* aſſerting, *eſſe mundum deum*: and yet in another place, that it is *quaſi communis deorum, atq; hominum* domus, *aut* urbs *utrorumque*; and *deorum, hominumq;* cauſa factus: in another, *providentia deorum mundum, & omnes mundi* partes *& initio conſtitutas eſſe, & omni tempore adminiſtrari*: in another, *mundum ipſum naturâ adminiſtrari*: with other like inconſiſtences.

which

which we can be more certain. Were we all the *ſame* being, and had *one* mind, as in that caſe we muſt have, thoughts could not be private, or the peculiar thoughts of any one perſon; but they muſt be *common* acts of the whole mind, and there could be but one conſcience *common* to us all (*a*). Beſide, if all things conjunctly are God or the perfect being (I dread the mention of ſuch things, tho it be in order to refute them), how comes this remarkable inſtance of imperfection, among many others, to cleave to us, that we ſhould *not know* even our ſelves, and what we are (*b*)? In ſhort, no *collection* of beings can be *one* being; and therefore not God. And the univerſe itſelf is but a collection of diſtinct beings (*c*).

XIII. *It is ſo far from being true that God is corporeal, that there could be no ſuch thing as either matter or motion, if there was not ſome Superior being, upon whom they depended.* Or, *God is ſuch a being, that without Him there could be neither matter nor motion.* This muſt be true of *matter*: becauſe it has been proved already, that there can be *but one* independent being; that he is *incorporeal*; and that the exiſtence of all other beings muſt *depend upon Him.* But the ſame thing may be proved otherwiſe. If *matter* (I mean the exiſtence of it) does not depend upon ſomething above it, it muſt be an independent being; and if an independent being, a neceſſary being; and then there could be no ſuch thing as a *vacuum*: but all bodies muſt be *perfectly ſolid*, and, more than that, the whole world could be but *one ſuch* body, five times as firm as braſs, and incapable of all motion. For that being which *exiſts neceſſarily* does *neceſſarily exiſt*: that is, it cannot *not exiſt*. But in a *vacuum* matter does not exiſt.

Moreover, if *matter* be an independent, neceſſary being, and exiſts of itſelf, this muſt be true of *every particle* of it: and if ſo, there could not only be no *vacuum*

(*a*) Ἄτοπον ἰὸ μία ἡ ἐμὴ [ψυχὴ] ἢ ἡ ὑτῳοῦν ἄλλη· ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἐμοῦ αἰσθανομένου, ἢ ἄλλου αἰσθάνεσθαι, --- ἢ ὅλως ὁμοπαθεῖν ἡμᾶς τι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἢ πρὸς τὸ πᾶν. *Plot.* Here this author is clear, tho at ſome other times very dark. (*b*) *Cur quidquam ignoraret animus hominis, ſi eſſet Deus?* Cic.

(*c*) The ſyſtem of *Spinoſa* is ſo *apparently* falſe, and full of impieties and contradictions, that more needs not be ſaid againſt it: tho much might be. What *Velleius* ſays in *Cicero*, is not only true, *Si mundus eſt deus,----dei membra partim ardentia, partim refrigerata dicenda ſunt*: but, if there is but one ſubſtance, one nature, *one being*, and this being is God, then all the follies, madneſſes, wickedneſſes that are in the world, are in God; then all things done and ſufferd are both done and ſufferd by Him; He is both cauſe and effect; He both willes and nilles, affirms and denies, loves and hates the ſame things at the ſame time, *&c.* That ſuch groſs atheiſm as this ſhould ever be faſhionable! *Atheiſm*: for certainly when we inquire, whether there *is* a God, we do not inquire, whether we ourſelves and all other things which are viſible about us do *exiſt*: ſomething different from them muſt be intended. Therefore to ſay, there is no God different from them, is to ſay, there is no God at all.

but

but every particle muſt be *every where*. For it could not be limited to occupy only a place of ſuch certain dimenſions by its *own nature*: ſince this confinement of exiſtence within certain bounds implies non-exiſtence in other places beyond thoſe bounds, and is equal to a negation of exiſtence; and when *exiſtence* is eſſential to any being, a *negation of exiſtence* cannot be ſo. Nor, in the next place, could its exiſtence be limited by *any thing elſe*, becauſe it is ſuppoſed to have its exiſtence only of itſelf; *i. e.* to have a *principle* of exiſtence in itſelf, or to have an exiſtence that is not dependent upon or obnoxious to any other.

And I may add ſtill, if *matter* be ſelf-exiſtent, I do not ſee, not only how it comes to be reſtraind to a place of ſome certain capacity, but alſo how it comes to be limited *in other reſpects*; or why it ſhould not exiſt in a manner that is *in all reſpects* perfect. So that thus it appears, *matter* muſt derive its exiſtence from ſome other being, who cauſes it to be juſt what it is. And the being, *who can do this*, muſt be God.

It is to no purpoſe to object here, that one cannot *conceive*, how the exiſtence of matter can be derived from another being. For God being *above our conceptions*, the manner in which He operates, and in which things depend upon him, muſt alſo be *unconceivable*. Reaſon diſcovers, that this viſible world muſt owe its exiſtence to ſome inviſible Almighty being; *i. e.* diſcovers this to be fact, and we muſt not deny facts becauſe we know not *how* they are effected. It is far from being new, that our faculties ſhould diſcloſe to us the exiſtence of things, and then drop us in our enquiry *how* they are. Thus much for *matter*.

As for *motion*; without a Firſt cauſe, ſuch as has been deſcribed, there could be none: and much leſs *ſuch* motions as we ſee in the world. This may be immediately deduced from the foregoing paragraphs. For if *matter* itſelf could not be without ſuch a cauſe, it is certain *motion*, which is an affection of matter, could never be.

But further, there could be no *motion*, unleſs either there be in matter itſelf a power of *beginning* it; or it is communicated from body to body in an *infinite ſucceſſion*, or in a *circle*, and ſo has no beginning; or elſe is *produced* by ſome incorporeal being, or beings. Now as hardy as men are in advancing opinions that favor their vices, tho never ſo repugnant to reaſon, I can hardly believe any one will aſſert, that a parcel of *mere matter* (let it be great or ſmall, of any figure whatſoever, *&c.*) left altogether to itſelf, could ever of itſelf *begin* to move. If there is any ſuch bold aſſertor, let him fix his eyes upon ſome lump of matter, *ex. gr. a ſtone*, piece of *timber*, or a *clod* (cleard of all animals), and peruſe it well; and then ask himſelf ſeriouſly, whether it is poſſible for him in earneſt to *believe*, that that *ſtone*, *log*, or *clod*, tho nothing corporeal or incorporeal ſhould excite or meddle with it, might ſome time or other of itſelf begin to *creep*. However, to be ſhort, a power of *beginning* motion

is not in the idea of matter. It is paſſive, as we ſee, to the impreſſions of motion, and ſuſceptive of it; but *cannot* produce it. On the contrary, it will always perſiſt uniformly in its *preſent ſtate*, either of reſt or motion, if nothing ſtirs, diverts, accelerates, or ſtops it. Nor is there any thing in all phyſics better ſettled than that, which is called *vis inertiæ*, or the *inertia* of matter.

The propagation of motion from body to body, *without any Firſt mover*, or immaterial cauſe of motion, has been proved impoſſible, prop. I.

The ſuppoſition of a perpetual motion in a *circle* is begging the queſtion. For if A moves B, B moves C, and ſo on to Z, and then Z moves A; this is the ſame as to ſay, that A moves A, by the intervention of B, C, D,---Z: that is, A *moves itſelf*, or can *begin* motion (*a*).

It remains then, that all corporeal motions come originally from ſome mover *incorporeal*: which muſt be either that Supreme and ſelf-exiſting *ſpirit* himſelf, who is God; or ſuch, as will put us into the way how to find, that there is ſuch a Being. Turn back to p. 65.

If we conſider *ourſelves*, and the voluntary motions begun by us, we may there ſee the thing exemplified. We move our bodies or ſome members of them, and by theſe move other things, as they again do others; and know theſe motions to ſpring from the operations of our minds: but then we know alſo, that we have not an independent power of creating motion. If we had, it could not be ſo limited as our loco-motive faculties are, nor confined to ſmall quantities and certain circumſtances only: we ſhould have had it from eternity, nor could we ever be deprived of it. So that we are neceſſitated to look up and acknowledge ſome Higher being, who is able not only to *produce* motion, but to impart a *faculty of producing it*.

And if the *petty* motions of us mortals afford arguments for the being of a God, much more may thoſe *greater* motions we ſee in the world, and the *phænomena* attending them: I mean the motions of the *planets* and *heavenly bodies*. For *theſe* muſt be put into motion, either by one common mighty Mover, acting upon them immediately, or by cauſes and laws of his appointment; or by their reſpective movers, who, for reaſons to which you can by this time be no ſtranger, muſt depend upon ſome *Superior*, that furniſhed them with the power of doing this. And grant-

(*a*) What *Cenſorinus* charges upon many great men (but upon ſome of them ſurely unjuſtly) is to me unintelligible. He ſays, they believed *ſemper homines fuiſſe*, &c. and then, *Itaque & omnium, quæ in ſempiterno iſto mundo ſemper fuerunt, futuraque ſunt, aiunt principium fuiſſe nullum; ſed orbem eſſe quemdam generantium, naſcentiumque, in quo uniuſcujuſque geniti initium ſimul & finis eſſe videatur.*

ing

ing it to be done *either* of these ways, we can be at no great distance from a demonstration of the *existence* of a Deity.

It may perhaps be said, that tho matter has not the power of moving itself, yet it hath an *attractive* force, by which it can move other parts of matter: so that all matter equally *moves* and is *moved*. But, allowing those things which are now usually ascribed to *attraction*, we shall still be necessitated to own some Superior being, whose *influence* mixes itself with matter, and operates upon it; or at least who, some way or other, *imparts* this force. For *attraction*, according to the true sense of the word, supposes one body to act upon another at a distance, or where it is not; but nothing can *be* an agent, where it is *not* at all. Matter can act only by *contact*, impelling contiguous bodies, when it is put into motion by something else, or resisting those which strike against it, when it is at rest. And this it does *as matter*; *i. e.* by being impenetrable to other matter: but attraction is not of the nature or idea of matter. So that what is called *attraction*, is so called only because the same things happen, as if the parts of matter did mutually attract: but in truth this can only be an effect of something, which acts upon or by matter according to a certain law. The parts of matter seem not only to gravitate *towards* each other, but many of them to *fly* each other. Now these two *contrary* motions and seeming qualities cannot *both* proceed from matter *quâ* matter; cannot *both* be of the nature of it: and therefore they must be owing to some *external* cause, or to some *other* being, which excites in them this, as it were love and discord (*a*).

Beside, as to the *revolution* of a planet about the sun, *mere gravitation* is not sufficient to produce that effect. It must be compounded with a motion of *projection*, to keep the planet from falling directly into the sun, and bring it about: and from *what hand*, I desire to know, comes this other motion (or direction)? Who impressed it?

What a vast field for *contemplation* is here opend! Such regions of matter about us, in which there is not the *least particle* that does not carry with it an argument of God's existence; not the *least* stick or straw or other *trifle* that falls to the ground, but shews it; not the slightest motion produced, the least *whisper* of the air, but tells it.

XIV. *The frame and constitution of the world, the astonishing magnificence of it, the various phenomena and kinds of beings, the uniformity observed in the productions of things, the uses and ends for which they serve, &c. do all shew that there is some Almighty design-*

(*a*) So what we call attraction and aversion (centripetal and centrifugal forces) seem to have been called by *Empedocles*: φιλία ἡ συγκρίσιας [τὰ στοιχεῖα], ἡ νεῖκος ἡ διακρίσιας *Diog. L.* (*v. Emp.*) *V. Arist. Cic. & al.*

er, an infinite wiſdom and power at the top of all theſe things: ſuch marks there are of both (*a*). Or, *God is that Being, without whom ſuch a frame or conſtitution of the world, ſuch a magnificence in it, &c. could not be.* In order to prove to any one the *grandneſs* of this fabric of the world, one needs only to bid him conſider the *ſun* with that inſupportable glory and luſtre that ſurrounds it: to demonſtrate the vaſt *diſtance*, *magnitude* and *heat* of it: to repreſent to him the *chorus of planets* moving periodically, by uniform laws, in their ſeveral orbits about it; affording a regular variety of aſpects; guarded ſome of them by *ſecondary* planets, and as it were emulating the ſtate of the ſun; and probably all poſſeſt by proper *inhabitants:* to remind him of thoſe ſurpriſing viſits the *comets* make us; the large trains, or uncommon ſplendor, which attends them; the far country they come from; and the curioſity and horror they excite not only among us, but in the inhabitants of other planets, who alſo may be up to ſee the entry and progreſs of theſe miniſters of fate (*b*): to direct his eye and contemplation, through thoſe azure fields and vaſt regions above him, up to the *fixt ſtars*, that radiant numberleſs hoſt of heaven; and to make him underſtand, how unlikely a thing it is, that they ſhould be placed there only to adorn and beſpangle a canopy over our heads (tho that would be a great piece of magnificence too), and much leſs to ſupply the places of ſo many glow-worms, by affording a feeble light to our earth, or even to all our fellow-planets: to convince him, that they are rather ſo many *other ſuns*, with their ſeveral regions and ſets of planets about them: to ſhew him, by the help of glaſſes, ſtill more and more of theſe fixt lights, and to beget in him an apprehenſion of their unaccountable *numbers*, and of thoſe *immenſe ſpaces*, that lie retired beyond our *utmoſt* reach and even imagination: I ſay, one needs but to do this, and explain to him ſuch things as are now known almoſt to every body; and by it to ſhew that if the world be not infinite, it is *infinito ſimilis* (*c*); and therefore ſure a *magnificent* ſtructure, and the work of an *infinite* Architect. But if we could take a view of all the *particulars* containd within that aſtoniſhing compaſs, which we have thus *haſtily* run over, how would wonders multiply upon us? Every corner, every part of the world is as it were made up of *other* worlds. If we look upon this *our ſeat* (I mean this

(*a*) So far is that from being true, *Nequaquam---divinitus eſſe creatam Naturam mundi, quæ tantâ eſt præditæ culpâ. Lucret.* Men raſhly (impiouſly) cenſure what they do not underſtand. Like that king of *Caſtile*, who fancied himſelf able to have contrived a better ſyſtem of the world; becauſe he knew not what the true ſyſtem is, but took it to be as deſcribed to him by *R. Iſ. ab. Sid.* and other aſtronomers of thoſe times. (*b*) Since they have, or may have great effects upon the ſeveral parts of the ſolar ſyſtem, one may ſpeak thus, without falling into the ſuperſtition of the multitude, or meaning what is intended by that, *Nunquam cælo ſpectatum impune cometen* (in *Claud.*) or the like. (*c*) *Finitus, & infinito ſimilis.* Plin.

earth),

earth), what ſcope is here for admiration? The great *variety* of mountains, hills, valleys, plains, rivers, ſeas, trees, plants! The many tribes of different *animals*, with which it is ſtocked! The multifarious *inventions* and *works* of one of theſe; that is, of us *men*, &c. And yet when all theſe (heaven and earth) are ſurveyed as *nicely* as they can be by the help of our unaſſiſted ſenſes, and even of teleſcopical glaſſes, by the aſſiſtance of good *miſcroſcopes* in very *ſmall* parts of matter as many *new* wonders (*a*) may perhaps be diſcoverd, as thoſe already obſerved; new *kingdoms* of animals; new *architecture* and curioſity of work. So that as before our ſenſes and even conception fainted in thoſe *vaſt journeys* we were obliged to take in conſidering the expanſe of the univerſe; ſo here again they fail us in our reſearches into the *principles* and conſtituent parts of it. Both the *beginnings* and the *ends* of things, the *leaſt* and the *greateſt*, all conſpire to baffle us: and which way ever we proſecute our inquiries, we ſtill fall in with *freſh* ſubjects of amazement, and *freſh* reaſons to believe that there are indefinitely ſtill *more* and *more* behind, that will for ever eſcape our eagereſt purſuits and deepeſt penetration

This mighty *building* is not only thus grand, and the appearances ſtupendous in it, but the *manner* in which things are effected is commonly unintelligible, and their cauſes *too profound* for us. There are indeed many things in nature, which we know; and ſome, of which we ſeem to know the *cauſes:* but, alas! how *few* are theſe with reſpect to the whole ſum? And the cauſes which we aſſign, what are they? Commonly ſuch, as can only be expreſſed in general terms, whilſt the *bottoms* of things remain unfathomable. Such, as have been collected from *experience*, but could ſcarcely be known beforehand, by any arguments *à priori*, to be capable of rendering ſuch effects: and yet till cauſes are known after that manner, they are not *thoroughly* underſtood. Such, as ſeem diſproportionate and *too little*, and are ſo inſufficient and unſatisfactory, that one cannot but be inclined to think, that ſomething *immaterial* and *inviſible* muſt be immediately concerned. In ſhort, we know may times, that ſuch a thing will have ſuch an effect, or perhaps that ſuch an effect is produced by ſuch a cauſe, but the manner *how* we know not; or but groſly, and if ſuch an *hypotheſis* be true. It is impoſſible for us to come at the true *principles* of things, or to ſee into the œconomy of the *fineſt* part of nature and workings of the *firſt* ſprings. The cauſes that appear to us, are but *effects* of other cauſes: the *veſſels*, of which the bodies of plants and animals conſiſt, are made up of *other*, *ſmaller* veſſels: the *ſubtileſt* parts of matter, which we have any notion of (as animal ſpirits, or particles of light), have *their parts*, and may for ought we know be *compound* bodies: and as to the *ſubſtances*

(*a*) Ποικιλη θαυματεργια. Plot.

them-

themſelves of all theſe things, and their *internal conſtitution*, they are hid from our eyes. Our philoſophy dwells in the ſurface of nature.

However, in the next place, we ourſelves cannot but be witneſſes, that there are *ſtated methods*, as ſo many ſet forms of proceeding, which things punctually and religiouſly keep to. The ſame *cauſes*, circumſtanced in the ſame manner, have always the ſame ſucceſs: all the *ſpecies* of *animals*, among us, are made according to one general *idea*; and ſo are thoſe of *plants* alſo, and even *minerals*: no *new* ones are brought forth or ariſen any where: and the old are preſerved and continued by the *old ways*.

Laſtly, it appears I think plainly enough in the parts and model of the world, that there is a *contrivance* and a reſpect to certain reaſons and *ends*. How the *ſun* is poſited near the middle of our ſyſtem for the more *convenient* diſpenſing of his benign influences to the *planets* moving about him; how the plain of the earth's *æquator* interſects that of her *orbit*, and makes a proper angle with it, in order to diverſify the *year*, and create a uſeful variety of *ſeaſons*, and many other things of this kind, tho a thouſand times repeated, will *always* be pleaſing meditations to good men and true ſcholars. Who can obſerve the *vapors* to aſcend, eſpecially from the ſea, meet above in clouds, and fall again after condenſation, and not underſtand this to be a kind of *diſtillation* in order to clear the water of its groſſer ſalts, and then by rains and dews to ſupply the fountains and rivers with freſh and wholſom liquor; to nouriſh the vegetables below by ſhowers, which deſcend in drops as from a *watering-pot* upon a garden, *&c.* who can view the *ſtructure* of a plant or animal; the *indefinite* number of their fibres and fine veſſels, the *formation* of larger veſſels and the ſeveral members out of them, and the apt *diſpoſition* of all theſe; the way laid out for the reception and diſtribution of *nutriment*; the *effect* this nutriment has in extending the veſſels, bringing the vegetable or animal to its full growth and expanſion, continuing the *motion* of the ſeveral fluids, repairing the *decays* of the body, and preſerving *life*: who can take notice of the ſeveral *faculties* of animals, their *arts* of ſaving and providing for themſelves, or the ways in which they are provided for; the *uſes* of plants to animals, and of ſome animals to others, particularly to mankind; the care taken that the ſeveral *ſpecies* ſhould be *propagated* out of their proper ſeeds (without confuſion (*a*), the ſtrong *inclinations* implanted in animals for that purpoſe, their *love of their young*, and the like: I ſay, who can do this, and not ſee a *deſign*, in ſuch *regular* pieces, ſo nicely wrought, and *ſo* preſerved? If there was but *one* animal, and

(*a*) If any one, ſitting upon mount *Ida*, had ſeen the *Greek* army coming on in proper order [μετὰ πολλῆ κόσμε καὶ τάξεως τοῖς πεδίοις προσιῶσαν], he ought moſt certainly, notwithſtanding what *Sext. Imper.* ſays, to have concluded, that there was ſome commander, under whoſe conduct they moved.

in

in that caſe it could not be doubted but that his *eyes* were made that he might *ſee* with them, his *ears* that he might *hear* with them, and ſo on, through at leaſt the moſt conſiderable parts of him; if it can much leſs be doubted, when the ſame things are *repeted* in the individuals of all the tribes of animals; if the like obſervations may be made with reſpect to *vegetables*, and other things: and if all theſe *kinds* of things, and therefore much more their *particulars*, upon and in the earth, waters, air, are unconceivably *numerous* (as moſt evidently they are, one cannot but be convinced from that, which is ſo *very* obvious to every underſtanding, and *plainly* runs through the *nobler* parts of the viſible world, that not only they, but other things, even thoſe that ſeem to be *leſs noble*, have their *ends* too, tho not ſo well underſtood.

And now ſince we cannot ſuppoſe the *parts* of matter to have *contrived* this wonderful form of a world among themſelves, and then by agreement to have taken their reſpective poſts, and purſued conſtant *ends* by certain methods and meaſures *concerted* (becauſe theſe are acts, of which they are not capable), there muſt be ſome other Being, whoſe wiſdom and power are equal to ſuch a mighty work, as is the *ſtructure* and *preſervation* of the world. There muſt be ſome almighty *Mind*, who models and adorns it; lays the cauſes of things ſo deep; preſcribes them ſuch uniform and ſteady laws; deſtines and adapts them to certain purpoſes; and makes one thing to fit and anſwer to another (*a*).

That *ſuch* a beautiful ſcheme, *ſuch* a juſt and geometrical arrangement of things, compoſed, of *innumerable* parts, and placed as the offices and uſes and wants of the ſeveral beings *require*, through ſuch an *immenſe* extent, ſhould be the effect of *chance* only, is a conceit ſo prodigiouſly abſurd, that certainly no one can eſpouſe it heartily, who underſtands the *meaning* of that word. *Chance* ſeems to be only a term, by which we expreſs our *ignorance* of the cauſe of any thing. For when we ſay any thing comes *by chance*, we do not mean, that it had no other cauſe; but only, that we do *not know* the true cauſe, which produced it, or interpoſed in ſuch a manner, as to make that fall out which was not expected. Nor can I think, that any body has ſuch an idea of *chance*, as to make it an *agent* or really exiſting and acting cauſe of any thing, and much leſs ſure of all things. Whatever events or effects there are, they muſt proceed from ſome agent or cauſe, which is either *free* or *not free* (that is, neceſſary). If it be free, it wills what it produces: and therefore that which is produced is produced with *deſign*, not by chance. If it acts neceſſarily, the event muſt *neceſſarily* be, and therefore it is not by accident. For that, which is by accident or chance only, might not have been; or it is an accident

(*a*) Τίς ὁ ἁρμόζων τὴν μάχαιραν πρὸς τὴ κολεὸν, ἢ τὴ κολεὸν πρὸς τὴν μάχαιραν, κτλ. *Arr.* Even ſuch a thing as this doth not come by accident.

only,

only, that it is. There can be therefore *no ſuch cauſe* as chance. And to omit a great deal that might yet be ſaid, *matter* is *indefinitely* diviſible, and the firſt particles (or atoms) of which it conſiſts muſt be ſmall beyond all our apprehenſion; and the chances, that muſt all hit to produce *one* individual of any *ſpecies* of material beings (if only chance was concerned), muſt conſequently be *indefinitely many*: and if *ſpace* be alſo *indefinitely* extended, and the number of thoſe individuals (not to ſay of the *ſpecies* themſelves) which lie diſperſed in it *indefinite*, the *chances* required to the production of them all, or of the univerſe, will be the rectangle of one *indefinite* quantity drawn into *another*. We may well call them *infinite*. And then to ſay, that any thing cannot happen, unleſs *infinite* chances coincide, is the ſame as to ſay, there are *infinite* chances againſt the happening of it, or odds that it will not happen: and this again is the ſame as to ſay, it is *impoſſible* to happen; ſince if there be a poſſibility that it *may* happen, the hazard, is *not* infinite. The world therefore cannot be the child of *chance* (*a*). He muſt be little acquainted with the works of nature, who is not ſenſible how delicate and fine they are: and the *finer* they are, the *groſſer* were thoſe of *Epicurus* (*b*).

If it ſhould be objected, that many things ſeem to be *uſeleſs*, many births are *monſtrous*, or the like, ſuch anſwers as theſe may be made. The *uſes* of ſome things are known to *ſome* men, and not to *others*: the uſes of ſome are known *now*, that were not known to any body *formerly*: the uſes of many may be diſcoverd *hereafter*: and thoſe of ſome other things may *for ever* remain unknown to all men, and yet *be in nature*, as much as thoſe diſcoverd were before their diſcovery, or are now in reſpect of them who know them not. Things have not therefore no uſes, becauſe they are conceald from us. Nor is *nature* irregular, or without method, becauſe there are ſome *ſeeming* deviations from the common rule. Theſe are generally the effects of that influence, which free agents and various circumſtances have upon natural productions; which may be deformed, or hurt by external *impreſſions*, heterogeneous *matter* introduced, or diſagreeable and unnatural *motions* excited: and if the caſe could be *truly* put, it would no doubt appear, that nature proceeds as *regularly* (or the laws of nature have as regular an effect), when a *monſter* is produced, as when the *uſual* iſſue in common caſes. Under theſe circumſtances the monſter is the *genuine* iſſue: that is,

(*a*) *Hoc qui exiſtimat fieri potuiſſe, non intelligo cur non idem putet, ſi innumerabiles unius & viginti formæ literarum,----aliquò conjiciantur, poſſe ex his in terram excuſſis annales Ennij, ut deinceps legi poſſint, effici: quod neſcio anne in uno quidem verſu poſſit tantum valere fortuna.* Cic. But alas, what are *Ennius*'s annals to ſuch a work as the world is! (*b*) He was πολυγραφώτατος, πάντας ὑπερβαλλόμενος πλήθει βιβλίων, *D. L.* But that part of his phyſics is here meant, in which he treated of the origin of the world; or rather of *infinite worlds*; which makes his thought the groſſer ſtill. For infinite worlds require *infinite* chances *infinitely* repeted.

in

in the ſame circumſtances there would always be the ſame kind of production. And therefore if things are now and then miſ-ſhaped, this infers no unſteadineſs or miſtake in nature. Beſide, the magnificence of the world admits of ſome *perturbations*; not to ſay, requires ſome *variety*. The queſtion is, Could all thoſe things, which we *do know* to have uſes and ends, and to the production of which ſuch wonderful contrivance and the combinations of ſo many things are required, be produced, and method and regularity be preſerved *ſo far as it is*, if nothing but *blind* chance preſided over all? Are not the innumerable inſtances of things, which are *undeniably* made with reference to certain ends, and of thoſe which are propagated and repeted by the *ſame* conſtant methods, *enough* to convince us, that there are ends propoſed, and rules obſerved, even where we do not ſee them. And, laſtly, if we ſhould deſcend to particulars, what are thoſe ſeemingly uſeleſs or monſtrous productions in reſpect of the *reſt*, that *plainly* declare the ends, for which they were intended, and that come into the world by the *uſual* ways, with the *uſual* perfection of their ſeveral kinds? If the compariſon could be made, I verily believe theſe would be found to be almoſt infinituple of the other; which ought therefore to be reputed as *nothing*.

They, who content themſelves with words, may aſcribe the formation of the world to *fate* or *nature*, as well as to *chance*, or better. And yet *fate*, in the firſt place, is nothing but a *ſeries* of events, conſiderd as neceſſarily following in ſome certain order; or of which it has always been true, that they *would be* in their determinate times and places. It is called indeed a *ſeries* of *cauſes* (*a*): but then they are ſuch cauſes as are alſo *effects*, all of them, if there is no Firſt cauſe; and may be taken for *ſuch*. So that in this deſcription is nothing like ſuch a *cauſe*, as is capable of giving this form to the world. A *ſeries* of events is the ſame with events happening *ſeriatim*: which words declare nothing concerning the *cauſe* of that concatenation of events, or why it is. Time, place, manner, neceſſity are but *circumſtances* of things that come to paſs; not cauſes of their exiſtence, or of their being as they are. On the contrary, ſome external and ſuperior cauſe muſt be ſuppoſed to put the *ſeries* in motion, to project the order, to connect the cauſes and effects, and to *impoſe* the neceſſity (*b*).

(*a*) *Series implexa cauſarum.* Sen. (*b*) *Seneca* ſays himſelf, that in this ſeries God is *prima omnium cauſa, ex quâ cæteræ pendent.* Indeed it is many times difficult to find out what the ancients meant by *fate*. Sometimes it ſeems to follow the motions of the *heavenly bodies* and their aſpects. Of this kind of fate is that paſſage in *Suetonius* to be underſtood, where he ſays that *Tiberius* was *addictus mathematicæ, perſuaſioniſq; plenus cuncta fato agi.* Sometimes it is confounded with *fortune*. So in *Lucian* we find τὴν τύχην πεπέιχσαν τὰ μεμοιρασμένα, ἢ ἃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἑκάστῳ ἐπεκλάσθη. And ſometimes it is the ſame with God: as when the *Stoics* ſay, ἓν τι εἶναι θεὸν ἢ νοῦν ἢ εἱμαρμένην ἢ Δία, *ap. Diog. L.* and the like elſewhere.

Then for *nature*, 1. If it be uſed for the *intrinſic manner* of exiſting; that conſtitution, make, or diſpoſition, with which any thing is produced or *born*, and from which reſult thoſe properties, powers, inclinations, paſſions, qualities, and manners, which are called *natural* (and ſometimes *nature*), in oppoſition to ſuch as are *acquired*, adventitious, or forced (which uſe is common): then to ſay, that nature formed any thing, or gave it its manner of exiſtence, is to ſay, that it formed itſelf, or that the *effect* is the *efficient* (*a*). Beſide, how can *manner* (manner of exiſting) be the cauſe of exiſting, or properly do any thing. An agent is an acting being, ſome ſubſtance, not a *manner* of being. 2. If it be uſed in that other ſenſe, by which it ſtands for the *ideas* of things, what they are in themſelves, and what in their circumſtances, cauſes, conſequences, reſpects; or, in ſhort, that which determines them to be of this or that kind (as when we ſay, the *nature* of juſtice (*b*) requires this or that; *i. e* the idea of juſtice requires or ſuppoſes it: a crime is of ſuch a *nature*; that is, bears ſuch a reſpect to the law, and is attended with ſuch circumſtances, or the like): then none of *theſe* ſenſes can do an *atheiſt* any ſervice. 3. If it be uſed for the *world* (*c*) (as, the laws of *nature* may be underſtood to be the laws of the world, by which it is governed, and the *phænomena* in it produced; after the ſame manner of ſpeaking as when we ſay, the laws of *England*, *France*, &c.) then it ſtands for *that very thing*, the former and architect of which is the object of our inquiry; and therefore cannot be that architect *itſelf*. Under this ſenſe may be comprehended that, when it denotes *reality of exiſtence*, as when it is ſaid that ſuch a thing is not in *nature* (not to be found in the *world*). 4. If it ſignifies the forementioned *laws* themſelves; or that courſe, in which things by virtue of theſe laws proceed (as when the effects of theſe laws are ſtyled the works of *nature*): then, laws ſuppoſe ſome legiſlator, and are poſterior to that of which they are the laws. There can be no laws of any nation, till the people are of which that nation conſiſts. 5. If it be uſed after the ſame manner as the word *habit* frequently is; to which many things are aſcribed (juſt as they are to nature), though it be nothing exiſting diſtinct from the *habits*, which *particular* men or beings contract: then nature is a kind of *abſtract* notion, which can *do* nothing. Perhaps *nature* may be put for *natures*, all natures, after the manner of a collective noun; or it may be mentiond as an *agent*, only as we perſonify virtues and attributes, either for variety, or the ſhorter and more convenient expreſ-

(*a*) As when *Strato Lampſ.* according to *Tully*, *docet omnia eſſe effecta naturâ.* (*b*) *Vis & natura juſtitiæ.* Cic. (*c*) Almoſt as if it ſtood for *nata*, or *res natæ*; all things, that are produced. (So *futura* ſeems to be put ſometimes for *fœtus*.) *Sunt, qui omnia naturæ nomine appellent,----corpora, & inane, quæq; his accidant*, Cic.

ſing

ſing of things. Laſtly, if it denotes the *Author of nature*, or God (*a*) (the *effect* ſeeming, tho by a hard metonymy in this caſe, to be put for the *efficient*): then, to *Him* it is that I aſcribe the formation of the world, *&c.* To all which I muſt ſubjoin, that there is an unaccountable *liberty* taken in the uſe of this word: and that frequently it is uſed merely as a *word*, and nothing more, they who uſe it not knowing themſelves, what they mean by it (*b*). However, in *no ſenſe* can it ſuperſede the being of a Deity.

XV. *Life, ſenſe, cogitation, and the faculties of our own minds ſhew the exiſtence of ſome ſuperior Being, from whom they are derived.* Or, *God is that Being, without whom neither could theſe be, any more than the things before mentioned.* That they cannot flow from the nature of any *matter* about us as matter, or from any modification, ſize, or motion of it, if it be not already apparent, may perhaps be proved more fully afterwards. And that our *ſouls* themſelves are not ſelf-exiſtent, nor hold their faculties independently of all other beings, follows from pr. IV. and VII. Therefore we muſt neceſſarily be indebted for what we have of this kind to ſome great Benefactor, who is the *fountain* of them. For ſince we are conſcious, that we have them, and yet have them not of our ſelves, we muſt have them from *ſome other*.

A man has little reaſon, God knows, to fancy the *ſuppoſitum* of his life, ſenſe, and cogitative faculties to be an independent being, when he conſiders how *tranſitory* and *uncertain* at beſt his life and all his injoyments are; *what* he is, *whence* he came, and *whither* he is going (*c*). The mind acts not, or in the moſt imperceptible manner *in animalculo*, or the ſeminal ſtate of a man; only as a principle of vegetation in the ſtate of an *embryon*; and as a ſenſitive ſoul in the ſtate of *infancy*, at leaſt for ſome time, in which we are rather below, than above, many other animals. By degrees indeed, with age and exerciſe and proper opportunities, it ſeems to open itſelf, find its own *talents*, and *ripen* into a rational being. But then it reaſons not without labor, and is forced to take many tedious ſteps in the purſuit of truth; finds all its powers ſubject to great *eclipſes* and diminutions, in the time of ſleep, indiſpoſition,

(*a*) *Natura, inquit, hæc mihi præſtat. Non intelligis te, cum hoc dicis, mutare nomen Deo? Quid enim aliud eſt Natura, quàm Deus, & divina ratio,* &c? Sen. When it is ſaid, *Neceſſe eſt mundum ipſum naturâ adminiſtrari, ap. Cic.* What ſenſe are thoſe words capable of, if by *nature* be not really meant *God?* For it muſt be ſomething different from the world, and ſomething able to govern it. (*b*) *Alii naturam cenſent eſſe vim quandam ſine ratione, cientem motus in corporibus neceſſarios,* &c. ſays *Balbus* in *Cic.* What can this *vis* be: *vis* by it ſelf, without the mention of any ſubject, in which it inheres; or of any cauſe, from whence it proceeds? A *ſoul* of the world, *plaſtic* nature, *hylarchic* principle, Intelligent actor, and the like, are more intelligible than that. (*c*) Know from whence thou cameſt, where thou goeſt. *P. Ab.*

ſickneſs, &c. and at beſt reaching but a *few* objects in reſpect of all, that are in the immenſity of the univerſe; and, laſtly, is obnoxious to many painful ſenſations and reflexions. Had the *ſoul* of man the principle of its own exiſtence and faculties *within itſelf*, clear of all dependence, it could not be liable to all theſe *limitations* and *defects*, to all theſe *alterations* and *removes* from one ſtate to another: it muſt certainly be conſtant to itſelf, and perſiſt in an *uniform* manner of being.

There may be perhaps who will ſay, that the *ſoul*, together with life, ſenſe, &c. are propagated by *traduction* from parents to children, from them to their children again, and ſo from eternity (*a*): and that therefore nothing can be collected from the nature of them as to the exiſtence of a Deity. *Anſ.* If there could be ſuch a traduction, yet to ſuppoſe one *traduced* to come from another *traduced* and ſo *ab æterno*, without any further account of the original of mankind, or taking in any author of this traductive power, is the ſame as to ſuppoſe an infinite ſeries of *moveds* without a *mover*, or of *effects* without a *cauſe*: the abſurdity of which is ſhewn already prop. I. But concerning this matter I cannot but think, further, after the following manner. What is meant by *tradux animæ* ought to be clearly explaind: for it is not eaſy to conceive how thought, or thinking ſubſtances, can be propagated after the manner of *branches*, or in any manner that can be *analogous* to it, or even warrant a *metaphorical* uſe of that phraſe (*b*). It ſhould alſo be told, whether this traduction be made from *one* or from *both* the parents. If from one, from *which* of them is it? And if from both, then the ſame *tradux* or branch muſt always proceed from *two* ſtocks: which is a thing, I preſume, that can no where elſe be found, nor has any parallel in nature. And yet ſuch a thing may much better be ſuppoſed of vines, or plants, than of *thinking* beings, who are ſimple and uncompounded ſubſtances (*c*).

(*a*) For I cannot think, that any body will now ſtand by that way of introducing men firſt into the world, which is mentiond by *Diodorus Sic.* but aſſerted by *Lucretius*. *Ubi quaq; loci regio opportuna dabatur, Creſcebant uteri terræ radicibus apti, &c.* (*b*) What by *Tertullian* in one place is called *anima ex Adam tradux*, in another is *velut ſurculus quidam ex matrice Adam in propaginem deducta*, and equally unintelligible. Nor doth he explain himſelf better, when he confeſſes there to be *duas ſpecies ſeminis, corporalem & animalem* (al. *corporis ſemen & animæ*) : or more fully *ſemen animale ex animæ diſtillatione, ſicut & virus illud, corporale ſemen, ex carnis defæcatione.* (*c*) According to the fore-cited author, the ſoul is derived from the *father* only, *& genitalibus ſamina foveis commendata :* and all ſouls from that of *Adam*. *Definimus animam*, ſays he, *Dei flatu natam, ex una redundantem :* and in another place, *ex uno homine tota hæc animarum redundantia agitur*. But this doth not well conſiſt with his principal argument for traduction, *that children take after their parents*. For beſide what will here be ſaid by and by, if there is a traduction of all men from one man, and traduction cauſes likeneſs ; then every man muſt be like the firſt, and (conſequently) every other.

This

This opinion of the *traduction* of ſouls ſeems to me to ſtand upon an unſound foundation. For I take it to be grounded chiefly on theſe two things: the *ſimilitude* there is between the features, humors, and abilities of children and thoſe of their parents (*a*); and the difficulty men find in forming the *notion of a ſpirit* (*b*). For from hence they are apt to conclude, that there can be no other ſubſtance but *matter:* and that the *ſoul* reſulting from ſome diſpoſition of the body, or ſome part of it, or being ſome merely material appendix to it, muſt *attend* it, and come along with it from the parent or parents; and as there is a derivation of the *one*, ſo there muſt be alſo of the *other* at the ſame time.

Now the former of theſe is not always *true*; as it ought to be, to make the argument valid. Nothing more common than to ſee children *differ* from their parents, in their underſtandings, inclinations, ſhapes, complexions, and (*I am ſure*) one from another. And this *diſſimilitude* has as much force to prove there is *not* a traduction, as *ſimilitude*, whenever that happens, can have to prove there is. Beſides, it ſeems to me not hard to account for *ſome* likeneſs without the help of traduction. It is viſible the meat and drink men take, the air they breath, the objects they ſee, the ſounds they hear, the company they keep, &c. will create *changes* in them, ſometimes with reſpect to their intellectuals, ſometimes to their paſſions and humors, and ſometimes to their health and other circumſtances of their bodies: and yet the *original ſtamina* and fundamental parts of the man remain ſtill the *ſame*. If then the *ſemina*, out of which animals are produced, are (as I doubt not) *animalcula* already formed (*c*); which, being diſtributed about, eſpecially in ſome opportune places, are *taken in* with aliment, or perhaps the very air; being ſeparated in the bodies of the *males* by ſtrainers proper to every kind, and then lodged in *their* ſeminal veſſels, do *there* receive ſome kind of addition and influence; and being thence transferred into the wombs of the *females*, are *there* nouriſhd more plentifully, and grow, till they become too big to be longer confind (*d*): I ſay, if this be the caſe, why may not the

(*a*) *Unde, oro te,* ſays the ſame author, *ſimilitudine animæ quoq; parentibus de ingeniis reſpondemus,---- ſi non ex animâ ſemine educimur?* Then, to confirm this, he argues like a father indeed, thus: *in illo ipſo voluptatis ultimo æſtu quo genitale virus expellitur, nonne aliquid de animâ quoq; ſentimus exire?* I am aſhamed to tranſcribe more. (*b*) Therefore the ſaid father makes the ſoul to be corporeal. (*c*) This might ſeem to be favo'd by them who hold, that all ſouls were created in the beginning (an opinion mentiond in *Nahh. ab. & al.* often), did not the ſame authors derive the body, *Ex guttâ fatidâ*: as may be ſeen in *P. Ab. & paſſ.* Particularly *R. D. Qimhhi* ſays of man, That his body was created from a ſpeck of ſeed, which was turned into blood, and after, grew by little and little, till his members were finiſht. (*d*) This account deſtroys that argument, upon which *Cenſorinus* ſays many of the old philoſophers aſſerted the eternity of the world: *quod negent omnino poſſe reperiri,*

the *nutriment* received from the parents, being prepared by their veſſels, and of the ſame kind with that with which they themſelves are nouriſhed, be the ſame in great meaſure to the *animalcula* and *embrya* that it is to *them*, and conſequently very much aſſimilate their young, without the derivation of any thing elſe from them? Many impreſſions may be made upon the *fœtus*, and many tinctures given to the *fluids* communicated to it from the parents; and yet it, the *animal it ſelf*, may not be originally begun in them, or traduced from them. This hypotheſis (which has long been mine) ſuggeſts a reaſon, why the *child* is ſometimes more like the *father*, ſometimes the *mother*: viz. becauſe the veſſels of the *animalculum* are diſpoſed to receive a greater proportion of aliment ſometimes from the *one*, ſometimes from the *other*: or the fluids and ſpirits in one may ferment and operate *more ſtrongly* than in the other, and ſo have a *greater* and more ſignal effect. (Here it ought to be obſerved, that tho what the *animalculum* receives from the father, is in quantity little in reſpect of all that nutriment, which it receives by the mother; yet the former, being the firſt accretion to the original *ſtamina*, adhering immediately, and being early interwoven with them, may affect it more.)

Since there cannot be a proper *traduction* of the child (*one* mind, and *one* body) from both the *two* parents, all the ſimilitude it bears to *one* of them muſt proceed from ſome ſuch cauſe as I have aſſigned, or at leaſt not from *traduction*. For the child being *ſometimes* like the father, and *ſometimes* the mother, and the traduction either *always* from the father, or *always* from the mother, there muſt ſometimes be *ſimilitude*, where there is no *traduction*: and then if the child may reſemble one of them without it, why not the other too? The account I have given, appears, many times at leaſt, to be true in *plants*, which raiſed from the *ſame* ſeed, but in *different* beds and ſoil, will differ. The different nutriment introduces ſome diverſity into the ſeed or original plant, and aſſimilates it in ſome meaſure to the reſt raiſed in the ſame place.

The other thing, which I take to be one of the principal ſupports to this doctrine of *traduction* (a ſuppoſition, that the *ſoul* is merely material, or but the reſult of ſome diſpoſition in matter) has been undertaken to be refuted hereafter. But I may premiſe this here: tho we can have no *image* of a *ſpirit* (becauſe no being can be portraid or repreſented by an image, but what is material), yet we may have reaſon to aſſert the exiſtence of *ſuch* a ſubſtance (*a*). *Matter* is a thing, which we converſe with, of which we know pretty well the nature, and properties; and ſince we cannot find

reperiri, aveſne ante, an ova generata ſint; cùm & ovum ſine ave, & avis ſine ovo gigni non poſſit. This queſtion was once much agitated in the world, as may be ſeen by *Macrobius*, and *Plutarch*; who calls it, τὸ ἄπορον ἐ πολλὰ πράγματα, τοῖς ζητητικοῖς παρέχον------προβλημα.

(*a*) This is as much as *Epicurus* had to ſay for his atoms: for they were only σώματα λόγῳ θεωρητὰ, κλ. *Juſt. M.*

among

among them any that are *cogitative*, or ſuch a thing as *life*, but ſeveral things *inconſiſtent* with them, we are under a neceſſity of confeſſing that there is ſome *other* ſpecies of ſubſtance beſide that which is corporeal, and that our *ſouls* are of that kind (or rather of one of thoſe kinds, which are not merely corporeal: for there muſt be more than one), tho we can draw no image of it in our own minds. Nor is it at all ſurpriſing, that we ſhould not be able to do this: for how can the mind be the object of itſelf (*a*)? It may contemplate the body which it inhabits, may be conſcious of its own acts, and reflect upon the ideas it finds: but of its own ſubſtance it can have no adequate notion, unleſs it could be as it were *object* and *ſpectator* both. Only that perfect Being, whoſe knowledge is infinite, can thus *intimately* know himſelf.

They, who found the *traduction* of the ſoul upon this preſumption, that it is *material*, and attends the body as ſome part or affection of it, ſeem further to be moſt wofully miſtaken upon this account: becauſe the body *itſelf* is not propagated by traduction. It paſſes indeed *through* the bodies of the parents, who afford a tranſitory habitation and ſubſiſtence to it: but it cannot be *formed by* the parents, or *grow out* of any part of them. For all the *vital* and *eſſential* parts of it muſt be one *coeval* ſyſtem, and formed *at once* in the firſt article of the naſcent *animalculum*; ſince no one of theſe could be *nouriſhd*, or ever come to any thing, without the reſt: on the contrary, if any one of them could prevent and be before the reſt, it would ſoon wither and decay again for lack of nouriſhment received by proper veſſels; as we ſee the limbs and organs of animals do, when the ſupply due from the animal œconomy is any way intercepted or obſtructed. And ſince an organized body, which requires to be thus *ſimultaneouſly* made (faſhiond as it were at one ſtroke) cannot be the effect of any natural and *gradual* proceſs, I cannot but conclude, that there were *animalcula* of every tribe originally formed by the almighty Parent, to be the *ſeed* of all future generations of animals. Any other manner of production would be like that, which is uſually called *equivocal* or ſpontaneous generation, and with great reaſon now generally *exploded*. And it is certain, that the analogy of nature in other inſtances, and microſcopial obſervations do abet what I have ſaid *ſtrongly*.

Laſtly, if there is no *race* of men that have been from eternity, there is no man who is not deſcended from two *firſt parents*: and then the ſouls of thoſe two firſt parents could be traduced from *no other*. And that there is no ſuch race (none that has been upon this earth from eternity), is apparent from the face of earthly things, and the *hiſtory* of mankind (*b*), arts, and ſciences. What is objected againſt this argument

(*a*) Οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ διαφυμένῳ τὸ διαφεῖν. Plot. (*b*) *Si nulla fuit genitalis origo Terrai & cœli---- Cur ſupra bellum Thebanum & funera Troja Non alias alii quoq; res cecinere poeta.* Lucr.

from

from fancied *inundations*, *conflagrations*, &c (*a*). has no weight with me. Let us ſuppoſe ſome ſuch great calamity to happen now. It muſt be either univerſal, or not. If *univerſal*, ſo that no body at all could be ſaved, then either there muſt never be any more men, or they muſt begin again in ſome *firſt parents*. If it was only *topical*, effecting ſome one tract of the globe, or if the tops of mountains more eminent, or rocks more firm remaind unaffected, or if there were *any* natural means left by which men might eſcape, conſiderable numbers muſt certainly *ſurvive*: and then it cannot be imagined, that they ſhould all be *abſolutely* ſo *ignorant* of every thing, that no one ſhould be able to give an account of ſuch things as were *common*; no one able to write, or read, or even to recollect that there were ſuch things as letters; none, that underſtood any trade; none, that could tell what kind of habitations they had, how they uſed to be clothed, how their meat dreſt, or even what their food was: nor can it be thought, that *all* books, arms, manufactures of every kind, ſhips, buildings, and all the product of human skill and induſtry now extant in the world ſhould be ſo *univerſally* and *utterly* aboliſhd, that no part, no *veſtigium* of them ſhould remain; not ſo much, as to give a hint toward the ſpeedy reſtoration of neceſſary arts at leaſt. The people eſcaping muſt ſure have clothes on, and many neceſſaries about them, without which they could not eſcape, nor outlive ſuch a dreadful ſcene. In ſhort, no *conflagration*, no *flood*, no *deſtruction* can ſerve the objectors purpoſe, to reduce mankind to that ſtate, which by ancient memoirs and many undeniable ſymptoms we find them to have been in *not many* thouſands of years ſince; I ſay, no deſtruction can ſerve his purpoſe, but ſuch an one as makes *thorough* work, only ſparing two or three couples, ſtript of every thing, and the moſt ſtupid and verieſt blocks (*b*) to be picked out of the whole number: natural fools, or mere *homines ſylveſtres* would retain habits, and fall to their old way of living, as ſoon as they had the opportunity to do it. And ſuppoſe they never ſhould have ſuch an opportunity; yet neither would *this* ſerve him effectually: ſince without ſome *ſupernatural* Power interpoſing ſuch a revolution could not be brought about, nor the naked creatures preſerved, nor the earth reformed out of its aſhes and ruins after ſuch a calcination, or diſſolution, ſuch a *total* demolition of every thing. To this give me leave to add, that tho many inundations, great earthquakes, vulcano's and fiery eruptions have been in particular countries; yet there is no memory or teſtimony of any ſuch thing, that has ever been *univerſal* (*c*), except perhaps of one deluge: and as to that, if the *genius* of the

(*a*) Πολλαὶ ἁ καὶ πολλὰ φθοραὶ γεγίνασιν ἀνθρώπων, ἁ ἴσασι, πυρὶ μὲν ἁ ὕδατι μίγισαι. *Plato.* (*b*) Τὰς ἀγραμμάτους ἁ ἀμούσους, as *Plato* ſpeaks. (*c*) For what has been ſaid only in general, and preſumptively, to ſerve a cauſe, ſignifies nothing: no more than that teſtimony in *Arnobius*, where he ſeems to allow, that there have been univerſal conflagrations. *Quando*, ſays he, *mundus incenſus in favillas & cineres diſſolutus eſt? Non ante nos?*

language,

language in which the relation is deliverd, and the manner of writing hiſtory in it were well underſtood, ſome labourd and moliminous attempts to account for it might have been prevented. And beſide that, the ſame *record*, which tells the thing was, tells alſo how immediately God was concernd in it; that ſome perſons actually were ſaved; and that the people who then periſhed, as well as they who ſurvived, all deſcended from two *firſt parents*: and if that authority be a ſufficient proof of *one part* of the relation, it muſt be ſo of the *reſt*.

We may conclude then, that the *human ſoul* with its faculties of cogitation, *&c.* depends upon a *Superior* being. And who can this be but the *Supreme* being, or God? Of whom I now proceed to affirm, in the next place, that,

XVI. *Though His eſſence and manner of being is to us altogether incomprehenſible, yet we may ſay with aſſurance, that He is free from all defects; or One, from whom all defects muſt be removed.*

This propoſition hath in effect been proved already (*a*). However I will take the liberty to enlarge a little further upon it here. As our minds are *finite*, they cannot without a contradiction comprehend what is *infinite*. And if they were inlarged to ever ſo great a capacity, yet ſo long as they retain their general nature, and continue to be of the *ſame kind*, they would by that be only renderd able to apprehend *more* and *more finite* ideas; out of which, howſoever increaſed or exalted, no poſitive idea of the *perfection* of God can ever be formed. For a *Perfect* being muſt be *infinite*, and perfectly *One*: and in ſuch a nature there can be nothing *finite*, nor any *compoſition* of finites.

How ſhould we comprehend the nature of the Supreme incorporeal being, or how He exiſts, when we comprehend not the nature of the moſt *inferior ſpirits*, nor have any conception even of matter itſelf diveſted of its accidents? How ſhould we attain to an *adequate* knowledge of the Supreme author of the world, when we are utterly incapable of knowing the *extent* of the world itſelf, and the numberleſs undeſcried regions, with their ſeveral ſtates and circumſtances, containd in it, never to be frequented or viſited by our philoſophy; nor can turn our ſelves any way, but we are ſtill accoſted with ſomething *above* our underſtanding? If we cannot penetrate ſo far into *effects*, as to diſcover them and their nature throughly, it is not to be expected, that we ſhould, that we *can* ever be admitted to ſee through the myſteries of His nature, who is the *Cauſe*, ſo

(*a*) Prop. V, VI.

far *above them all.* The Divine perfection then, and manner of being muſt be of a *kind* different from and above all that we can conceive.

However, notwithſtanding our own defects, we may poſitively affirm there can be *none* in God; ſince He is *perfect*, as we have ſeen, He cannot be *defective* or *imperfect*. This needs no further proof. But what follows from it, I would have to be well underſtood and rememberd: *viz.* that from Him muſt be removed *want of life and activity*, *ignorance*, *impotence*, *acting inconſiſtently with reaſon and truth*, and the like. Becauſe theſe are *defects*; defect of knowledge, power, &c. Theſe are defects and blemiſhes even in *us*. And tho his perfection is above all our ideas, and of a different *kind* from the perfections of men or any finite beings; yet what would be a defect in *them*, would be much more ſuch in *Him*, and can by no means be aſcribed to Him (*a*),

Though we underſtand not His manner of knowing things; yet *ignorance* being uniform and the *ſame* in every ſubject, we *underſtand* what is meant by that word, and can literally and truly *deny* that to belong to Him. The like may be ſaid with reſpect to His power, or manner of operating, &c. And when we ſpeak of the *internal eſſential* attributes of God poſitively, as that He is omniſcient, omnipotent, eternal, &c. the *intent is* only to ſay, that there is no object of knowledge or power, which He does not know or cannot do, He exiſts without beginning and end, &c. and thus we keep ſtill within the limits allowd by the propoſition (*b*). That is, we may ſpeak *thus* without pretending to *comprehend* His nature. And ſo,

XVII. *We may conſider God as operating in the production and government of the world, and may draw concluſions from His works, as they are called, notwithſtanding any thing which has been ſaid* (*c*). Becauſe this we can do without comprehending the manner of His exiſtence. Nay, the contemplation of His works leads us into a neceſſity of owning, that there muſt be an incomprehenſible Being at the head of them.

Though I do not comprehend the *mode*, in which the world depends upon him and He influences and diſpoſes things, becauſe this enters into His *nature*, and the one cannot be underſtood without the other: yet if I ſee things, which I know cannot be *ſelf-exiſtent*, and obſerve plainly an *œconomy* and *deſign* in the diſpoſition of them, I may conclude that there is *ſome Being*, upon whom their exiſtence doth depend, and by whom they are modeld; may call this Being GOD, or the Author

(*a*) If that in *Terence* had been (not a queſtion, as it is there, but) an affirmation, *Ego homuncio hoc non facerem*, what a bitter reflexion had it been upon the heathen deity? (*b*) Λέγομεν ὁ μή ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ ἐστιν, ἃ λέγομεν. *Plotin.* (*c*) There is no way to find him out, but from his works. *Maim.*

and

and Governor of the world, &c. without *contradicting* my ſelf or truth; as I hope it will appear from what has been ſaid, and is going to be ſaid in the next propoſition.

XVIII. *God, who gives exiſtence to the world, does alſo govern it by His providence.* Concerning this grand queſtion, *Whether there is a Divine providence or not*, I uſe to think, *for my ſelf*, after the following manner.

Firſt, The world may be ſaid to be *governed* (at leaſt cannot be ſaid to be ἀνεπίτροπον, or left to fluctuate fortuitouſly), if there are *laws*, by which *natural cauſes* act, the ſeveral *phænomena* in it ſucceed regularly, and, in general, the conſtitution of things is preſerved: if there are *rules* obſerved in the production of *herbs*, *trees*, and the like: if the ſeveral kinds of *animals* are, in proportion to their ſeveral degrees and ſtations in the animal kingdom, furniſhd with *faculties proper to direct* and determin their actions; and when they act according to them, they may be ſaid to follow the *law* of their nature: if they are *placed* and *provided for* ſuitably to their reſpective natures and wants (*a*), or (which amounts to the ſame thing) if their natures are adapted to their circumſtances (*b*): if, laſtly, *particular caſes* relating to *rational beings* are taken care of in ſuch a manner, as will at laſt agree beſt with *reaſon*.

Secondly, If there are ſuch *laws* and *proviſions*, they can come originally from no other being, but from Him who is the *Author of nature*. For thoſe laws, which reſult from the *natures* of things, their properties, and the uſe of their faculties, and may be ſaid to be written upon the things themſelves, can be the laws of no other: nor can thoſe things, whoſe very *being* depends upon God, exiſt under any condition *repugnant* to His will; and therefore can be ſubject to no laws or diſpoſitions, which He would not have them be ſubject to; that is, which are not *His*. Beſide, there is *no other* being capable of impoſing laws, or any ſcheme of government upon the world; becauſe there is no other, who is not himſelf *part* of the world, and whoſe own exiſtence doth not *depend* upon Him.

Thirdly, By the *providence of God* I mean His governing the world by *ſuch* laws, and making *ſuch* proviſions, as are mentiond above. So that if there are *ſuch*, there is a Divine providence.

(*a*) From the horns of the unicorns, to the eggs of lice, as the *Jews* ſpeak. (*b*) I ſhall not pretend here to meddle with particular caſes relating to *inanimate* or *irrational* beings; ſuch as are mentiond in *Mo. nebok.* (a leaf's falling from a tree, a ſpider's catching a flie, *&c.*) and which are there ſaid to be by perfect accident. Tho it is hard to ſeparate theſe many times from the caſes of rational beings; as alſo to comprehend what perfect accident is.

Laſtly, It is not *impoſſible*, that there ſhould be *ſuch*: on the contrary, we have juſt reaſons to believe there are. It would be an abſurd aſſertion to ſay, that any thing is *impoſſible* to a being whoſe nature is infinitely above our comprehenſion, if the terms do not *imply a contradiction*: but we may with confidence aſſert, that it is *impoſſible* for any thing, whoſe *exiſtence* flows from ſuch a being, ever to grow ſo far out of His reach, or be ſo emancipated from under Him, that the *manner* of its exiſtence ſhould not be regulated and determind by Him.

As to *inanimate ſubſtances*, we ſee the caſe to be really juſt as it was ſuppoſed before to be. The heavenly and greater bodies keep their ſtations, or perſevere to go the ſame circuits over and over by a *certain law*. Little bodies or particles, of the ſame kind, obſerve continually the ſame *rules* of attracting, repelling, &c. When there are any ſeeming variations in nature, they proceed only from the different circumſtances and combinations of things, acting all the while under their ancient *laws*. We are ſo far acquainted with the *laws* of gravitation and motion, that we are able to calculate their effects, and ſerve our ſelves of them, ſupplying upon many occaſions the defect of power in our ſelves by mechanical powers, which never fail to anſwer according to the *eſtabliſhment*. Briefly, we ſee it ſo far from being *impoſſible*, that the *inanimate* world ſhould be governd by *laws*, that all the parts of it are obnoxious to *laws* by them *inviolable*

As to *vegetables*, we ſee alſo how they are determind by *certain methods* preſcribed them. Each ſort is produced from its *proper* ſeed; hath the *ſame* texture of fibres; is nouriſhd by the *ſame* kind of juices out of the earth, digeſted and prepared by the *ſame* kind of veſſels, *&c.* Trees receive annually their *peculiar* liveries, and bear their *proper* fruits: flowers are dreſt, each family, in the *ſame* colors, or diverſify their faſhions after a certain manner *proper* to the kind, and breath the *ſame* eſſences: and both theſe and all other kinds *obſerve* their ſeaſons; and ſeem to have their ſeveral profeſſions and trades *appointed them*, by which they produce ſuch food and manufactures (pardon the *catachreſis*), as may *ſatisfy the wants* of animals. Being ſo very neceſſary, they, or at leaſt the moſt uſeful, grow *eaſily*: being fixt in the earth, inſenſible, and not made for ſociety, they are generally ἀφειδοβίους being liable to a great conſumption both of them and their ſeeds, they yield *great quantities* of theſe, in order to repair and multiply their race, *&c.* So that here is evidently a *regulation*, by which the ſeveral orders are preſerved, and the ends of them anſwerd according to their firſt *eſtabliſhment* too.

Then as to *animals*, there are *laws*, which *mut. mutand.* are common to them with inanimate beings and vegetables, or at leaſt ſuch as reſemble(*a*) their laws. The individu-

(*a*) *Pliny* in his chapter *De ordine naturæ in ſatis*, &c. treats of trees in terms taken from animals.

als

als of the ſeveral kinds of thoſe, as of theſe, have the *ſame* (general) ſhape and members, to be managed after the *ſame* manner: have the *ſame* veſſels repleniſhd with the *ſame* kinds of fluids, and furniſhd with the ſame glands for the ſeparation and diſtribution of ſuch parts of them, as anſwer the *ſame* intentions in them all: are ſtimulated by the *ſame* appetites and uneaſineſſes to take in their food, continue their breed, *&c.* And whatever it is, that proceeds thus in a manner ſo like to that of vegetables, according to *fixt* methods, and keeps in the ſame general track as they do, may be ſaid to obſerve and be under ſome *like rule* or *law*, which either operates upon and limits it *ab extra*, or was given it with its nature. But there are, moreover, certain obligations reſulting from the ſeveral degrees of reaſon and ſenſe, or ſenſe only, of which we cannot but be conſcious in our ſelves, and obſerve ſome faint indications in the kinds below us, and which can be lookt upon as nothing leſs than *laws*, by which animals are to move and manage themſelves: that is, otherwiſe expreſt, by which the author of their natures *governs* them. 'Tis true *theſe laws* may not impoſe an abſolute neceſſity, nor be of the ſame rigor with thoſe of inanimate and merely paſſive beings, becauſe the beings which are ſubject to theſe (men at leaſt) may be ſuppoſed in ſome meaſure free, and to act upon ſome kind of principles or motives: yet ſtill they may have the nature of *laws*, tho they may be broken; and may make a part of that *providence* by which God *adminiſters* the affairs of the world. Whatever advantages I obtain by my own free endeavours, and right uſe of thoſe faculties and powers I have, I look upon them to be as much the effects of God's *providence* and government, as if they were given me *immediately* by Him, without my acting; ſince all my faculties and abilities (whatever they are) depend upon *Him*, and are as it were *inſtruments* of his providence to me in reſpect of ſuch things as may be procured by them.

To finiſh this head: it is ſo far from being *impoſſible*, that the ſeveral tribes of *animals* ſhould be ſo made and placed, as to find proper ways of ſupporting and defending themſelves (I mean, ſo far as it is conſiſtent with the general œconomy of the world: for ſome cannot well ſubſiſt without the deſtruction of ſome others), that, on the contrary, we ſee men, beaſts, birds, fiſhes, inſects all have organs and faculties adapted to their reſpective circumſtances and opportunities of finding their proper food or prey, *&c.* even to the aſtoniſhment of them who attend to the hiſtory of nature. If *men*, who ſeem to have more wants than any other kind, meet with difficulties in maintaining life, it is becauſe they themſelves, not contented with what is *decent* and *convenient* only, have by their luxuries and ſcandalous neglect of their reaſon *made* life expenſive.

(*d*) Therefore if thoſe *Eſſenes* in *Joſephus*, who are ſaid ἐπὶ μὲν Θεῷ καταλιπεῖν τὰ πάντα, excluded human endeavours, they muſt be much in the wrong.

The

The *world* then being not left in a ſtate of confuſion or as a chaos, but reduced into *order* and *methodized* for ages to come; the ſeveral ſpecies of beings having their offices and provinces *aſſignd* them; plants and animals ſubſiſtence *ſet out* for them; and as they go off, ſucceſſors *appointed* to relieve them, and carry on the *ſcheme*, &c. that the *poſſibility* only of a *general* providence ſhould be allowd, is certainly *too modeſt* a demand. We ſee, or may ſee, that *in fact* there is *ſuch* a providence (*a*).

The great difficulty is, how to account for that *providence*, which is called *particular*; or that, which reſpects (principally) *particular* men. For rational beings and free agents are capable of doing and deſerving *well*, or *ill*. Some *will* make a right uſe of their faculties and opportunities, ſome *will not*: the vicious may, or may not *repent*, or repent and *relapſe*: ſome fall into evil habits through inadvertence, bad examples, and the like, rather than any deſign: and theſe want to be reclaimd: ſome may be ſuppoſed to worſhip God and to crave His protection and bleſſing, &c. and then a proper anſwer to their prayers may be humbly expected. Hence many and great differences will ariſe, which will require from a governor *ſuitable* incouragements, rewards, correptions, puniſhments; and that ſome ſhould be protected and fortunate, others not, or leſs. Now the *good* or *ill* ſtate of a man here, his ſafety or danger, happineſs or unhappineſs depend upon many things, which ſeem to be ſcarce *all capable* of being determind by providence. They depend upon what he does *himſelf*, and what naturally follows from his own behaviour: upon what is done by *others*, and may either touch him at the ſame time, or reach him afterward: upon the *courſe* of nature, which muſt affect him: and, in fine, upon many *incidents*, of which no account is to be given (*b*). As to what *he does himſelf*, it is impoſſible for him, as things are in this maze of life, to know always what tends to happineſs, and what not: or if he could know, that, which ought to be done, may not be within the compaſs of his powers. Then, if the actions of other men are *free*, how can they be determind to be only *ſuch*, as may be either good or bad (as the *caſe requires*) for ſome other particular man; ſince ſuch a determination ſeems inconſiſtent with liberty? Beſide, numbers of men acting every one upon the foot of their own *private* freedom, and the ſeveral *degrees* of ſenſe and ability which they *reſpectively* have, their acts, as they either conſpire, or croſs and obliquely impede, or perhaps directly meet

(*a*) *Ut ſiquis in domum aliquam, aut in gymnaſium, aut in forum venerit, cùm videat omnium rerum rationem, modum, diſciplinam, non poſſit ea ſine cauſa fieri judicare, ſed eſſe aliquem intelligat, qui præſit, & cui pareatur*, &c. Cic. (*b*) Little things have many times unforeſeen and great effects: *& contra*. The bare ſight of a fig, ſhewn in the ſenate-houſe at *Rome*, occaſiond *Carthage* to be deſtroyd: *quod non Trebia, aut Traſymennus, non Canna buſto inſignes Romani nominis perficere potuere; non caſtra Punica ad tertium lapidem vallata, portæ; Collina adequitans ipſe Hannibal*. Plin.

and

and *oppoſe* each other, and have different effects upon men of different *makes*, or in different *circumſtances*, muſt cauſe a ſtrange embarras, and intangle the plot (*a*). And as to the *courſe of nature*, if a *good* man be paſſing by an infirm building, juſt in the article of falling, can it be expected, that God ſhould *ſuſpend* the force of gravitation till he is gone by, in order to his deliverance; or can we think it would be increaſed, and the fall haſtned, if a *bad* man was there, only that he might be caught, cruſhd, and made an example (*b*)? If a man's ſafety or proſperity ſhould depend upon winds or rains, muſt *new* motions be impreſt upon the atmoſphere, and *new* directions given to the floating parts of it, by ſome *extraordinary* and *new* influence from God? Muſt clouds be ſo precipitated, or kept in ſuſpenſe (*c*), as the *caſe* of a particular man or two requires? To which add, that the differing and many times contrary intereſts of men are ſcarce to be *reconciled*. The wind, which carries one into the *port*, drives another back to *ſea*; and the rains, that are but juſt ſufficient upon the *hills*, may drown the inhabitants of the *valleys* (*d*). In ſhort, may we expect *miracles* (*e*): or can there be a particular providence, a providence that ſuits the *ſeveral caſes* and prayers of individuals, without a continual *repetition* of them, and force *frequently* committed upon the laws of nature, and the freedom of intelligent agents? For my part, I verily believe there may. For,

1. It ſeems to me not *impoſſible*, that God ſhould know *what is to come*: on the contrary, it is highly reaſonable to think, that He does and muſt know things *future*. Whatever happens in the world, which does not come immediately from Him, muſt either be the effect of *mechanical* cauſes, or of the motions of living beings and *free* agents. For *chance* we have ſeen already is no cauſe. Now as to the former, it cannot be *impoſſible* for Him, upon whom the being and nature of every thing depends and who therefore muſt *intimately* know all their powers, and what effects they will

(*a*) While every one puſhes his own deſigns, they muſt interfere, and hinder one another. *Ad ſummum ſuccedere honorem Certantes, iter infeſtum fecere viai*, Lucr. (*b*) Or is it not more likely, παντάσιν ἐυεδρεύειν, ἢ ὑποπτεύοντα κολάζειν, ὁ πολὺ ποτ' ἂν ἦ (in *Plotinus*'s words)? (*c*) Something more than this we meet with in *Ong*'s paraphraſe, where it is ſaid, that upon *Moſes*'s prayer, the rain which was coming down, did not come all the way to the ground; Which ſame place *Raſbi* explains after the ſame manner: The rain did not come all the way to the ground; and alſo the ſigns which were in the air, did not fall quite to the ground. (*d*) In *Lucian*, Τ πλούτων ὁ μὲν βορέαν ἠυχετο ἐπιπνεῦσαι· ὁ δὲ, νότον· ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς ἄτε ὑετόν ὁ δὲ κυφοὺς, ἥλιον. (*e*) Some have talked to this purpoſe. So *R. Albo* ſays of ſome prophets and good-men, that they changed nature, or that it was changed for their ſakes. So *R. Iſ. Abuh.* that the good or evil, which happens to a man in this world by way of reward or puniſhment, is not only in the buſineſs of a plain miracle, but likewiſe in your unobſerved miracle, where he that ſees it thinks that it is according to the courſe of the World. So *Abarb.* The power of God changeth natural things by his providence. And according in *Sed. teph.* we find this thankſgiving: We praiſe thee,----becauſe of thy miracles, which are every day with us.

have,

have, to ſee through the whole *train* of cauſes and effects, and whatever will come to paſs in *that way* (*a*): nay, it is *impoſſible*, that He ſhould *not* do it. We our ſelves, if we are ſatisfied of the goodneſs of the materials of which a machine is made, and underſtand the force and determination of thoſe powers by which it is moved, can tell what it will do, or what will be the effect of it. And as to thoſe things which depend upon the *voluntary* motions of free agents, it is well known, that men (by whom learn how to judge of the reſt) can only be free with reſpect to ſuch things as are within their *ſphere*; not great, God knows: and their freedom with reſpect to theſe can only conſiſt in a liberty either to act, without any incumbent neceſſity, as their *own reaſon* and judgment ſhall determin them; or to *neglect* their rational faculties, and not uſe them at all, but ſuffer themſelves to be carried away by the tendences and inclinations of the body, which left thus to itſelf acts in a manner *mechanically*. Now He, who knows what *is* in mens power, what not; knows the make of their bodies, and all the *mechaniſm* and propenſions of them; knows the *nature* and *extent* of their underſtandings, and what will determin them this or that way; knows all the proceſs of natural (or ſecond) cauſes, and conſequently how theſe may work upon them (*b*): He, I ſay, who knows all this, may know *what* men will do, if He can but know this one thing more, *viz.* whether they *will uſe* their rational faculties or *not*. And ſince even we our ſelves, mean and defective as we are, can *in ſome meaſure* conceive, how ſo much as this may be done, and ſeem to want but one ſtep to finiſh the account, can we with any ſhew of reaſon deny to a *Perfect* being this one article more, or think that He cannot do that too; eſpecially if we call to mind, that this very power of *uſing* our own faculties is held of Him (*c*)?

Obſerve what a ſagacity there is in ſome *men*, not only in reſpect of phyſical cauſes and effects, but alſo of the future actings of mankind; and how very eaſie it is many times, if the perſons concernd, their characters, and circumſtances are given, to foreſee what they will do: as alſo to foretel many general events, tho the intermediate tranſactions upon which they depend are not known (*d*). Conſider how much more remarkable this penetration is in *ſome* men, than in *others*: conſider further, that if there be any *minds* more perfect than the human, (and who can be ſo conceited of himſelf as to queſtion this?) they muſt have it in a ſtill more eminent degree, *proportionable* to the excellence of their natures: in the laſt place, do but allow

(*a*) What *Seneca* ſays of the gods (in the heathen ſtyle), may be ſaid of the true God. *Nota eſt illi operis ſui ſeries: omniumq; illi rerum per manus ſuas iturarum ſcientia in aperto ſemper eſt; nobis ex abdito ſubit, &c.* (*b*) Ὁ γὰρ ζωοπλάστης θεὸς ἐπίσταται τὰ ἑαυτῦ καλῶς δημιουργήματα. *Ph. J.* (*c*) *Ipſa noſtra voluntates in cauſarum ordine ſunt, qui certus eſt Deo, ejuſq; præſcientia continetur, &c.* S. Auſt. (*d*) *Etſi quem exitum acies habitura ſit, divinare nemo poteſt; tamen belli exitum video, &c.* and after, *quem ego tam video animo, quam ea, quæ oculis cernimus.* Cic.

(at

(as you muſt) this power of diſcerning to be in God *proportionable* to His nature, as in lower beings it is proportionable to *theirs*, and then it becomes *infinite*; and then again, the *future* actions of free agents are at once all unlocked, and expoſed to His view. For that knowledge is not infinite, which is limited to things *paſt* or *preſent* or which come to paſs *neceſſarily*.

After all, what has been ſaid is only a feeble attempt to ſhew, how far *even we* can go toward a conception of the *manner*, in which future things may be known: but as we have no adequate idea of an infinite and perfect Being, His powers, and among them His *power of knowing*, muſt infinitely paſs all our underſtanding. It muſt be ſomething different from and *infinitely* tranſcending all the modes of apprehending things, which we know any thing of (*a*).

We know matters of fact by the help of our *ſenſes*, the ſtrength of *memory*, impreſſions made upon *phanſy*, or the *report* of others (tho that indeed is comprehended under *ſenſes*. For that, which we know only by report, in proper ſpeaking we only know the report of, or we have heard it;) and all theſe ways do ſuppoſe thoſe matters either to be *preſent*, or once to have *been*: but it is therefore *impoſſible*, that there ſhould be any *other* ways of knowing? This is ſo far from being true, that, ſince God has no organs of ſenſation, nor ſuch mean faculties as the beſt of ours are, and conſequently cannot know things in the way which we know them in, if He doth not know them by ſome *other* way, He cannot know them *at all*, even tho they were preſent: and therefore there muſt be *other* ways, or at leaſt *another* way of knowing even matters of fact. And ſince the difficulty we find in determining, whether *future* matters of fact may be known, ariſes chiefly from this, that we in reality conſider, without minding it, whether they may be known in *our way* of knowing; it vaniſhes, when we recollect, that they are and muſt be known to God by ſome other way: and not only ſo, but this muſt be ſome way, that is perfect and worthy of Him. *Future*, or what to us is future, may be as truly the object of divine knowledge, as *preſent* is of ours: nor can we (*b*) tell, what reſpect *paſt*, *preſent*, *to come*, have to the Divine mind, or wherein they differ. To deaf men there is no ſuch thing as *ſound*, to blind no ſuch thing as *light* or *color*: nor, when theſe things are defined and explaind to them in the beſt manner, which their circumſtances admit, are they capable of knowing *how* they are apprehended. So here, we cannot tell *how* future things are known perhaps, any more than deaf or blind people what ſounds or colors are, and *how* they are perceived; but yet there may be a way of knowing *thoſe*,

(*a*) This knowledge is not of the ſame kind with our knowledge. *Maim.* It differs not only in much or little, but in the very kind of its exiſtence. *Id.* (*b*) *Ignari, quid queat eſſe, Quid nequeat*: to uſe *Lucretius*'s words more properly.

as well as there is of perceiving *theſe*. As they want a *fifth* ſenſe to perceive ſounds or colors, of which they have no notion: ſo perhaps we may want a *ſixth* ſenſe, or *ſome faculty*, of which future events may be the proper objects. Nor have we any more reaſon to deny, that there is in nature *ſuch* a ſenſe or faculty, than the deaf or blind have to deny there is ſuch a ſenſe as that of *hearing* or *ſeeing*.

We can never conclude, that it is *impoſſible* for an infinitely perfect Being to know what a free agent will *chooſe* to do, till we can comprehend *all* the powers of ſuch a Being, and that is till we our ſelves are infinite and perfect (*a*). So far are we from being able to pronounce with any ſhew of reaſon, that it is *impoſſible* there ſhould be ſuch knowledge in God.

In the laſt place, this knowledge is not only not *impoſſible*, but that which has been already proved concerning the Deity and His perfection doth neceſſarily infer, that nothing can be hid from Him. For if *ignorance* be an imperfection, the ignorance of *future* acts and events muſt be ſo: and then if *all* imperfections are to be denied of Him, *this muſt*.

There is indeed a common prejudice againſt the *preſcience* (as it is uſually called) of God; which ſuggeſts, that, if God foreknows things, He foreknows them infallibly or *certainly:* and if ſo, then they are *certain*; and if certain, then they are no longer matter of *freedom*. And thus preſcience and freedom are inconſiſtent. *But ſure* the nature of a thing is not *changed* by being known, or known before hand. For if it is known truly, it is known to be what it is; and therefore is not alterd by this. The truth is, God foreſees, or rather ſees the actions of free agents, becauſe they *will be*; not that they will be, becauſe He *foreſees* them (*b*). If I ſee an object in a certain place, the veracity of my faculties ſuppoſed, it is *certain* that object is there: but yet it cannot be ſaid, it is there *becauſe* I ſee it there, or that my ſeeing it there is the *cauſe* of its being there: but becauſe it *is there*, therefore I *ſee* it there. It is the object, that determins my ſenſation: and ſo in the other caſe, it is the future *choice* of the free agent, that determins the preſcience, which yet may be infallibly true (*c*).

Let us put theſe two contradictory propoſitions, *B* (ſome particular man) *will go to church next Sunday, and B will not go to church next Sunday*; and let us ſuppoſe withall,

(*a*) To attempt to comprehend the manner of God's knowing is the ſame as for us to endeavour to be God himſelf. *Maim.* (*b*) His knowledge of what may be, does not produce the thing, tho' naturally poſſible. *Maim.* Much might be inſerted upon this ſubject (out of *Abarb.* particularly) which I ſhall omit. (*c*) *Sicut enim tu memoriâ tuâ non cogis facta eſſe quæ præterierunt; ſic Deus præſcientiâ ſuâ non cogit facienda quæ futura ſunt.* S. Auſt.

that

that B is *free*, and that his going or not going depends merely upon his *own will*. In this caſe he may indeed do either, but yet he can do but *one* of theſe two things, either *go*, or *not go*; and one he muſt do. One of theſe propoſitions therefore is now *true*; but yet it is not the truth of that propoſition, which forces him *to do* what is containd in it: on the contrary, the *truth* of the propoſition ariſes from what he ſhall *chooſe* to do. And if that truth doth not force him, the *foreknowledge* of that truth will not. We may ſure ſuppoſe B himſelf to *know certainly* before hand, which of the two he will chooſe to do, whether to go to church or not (I mean ſo far as it depends upon his choice only): and if ſo, then here is B's own *foreknowledge* conſiſtent with his freedom: and if we can but, further, ſuppoſe God to know *as much* in this reſpect as B does, there will be God's *foreknowledge* conſiſtent with B's *freedom*.

In a word, it involves no *contradiction* to aſſert, that God certainly knows what any man will chooſe; and therefore that he ſhould do this cannot be ſaid to be *impoſſible*.

2. It is not *impoſſible*, that ſuch *laws* of nature, and ſuch a *ſeries* of cauſes and effects may be *originally* deſignd, that not only general proviſions may be made for the ſeveral ſpecies of beings, but even *particular caſes*, at leaſt many of them, may alſo be provided for without *innovations* or *alterations* in the courſe of nature (*a*). It is true this amounts to a prodigious ſcheme, in which all things to come are as it were comprehended under one view, eſtimated, and laid together: but when I conſider, what a maſs of *wonders* the univerſe is in other regards; what a Being God is, *incomprehenſibly* great and perfect; that He cannot be ignorant of any thing, no not of the *future* wants and deportments of *particular* men; and that all things, which derive from Him as the Firſt cauſe, muſt do this ſo as to be *conſiſtent* one with another, and in ſuch a manner, as to make *one compact* ſyſtem, befitting ſo great an Author: I ſay, when I conſider this, I cannot deny ſuch an *adjuſtment* of things to be within His power (*b*). The order of events, proceeding from the ſettlement of nature, may be as compatible with the due and reaſonable ſucceſs of *my* endeavours and prayers (as inconſiderable a part of the world as I am) (*c*), as with any other thing or *phænomenon* how *great* ſoever.

(*a*) Things come to paſs ἢ κατὰ φυσικὰς ἀκολουθίας ἢ κατὰ λόγον· and even τὰ σμικρότατα δεῖ συντετάχθαι ἢ σωυφάνθαι νομίζειν. *Plot.* That in *Seneca* looks ſomething like this: *Hoc dico, fulmina non mitti a Jove, ſed ſic omnia diſpoſita, ut ea etiam, quæ ab illo non fiunt, tamen ſine ratione non fiant: quæ illius eſt.*-----*Nam etſi Jupiter illa nunc non facit, fecit ut fierent.* (*b*) This ſeems to be what *Euſebius* means, when he ſays, that Divine providence does (among other things) τοῖς ἐκτὸς συμβαίνουσι τὴν δίκαιαν τάξιν ἀπονέμειν. (*c*) Τὴν γὰρ ἀδύνειαν τὴν ἐμαυτῦ μετρεῖν ἐμαθον, in *Philo*'s words,

Perhaps my meaning may be made more intelligible thus. Suppoſe M (ſome man) certainly to *foreknow* ſome way or other that, when he ſhould come to be upon his death-bed, L would *petition* for ſome *particular legacy*; in a manner ſo earneſt and humble, and with ſuch a good diſpoſition, as would render it proper to grant his requeſt: and upon this M makes his *laſt will*, by which he deviſes to L that which was to be asked, and then locks up the *will*; and all this many years before the death of M, and whilſt L had yet no expectation or thought of any ſuch thing. When the time comes, the *petition* is made, and *granted*; not by making any *new* will, but by the *old* one already made, and without *alteration*: which legacy had, notwithſtanding that, never been left had the petition never been preferred. The grant may be called an effect of a future act, and depends as much upon it, as if it had been made after the act. So if it had been foreſeen, that L would not *ſo much as ask*, and had therefore been left out of the will; this *preterition* would have been cauſed by his carriage, tho much later than the date of the will. In all this is nothing hard to be admitted, if M be allowd to *foreknow* the caſe (*a*). And thus the *prayers*, which good men offer to the *All-knowing* God, and the *neglects* of others, may find fitting effects *already* forecaſted in the courſe of nature. Which *poſſibility* may be extended to the labors of men, and their behaviour in general.

It is obvious to every one's obſervation, that in *fact* particular men are very commonly (at leaſt in ſome meaſure) rewarded or puniſhd by the *general* laws and methods of nature. The *natural* (tho not conſtant) attendents and conſequences of virtue are peace, health, and felicity; of vice, loſs of philoſophical pleaſures, a diſeaſed body, debts, and difficulties. Now then, if B be *virtuous* and *happy*, C *vitious* and at laſt *miſerable*, laboring under a late and fruitleſs remorſe; tho this comes to paſs through the *natural tendence* of things, yet theſe two caſes, being ſuppoſed ſuch as require, the one that B ſhould be favord, the other that C ſhould ſuffer for his wickedneſs, are as effectually *provided for*, as if God exerted his power in ſome peculiar way on this occaſion.

3. It is not *impoſſible*, that men, whoſe natures and actions are foreknown, may be introduced into the world in ſuch *times*, *places*, and other *circumſtances*, as that their acts and behaviour may not only coincide with the *general* plan of things, but alſo anſwer many *private* caſes too (*b*). The *planets* and bigger parts of the world we cannot

(*a*) The caſe here put may perhaps ſupply an anſwer to that, which is ſaid in *Miſhn. maſſ. Berak.* He that prayeth that he may remove mountains, prayeth in vain. (*b*) If *Plato* had not been born in the time of *Socrates*, in all probability he had not been what he was. And therefore, with *Lactantius*'s favor, he might have reaſon to thank God, *quòd Athenienſis* [*natus eſſet*], *& quòd temporibus Socratis.* Juſt as *M. Antoninus* aſcribes, grateſully, to the Gods τὸ γνῶναι Ἀπολλώνιον, Ῥούφικον, Μάξιμον.

but

but ſee are diſpoſed into ſuch *places* and *order*, that they together make a noble *ſyſtem*, without having their natural powers of attraction (or the force of that which is equivalent to attraction) or any of the laws of motion *reſtraind* or *alterd*. On the contrary, being *rightly placed*, they by the obſervation of *theſe* become ſubſervient to the main deſign. Now why may there not be in the Divine mind ſomething like a projection of the *future hiſtory* of mankind, as well as of the order and motions and various aſpects of the greater bodies of the world? And then why ſhould it not be thought *poſſible* for *men*, as well as for *them*, by ſome ſecret law, tho of another kind, or rather by the preſidence and guidance of an unſeen governing power, to be brought into their places in ſuch a manner as that by the *free* uſe of their faculties, the conjunctions and oppoſitions of their intereſts and inclinations, the natural influence and weight of their ſeveral magnitudes and degrees of parts, power, wealth, &c. they may conſpire to make out the ſcheme? And then again, ſince generals conſiſt of particulars, and in this ſcheme are comprehended the actions and caſes of *particular* men, they cannot be ſo ſituated reſpectively among the reſt of their ſpecies as to be ſerviceable to the principal intention, and fall properly into the *general diagram* of affairs, unleſs they and their ſeveral actings and caſes do in the main correſpond one to another, and fit among themſelves, or at leaſt are not *inconſiſtent*.

Here is no implication of any *contradiction* or *abſurdity* in all this: and therefore it may at leaſt be fairly *ſuppoſed*. And if ſo, it will follow, that a *particular providence* may be compatible with the natural *freedom* of mens actions. Such a ſuppoſition is certainly not beyond the power of an *almighty*, *perfect* Being: it is moreover worthy of Him, and what they, who can dwell a while upon thoſe words, and take their import, muſt believe.

The ancients I am perſuaded had ſome ſuch thoughts as theſe. For they were generally *fataliſts*, and yet do not ſeem to have thought, that they were *not maſters* of their own actions (*a*).

4. It is not *impoſſible* (for this is *all* that I contend for here), that many things, ſuitable to ſeveral caſes, may be brought to paſs by means of *ſecret* and ſometimes *ſudden influences* on our minds (*b*), or the minds of other men, whoſe acts may af-

(*a*) *Plato* and the *Stoics*, *ap. Plut.* make *fate* to be συμπλοκὴν αἰτιῶν τεταγμένην, ἐν ᾗ συμπλοκῇ ἕ τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς· ὥςε τὰ μὲν ἑιμάρθαι, τὰ δὲ ἀνεμάρθαι. (*b*) The Heathen were of this opinion: otherwiſe *Homer* could have had no opportunity of introducing their Deities as he doth. Τῷ δ' ἄρ ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θῆκε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη· Ἀλλά τις ἀθανάτων τρέψε φρένας· and the like often. *Plutarch* explains theſe paſſages thus. Οὐκ ἀναιρῶντα ποιεῖ [Ὅμηρος] τὸν θεὸν, ἀλλὰ κινοῦντα τὴν προαίρεσιν· οὐδ' ὁρμὰς ἐργαζόμενον, ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ὁρμῶν ἀγωγός· and afterwards the Gods are ſaid to help men, τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πρακτικὸν ἕ προαιρετικὸν ἀρχαῖς τισι ἕ φαντασίαις ἕ ἐπινοίαις ἐγείροντες, ἕ τἐναντίον ἀποτρέποντες ἕ ἴσχοντες.

fect

fect us. For inſtance; if the caſe ſhould require, that N ſhould be deliverd from ſome threatning *ruin*, or from ſome *misfortune*, which would certainly befall him, if he ſhould go ſuch a way at ſuch a time, as he intended: upon this occaſion ſome *new* reaſons may be preſented to his mind, why he ſhould not go *at all*, or not *then*, or not *by that road*; or he may forget to go. Or, if he is to be deliverd from ſome dangerous *enemy*, either ſome new turn given to his thoughts may divert him from going where the *enemy* will be, or the enemy may be after the ſame manner diverted from coming where *he* ſhall be, or his [the enemy's] reſentment may be *qualified*, or ſome proper method of *defence* may be ſuggeſted, or degree of reſolution and vigor excited. After the ſame manner not only deliverances from dangers and troubles, but advantages and ſucceſſes may be conferred: or on the other ſide, men may, by way of puniſhment for crimes committed, incur miſchiefs and calamities. I ſay, theſe things and ſuch like *may be*. For ſince the motions and actions of men, which depend upon their wills, do alſo depend upon their judgments, as theſe again do upon the *preſent appearances* or *non-appearances* of things in their minds; if a *new* proſpect of things can be any way produced, the lights by which they are ſeen *alterd*, *new* forces and directions impreſt upon the ſpirits, paſſions *exalted* or *abated*, the power of judging *inlivened* or *debilitated*, or the attention taken off, without any ſuſpenſion or alteration of the ſtanding laws of nature, then without that *new* volitions, deſigns, meaſures, or a ceſſation of thinking may alſo be produced, and thus many things prevented, that otherwiſe would *be*, and many brought about, that would *not*. But that this is far from being *impoſſible*, ſeems clear to me. For the operations of the mind following in great meaſure the preſent diſpoſition of the *body*, ſome thoughts and deſigns, or abſences of mind, may proceed from *corporeal* cauſes, acting according to the common laws of matter and motion themſelves; and ſo the caſe may fall in with n. 2. or they may be occaſiond by ſomething ſaid or done by *other men*; and then the caſe may be brought under n. 3. or they may be cauſed by the ſuggeſtion, and impulſe, or other ſilent communications of ſome *ſpiritual being*; perhaps the Deity himſelf. For that ſuch imperceptible influences and ſtill whiſpers may be, none of us all can poſitively deny: that is, we cannot know certainly, that there are no ſuch things. On the contrary, I believe there are but few of them who have made obſervations upon themſelves and their affairs, but muſt, when they reflect on life paſt and the various adventures and events in it, find many inſtances, in which their uſual judgment and ſenſe of things cannot but ſeem to themſelves to have been *over-ruled* they knew not *by what*, nor *how* (*a*), nor *why* (i. e. they have done

(*a*) Σφαλεὶς [ὁ μειραξισκος] ἀκ οἶδ' ὅπως, ἐμοὶ μὲν τὸ φάρμακον Πτολεμαῖος δὲ ἀφάρμακτον [κύλικα] ἐπίδωκε, ſays *Callidemides*, who deſigned the poiſon for *Ptæodorus*, in Lucian.

things,

things, which afterwards they wonder how they came *to do*); and that theſe actions have had conſequences very *remarkable* in their hiſtory (*a*). I ſpeak not here of men dementated with wine, or inchanted with ſome temptation: the thing holds true of men even in their ſober and more conſidering ſeaſons.

That there may be *poſſibly* ſuch inſpirations of new thoughts and counſels may perhaps further appear from this; that we ſo frequently find thoughts ariſing in our heads, into which we are led by *no* diſcourſe, *nothing* we read, *no* clue of reaſoning; but they ſurpriſe and come upon us from we *know not* what quarter (*b*). If they proceeded from the mobility of ſpirits, ſtraggling out of order, and fortuitous affections of the brain, or were of the nature of *dreams*, why are they not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant as they are? Not to add, that the world has generally acknowledged, and therefore ſeems to have *experienced* ſome aſſiſtance and directions given to good men by the Deity; that men have been many times infatuated, and loſt to themſelves, &c. If any one ſhould object, that if men are thus over-ruled in their actings, then they are deprived of their *liberty*, &c. the anſwer is, that tho man is a free agent, he may not be free as to *every thing*. His freedom may be reſtraind, and he only accountable for thoſe acts, in reſpect of which he is *free*.

If this then be the caſe, as it ſeems to be, that men's minds are ſuſceptive of ſuch *inſinuations* and *impreſſions*, as frequently by ways unknown do affect them, and give them an inclination toward this or that, how many things may be brought to paſs by theſe means without *fixing* and *refixing* the laws of nature: any more than they are unfixt, when one man alters the opinion of another by throwing a book, proper for that purpoſe, in his way? I ſay, how many things may be brought about thus, not only in regard of *our ſelves*, but *other people*, who may be concerned in our actions, either *immediately* (*c*), or *in time* through perhaps many intermediate events? For the proſperity or improſperity of a man, or his fate here, does not intirely depend upon his *own* prudence or imprudence, but in great meaſure upon his *ſituation* among the reſt of mankind, and what *they* do. The natural effect of his management meeting with ſuch things, as are the natural effects of the actions of other men, and being blended with them, the reſult may be ſomething not intended or foreſeen.

5. There *poſſibly* may be, and moſt probably are beings *inviſible*, and *ſuperior* in nature to us, who may by *other* means be in many reſpects *miniſters* of God's provi-

(*a*) When *Hannibal* was in ſight of *Rome*, *non auſus eſt obſidere. S. Hier.*----*Sed religione quadam abſtinuit, quod diceret, capienda urbis modo non dari voluntatem, modo non dari facultatem, ut teſtatur & Oroſius. Schol.* (*b*) *Non enim cuiquam in poteſtate eſt quid veniat in mentem.* S. Auſt. (*c*) They who called *Simonides* out from *Scopas* and his company, as if it were to ſpeak with him, ſaved his life. The ſtory known.

dence

dence, and authors under Him of many events to particular men, without *altering* the laws of nature. For it implies no *contradiction* or *abſurdity* to ſay there are ſuch beings: on the contrary we have the greateſt reaſon to think what has been intimated already; that ſuch imperfect beings, as we are, are far below the *top* of the ſcale. Tho *pictures* of ſpiritual beings cannot be drawn in our imagination, as of corporeal; yet to the upper and reaſoning part of the mind the idea of *ſpiritual ſubſtance* may perhaps be as clear, as that of *corporeity* (*a*). For what *penetrability* is, muſt be known juſt as well as what *impenetrability* is: and ſo on.

And ſince it has been proved (p. 77, 78), that all corporeal motions proceed originally from ſomething *incorporeal*, it muſt be as certain, that there are incorporeal ſubſtances, as that there is motion. Beſide, how can we tell but that there may be above us beings of greater powers, and more perfect intellects, and capable of mighty things, which yet may have *corporeal* vehicles as we have, but *finer* and *inviſible*? Nay, who knows but that there may be even of theſe many *orders*, riſing in dignity of nature, and amplitude of power, one above another? It is no way below the *philoſophy* of theſe times, which ſeems to delight in inlarging the capacities of matter, to aſſert the *poſſibility* of this. But however, my own defects ſufficiently convince me, that I have no pretenſion to be one of the *firſt* rank, or that which is *next under* the All perfect.

Now then, as *we our ſelves* by the uſe of our powers do many times interpoſe and alter the courſe of things within our ſphere from what it would be, if they were left intirely to the laws of motion and gravitation, without being ſaid to alter thoſe *laws*; ſo may theſe *ſuperior* beings likewiſe in reſpect of things within their ſpheres, much larger be ſure, the leaſt of them all, than ours is: only with this difference, that as their knowledge is more extenſive, their intellects purer, their reaſon better, they may be much *properer* inſtruments of Divine providence with reſpect to *us*, than we can be with reſpect *one to another*, or to the *animals* below us. I cannot think indeed, that the power of theſe beings is ſo large, as to alter or ſuſpend the *general laws* of the world; or that the world is like a bungling piece of clock-work, which requires to be oft ſet backward or forward by them; or that they can at pleaſure change their condition to ape us, or inferior beings; and conſequently am not apt haſtily to credit ſtories of *portents*, &c. ſuch as cannot be true, unleſs the natures of things and their manner of being be

(*a*) They, who believe there is nothing but what they can handle or ſee (εἰ μὴ ἁπτὸν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ οὐ δύνωνται ἀπρεπῶς ταῖν χερσῖν λαβίσθαι,----- πᾶν ᾧ τὸ ἀόρατον μὴ ἐνδεχόμενοι εἶς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει) are by *Plato* reckond to be void of all philoſophy, ἀμύητοι, σκληροὶ, ἀντίτυποι, μᾶλ' ἢ ἄμουσοι.

quite

quite renverſed: yet (I will repeat it again) as men may be ſo placed as to become, even by the free exerciſe of their own powers, *inſtruments* of God's particular providence to other men (or animals); ſo may we well ſuppoſe, that theſe *higher* beings may be ſo *diſtributed* through the univerſe, and ſubject to ſuch an œconomy (tho I pretend not to tell what that is), as may render *them alſo* inſtruments of the ſame providence; and that they may, in proportion to their greater abilities, be capable, *conſiſtently with the laws of nature*, ſome way or other, tho not in our way, of influencing human affairs in proper places.

Laſtly, what I have ventured to lay before you I would not have to be ſo underſtood, as if I peremptorily *aſſerted* things to be juſt in this manner, or pretended to *impoſe* my thoughts upon any body elſe: my deſign is only to ſhew, how I *endeavour* to help my own narrow conceptions. There muſt be *other ways* above my underſtanding (a), by which ſuch a Being as God is may take care of *private caſes* without interrupting the order of the univerſe, or putting any of the parts of it out of their channels. We may be ſure He regards every thing *as being what it is*; and that therefore His *laws* muſt be accommodated to the true genius's and capacities of thoſe things, which are affected by them. The *purely material* part of the world is governd by ſuch, as are ſuited to the ſtate of a being, which is *inſenſible*, *paſſive only*, and every where and always *the ſame*: and theſe ſeem to be ſimple and few, and to carry natural agents into one conſtant road. But *intelligent active*, *free* beings muſt be under a government of another form. They muſt, truth requiring it, be conſiderd *as beings*, who may behave themſelves as they ought, or not; *as beings* ſuſceptive of pleaſure and pain; *as beings*, who not only owe to God all that they are or have, but are (or may be) ſenſible of this, and to whom therefore it muſt be *natural* upon many occaſions to ſupplicate Him for mercy, defence, direction, aſſiſtance; laſtly, *as beings*, whoſe caſes admit great variety: and therefore that *influence*, by which He is preſent to them, muſt be different from that, by which gravitation and common *phænomena* are produced in matter. This ſeems to be as it were a public influence, the other private, anſwering private caſes, and prayers; this to operate directly upon the body, the other more eſpecially upon the mind, and upon the body by it, *&c.* But I forbear, leſt I ſhould go too far out of my depth: only adding in general, that God cannot put things ſo far out of His own power, as that He ſhould not *for ever govern* tranſactions and events in His own world; nor can *perfect* knowledge and power ever want *proper* means to atchieve

(a) Οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀνθρωπῳ ἀμύνεται ὁ Θεός. *Ph. Jud.*

what is fit to be done. So that, tho what I have advanced ſhould ſtand for nothing, there *may* ſtill be a *particular providence* notwithſtanding the forementiond difficulty. And then, if there *may be* one, it will unavoidably follow, that there *is* one: becauſe in the deſcription of providence, p. 95, nothing is ſuppoſed with reſpect to *particular caſes*, but that they ſhould be provided for in ſuch a manner as will at laſt *agree beſt with reaſon*: and to allow, that this may be done, and yet ſay, that it is not done, implies a blaſphemy that creates horror; it is to charge the *Perfect* being with one of the greateſt *imperfections*, and to make Him not ſo much as a *reaſonable* being.

I conclude then, that it is as certain, that there is a *particular providence*, as that God is a Being of *perfect reaſon*. For if men are treated according to reaſon, they muſt be treated according to what they are: the virtuous, the juſt, the compaſſionate, *&c. as ſuch*, and the vitious, unjuſt, cruel, *&c.* according to *what they are*: and their ſeveral caſes muſt be taken and conſiderd as *they are*: which cannot be done without *ſuch* a providence.

Againſt all this it has been, as one might well expect, *objected* of old, that things do not ſeem to be dealt according to *reaſon*, virtuous and good men very oft laboring under adverſity, pains, perſecutions, whilſt vitious, wicked, cruel men prevail and flouriſh (*a*). But to this an *anſwer* (in which I ſhall a little further explain my ſelf) is ready. It might be taken out of that, which has been given to the *Manichean* objection under prop. VII. But I ſhall here give one more direct: and let *that* and *this* be mutually aſſiſting and ſupplements each to the other. 1. We are not always certain, who are *good*, who *wicked* (*b*). If we truſt to fame and reports, theſe may proceed, on the one hand, from partial friendſhip, or flattery; on the other, from ill-natured ſurmiſes and conſtructions of things, envy, or malice; and on either, from ſmall matters aggrandized, from miſtake, or from the unskilful relation even of *truth* itſelf. Oppoſite parties make a merit of blackening their adverſaries (*c*), and brightening their

(*a*) *Si curent* [*Dij*] *homines, benè bonis ſit, malè malis: quod nunc abeſt. Ap. Cic.* The *Jews*, who call this caſe, evil to the good, and good to the evil, have written many things about it, to be ſeen in their books: *Mo. nebok. S. Iqquar. Men. hamma Nahh. ab. &c.* So have the heathen philoſophers too; *Seneca, Plutarch, Plotinus, Simplicius*, al. But the anſwers of neither are always juſt. God forbid that ſhould be thought true, which is aſſerted by *Glauco, ap. Plat.* that the juſt, if they had *Gyges*'s ring, would do as the unjuſt, and ὅτι κἀκεῖς ἰκὼν δίκαιος ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαζόμενος, κλ. Or that in *S. Hhaſid.* and *Men. hamma.* He is good, and it is ill with him, He is good, and he is miſerable. The reaſon aſſigned for this caſe in another place is ſomething better, that they may not ſay, if he is not happy, he is not a good man. But the way of ſalving it in *Niſhm. hhaiy.* by the revolution of ſouls, or what the Cabbaliſts call Tranſmigration, is worſt of all. (*b*) *Cadit & Ripheus*, juſtiſſimus *unus Qui fuit in Teucris, & ſervantiſſimus aqui. Dis* aliter *viſum.* Virg. (*c*) *Virtutes ipſas invertimus.* Hor.

friends,

friends, *undeſervedly* and *unmeaſurably:* and to idle companions and goſſips it is diverſion, and what makes the principal part of their converſation (*a*), to rehearſe the characters of men, dreſt up out of their own *dreams* and *inventions*. And beſide all this, the good or bad repute of men depends in great meaſure upon *mean* people, who carry their ſtories from family to family, and propagate them very faſt: like little inſects, which lay apace, and the *leſs* the *faſter*. There are few, very few, who have the opportunity and the will and the ability to repreſent things *truly* (*b*). Beſide the matters of fact themſelves there are many *circumſtances* which, before ſentence is paſſed, ought to be known and weighed, and yet ſcarce ever can be known, but to the perſon *himſelf* who is concerned. He may have other views, and another ſenſe of things, than his judges have: and what he underſtands, what he feels, what he intends, may be a *ſecret* confind to his own breſt. A man may through bodily indiſpoſitions and faults in his conſtitution, which it is not in his power to correct, be ſubject to *ſtarts* and *inadvertences*, or obnoxious to *ſnares*, which he cannot be aware of; or through want of information or proper helps he may labor under *invincible* errors, and act as in the dark: in which caſes he may do things, which are in themſelves wrong, and yet be innocent, or at leaſt rather to be pitied, than cenſured with ſeverity. Or perhaps the *cenſurer*, notwithſtanding this kind of men talk as if they were infallible, may be miſtaken himſelf in his opinion, and judge that to be *wrong*, which in truth is *right* (*c*). Nothing more common than this. Ignorant and ſuperſtitious wretches meaſure the actions of *letterd* and *philoſophical* men by the tattle of their nurſes or illiterate parents and companions, or by the faſhion of the country: and people of differing religions judge and condemn each other by their own tenents; when *both* of them cannot be in the right, and it is well if *either* of them are. To which may be added, that the true

(*a*) Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄτοπος ἀδὺ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὡς τὸ λαλεῖν τὰ ἀλλότρια· ἢ μάλιστα ἐὰν τύχωσιν ὑπ' ἐυνοίας τινὸς ἢ μίσους ἐλκόμενοι, ὑφ' ὧν ἢ φιλεῖ κλέπτειν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἢ ἀληθεια. *Greg. Naz.* (*b*) Therefore, with *Socrates* in *Plato*, we ought not much to care what the multitude [ὁι πολλοὶ] ſay of us, ἀλλ' ὃ, τι ὁ ἰατρὸν ἆρα ἢ δικαίων, ἢ ἀδίκων, ὁ ἴις, ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ ἀληθεια. (*c*) Or, *v. v.* he may judge that to be *right*, which is *wrong*. This ſeems to be pretty much the caſe in that enumeration of good men, who ſufferd, *ap. Cic. Cur duo Scipiones, fortiſſimos & optimos viros, in Hiſpania Pœnus oppreſſit? Cur Maximus extulit filium conſularem? Cur Marcellum Annibal interemit, &c.* For here they are reckond *boni*, only becauſe they were *fortes*; that is, becauſe they had been zealous and ſucceſsful inſtruments in conquering and deſtroying them, who happend to be ſo unfortunate as to be neighbours to the *Romans*, upon various pretences indeed, but in truth only to enlarge their own territories. Is this to be *good?* Doth it deſerve ſuch a particular obſervation, that *F. Maximus* buried a ſon, after he had been Conſul too? How doth it appear, that *Marcellus* was a better man than *Hannibal?* Is it ſuch a wonder, if they, who ſpend their lives in ſlaughter, ſhould at length be ſlain themſelves? If the margin permitted, more remarks might be made upon this catalogue: as alſo ſome upon that, which follows in the ſame place, of others, *quibus improbis optime evenit.*

characters of men muſt chiefly depend upon the *unſeen* part of their lives; ſince the trueſt and beſt religion is moſt private, and the greateſt wickedneſs endeavours to be ſo (*a*). Some are modeſt, and hide their virtues: others hypocritical, and conceal their vices under ſhews of ſanctity, good nature, or ſomething that is *ſpecious*. So that it is many times hard to diſcern, to which of the two ſorts, the *good* or the *bad*, a man ought to be aggregated. 2. It rarely happens, that we are competent judges of the *good* or *bad fortune* of other people (*b*). That, which is diſagreeable to one, is many times agreeable to another, or diſagreeable in a leſs degree. The miſery accruing from any infliction or bad circumſtance of life is to be computed as in p. 32, 33: or according to the reſiſtence and capacity of bearing it, which it meets with. If one man can carry a weight of four or five hundred pounds as well as another can the weight of one hundred, by theſe *different* weights they will be *equally* loaded. And ſo the ſame poverty or diſgrace, the ſame wounds, *&c*, do not give the *ſame pain* to all men. The apprehenſion of but a *vein* to be opend is worſe to ſome, than the *apparatus* to an execution is to others: and a *word* may be more terrible and ſenſible to tender natures, than a *ſword* is to the ſenſeleſs, or intrepid breed. The ſame may be ſaid with reſpect to injoyments: men have different taſtes, and the uſe of the ſame things does not beget *equal pleaſure* in all. Beſide, we ſcarce ever know the whole caſe. We do not ſee the *inward* ſtings and ſecret pains, which many of thoſe men carry about them, whoſe *external* ſplendor and flouriſhing eſtate is ſo much admired by beholders (*c*): nor perhaps ſufficiently conſider the *ſilent* pleaſures of a lower fortune, ariſing from temperance, moderate deſires, eaſy reflexions, a conſciouſneſs of knowledge and truth; with other pleaſures of the *mind*, much greater many times than thoſe of the *body* (*d*). Before one can pronounce another happy or otherwiſe, he ſhould

(*a*) *Vita poſtſcenia celant* (in *Lucr.*) may be aptly applied to the wicked. *Multi famam, conſcientiam pauci verentur.* Plin. jun. (*b*) *Neq; mala vel bona, qua vulgus putat: multi, qui conflictari adverſis videntur, beati; ac pleriq; quanquam magnas per opes, miſerrimi, &c.* Tacit. (*c*) *Feliciorem tu Mecanatem putas, cui amoribus anxio, & moroſa uxoris quotidiana repudia deflenti, ſomnus per ſymphoniarum cantum, ex longinquo bene reſonantium, quaritur? Mero ſe licet ſopiat,----; tam vigilabit in plumâ, quàm ille* [Regulus] *in cruce.-------ut dubium* [non] *ſit, an electione fati datâ, plures Reguli naſci, quàm Mecanates velint.* Sen. *Iſti, quos pro felicibus aſpicitis, ſi non qua occurrunt, ſed qua latent, videritis, miſeri ſunt.* Id.

(*d*) *Archimedes*, having found the way of ſolving a problem (*examinandi, an corona aurea prorſus eſſet*), ran in an ecſtacy out of the bath, crying Εὕρηκα: but who ever heard of a man, that after a luxurious meal, or the injoyment of a woman, ran out thus, crying Βέβρωκα, or Πεφίληκα? *Plut.*

know

know all the other's injoyments and all his ſufferings (*a*). Many misfortunes are compenſated (*b*) by ſome larger indowments, or extraordinary felicities in other reſpects. But ſuppoſe the pleaſures of ſome, and the ſufferings of ſome others, to be juſt as they appear: ſtill we know not the *conſequences* of them (*c*). The pleaſures of thoſe men may lead to miſeries greater than thoſe of the latter, and be in reality the greater misfortune: and, again, the ſufferings of theſe may be preludes to ſucceeding advantages (*d*). So that indeed we know not how to name theſe outward appearances of particular men, nor which to call *happineſs*, which the *contrary*; unleſs we knew the inward ſenſe of the perſons themſelves, all their true circumſtances, and what will be hereafter conſequent upon their preſent ſucceſs or adverſity. 3. Men ought to be conſiderd as *members* of families, nations, mankind, the univerſe, from which they cannot be ſeparated: and then from the very *condition of their being* it will appear, that there muſt be great inequalities (*e*); that the innocent cannot but be ſometimes involved in general calamities or puniſhments, nor the guilty but ſhare in public proſperities (*f*); and that the good of the *whole* ſociety or kind is to be regarded preferably to the preſent pleaſure of any *individual*, if they happen to claſh (*g*). *Laſtly*, if the *virtuous* man has undergone more in *this life*, than it would be reaſonable he ſhould ſuffer if there was *no other*; yet thoſe ſufferings may not be unreaſonable, if *there is* another. For they may be made up to him by ſuch injoyments, as it would be reaſonable for him to prefer, even with thoſe previous mortifications, before the pleaſures of this life with the *loſs of them*. And moreover, ſometimes the *only* way to the felicities of a better ſtate may lie through dark and difficult paſſes, diſcipline to ſome men being neceſſary, to bring them to reflect, and to force them into ſuch *methods* as may produce in them proper improvements; ſuch, as otherwiſe and of themſelves they would never have faln into. On the other ſide, if *vitious* and wicked men do proſper and make a figure; yet it is poſſible their ſufferings hereafter may be ſuch, as that the *exceſs* of them above their paſt in-

(*a*) *Fatis contraria fata rependens.* Virg. See what *Pliny* writes of *Agrippa*, the other great favorite and miniſter of *Auguſtus*, whom he reckons to be the only inſtance of felicity among them who were called *Agrippa*. *Is quoq; adverſa pedum valetudine, miſera juventa, exercito ævo inter arma mortesque,----infelici terris ſtirpe omni,---præterea brevitate ævi,----in tormentis adulteriorum conjugis, ſocerique; pragravi ſervitio, fuiſſe augurium præpoſteri natalis exiſtimatur.* (*b*) Ὀφθάλμων μὲν ἄμειρε, δῶκε δ' ἀοιδὴν ἡδείαν. Hom. (*c*) *Zeno* reckond he made a good voyage, when he was ſhipwracked. *Diog. L.* (*d*) If a good man labors under poverty, ſickneſs, or the like, ὡς ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσει, ζῶντι ἢ ἀποθανόντι· for how can he be neglected of God, who ſtudies according to his poor abilities to be like Him? *Plato.* (*e*) Who blames a *drama*, becauſe all the perſons are not heroes? *Plot. Abarb.* & *paſſ.* (*f*) The world is judged promiſcuouſly, i. e. without diſtinction of Perſons. (*g*) Μέρος μὲν ἕνεκα ὅλου, ὁ δ' οὐχ ὅλον μέρος ἕνεκα ἀποργάζεται, κτλ. *Plato.*

joyments

joyments may be equal to the *juſt mulct* of their villanies and wickedneſs. And further, their worldly pleaſures (which muſt be ſuppoſed to be ſuch as are not philoſophical, or moderated and governed by reaſon and habits of virtue) being apt to fill the mind, and ingroſs the whole man, and by that means to exclude almoſt all right reflections, with the proper applications of them, may be the very cauſes of their ruin; whilſt they leave them under ſuch defects *at the end of their days*, as we ſhall ſee afterward tend to unhappineſs.

If what is objected be in many inſtances true, this only infers the *neceſſity* of a future ſtate: that is, if good and bad men are not reſpectively treated according to reaſon in *this life*, they may yet be ſo treated, if *this* and *another* to follow be taken together into the account (*a*). And perhaps it is (as I have been always apt to think) in order to convince us of the certainty of a future ſtate, that inſtances of that kind have been ſo *numerous*. For he muſt not only be guilty of blaſphemy, but reduced to the greateſt abſurdity, who, rather than he will own there is ſuch a ſtate, is forced to make God an *unreaſonable* Being (*b*): which I think amounts to a ſtrong demonſtration, that *there is one*. But of that more hereafter.

XIX. *If we would behave ourſelves as being what we cannot but be ſenſible we are, towards GOD as being what He is according to the foregoing propoſitions*; or, *if we would endeavour to behave our ſelves towards him according to truth, we muſt obſerve theſe following and the like particulars.*

1. *We muſt not pretend to repreſent Him by any picture or image whatſoever* (*c*). Becauſe this is flatly to deny his incorporeity, incomprehenſible nature, &c.

2. *We ought to be ſo far from doing this, that even the language we uſe, when we ſpeak of Him, and eſpecially of His poſitive nature and eſſential properties, ought not only to be choſen with the utmoſt care, but alſo to be underſtood in the ſublimeſt ſenſe: and the ſame is true with reſpect to our thoughts, mut. mutand* (*d*) Or thus: we muſt endeavour to *think*

(*a*) Divine providence and immortality of the ſoul muſt ſtand and fall together. Θάτερον ἂν ἴσῃ ἀπολωλεκὼς ἀναιρῇ τὸ θάτερον. *Plut.* (*b*) Τοῦτο ταυτόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι εἶναι θεὸν ἃ ὄντα μὴ προνοεῖν· προνοοῦντα μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἢ δίκαιον. *Hierocl.* (*c*) Sure no body ever did *in reality* pretend to do this. According to *Diog. L.* the *Egyptians* ſet up ἀγάλματα in their temples τῷ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ μορφήν: for that very reaſon, becauſe they did not know his ſhape; or, how to repreſent Him. Their images ſeem to have been ſymbols or hieroglyphics, expreſſing ſomething of their ſenſe or opinion concerning Him. For, as *Maimonides* obſerves, no man ever did, or ever will worſhip an idol, made of metal, ſtone, or wood, as that Being who made heaven and earth. (*d*) *Non eſt dubium, quin religio nulla ſit, ubicunq; ſimulachrum eſt.* Lact. (*e*) Ὡς γὰρ ἔργον σώματος τὸ σωματικῶς τι ἐπιτελέσαι, ὅταν ἡ ψυχῆς ἔργον τὸ ταῖς ἐννοίαις τὰς ἀρετικὰς φαντασίας τελεσιεργῆσαι ὡς θέλει. διὸ ἡ τὰς ἐννοίας ἁμαρτίας μὴ ὡς φαντασίας ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔργα ἐν ψυχῇ γινόμενα δίκαιον κρίνειν. *S. Baſil.*

and

and *ſpeak* of Him in the moſt *reverent* terms and moſt proper manner *we are able* (*a*); keeping withall this general concluſion, and as it were habitual reflection in our minds, that, tho we do the beſt we can, He is ſtill ſomething *above all our conceptions*; and deſiring, that our faint expreſſions may be taken as aiming at a *higher* and more *proportionable* meaning. To do otherwiſe implies not only, that his mode of exiſtence and eſſential attributes are comprehenſible by us, but alſo (which is more) that our words and phraſes, taken from among our ſelves (*b*) and the objects of our faculties, are adequate expreſſions of them: *contrary to truth.*

To explain myſelf by a few inſtances. When we aſcribe *mercy* to God, or implore His *mercy*, it muſt not be underſtood to be *mercy* like that, which is called *compaſſion* in us. For tho this be a very diſtinguiſhing affection in human nature (*c*), to which we are made ſubject for good reaſons, the conſtitution of the world and circumſtances of our preſent ſtate making it neceſſary for us to *compaſſionate* each the ſufferings of another; yet it is accompanied with *uneaſineſs*, and muſt therefore not be aſcribed ſtrictly to God in that *ſenſe*, in which it is uſed when aſcribed to our ſelves. It perhaps may not be amiſs to call it *Divine mercy*, or the like; to diſtinguiſh it, and to ſhew, that we mean ſomething, which, tho in our low way of ſpeaking and by *way* of analogy we call it by the ſame name, is yet in the perfect nature of God very different. Or we may conſider it in general as the manner, in which God *reſpects* poor ſuppliants and proper objects *for their good*. For certainly the *reſpect* or relation, which lies between God, conſiderd as an *unchangeable* Being, and *one* that is humble and ſupplicates and endeavours to qualify himſelf for mercy, cannot be the *ſame* with that, which lies between the ſame *unchangeable* God and *one* that is obſtinate, and will not ſupplicate, or endeavour to qualify himſelf (*d*): that is, the ſame thing, or Being, cannot reſpect *oppoſite* and *contradictory* characters in the ſame manner; him who does behave himſelf as before, and him who does not. Therefore when we apply to the mercy of God, and beg of him to pity our infirmities and wants, the deſign is not to move His *affections*, as good ſpeakers move their auditors by the pathetic arts of rhetoric, or hearty beggars theirs by importunities and tears; but to expreſs our own ſenſe of our ſelves and circumſtances in ſuch a manner, as may render us more *capable* of the emanations of Divine goodneſs, and *fit* to receive ſuch

(*a*) Θεοπρεπῶς ἅπαντα νοοῦντες. *S. Chryſ.* (*b*) We uſe them (and ſpeak, as the *Jews* every where inculcate, according to the language of the ſons of men only ἀπορία ὀικείας προσηγορίας------τὰ ὀνόματα παρ' ἡμῖν ἀγαπώμενα μεταφέροντες. *Plot.* (*c*) *Molliſſima corda* Humano *generi dare ſe natura fatetur, Quæ lacrymas dedit. hæc noſtri pars optima ſenſûs.--ſeparat hoc nos à grege* mutorum, *&c.* Juv. (*d*) *The ratio* of G to M ⟂ q is different from that of G to M---q: and yet G remains unaltered.

inſtances

inſtances of His beneficence, as to us may ſeem to be the effects of *compaſſion*, tho they proceed not from any alteration in the Deity. For it may be, and no doubt is agreeable to perfect reaſon *always* and *without alteration*, that he, who labors under a ſenſe of his own defects, honeſtly uſes his beſt endeavours to mend what is amiſs, and (among other things) flies for relief to Him, upon whom his being and all that he has do depend, ſhould have many things granted *him*, which are not given to the careleſs, obdurate, *unasking* (*a*) part of mankind; tho his expreſſions and manner of addreſs, with all his *care*, are ſtill *inadequate*, and below the Divine nature. In ſhort, by our applications we cannot pretend to produce any alteration in the Deity, but by an alteration in our ſelves we may alter the relation or reſpect lying between him and us.

As God is a pure, uncompounded Being, His attributes of *mercy*, *juſtice*, &c. cannot be as we conceive them: becauſe in him they are *one*. Perhaps they may more properly be called together *Divine reaſon:* which, as it exerts itſelf upon this or that occaſion, is by us *variouſly* denominated.

Here it muſt not be forgot, that *mercy* or *mercies* are many times taken for advantages or benefits injoyd by us: and then they are *properly* aſcribed to God, from whom they proceed as the effects of his beneficence and providence.

When we ſpeak of the *knowledge* of God, we muſt not mean, that He knows things *in the way that we do:* that any intention or operation of His mind is requiſite to produce it: that He apprehends things by any impreſſions made upon Him: that He reaſons by the help of ideas: or even that the knowledge, which in us is moſt *intuitive* and *immediate*, does in any degree come up to the mode in which He knows things. We muſt rather intend, in general, that there is nothing, of which He is, or can be *ignorant*: which has been ſaid already; and is, I am afraid, as much as we can *ſafely* ſay.

When *glory*, *honor*, *praiſe* (*b*) are given to God; or He is ſaid to do any thing for His own *glory*, or we to propoſe the *glory* of His name in what we do; thoſe words ſhould not be taken as ſtanding for *that kind* of glory and applauſe, which is ſo induſtriouſly ſought, and capriciouſly (*c*) diſtributed among us mortals, and which I will take this opportunity to handle a little more *largely*, in order to give here a ſpecimen of the world, and ſave that trouble in another place. Among us ſome are celebrated for

(*a*) Πῶς ἂν δόιη τῷ πρὸς τὰς ὁρμὰς ἀντιξυσίᾳ μὴ αἰτοῦντι ὁ δίδοναι φιλουμὲς Θεός; *Hierocl.* (*b*) Τῶν ἀρίστων ἐκ ἐστιν ἐπαινος, ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν τι ἢ ἔπαινος. Therefore ὁ Θεὸς ἢ ταγαθὸν are above praiſe. *Ariſt.* Οἱ τὰς θεὰς ἐπαινέντες γελοῖοί εἰσιν, ἡμῖν δυτὰς ἐξισοῦντες. *Andron. Rh.* (*c*) *Cleon*, only a ſongſter [ᾠδὸς], had a ſtatue at *Thebes*, kept as ſacred, when *Pindar* himſelf had none. See the ſtory in *Athenæus*.

ſmall

ſmall matters, either through the ignorance of the multitude, the partiality of a faction, the advantage of great friendſhips, the uſual deference paid to men in eminent ſtations, or mere good luck (*a*); and others for atchieving *ſuch things*, as if they were duly weighed, and people were not impoſed upon by *falſe notions*, firſt introduced in barbarous times, and ſince poliſhd and brought into faſhion by hiſtorians, poets, and flatterers, would appear rather to be a diſgrace to *ſavages* than any recommendation of rational and *civilized* natures. Strength, and courage, and beauty, and parts, and birth are followd with *encomiums* and honors, which, tho they may be the felicities and *privileges* of the poſſeſſors, cannot be their *merit*, who received them *gratis*, and contributed nothing (*b*) themſelves toward the acquiſition of them: whilſt real virtue and induſtry (which, even when unſucceſsful, or oppreſt by ill health or unkind fortune, gave the *trueſt title* to praiſe) lie diſregarded. Thirſt after glory, when that is deſired merely for its own ſake, is founded in *ambition* and *vanity* (*c*): the thing itſelf is but a *dream*, and imagination; ſince, according to the differing humors and ſentiments of nations and ages, the ſame thing may be either *glorious* or *inglorious*: the *effect* of it, conſiderd ſtill by itſelf, is neither more health, nor eſtate, nor knowledge, nor virtue to him who has it; or if that be any thing, it is but *what muſt ceaſe* when the man (*d*) dies: and, after all, as it lives but in the *breath* of the people, a little ſly envy or a new turn of things extinguiſhes it (*e*), or perhaps it goes quite out of itſelf (*f*) Men pleaſe themſelves with notions of *immortality*, and fancy a perpetuity of fame ſecured to themſelves by books and teſtimonies of hiſtorians: but, alas! it is a ſtupid deluſion, when they imagine themſelves *preſent*, and *injoying* that fame at the reading of their ſtory after their death. And, beſide, *in reality* the man is not known ever the more to poſterity, becauſe his name is tranſmitted to them: *he* doth not live, becauſe his *name* does. When it is ſaid, *J. Cæſar* ſubdued *Gaul*, beat *Pompey*, changed the *Roman* commonwealth into a monarchy, &c. it is the ſame thing, as to ſay, the conqueror of *Pompey*, &c. was *Cæſar*: that is, *Cæſar* and the conqueror of *Pompey* are the ſame thing; and *Cæſar* is as much known by the one deſignation as by the other. The amount then is only this: that the conqueror of *Pompey* conquerd *Pompey*; or ſome body con-

(*a*) What *Seneca* ſays of *Alexander*, is true of many an other heroe: *pro virtute erat felix temeritas.* (*b*) *Tumes alto Druſorum ſanguine, tanquam Feceris ipſe aliquid, &c.* Juv. (*c*) *Gloria quantalibet quid erit, ſi gloria tantum eſt?* Juv. (*d*) To day here, and to morrow in the grave, To day alive, and to morrow worms. *S. Hhaſ.* (*e*) Κτῆμα σφαλερώτατον. *Ph. Jud.* (*f*) Even the great *pyramid* in *Egypt*, tho it ſtill remains, hath not been able to preſerve the *true name* of its builder; which is loſt, one may juſtly wonder how.

querd *Pompey*; or rather, ſince *Pompey* is as little known now as *Cæſar*, *ſome body* conquerd *ſome body* (*a*), Such a *poor buſineſs* is this boaſted immortality (*b*): and ſuch, as has been here deſcribed, is the thing called *glory* among us! The notion of it may ſerve to excite them, who having abilities to ſerve their countrey in time of real danger, or want, or to do ſome other good, have yet not *philoſophy* enough to do this upon principles of virtue, or to ſee through the glories of the world (juſt as we excite children by *praiſing* them; and as we ſee many good inventions and improvements proceed from emulation and vanity): but to diſcerning men this *fame* is mere air, and the next remove from nothing (*c*); what they deſpiſe, if not ſhun. I think there are two conſiderations, which may juſtify a deſire of *ſome* glory or honor: and ſcarce more. When men have performed any *virtuous* actions, or ſuch as ſit eaſy upon their memories, it is a *reaſonable pleaſure* to have the teſtimony of the world added to that of their own conſciences, that they have done well (*d*): and more than that, if the *reputation* acquired by any qualification or action may produce a man any *real* comfort or advantage (if it be only protection from the inſolencies and injuſtice of mankind; or if it enables him to do by his authority more good to others), to have this privilege muſt be a great ſatisfaction, and what a *wiſe* and *good* man may be allowd, as he has opportunity, to propoſe to himſelf. But then he propoſes it no further than it may be *uſeful*: and it can be no farther uſeful than he *wants* it. So that, upon the whole, *glory*, *praiſe*, and the like, are either mere *vanity*, or only valuable in proportion to our *defects* and *wants*. If then thoſe words are underſtood according to the import and value they have *among men*, how dares any one think, that the Supreme being can propoſe ſuch a *mean* end to Himſelf as our praiſes? He can neither *want*, nor *value* them. *Alexander*, according to his taſte of things, it may well be ſuppoſed would have been proud to have heard that he ſhould be the ſubject of *ſome* ſecond *Homer* (*e*), in whoſe ſheets his name might be imbalmed for ages to come; or to have been celebrated at *Athens*, the mother of ſo many wits and captains: but ſure *even he*, with all his vanity, could not propoſe to himſelf as the end of all his fatigues and dangers only to be praiſed by *children*, or rather by *worms* and *inſects*, if they were capable of ſhewing ſome faint

(*a*) Τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν πάλαι κολυμνήτων νῦν τρόπον τινὰ γλωσσήματά ἐϛι. *M. Anton.* (*b*) Μικρὸν ἡ μικρίϛη ὑϛεροφημία, ἡ αὐτὴ ἡ κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀνθρωπαρίων τάχιϛα τεθνηξομένων, ἡ ἀκ ἰδίτων ἐδὲ ἑαυτῶς, ὅτε γε τὸν πρόπαλαι τεθνηκότα. *Id.* (*c*) *Expende Hannibalem: quot libras in duce ſummo Invenies?* Μέχρι τῶδε οἱ ἔπαινοι ἀγεκτοί ἐϛιν, ἐις ὅσον ἂν ὁ ἐπαινόμενος γνωρίζῃ ἕκαϛον τῶν λεγομένων πρὸϛ ἑαυτόν· τὸ δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦτο, ἀλλότριον, κλ. *Luc.* (*e*) Μακαρίσας αὐτὸν [Ἀχιλλέα] ὅτι ἐν ζῶν φίλε πιϛὸς, ἡ τελευτήσας μεγάλε κήρυκος ἔτυχε. *Plut.*

ſenſe

ſenſe of his *greatneſs* (*a*). And yet how far ſhort is this compariſon! In concluſion therefore, tho men have been accuſtomd to ſpeak of the *Deity* in terms taken from *princes*, and ſuch things as they have, in their weakneſs, admired; tho theſe are now incorporated into the language of Divines; and tho, conſidering what defects there are in our ways of thinking and ſpeaking, we cannot well part with them all: yet we muſt remember to *exalt* the ſenſe of them, or annex ſome *mental* qualification to the uſe of them. As, if God be ſaid to do things for His own glory, the meaning I *humbly* conceive muſt be, that the tranſcendent excellence of His nature may be collected from the form of the world and adminiſtration of things in it; where there occurr ſuch *marks* of inexpreſſible wiſdom and power, that He needed not to have given us *greater*, had He only intended His own *glory:* or ſomething to this purpoſe. Or if the glory of what *we* do, be aſcribed to *Him*; by this muſt be ſignified, that no glory is due to us, who have no powers, but what originally depend upon Him; and that we deſire therefore to acknowledge Him to be the true author of all that, which is *laudable* in us (*b*).

When we *thank God* for any deliverance or injoyment, this muſt not be ſo underſtood, as if He could value Himſelf upon our *ceremonious acknowledgments*, or wanted complements, or any return from us. *It is* rather a profeſſion of the *ſenſe we have* of our wants and defects, of the beneficence of His nature, and the greatneſs or ſeaſonableneſs of the mercies received: an effort of a poor dependent being, who deſires to own things, as far as he is able, to be *what they are* (*c*); and eſpecially to beget in himſelf ſuch a diſpoſition of mind, as he ought to have towards his Almighty *benefactor*.

When we are ſaid to be *ſervants of God*, or to *ſerve* Him, or do Him *ſervice*, theſe phraſes are not to be taken as when *one* man is ſaid to be ſervant of *another*, or to do him ſervice. For here it implies the doing of ſomething, which is uſeful and beneficial to the man who is ſerved, and what he *wants*, or fancies he wants: but nothing of *want* can be ſuppoſed in God, nor can we any way be *profitable* or ſerviceable to Him. To *ſerve Him* therefore muſt rather be *to worſhip* or adore Him (of which ſomething by and by). And thus that word in another language, of which our *ſerve*

(*a*) As *Pſaphon* was celebrated by the *birds*, ſinging Μέγας θεὸς ψάφων. *M. Tyr.* (*b*) *Honoribus auctis--------cùm diis gratias agimus, tum nihil noſtra laudi aſſumptum arbitramur.* Cic. Ὅτι ἂν ἀγαθὸν πράττῃς εἰς θεὸν ἀνάπεμπε. A ſaying of *Bias ap. Diog. L.* (*c*) Εἰ γὰρ ἃ μὴ δυνάμεθα κατ' ἀξίαν ποτὲ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι,-------ἀλλ' ὅμως τὴν κατὰ δύναμιν ἀνενεγκεῖν εὐχαριστίαν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη. *Chryſ.*

is but the tranſlation, is frequently uſed: as *to ſerve a graven image* (a) is *to worſhip the image*; but cannot ſignify the doing of any thing, which may be ſerviceable or uſeful to the dead ſtone. Or *to ſerve God* may be underſtood in a ſenſe ſomething like that: *Serve the king of Babylon* (*b*). For they were ſaid to ſerve the king of *Babylon*, who ownd his authority, and lived according to his laws, tho they did nothing, nor had any thing perhaps, which could be particularly *ſerviceable* to him: and ſo they may be ſaid to *ſerve God*, or to be His *ſervants*, who live in a continual ſenſe of His ſoveraign nature and power over them, and endeavour to conform themſelves to the *laws* which He has impoſed upon them (*c*). In theſe ſenſes we pray, that we may live *to ſerve Him*: that is, we pray, that we may live to worſhip Him, and practiſe thoſe *laws* of reaſon and virtue, to which rational natures are by Him ſubjected (*d*).

Many more reflexions might be made upon *epithets* and *ways of ſpeaking*, introduced by cuſtom, from rude antiquity, or by neceſſity following from the narrowneſs either of men's minds, or their language. It is plain, that *love*, *anger*, *hands*, *eyes*, &c. when aſcribed to God, cannot import ſuch *bodily* parts or paſſions as are found in us. Even the pronouns *my*, *thy*, *his* (as His people, His houſe, &c.) require much *temper* in the uſe of them (*e*).

3. *We ſhall find our ſelves bound to worſhip Him, in the beſt manner we can.* For by worſhipping Him I mean nothing but owning Him to be *what* He *is*, and our ſelves to be *what we are*, by ſome more *ſolemn* and proper act: that is, by addreſſing our ſelves *as His dependents* to Him *as the Supreme cauſe*, and *Governour of the world*, with acknowledgments of what we injoy, petitions for what we really want, or He knows to be convenient for us (*f*), and the like. As if, *ex. gr.* I ſhould in ſome humble and compoſed manner (*g*) pray to that *Almighty being, upon whom depends the exiſtence of the world, and by whoſe providence I have been preſerved to this moment, and injoyd many undeſerved advantages, that He would graciouſly accept my grateful ſenſe and acknowledgments of all His beneficence toward me: that He would deliver me from the evil conſequences of all*

(*a*) All they that ſerve a graven image. They ſerved, *i. e.* worſhipped their graven images, *& ſim. paſſ.* Deut. 12. mention is made of the places, wherein the nations ſerved their Gods in *Chald. par. Palebbou*, ſerved, *i. e.* worſhipped. *Sept.* ἐλάτρευσαν (in the eccleſiaſtical ſenſe). *Vulg. v. coluerunt.* (*b*) ſerve the king of *Babylon*. (*c*) *Plato* applies the word *ſerve* even to the laws themſelves in that phraſe δουλεύειν τοῖς νόμοις. (*d*) Ἐκείνῳ ἐδὴν ἕξα φιλοδισποίτα γνώμης παρέχοντες. *Ph. Jud.* (*e*) in a rational ſenſe. (*f*) Care muſt be taken how we pray, leſt we ſhould ask what may be hurtful to us. Οὐκοιῶ δουεῖ πολλῆς προμηθίας γε προσδεῖσθαι, ὅπως μὴ λάσῃ τις αὐτὸν ἰυχόμιν & μεγάλα κακὰ, δοκῶν δ' ἀγαθά. Plato. *Evertere domos totas, optantibus ipſis, Di faciles, &c.* is a poet's obſervation. The author of *S. Hbaſ.* adds, that we ſhould not pray for that which is impoſſible, or which does not happen according to the ordinary courſe of Nature, or which is not fit to be done, or that God ſhould work a miracle, by changing the Courſe of the world. (*g*) Mine Eye beneath, and my Heart above.

my

my tranſgreſſions and follies: that He would indue me with ſuch diſpoſitions and powers, as may carry me innocently and ſafely through all future trials; and may inable me upon all occaſions to behave my ſelf conformably to the laws of reaſon, piouſly, and wiſely: that He would ſuffer no being to injure me, no misfortune to befall me, nor me to hurt my ſelf by any error or miſconduct of my own: that He would vouchſafe me clear and diſtinct perceptions of things; with ſo much health and proſperity, as may be good for me: that I may at leaſt paſs my time in peace, with contentment, and tranquility of mind: and that, having faithfully diſcharged my duty to my family and friends, and endeavourd to improve my ſelf in virtuous habits and uſeful knowledge, I may at laſt make a decent and happy exit, and then find my ſelf in ſome better ſtate. Not to do this, or ſomething like it, will certainly fall among thoſe criminal *omiſſions* mentiond Sect. I. prop. V. For never to acknowledge the injoyments and privileges we have received, and hold of God, is in effect to *deny* that we receive them from Him; not to apply to Him for what we want is to *deny*, either our wants, or His power of helping us; and ſo on: all contrary to truth (*a*).

It muſt ever be ownd, that no worſhip can be proportionable to the Divine nature and perfections; but yet that we are obliged to do what we can: therefore I added thoſe words *in the beſt manner we can*. And it muſt be acknowledged further, that thoſe words do not oblige us to be *always* at our devotions neither (*b*). For as in the worſhip of God we own Him to be *what He is*, ſo muſt we do this as not denying our ſelves to be *what we are:* beings not capable of bearing continual *intention* of mind; beings, that are incompaſſed with many *wants*, which by the conſtitution of our nature require to be ſupplied, not without *care* and *activity* joind to our prayers; beings, that are made for many *harmleſs injoyments*; beings, that have *many offices* to perform one for another; and beings, in whom, all things conſiderd, it would be *leſs reſpect* to be conſtantly in the formal act of devotion, than it is to addreſs our ſelves to Him with prepared minds, at certain times, or upon certain occaſions. To be *always* thus ingaged, if it could be, would be to make God *what He is not*: ſince it ſeems to ſuppoſe, that He wants it and we merit of Him by it; or that He is bound to give what we ask, without our endeavouring; or, at leaſt, that He is a Being obnoxious to importunity and teaſing. For theſe reaſons I have alſo in the explication of my meaning inſerted that limitation, *by ſome ſolemn and proper act.*

(*a*) Prayer is a Branch that ſhoots forth from providence, (as the Root) *Albo*. Every one that believes Providence, believes alſo that prayer will be of uſe to himſelf. *Id.* (*b*) Like thoſe Ἀκοιμηταὶ at *Conſtantinople* particularly, who continued divine ſervice night and day *without intermiſſion*. Or the *Meſſalians* perhaps (*Matſlin*, the ſect of the Precantes, Εὐχῖται), who placed (or pretended to place) *all* religion in prayer, μόνῃ χολάζειν τῇ προσευχῇ προσποιούμενοι. *V. Suic.*

The

Tho every man knows beſt his own opportunities and circumſtances, and therefore may be moſt able to judge for himſelf, how he may *beſt* perform this duty; yet in general it may be ſaid, that to the doing of it *ſolemnly* and in the beſt manner we can theſe things are required: an intent *mind* (*a*), proper *times* and *places*, a proper *form* of words, and a proper *poſture*. For if the *mind* be abſent, or attends not to what is ſaid, it is not the *man* that prays: this is only as it were the noiſe of a machine, which is put into motion indeed, but without any conſciouſneſs of its own act. To repeat one's prayers with moving *lips*, but alienated *thoughts*, is not to pray in the *beſt* manner we can: becauſe it is not in a manner agreeable to what we are, or to *truth*. For this is to do it only as *ſpeaking*, and not as *thinking* beings.

Upon this account it will be certain, that *all* times and places cannot be equally proper (*b*). Some times are ingroſſed by the buſineſs of life, and ſome places lie expoſed to interruptions. Thoſe of *retreat* and *ſilence* ought to be ſought, and, as far as fairly it may be, contrived. And for this further reaſon, becauſe the farther we are removed from the notice of others, the clearer we ſtand of all *oſtentation*: that is, the more we do it upon the ſcore of *truth* and *duty*; and this is again, the more *truely* and *dutifully* we do it.

Our next care is a proper *form* of words. All prayer muſt either be vocal, or mental. Now even that which is called *mental* can ſcarce be made without words (*c*), or ſomething equivalent (*d*). (I believe, that even the *deaf* and *dumb* form to themſelves ſome kind of language: I mean ſomething, which ſupplies the room of language.) For thoughts in their naked ſtate, deveſted of all words, and taken *merely by themſelves*, are ſuch ſubtle and fleeting things, as are ſcarce capable of making any *appearance* in the mind; at leaſt of being detaind, compared together, and ranged into *ſentences*. If a ſentence may be ſo made up of ſenſible ideas as to ſubſiſt in the mind by the help of thoſe images which remain in the phantaſy, after the manner of a ſentence expreſt in *pictures*, or by *hieroglyphics*: yet ſuch a ſentence muſt be very imperfect, through the *want* of grammatical inflexions, particles, and other additions neceſſary

(*a*) No prayer without Attention, is a prayer. *Maim.* A prayer wavering in the heart. *S. Hhaſ.* and the like every where. (*b*) This in general is true: notwithſtanding which I do not deny but there may be occaſions, when οὐδὲν κωλύει τόπῳ, οὐδὲ ἐμποδίζει καιρός· ἀλλὰ κἂν γόνατα μὴ κλίνῃς,--------διάνοιαν δὲ μόνον ἐπιδίξῃ θερμὴν, τὸ πᾶν ἀπήρτισας τῆς ψυχῆς· ἔξεστι γὰρ γυναῖκα ἠλακάτην καθίζουσαν ἢ ἐργάσαν ἀναβλέψαι εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἢ καλέσαι μετὰ θερμότητος τὸν θεόν· ἔξεστι δὲ ἀνθρώπου εἰς ἀγορὰν ἐμβαλλοντα ἢ καθ' ἑαυτὸν βαδίζοντα ψυχὰς ποιεῖσθαι ἱκετευτὰς, κλ. S. Chryſ. (*c*) Ὁ μὲν λόγος ἑρμηνεὺς διανοίας πρὸς ἀνθρώπους· ἡ δὲ διάνοια γίνεται τῷ λόγῳ τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν. *Ph. Jud.* (*d*) Cogitation it ſelf, according to *Plato*, is a kind of ſpeech of the mind. For he calls τὸ διανοεῖσθαι (cogitation) λόγον, ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται, περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. And ſo *Plotinus*, Ὁ ἐν φωνῇ λόγος μίμημα τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ.

to

to modify and connect the ideas, of which (particles, *&c.*) there can be no images (*a*); and indeed little more than a ſet of *diſjointed* conceptions, ſcarce exhibiting *any ſenſe* without the aſſiſtance of language to fill up the blanks: and beſide that, a *prayer* cannot be made out of ſuch ſentences as thoſe. It is by the help of *words*, at leaſt in great meaſure, that we even reaſon and diſcourſe within our ſelves, as well as communicate our thoughts and diſcourſe with others: and if any one obſerves himſelf well, he will find, that he *thinks*, as well as *ſpeaks* in ſome language, and that in thinking he ſuppoſes and runs over ſilently and habitually thoſe ſounds, which in ſpeaking he actually makes. This is the cauſe, why men can ſcarce write *well* in any language but *their own*: for whilſt they think in their own, their ſtyle and ſpeech, which is but the portraiture of their thoughts, muſt have the *turn* and *genius* of their own language, to what language ſoever the particular words belong. In ſhort, *words* ſeem to be as it were *bodies* or *vehicles* to the ſenſe or meaning, which is the *ſpiritual part* (b), and which without the other can hardly be fixt in the mind. Let any man try ingenuouſly, whether he can think over but that ſhort prayer in *Plato*, Τὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ, κτλ. (*c*), abſtracted quite from thoſe and all other *words*. One may apply his mind to the words of a prayer pronounced by *another*, and by taking them in make them *his own*; or he may be as it were his own reader, and pronounce them *himſelf*; or he may lay before him a prayer in *writing*, and ſo carry his eyes and his mind together through it; or he may go over a form of words imprinted on his *memory*; or he may put words together in his mind *ex tempore*: but ſtill in all theſe ways *words* and language are uſed. And ſince to *think* over a ſet of words can not be a more adequate manner of addreſſing to God (who neither ſpeaks, nor thinks like us) than to *ſpeak* it over and *think* too; and moreover, ſince the very *ſound* of the words affects us, and, when the form is ready prepared, and the mind freed from the labor of compoſing, doth really help *attention* (*d*): I ſay, ſince this is the caſe, it muſt be better, when we have opportunity, to *pronounce* a prayer (*e*), than only to *think* it over. But then it ſhould be ſpoken no louder (I mean when we pray privately), than juſt to make it audible to *our ſelves* (*f*). It is not upon God's account that we ſpeak, ſince he would know

(*a*) *Multa ſunt verba, quæ quaſi articuli, connectunt membra orationis, quæ formari ſimilitudine nulla poſſunt.* Cic. (*b*) Prayer without attention, is like the body without a ſoul. *Nabh. ab.*

(*c*) *Alcib.* 2. (*d*) A man's uttering of the words, helps attention *Abarb.* That in *S. Hhared.* quoted out of the ſmaller book of precepts explains this thus: He that weighs every word, is like him, that reckons pieces of gold. (*e*)-------*Ut eos* [*deos* in the ſtyle of the Heathens] *ſemper pura*-------*mente & voce veneremur.* Cic. Ὦ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὑπὸ σῦ, Δέσποτα, κρείττονες γεγόναμεν, τούτῳ τὴν σὴ ἐυλογῆν μεγαλειότητα πρέπει, ſays *Solomon* in his prayer *ap. Joſ.* (*f*) This we find often among the *Dinim* of the *Jews*. All praiſes ſhould be uttered ſo, that he himſelf may hear them that makes them. *Maim.* And *R. Elaz. Azquari*, having cited this paſſage, adds, The greateſt part of the Doctors agree, that if he does not ſpeak ſo as to be heard, it will be ineffectual. *Maimonides* in another place expreſſes himſelf thus: He ſhall not pray in his heart only, but ſhall articulate the words with his lips, and ſhall ſo pronounce them, as to hear them. (That *only* I inſerted from *Shulhh. aruk.*) The ſame occurs in *Or hhadaſh, & paſs.*

even

even our thoughts: but it is upon *our own* account, and to make our *adorations*, tho imperfect at the beſt, as compleat as we are able. (Which, by the way, is an anſwer to them, who object againſt prayer the *impertinence* of talking to God). This being premiſed, and it being found that we muſt make uſe of *words*, it cannot be denied that we ought to uſe the *beſt* and *propereſt* we can. This cannot be done in *extemporaneous* effuſions: and therefore there muſt be forms *premeditated*; the *beſt*, that we are capable of making or procuring, if we would worſhip God to the beſt of our capacity. As a prayer ought to have all the marks of ſeriouſneſs and being in earneſt, it ought to be the *plaineſt*, and at the ſame time is perhaps the *hardeſt* of all compoſitions. It ought to take in a general view of what we have *injoyd*, what we *want*, what we have *done*, &c. and every thing ought to be expreſt with *method*, in phraſes that are *grave* and *pointing*, and with ſuch a *true* eloquence, as ingages all our attention, and repreſents our *deepeſt* ſenſe, without *affectation* or *needleſs repititions*. Theſe conſiderations have cauſed me many times to wonder at thoſe men, who diſpute againſt pre-conceived forms of prayer. They, who talk ſo much of the ſpirit of prayer, ſeem to know but little of it.

As to the *poſture*, that is beſt, which beſt *expreſſes* our humility, reverence (*a*). and earneſtneſs, and affects us moſt. Tho perhaps ſome regard is to be paid to the cuſtoms of the *place* where we are; or of our own *country*, to which we have been moſt uſed. Several nations may denote the ſame thing by different geſtures: and we may take theſe, as we do their words; *i. e.* as having that ſignification which they put upon them.

Tho I have not hitherto mentiond it, there ought to be alſo a *public worſhip* of the Deity. For a man may be conſiderd as a member of a *ſociety*, and *as ſuch* he ought to worſhip God (if he has the opportunity of doing it: if there are proper prayers uſed publicly, which he may reſort to; and his health, *&c.* permit.) Or the *ſociety* may be conſiderd as *one body*, that has common intereſts and concerns, and *as ſuch* is obliged to worſhip the Deity, and offer one common prayer. Beſide, there are many, who know not of themſelves, *how* to pray; perhaps cannot ſo much as read. Theſe two muſt be taken *as they are*, and conſequently ſome time and place *appointed*, where they may have ſuitable prayers red to them, and be guided in their devotions. And further, toward the keeping mankind in order, it is *neceſſary* there ſhould be ſome religion profeſt, and even eſtabliſhd; which cannot be without ſome public worſhip. And were it not for that ſenſe of virtue, which is *principally* preſerved (ſo far as it is preſerved) by national *forms* and *habits* of religion, men would ſoon loſe it *all*, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what elſe the worſt of ſavages do.

(*a*) He that prays, -------ſhall think, as if the glorious preſence was before him. *Or Haiy.*

The

But how does this *public* worſhip, it may be demanded, comport with that retreat and *privacy* recommended above? *Anſ.* I ſpoke there of prayer *in general*, to which thoſe circumſtances give a great advantage: but then they are recommended no farther, than they can be had, and the nature of the prayer admits of them. Excuſe a ſhort reflexion here, which if it be not directly for the purpoſe, is not altogether foreign to it. Tho he who reads the form of public prayer reads it to *all* at the ſame time, that *all* may unite in one common act, which otherwiſe they could not do: yet ſtill every *particular* perſon, who minds the prayers at all, has a ſeparate perception of the words in his *mind*, and *there* he offers them, or the ſenſe containd under them, with more or leſs application and ardor. And ſince no man can be ſaid *to pray* any further than he *does this*; and it cannot be known to any body in the congregation beſide himſelf, how far he *doth do it*; his prayer is in reality as *private*, as if he was incloſed within a thouſand walls. So that, though there are reaſons for a public worſhip, yet I will venture to affirm, that all *true* prayer is *private*: and the true ſeat of it being in the *mind*, toward the intereſting of whoſe powers all the circumſtances of worſhip are mainly deſigned to contribute, it may be ſaid upon that account to be always made in the moſt retired and *undiſcerned* of all retreats (*a*): nor can more be ſaid in reſpect of a worſhip, which by the terms is in other reſpects *public*. A man may be preſent in a congregation, and either pray the ſame prayer in which others ſeem to join, or ſome other, or none at all (*b*), for ought any body there can tell beſides himſelf.

I am not inſenſible how much I may expoſe myſelf by theſe things to the laughter of ſome, who are utter ſtrangers to all this language. What a ſtir is here, *ſay they*, about *praying*? Who ever obſerved, that they who pray are more *ſucceſsful* or happy, than they are who do not? *Anſ.* All obſervations of this kind muſt be very *lubricous* and uncertain. We neither *know* what other men are inwardly and really (*c*), nor how they pray (*d*), nor what to call ſucceſs (*e*). That, which is *good* for one, may be *bad* for another: and that, which ſeems good at preſent, may at length be evil, or introduce ſomething which is ſo (*f*). And as to the *proſperity* of them, who endeavour

(*a*) Ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ ὅιον τεῷ. *Platin.* (*b*) S. *Chryſoſtom.* ſays ſome are ſo unmindful of what they are about, that they know not ſo much as what they ſay themſelves. Εἰσίρχονται πολλοὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ------ἐξέρχονται, οὐκ οἶδασι τί εἶπον· τὰ χείλη κινοῦνται, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἐκ ἀκύει. (*c*) The very Heathens thought, that the Gods would not hear the prayers of wicked men. *Bias*, happening to be with ſome ſuch in the ſame ſhip, when a great ſtorm aroſe and they (being now frighted) began to invoke their deities, cries out, Σιγᾶτε, μὴ διαφθείρητε ὑμᾶς ἐνθάδε πλέοντας. *D. L.* (*d*) C. Ceſtius *ap. Tac.* ſays, *principes quidam inſtar deorum eſſe: ſed neque a diis niſi juſtas ſupplicum preces audiri.* (*e*) Sometimes πλέον ἥμισυ παντός: that is, as *Plato* paraphraſes thoſe words of *Heſiod*, Τὸ ἥμισυ τῦ παντὸς πολλάκις ἐστὶ πλέον, ὁπόταν ᾖ τὸ μὲν ὅλον λαμβάνειν ζημιώδες, κλ. (*f*) *Quid quod iſte calculi candore laudatus dies originem mali habuit? Quam multos accepta afflixere imperia? quam multos bona perdidere, & ultimis merſere ſuppliciis?* Plin.

to worſhip God in a proper and reaſonable manner, *whatever it is*, perhaps it might be *leſs*, if they did not; or their misfortunes might be *greater:* who can be certain of the contrary? If theſe gentlemen have any way of diſcovering it, I wiſh they would impart their *ſecret*. In the mean time ſure they cannot expect, that even in the moſt imperfect sketch of *natural religion* the *worſhip of the Deity* ſhould be omitted: that very thing, which hath been principally intended by the word *religion* (*a*).

4. And laſtly, to deliver what remains, ſummarily; *Rational beings, or they, to whom reaſon is the great law of their nature, if they would behave themſelves as above, ſhould conſider in earneſt, what a mighty being He is, who by the conſtitution of their nature has laid them under an obligation of being governed by it, and whoſe laws the dictates of right reaſon may be ſaid to be.* They ought to keep it well impreſt upon their minds, that He is the being, upon whom their very *exiſtence* depends: that it is He who ſuperintends and adminiſters the affairs of the world by His *providence:* that the effects of His *power* and *influence* are viſible before their faces, and round about them, in all the *phænomena* of nature, not one of which could be without Him: that they are always in His *preſence:* that He is a being of *perfect reaſon:* that, if it be *reaſonable* that the tranſgreſſors of *reaſon* ſhould be puniſhd, they will moſt certainly, *one time or other*, be puniſhd, *&c.* And then, if they do this, it is eaſy to ſee what effect it muſt have upon all their *thoughts*, *words* (*b*), and *actions*.

By what is ſaid here, no *ſuperſtition* is intended to be introduced: it is only the practice of *reaſon* and *truth*, which is required: and any thing, that is *not inconſiſtent with them*, may be freely done, though under the inſpection of our great Lawgiver himſelf.

(*a*) *Religio deorum cultu pio continetur.* Cic. *Qui omnia, qua ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligenter retractarent, & tanquam relegerent, ſunt dicti religioſi*, &c. Id. (*b*) Particularly with reſpect to *cuſtomary ſwearing*; which, beſide the ill conſequences it has in making oaths cheap, *&c.* is a great inſtance of diſregard and irreverence. For they, who uſe themſelves to it do, *at leaſt*, make the tremendous name of God to ſerve for an *expletive* only; and commonly to rude, paſſionate, or debauched diſcourſe (λόγων ἀναπλήρωμα ποιούμενοι τὸ ἀγιώτατον ϗ θεῖον ὄνομα. *Ph. Jud.*

SECT.

SECT. VI. *Truths reſpecting* Mankind *in general, antecedent to all human laws.*

IN this and the following ſections I ſhall proceed as in the foregoing.

I. *Every man hath in himſelf a principle of individuation, which diſtinguiſhes and ſeparates him from all other men in ſuch a manner, as may render him and them capable of diſtinct properties in things* (or, *diſtinct ſubjects of property*). That is, B and C are ſo diſtinguiſh'd, or exiſt ſo *diſtinctly*, that if there be any thing which B can call *his*, it will be for that reaſon *not C's:* and *v. v.* what is C's will for that reaſon not be B's. The proof of this I put upon every man's own conſcience. Let us ſee then whether there is any thing, which one man may truly call his.

II. *There are ſome things, to which (at leaſt before the caſe is alterd by voluntary ſubjection, compact, or the like) every individual man has, or may have, ſuch a natural and immediate relation, that he only of all mankind can call them his.*

The *life*, *limbs*, &c. of B are as much *his*, as B is *himſelf* (*a*). It is impoſſible for C, or any other to ſee with the *eyes* of B: therefore they are *eyes* only to B: and when they ceaſe to be *his eyes*, they ceaſe to be *eyes at all*. He then has the ſole *property* in them, it being impoſſible in nature, that the eyes of B ſhould ever be the eyes of C.

Further, the *labor* of B cannot be the labor of C: becauſe it is the application of the organs and powers of B, not of C, to the effecting of ſomething; and therefore the *labor* is as much B's, as the *limbs* and *faculties* made uſe of are his.

Again, the *effect* or *produce* of the labor of B is not the effect of the labor of C: and therefore this effect or produce is B's, not C's; as much B's, as the *labor* was B's, and not C's (*b*). Becauſe, what the labor of B cauſes or produces, B produces by his labor;

(*a*) Οὐδὲν ὕτως ἀμίτρητόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἡμῖν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. *Xen.* (*b*) And therefore the produce of a man's labor is often ſtill called his *labor*. So Strangers ſhall ſpoil his labour: and thou ſhalt eat the labour of thy hands *in Pſalm. & al. paſſim.*------ *Iliadumque labor veſtes.* Virg.

or it is the product of B by his labor: that is, it is B's product, not C's, or any other's. And if C should pretend to any *property* in that, which B only can truly call *his*, he would act contrary to *truth* (*a*).

Lastly, there may be *many* things, which B may truly call *his* in some such *sense*, or upon some such account, as *no other* can; and to which C has no more right than D, nor D than F, &c. the *property* of which will therefore be in B. Because C has no more title than D, nor D than F, &c. and that, to which every one *besides B* has an *equal* title, no one besides B can have *any title* to at all (*b*), their pretences mutually balancing and *destroying* each other, whilst his only *remains*. And in this case a small matter, being opposed to nothing, will be strong enough to maintain the claim of B.

III. *Whatever is inconsistent with the general peace and welfare (or good) of mankind, is inconsistent with the laws of human nature, wrong, intolerable.* Those maxims may be esteemd the natural and true laws of any particular society, which are most proper to procure the *happiness* of it. Because *happiness* is the end of society and laws: otherwise we might suppose *unhappiness* to be proposed as the right end of them; that is, unhappiness to be desirable, contrary to *nature* and *truth*. And what is said of a *particular* society is not less true, when applied to the *universal* society of mankind. Now those things are *most apt* to produce happiness, which make the *most men* happy. And therefore those maxims or principles, which promote the general *tranquillity* and *well-being* of mankind, if those words express the *happiness* of mankind, must be the *true* laws of humanity, or the basis of them: and all such practices, as interfere with these, must also interfere with those. It is contradictory to say, that any thing can be a *general* law of *human* nature, which tends only to favor the pleasures of *some particulars* to the prejudice of the rest, who partake of the same common nature; and especially if these pleasures are of the lower and *brutal* kind. As a *million* of men are more than *one*; so in fixing the public laws of human nature, and what ought to be, or not to be, they must in reason be more regarded by a *million of times*: for here we consider men only as men.

It will be easy now to shew, that the *transgression* of these laws, conducing to the general good of the world, is *wrong* and *morally evil*. For if mankind may be said in general to be a *rational animal*, the general welfare of it must be the welfare of a

(*a*) If B works for another man, who pays him for his work, or labor, that alters not the case. He may commute them for money, because they are *his*. (*b*) *Tantum Spartiatæ potarunt, sic se invicem jugulant, ut nemo ex omnibus restet*, as *Lactantius* says in another case.

rational

rational nature: and therefore that, and the laws which advance it, muſt be founded in *reaſon*; nor can be oppoſed by any thing, but what is oppoſite to *reaſon*, and conſequently to *truth*.

Let us ſuppoſe *ſome* rule, by which if all mankind would agree to govern themſelves, it would be in general good for the world: that is, ſuch a practice would be agreeable to the *nature* and *circumſtances* of mankind. If *all* men ſhould tranſgreſs this rule, what would be the conſequence of ſuch an *univerſal* revolt? A general *evil*, or ſomething diſagreeable to our *nature* and the *truth* of our circumſtances: for of contrary practices there muſt be contrary effects; and contraries cannot both be agreeable to the ſame thing. This then would be *wrong* by the terms. And as wrong it would be in any *one* man: becauſe all the individuals have *equal* right to do it, one as much as another; and therefore *all* as much as any *one*. At leaſt it is certain, that whoever ſhould violate that *rule*, would contribute his ſhare towards the introduction of univerſal *diſorder* and *miſery*; and would for his part *deny* human circumſtances to be what they are, public happineſs to be what it is, and the rule to be what it really is, as much as if all others conſpired with him in this iniquity and madneſs.

With what face can any *particular* man put his own humor or unreaſonable pleaſure into the ſcale againſt ſuch a weight of happineſs as that of *all the world*? Does not he, who thus centers in *himſelf*, diſregards the good of *every body elſe*, and intirely ſeparates his injoyments and intereſts from thoſe of the *public*; does not he, I ſay, ſtrike himſelf out of the roll of *mankind* (*a*)? Ought he to be ownd as one of them? Ought he not rather to be repelled, and treated as an *alien* and *enemy* to the common happineſs and tranquillity of our *ſpecies*?

IV. *Whatever is either reaſonable or unreaſonable in B with reſpect to C, would be juſt the ſame in C with reſpect to B, if the caſe was inverted* (*b*). Becauſe reaſon is univerſal, and reſpects caſes (*c*), not perſons. (See ſect. III. pr. II.)

Cor. Hence it follows, that a good way to know what is right or wrong in relation to *other men*, is to conſider what we ſhould take things to be were *we* in their circumſtances (*d*).

V. *In a ſtate of nature men are equal in reſpect of dominion* (*e*). I except for the preſent the caſe of *parents* and their *children*, and perhaps of ſome few other near relati-

(*a*) Ἀνθρωπόμορφον θηρίον. *Ph. Jud.* (*b*) *Nec enim aquus judex aliam de ſuâ, aliam de alienâ cauſâ, ſententiam fert.* Sen. (*c*) Ἀεὶ ταυτὰ πέρι γε τ' ἀντῶν γίνωσκε. *Iſocr.* (*d*) Don't judge thy neighbour, till thou putteſt thy ſelf in his place. *P. Aboth. Eo loco nos conſtituamus, quo ille eſt, ſi irraſcimur.* Sen. (*e*) He was a mere flatterer, who told *Cyrus*, Βασιλεῦ μὲν ἐμοὶ γε δοκεῖς σὺ φύσει πεφυκέναι ἀδὲν ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἐν τῷ σμήνει φύσει τ' μελιττῶν ἡγεμών. *Xen.*

ons

ons. Here let me be underſtood to mean only thoſe, between whom there is no family relation (or between whom all family relation is vaniſhd).

In a ſtate, where no *laws* of ſociety make any ſubordination or diſtinction, *men* can only be conſiderd *as men*, or only as individuals of the ſame *ſpecies*, and equally ſharing in one common definition (*a*). And ſince by virtue of this *ſame* definition B is the *ſame* to C, that C is to B; B has no more *dominion* over C than C *reciprocally* has over B: that is, they are in this regard *equal*.

Perſonal excellencies or defects can make no difference here: becauſe, 1. Who muſt *judge*, on which ſide the advantage lies? To ſay B (or D, or any body elſe) has a right to judge to the diſadvantage of C, is to *ſuppoſe* what is in queſtion, a dominion over him; not to *prove* it. 2. Great natural or acquired *indowments* may be privileges to them who have them: but this does not deprive thoſe, who have leſs, of *their title* to what they have; or, which is the ſame, give any one, who has greater abilities, a *right* to take it, or the uſe of it from them. If B has better *eyes* than C, it is well for him: but it does not follow from this, that C ſhould not therefore ſee for himſelf, and uſe *his eyes*, as freely as B may *his*. C's eyes are accommodated by nature to his uſe, and ſo are B's to his; and each has the ſole property in his own: ſo their reſpective properties are *equal*. The caſe would be parallel to this, if B ſhould happen to have better *intellectual faculties* than C. And further, if B ſhould be *ſtronger* than C, he would not yet for that reaſon have any right to be his *lord*. For C's leſs degree of ſtrength is *as much his*, as B's greater is *his*: therefore C has as much *right* to his, and (which is the natural conſequence) to uſe his, as B has to uſe his: that is, C has as much right to *reſiſt*, as B has to impoſe or *command*, by virtue of his ſtrength: and where the *right* (tho not the power) of reſiſting is equal to the right of commanding, the right of commanding or *dominion* is nothing. 3. Since ſtrength and power are moſt apt to pretend a title to dominion (*b*), it may be added further, that *power* and *right*, or a power of doing any thing, and right to do it, are quite different ideas: and therefore they may be ſeparated, nor does one inferr the other. *Laſtly*, if *power*, *quà* power, gives a right to dominion, it gives a right to *every thing*, that is obnoxious to it; and then nothing can be done that is wrong. For no body can do any thing which he has not the *power* to do.) But this is not only contrary to what has been proved in ſect. I. but to aſſert it would be to advance a plain *abſurdity* or

(*a*) *Nihil eſt unum uni tam ſimile, tam par, quàm omnes inter noſmet ipſos ſumus.* -------- *Quacunq; eſt hominis* definitio, *una in omnes valet.* Cic. (*b*) When the *Romans*, in *Livy*, asked the *Galls*, *Quodnam id jus eſſet, agrum à poſſeſſoribus petere, aut minari arma*, they anſwerd, *ſe in armis jus ferre, & omnia fortium virorum eſſe.* Like barbarians indeed!

contradiction

contradiction rather. For then to oppoſe the man who has this *power*, as far as one can, or (which is the ſame) as far as one has the *power* to do it, would not be wrong: and yet ſo it muſt be, if he has a right to dominion, or to be not oppoſed. Moreover, that a man ſhould have a *right* to any thing, merely becauſe he has the *power* to take it, is a doctrine indeed which may ſerve a few tyrants, or ſome *banditi* and rogues, but directly oppoſite to the peace and general good of mankind; and therefore to be exploded, by prop. III. It is alſo what the powerful themſelves could not allow, if they would but imagine themſelves to be in the ſtate of the *weak* and more *defenceleſs*; and therefore unreaſonable, by prop. IV. (*a*).

VI. *No man can have a right to begin to interrupt the happineſs of another.* Becauſe, in the firſt place, this ſuppoſes a dominion over him, and the moſt *abſolute* too that can be. In the next place, for B to begin to diſturb the peace and happineſs of C is what B would think *unreaſonable*, if he was in C's caſe. In the laſt, ſince it is ſuppoſed, that C has never invaded the happineſs of B, nor taken any thing from him, nor at all meddled with him, but the *whole tranſaction* begins originally from B (for all this is couchd in the word *begin*), C can have nothing that is B's; and therefore nothing, to which C has not at leaſt *as good a title* as B has; or, in other words, nothing, which C has not as much right to *keep* as B to *claim*. Theſe two rights being then *at leaſt* equal, and counterpoiſing each other, no alteration in the preſent ſtate of things can follow from any ſuperiority of right in B: and therefore it muſt of right remain as it is; and what C has muſt, for any right that B has to oppoſe this ſettlement, remain with C in his *undiſturbed* poſſeſſion. But the argument is ſtill ſtronger on the ſide of C: becauſe he ſeems to have ſuch a *property* in his own happineſs, as is mentiond in prop. II. ſuch a one as no other can have (*b*).

VII. *Tho no man can have a right to begin to interrupt another man's happineſs, or to hurt him; yet every man has a right to defend himſelf and his againſt violence, to recover what is taken by force from him, and even to make repriſals, by all the means that truth and prudence permit* (*c*). We have ſeen already, that there are ſome things, which

(*a*) *Joſephus*, when he ſays, νόμον γε μὴν ἀρίδηξ, ἢ παρὰ θεῶν ἰσχυρότατον, ἢ παρὰ ἀνθρώπους, ἴσχειν τοῖς δυναστεύουσι, can only mean, that neceſſity, or perhaps prudence, *obliges* to do this; not any law in the ſtricter ſenſe of that word. (*b*) *Societatis* [*inter homines*] *arctiſſimum vinculum eſt magis arbitrari eſſe contra naturam, hominem homini detrahere, ſui commodi cauſa, quàm omnia incommoda ſubire*, &c. Cic. (*c*) All this is ſuppoſed to be in a ſtate of nature and the abſence of human laws.

a man

a man may truly call *his*; and let us for the preſent only ſuppoſe, that there may be *more*. This premiſed, I proceed to make good the propoſition.

To deny a man the privilege mentiond in it is to aſſert, contrary to *truth*, either that he *has not* the faculties and powers, which he *has*; or that the Author of nature has given them to him in vain. For to what end has he them, if he may not *uſe* them? And how may he uſe them, if not for his own *preſervation*, when he is attacked, and like to be abuſed, or perhaps deſtroyd.

All *animals* have a principle of *ſelf-preſervation*, which exerts itſelf many times with an uncontroulable impetuoſity. Nature is *uniform* in this, and every where conſtant to itſelf. Even *inanimate* bodies, when they are acted upon, react. And one may be ſure, that no poſition can have any foundation *in nature*, or be conſiſtent with *it* and *truth* (thoſe inſeparable companions), which turns upon nature itſelf, and tends to *its deſtruction*.

Great part of the general happineſs of mankind depends upon thoſe *means*, by which the innocent may be ſaved from their cruel invaders: among which the opportunities they have of *defending* themſelves may be reckond the chief. Therefore to debar men of the uſe of theſe opportunities, and the right of defending themſelves againſt injurious treatment and violence muſt be inconſiſtent with the laws of nature by prop. III.

If a man has no right to *defend* himſelf and what is his, he can have no right to *any thing* (the contrary to which has been already in part, and will by and by be more amply proved); ſince that cannot be his right, which he may not *maintain* to be his right.

If a man has no right to *defend* himſelf againſt inſults, *&c.* it muſt be becauſe the aggreſſor has a right to *aſſail* the other, and *uſurp* what is his: but this pretenſion has been prevented in the foregoing propoſition. And, more than that, it includes a great abſurdity, to *commence* an injury, or to *begin* the violence, being in nature more than only to *repell* it. He, who begins, is the true cauſe of all that follows: and whatever falls upon him from the oppoſition made by the defending party, is but the effect of his own act: or, it is that violence, of which he is the author, *reflected* back upon himſelf. It is as when a man ſpits at heaven, and the ſpittle falls back upon his own face.

Since he, who begins to violate the happineſs of another, does what is *wrong*, he, who endeavours to obviate or put a ſtop to that violence, does in that reſpect what is *right*, by the terms.

Laſtly, ſince every man is obliged to conſult his own happineſs, there can be no doubt but that he not only *may*, but even *ought* to defend it (ſect. II. prop. 9.); in ſuch

a manner I mean, as does not interfere with *truth* (a), or his own deſign of being happy. He ought indeed not to act *raſhly*, or do *more* than the end propoſed requires: that is, he ought by a prudent carriage and wiſe foreca ſt to ſhut up, *if he can*, the avenues by which he may be invaded; and when that *cannot be done*, to uſe arguments and perſuaſives, or perhaps withdraw out of the way of harm: but when theſe meaſures are ineffectual or impracticable, he muſt take ſuch other as he can, and confront *force* with *force*. Otherwiſe he will fail in his duty to himſelf, and deny happineſs to be happineſs.

By the ſame means, that a man may *defend* what is his, he may certainly endeavour to *recover* what has been by any kind of violence or villainy taken from him. For it has been ſhewn already, that the *power* to take any thing from another gives no *right* to it. The *right* then to that, which has been taken from its owner againſt his will, remains ſtill where it was: he may ſtill truly call it *his*: and if it be *his*, he may uſe it as *his*: which if he who took it away, or any other, ſhall hinder him from doing, that man is even here the aggreſſor, and the owner does but *defend* himſelf and what is his. Beſides, he, who uſes any thing as *his*, when it is *his*, acts *on the ſide* of truth: but that man, who oppoſes him in this, and conſequently aſſerts a right to that, which is not his, acts *contrary* to truth. The former therefore does what cannot be amiſs: but what the latter does, is wrong by that fundamental propoſition, *S.* 1. *pr.* iv.

Then further, if a man hath ſtill a *right* to what is forceably or without his conſent taken from him, he muſt have a right to the *value* of it. For the thing is to him what it is *in value* to him: and the right he has to it, may be conſiderd as a right to a thing of *ſuch a value*. So that if the very thing which was taken be deſtroyed, or cannot be retrieved, the proprietor nevertheleſs retains his right to a thing of *ſuch a value to him*; and ſomething muſt be had *in lieu* of it: that is, he has a right to make *repriſals*. Since every thing is to every man what it is *in value* to him, things of the ſame *value* to any one may be reckond as to him *the ſame*, and to recover the *equivalent* the ſame as to recover the *thing itſelf*: for otherwiſe it is not an equivalent. If the thing taken by way of repriſal ſhould be *to the man*, from whom it is taken, of *greater* value than what he wrongfully took from the recoverer, he muſt charge himſelf with that loſs. If injuſtice be done him, it is done by himſelf, the other has no more than what he has a right to. To which add, that as a man has a right to recover *what is his*, or *the equivalent*, from an invader; ſo he ſeems for the ſame reaſons to have a right to an equivalent for the *expence* he is at in recovering his own, for the loſs of *time* and *quiet*, and for the *trouble*, *hazards*, and *dangers* undergone: be-

(a) ἐμὲ ὁ ἀδικῶν κακῶς ποιεῖ, ὁ ἀντιποιῶν κακῶς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιεῖ κακῶς, ἢν δύνηται. *Max. T.*

cauſe all theſe are the effects of the invaſion, and therefore to be added to the invader's account.

VIII. *The firſt poſſeſſion of a thing gives the poſſeſſor a greater right to it, than any other man has, or can have, till he and all that claim under him, are extinct.* For, 1. till then no other man can be the *firſt poſſeſſor* again; which is more than *nothing*; ſince he comes into it by God's providence, and as it were *donation*. 2. That, which no man has yet any title to (*a*), the finder may take without the violation of *any truth*. He doth not *deny* that to be another man's, which is another man's: he doth not *begin* to interrupt the happineſs of any body, &c. Therefore to poſſeſs himſelf of it is *not wrong*. So far from it, that, ſince every man is *obliged* to conſult his own happineſs (that is, his own intereſt and advantages, whenever he can do it without the violation of truth) not to act conſonantly to this *obligation* is an omiſſion that would be *wrong*. What he does therefore is *right*. And then if he does right in taking poſſeſſion of it, he muſt from thence be the *rightful poſſeſſor*; or, it becomes his. 3. There are many things, which cannot be poſſeſt without *cultivation* and the contrivance and labor of the firſt poſſeſſor. This has generally been the caſe of *lands*: and theſe are indeed more eminently meant by the word *poſſeſſions*. Now to deprive a man of the fruit of *his own* cares and ſweat, and to enter upon it, as if it was the effect of the *intruder's* pains and travel, is a moſt manifeſt violation of *truth*. It is aſſerting in fact that to be his, which cannot be his. See prop. II. 4. The contrary doctrine, *viz.* that *prime occupancy* gives no right, interferes with prop. III. for it muſt certainly be inconſiſtent with the *peace* and *happineſs* of mankind in general to be left in endleſs wars and ſtruggles for that, which *no man* can ever have any right to. And yet thus it muſt be, if that doctrine was true: becauſe it has been demonſtrated, that *power* confers no right; and therefore the *firſt right* to many things can only accrue from the firſt poſſeſſion of them. 5. If B ſhould endeavour by force (or fraud) to eject C out of the poſſeſſion of any thing, which C injoys, and obtaind without *expelling* or *diſturbing* any body, he would certainly do that, which he himſelf would judge *unreaſonable*, were he in C's place. Therefore he acts, as if that was not reaſon with reſpect to C, which would be reaſon in reſpect of B; contrary to the nature of *reaſon*, and to prop. IV. 6. To endeavour to turn a man violently out of his poſſeſſions is the ſame as to *command* him to leave them, upon pain of ſuffering for non-obedience. But this is uſurping a *dominion*, which he has no right to; and is contrary to prop. V. 7. No man can expell

(*a*) *Nam propriæ telluris herum natura neq; illum, Nec me, nec quenquam ſtatuit.* Hor.

another

another out of his poſſeſſion without *beginning* to interrupt his happineſs: nor can any one do this without contravening the *truth* containd in prop. VI. This therefore ſecures the poſſeſſor in his poſſeſſion for ever: that is, it confirms his *right* to the thing poſſeſt. *Laſtly*, the *firſt poſſeſſor*, of whom I have been ſpeaking, has undoubtedly a right to defend *his perſon*, and ſuch other things as can *only be his*, againſt the attempts of any aggreſſor (ſee prop. II.): therefore theſe no one can have a right to violate. And therefore again, if he cannot be forceably diſpoſſeſt without violence offerd to *theſe*, no one has any right to diſpoſſeſs him. But this muſt be the caſe, where the poſſeſſor does not quit his poſſeſſion *willingly*. The *right* conſequently muſt remain ſolely in him, unleſs he conſents to quit it.

N. The *ſucceſſors* of an invader, got into poſſeſſion wrongfully, may acquire a right *in time* (*a*), by the failure of ſuch, as might claim under him who had the right. For he, who happens to be in poſſeſſion, when all theſe are extinct, is in the place of a *prime occupant*.

IX. *A title to many things may be transferred by compact or donation* (*b*) If B has the ſole right in lands, or goods, no body has any right to the diſpoſal of them beſides B: and he has a right. For diſpoſing of them is but uſing them as *his*. Therefore the act of B in *exchanging* them for ſome thing elſe, or *beſtowing* them upon C, interferes not with *truth*: and ſo B does nothing that is wrong. Nor does C do any thing againſt *truth*, or that is wrong, in taking them: becauſe he treats them as being *what they are*; as things, which come to him by the act of that perſon, in whom is lodged the ſole power of *diſpoſing* of them. Thus C gets the title *innocently*.

But in the caſe of *compact* the reaſon, on which this tranſaction ſtands, is more evident ſtill. For the contractors are ſuppoſed to receive each from other the *equivalent* of that which they part with, or at leaſt what is equivalent *to them reſpectively*, or perhaps by each party *preferable*. Thus neither of them is hurt: perhaps both advantaged. And ſo each of them treats the thing, which he receives upon the innocent exchange, as being *what it is*: better for him, and promoting his convenience and happineſs. Indeed he, who receives the *value* of any thing, and what he likes as well, in effect has it ſtill. His *property* is not diminiſhd: the ſituation and matter of it is only alterd.

(*a*) Τας κλησεις, η τας ιδιας, η τας κοινας, ην επιγενηται πολις χρονῳ, κυριας η πατριους απασας, εν τοις νομιζομενοις. Iſocr. (*b*) To this may be reduced that title to things, which *Tully* mentions as conferred by ſome law (*lege*); and even thoſe, which accrue *conditione*, or *ſorte*. For I ſuppoſe the government to have a right of giving them thus.

Mankind could not well ſubſiſt without *bartering* one thing for another: therefore whatever tends to take away the benefit of this intercourſe, is inconſiſtent with the *general good* of mankind, &c. If a man could find the *neceſſaries* of life without it, and by himſelf, he muſt at leaſt want many of the *comforts* of it.

X. *There is then ſuch a thing as property, founded in nature and truth* (*a*): or, *there are things, which one man only can, conſiſtently with nature and truth, call his*: by prop. II. VIII, IX. (*b*).

XI. *Thoſe things, which only one man can truly and properly call his, muſt remain his, till he agrees to part with them (if they are ſuch, as he may part with) by compact or donation*; or (which muſt be underſtood) till they fail, or death extinguiſhes him and his title together, and he delivers the lamp to his next man. Becauſe no one can deprive him of them without his approbation, but the *depriver* muſt uſe them as *his*, when they are *not his*, in contradiction to *truth*. For,

XII. *To have the property of any thing and to have the ſole right of uſing and diſpoſing of it are the ſame thing: they are equipollent expreſſions.* For when it is ſaid, that P has the property, or that ſuch a thing is proper to P, it is not ſaid, that P and Q or P and others have the property (*proprium* limits the thing to P only): and when any thing is ſaid to be *his*, it is not ſaid that *part of it only* is his. P has therefore the *all* or all-hood (*c*) of it, and conſequently *all the uſe* of it. And then, ſince the *all* of it to him, or *all* that P can have of it, is but the *uſe* and *diſpoſal* of it (*d*), he who has this has the thing itſelf, and it is his (*e*).

Laws

(*a*) Which muſt not give way to opinions of *fitneſs*, &c. The maſter was in the right, who corrected *Cyrus* for adjudging the great coat to the great boy, and the little one to the little. He was not τῷ ἁρμόττοντι κριτὴς, but of *property*. *Omnium, quæ in hominum doctorum diſputatione verſantur, nihil eſt profecto præſtabilius, quàm planè intelligi nos ad juſtitiam eſſe natos, neque* opinione, *ſed* naturâ *conſtitutum eſſe jus.* Cic. (*b*) There is another way of acquiring a title mentiond: which is, by the right of war, as it is called. *Sunt privata nullâ naturâ? ſed aut veteri occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt; aut victoriâ, ut qui bello potiti ſunt,* &c. *Cic.* And ſo in *Xenophon* it is ſaid to be an eternal law among men, that if a city be taken in war, the bodies and goods of the people in it are the conqueror's; and they may poſſeſs them as their own, not ἀλλότρια. But ſure this wants limitations. (*c*) *Allodium.* (*d*) Πολλάκις ἐγέλασα διαθήκας ἀναγιγνώσκων λεγούσας· ὁ δεῖνα μὲν ἐχέτω τὴν δεσποτείαν τῶν ἀγρῶν, ἢ τῆς οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ χρῆσιν ἄλλος. Πάντες γὰρ τὴν χρῆσιν ἔχομεν, δεσποτείαν δὲ οὐδείς---ἐκ ἐκόντες ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ παραχωρήσομεν ἑτέροις, τὰν

Laws indeed have introduced a way of ſpeaking, by which the *property* and the *uſufruct* are diſtinguiſhd; but in truth the uſufructuary has a *temporary*, or *limited* property; and the proprietary has a *perpetual* uſufruct, either at preſent, or in reverſion. Propriety without the *uſe* (if the uſe is never to come to the proprietary) is an empty ſound.

I have before upon ſome occaſions taken it as granted, that he, who uſes any thing as *his* when it is *not his*, acts againſt *truth*, &c. but now I ſay further, that,

XIII. *He, who uſes or diſpoſes of any thing, does by that declare it to be his.* Becauſe this is all, that he, whoſe it *really* is, can do. *Borrowing* and *hiring* afford no objection to this. When the borrower or hirer uſes the thing borrowd or hired, he uſes what *is his own* for the time allowd; and his doing ſo is only one of *thoſe ways*, in which the true proprietary diſpoſes of it.

XIV. *To uſurp or invade the property of another man is injuſtice:* or, more fully, *to take, detain, uſe, deſtroy, hurt, or meddle* (*a*) *with any thing that is his without his allowance, either by force or fraud or any other way, or even to attempt any of theſe, or aſſiſt them, who do, are acts of injuſtice. The contrary; to render and permit quietly to every one what is his, is juſtice.* Def.

XV. *He that would not violate truth, muſt avoid all injuſtice*: or, *all injuſtice is wrong and evil.* It interferes with the truths (*b*) here before laid down, and perhaps more. It denies men to be *ſubjects* capable of diſtinct properties: in ſome caſes it denies them to have a property even in their own *bodies*, *life*, *fame*, and the like: the practice of it is incompatible with the *peace* and *happineſs* of mankind: it is what every man thinks unreaſonable *in his own caſe*, when the injury is done to himſelf: to take any thing from another only becauſe I think I want it, or becauſe I have power to take

---

τὴν χρῆσιν καμπωσάμενοι μόνον. S. Chryſ. Τούτων μὲν φύσει κύριοι ἐσμεν κύριοι, νόμῳ δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν χρήσιν αὐτῶν εἰς ἀόριστον παραλαμβανόντες, ὀλιγοχρόνιοι δεσπόται νομιζόμεθα. κἀπειδὰν ἡ προθεσμία παρέλθῃ τυπικᾶυτα παραλαβὼν ἄλλῳ ὑπολαύει τῷ ὀνόματι. Luc. (*c*) *Qui te paſcit agri, tuus eſt*, &c. *Horace*, alluding to this truth. Περὶ παντὸς, ſays *Plato*, ἐν εἰρήσθω τοιόνδε δή τι νόμιμον βιαίων πέρι· τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μηδένα μηδὲν φέρειν μηδὲ ἄγειν· and then proceeds, μηδ' ἅν χρῆσθαι μηδενὶ τῶν τῷ πέλας, ἐαν μὴ πείσῃ τὸν κεκτημένον, κτλ. In *Plutarch* the thing is carried farther: where it is ſaid, that a man paſſing by another man's door ought μὴ βλέπειν ἴσω, κλ. according to a ſaying of *Xenocrates*, μηδὲν διαφέρειν ἢ τῆς πόδας ἢ τες ὀφθαλμὲς εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν οἰκίαν τιθέναι. (*a*) *Furtum ſit,----cum quis alienam rem invito domino* contrectat. *Juſt. inſt.* (*b*) On the contrary let us do judgment: let us do truth. A ſaying of *Rabbi Joſua* ſon of *Levi*. And *Cicero* more than once uſes *verum* for *juſtum*, *veritas* for *bonitas* or *probitas*.

it

it, and will have it, without any title to it, is the higheſt pretence to *dominion*, and denial of our *natural equality:* it is ſetting up a right to *begin* to diſturb the happineſs of others: and laſtly, it is to deny there is any ſuch thing as *property*, *contrary* to *truth*.

Briefly, if there be any thing which P can truly and properly call *his*, then, if T takes or uſes it without the conſent of P, he declares it to be *his* (for if it was *his* he could do no more) when it is *not his*, and ſo acts a lie (*a*): in which conſiſts the *idea* and *formal ratio* of moral evil.

The very *attempting* any inſtance of injuſtice, or *aſſiſting* others in ſuch an attempt, ſince it is attempting and promoting what is *wrong*, is being in the wrong as much as one is *able* to be; or doing what one *can* to atchieve that which is *evil:* and to do this, by the *terms*, muſt be *wrong* and *evil*.

Even the *deſire* of obtaining any thing unjuſtly is evil: becauſe to deſire to do *evil*, by the terms again, is an *evil* or criminal *deſire*. If the act follows ſuch a deſire, it is the child and product of it: and the deſire, if any thing renders the fulfiling of it impracticable, is the act obſtructed in the beginning, and ſtifled in the womb.

Let it be obſerved here by way of *ſcholion* concerning the thing called *covetouſneſs*, that there ſeem to be three ſorts of it. One is this here mentiond: a deſire of getting from others, tho it be *unjuſtly*. This is wrong and wicked. Another is an immenſe deſire of heaping up what one can by juſt methods, but without any *reaſonable end* propoſed (*b*), and only in order to *keep* (*c*) and as it were *bury* it (*d*): and the more he accumulates, the more he craves (*e*). This alſo intrenches upon truth, and ſeems to be a vice. But to *covet* to obtain what is another man's by *juſt means*, and with his conſent, when it may contribute to the happineſs of our ſelves or families, and perhaps of the other perſon too, has nothing ſurely that looks *unfriendly* upon truth, or is blameable, in it. This, if it may be called covetouſneſs, is a virtuous *covetouſneſs*.

(*a*) Account τὸ σὸν μόνον σὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον, ὥσπερ ἐστὶν, ἀλλότριον. *Epict.*'s words. *Juſtitia primum munus eſt, ut ne cui quis noceat, niſi laceſſitus injuria; deinde, ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut ſuis.* Cic. This is to uſe things as being what they are. (*b*) Βλεψίας ὁ δανειστὴς, in *Lyſias*, dies of hunger (λιμῷ ἄθλιος ἐλέγετο ἀπολλύμενος). Ridiculous enough. (*c*) Or only πρὸς τὸ ἀριθμεῖν, as *Anacharſis* ſaid of ſome Greeks. *Athen.* (*d*) As that man, in *Athenæus*, indeavourd literally to do; of whom it is reported, that, being much in love with his money, before he died he ſwallowed as much of it as he could (καταπίνων ὡς ὀλίγους χρυσοῦς ἀποθανεῖν). (*e*) Of ſuch it is, that *Diogenes* uſed to ſay, Ὁμοίως τοὺς φιλαργύρους τοῖς ὑδρωπικοῖς, κ.λ. *Stob.* The *Mamſhilim*, mentiond in *Nahh. Ab.* compare them, to a man that is dry, and drinks ſalt water, for what he drinks, will ſtill increaſe his thirſt.

XVI. *When*

XVI. *When a man cares not what ſufferings he cauſes to others, and eſpecially if he delights in other men's ſufferings and makes them his ſport, this is what I call cruelty.* And *not to be affected with the ſufferings of other people, tho they proceed not from us, but from others, or from cauſes in which we are not concerned, is unmercifulneſs. Mercy and humanity are the reverſe of theſe.*

XVII. *He, who religiouſly regards truth and nature, will not only be not unjuſt, but (more) not unmerciful, and much leſs cruel.* Not to be affected with the *afflictions* of others, ſo far as we know them, and in proportion to the ſeveral degrees and circumſtances of them, tho we are not the cauſes of them, is the ſame as to conſider the afflicted as perſons not in affliction; that is, as being not what they are, or (which is the ſame) as being what they are not: and this contradicts *matter of fact*.

One can ſcarce know the *ſufferings* of another without having at leaſt ſome image of them in his mind: nor can one have theſe images without being conſcious of them, and as it were feeling them. Next to ſuffering itſelf is to carry the repreſentation of it about with one. So that he, who is not affected with the calamities of others, ſo far as they fall within his knowledge, may be ſaid to know and not to know; or at leaſt to cancel his knowledge, and contradict his own conſcience.

There is ſomething in *human* nature (*a*) reſulting from our very make and conſtitution, while it retains its genuin form, and is not *alterd* by vitious habits; not *perverted* by tranſports of revenge or fury, by ambition, company, or falſe philoſophy (*b*); nor *oppreſt* by ſtupidity and neglecting to obſerve what happens to others: I ſay, there is *ſomething*, which renders us obnoxious to the pains of others, cauſes us to ſympathize with them, and almoſt comprehends us in their caſe. It is grievous to ſee or hear (and almoſt to hear of) any man, or even any animal whatever, in *torment*. This *compaſſion* appears eminently in them, who upon other accounts are juſtly reckond amongſt *the beſt of men* (*c*): in ſome degree it appears in *almoſt* all; nay, even

(*a*) Properly called *humanity*; becauſe nothing of it appears in brutes. A beaſt does not care, nor trouble itſelf with the pain of another beaſt. *S. Hhaſ.* (*b*) When *Seneca* ſays, *Clementiam------ omnes boni praſtabunt, miſericordiam autem vitabunt*, he ſeems only to quibble. He has many other weak things upon this ſubject. That, *ſuccurret [ſapiens] alienis lachrymis, non accedet*, owns one uſe of tears: they obtain ſuccour even from a *Stoic*. (*c*) Ἀγαθοὶ ἐλεήμονες ἄνδρες. They, who of all writers undertake to imitate nature moſt, oft introduce even their *heroes* weeping. (See how *Homer* repreſents *Ulyſſes* Od. ι. 151,---2,---7,---8.) The tears of men are in truth very different from the cries and ejaculations of children. They are *ſilent ſtreams*, and flow from other cauſes; commonly ſome tender, or perhaps philoſophical reflexion. It is eaſy to ſee how hard hearts and dry eyes come to be faſhionable. But for all that, it is certain the *glandulæ lachrymales* are not made for nothing.

ſometimes

ſometimes, when they more coolly attend to things, in thoſe hardend and execrable *monſters* of cruelty themſelves, who ſeem juſt to retain only the leaſt tincture of humanity that can be. The *Pheræan* tyrant, who had never wept over any of thoſe murders he had cauſed among his own citizens, *wept* when he ſaw a tragedy but acted in the theater (*a*): the reaſon was, his attention was caught here, and he more obſerved the ſufferings of *Hecuba* and *Andromache*, than ever he had thoſe of the *Pheræans*; and more impartially, being no otherwiſe concerned in them but as a common ſpectator. Upon this occaſion the principle of *compaſſion*, implanted in human nature, appeard, overcame his habits of cruelty, broke through his petrifaction, and would ſhew that it could not be totally eradicated. It is therefore according to *nature* to be affected with the ſufferings of other people: and the contrary is *inhuman* and *unnatural*.

Such are the *circumſtances* of mankind, that we cannot (or but very few of us, God knows) make our way through this world without encountering *dangers* and ſuffering many *evils*: and therefore ſince it is for the good of ſuch, as are ſo expoſed or actually ſmarting under pain or trouble, to receive comfort and aſſiſtance from others, without which they muſt commonly continue to be miſerable or periſh, it is for the common good and welfare of the *majority at leaſt* of mankind, that they ſhould *compaſſionate* and *help* each other (*b*). To do the contrary muſt therefore be contrary to nature and *wrong* by prop. III. And beſide, it is by one's behaviour and actions to affirm, that the circumſtances of men in this world are *not* what they are; or that peace, and health, and happineſs, and the like, are not what *they* are

Let a man *ſubſtitute himſelf* into the room of ſome poor creature dejected with invincible poverty, diſtracted with difficulties, or groaning under the pangs of ſome diſeaſe, or the anguiſh of ſome hurt or wound, and without help abandond to want and pain. In this diſtreſs what reflexions can he imagine *he ſhould have*, if he found that every body neglected him, no body ſo much as pitying him, or vouchſafing to take notice of his calamitous and ſad condition? It is certain, that what it would be reaſonable or unreaſonable for others to do in reſpect of *him*, he muſt allow to be reaſonable or unreaſonable for him to do in reſpect of *them*, or deny a manifeſt *truth* in prop. IV.

If unmercifulneſs, as before defined, be wrong, no time need to be ſpent in proving that *cruelty* is ſo For all that is culpable in unmercifulneſs is containd in cruelty, with *additions* and *aggravations*. Cruelty not only denies due regard to the ſuffer-

(*a*) *Plut.* (*b*) A generous nature pities even an enemy in diſtreſs. Ἐποικτίρω δὲ τὸν δύστηνον ἐχθρὸν, κἀπερ ὄντα δυσμενῆ. *Soph.*

ings

ings of others, but *cauſes* them; or perhaps *delights* in them, and (which is the moſt inſolent and cruel of all cruelties) makes them a *jeſt* and ſubject of raillery. If the one be a *defect* of humanity, the other is diametrically oppoſite to it (*a*). If the one does *no good*, the other does *much evil*. And no man, how cruel ſoever in reality he was, has ever liked to be *reckond* a cruel man: ſuch a confeſſion of guilt does nature extort; ſo univerſally doth it reject, condemn, abhor this character.

XVIII. *The practice of juſtice and mercy is juſt as right, as injuſtice, unmercifulneſs, and cruelty are wrong.* This follows from the nature of contraries. Beſide, not to be juſt to a man is to be not juſt, or unjuſt to him: and ſo not to be merciful is to be unmerciful, or perhaps cruel.

Here I might end this ſection: but perhaps it may not be improper to be a little more particular. Therefore,

XIX. *From the foregoing propoſitions may be deduced the heinouſneſs of all ſuch crimes, as murder, or even hurting the perſon of another any how, when our own neceſſary defence does not require it* (it being not poſſible, that any thing ſhould be more *his*, than *his own* perſon, life and limbs); *robbing, ſtealing, cheating, betraying; defamation, detraction; defiling the bed of another man, et cæt. with all the approaches and tendencies to them.* For theſe are not only compriſed within the definition of injuſtice, and are therefore violations of thoſe truths, which are violated by that; but commonly, and ſome of them always, come within the deſcription of *cruelty* too. All which is evident at firſt ſight with reſpect to murder, robbery, cheating, ſlandering, &c. eſpecially if a man brings *himſelf* into the caſe, and views himſelf in his own imagination as renderd ſcandalous by calumniators and liers; ſtript by thieves; ruind in his fortunes and undone by knaves; ſtruggling to no purpoſe, convulſed and agonizing under the knife of ſome truculent ruffian; or the like.

The ſame is altogether as plain in the caſe *of adultery* (*b*), when any one (*c*) inſnares, and corrupts the wife of another; notwithſtanding the protection it gains from falſe notions, great examples (*d*), and the commonneſs of the crime (*e*). For (the nature of *matrimony* being for the preſent ſuppoſed to be ſuch, as it will appear by and by to be) the adulterer denies the *property* a husband has in his wife by compact, the moſt

(*a*) *Eſt hominum natura, quam ſequi debemus, maximè inimica crudelitas.* Cic. (*b*) Δεινὸν μὲν ὁ κλέπτης, ἀλλ' ἐχ ἧττω ὡς ὁ μοιχός. *Chryſ.* (*c*) One of the *Subſeſſores alienorum matrimoniorum*, as they are called in *Val. Max.* (*d*) *Palam apparet, adhuc ætate Divi Hieronymi adulterium capite ſolere puniri: nunc magnatum luſus eſt. Schol. in S. Hier.* (*e*) For hence follows impunity, &c. The bitter waters ceaſed, becauſe of the multitude of adulterers. *Miſhn.*

expreſs and ſacred that can poſſibly be made: he does that, which tends to ſubvert the peace of families, confounds relation, and is altogether inconſiſtent with the *order* and *tranquillity* of the world, and therefore with the laws of human nature: he does what no man in his wits could think *reaſonable*, or even *tolerable*, were he the perſon wrongd (*a*): briefly, he impudently treats a woman as *his own woman* (or *wife* (*b*), who is *not his*, but *another's*, contrary to *juſtice*, *truth* and *fact* (*c*). Nor is this ſimple injuſtice only, but injuſtice, for which *no reparation* can be made if the injured man thinks ſo; as he generally does (ſee ſect II. prop. I. obſ. 4.) injuſtice accompanied with the greateſt *cruelty*; ſo complicated, as ſcarce any other can be. The *husband* is for ever robbed of all that pleaſure and ſatisfaction, which ariſes from the wife's fidelity and affection to him (*d*); preſuming upon which he took her to be not only the partner of his bed, but the companion of his life, and ſharer in all his fortunes (*e*): and into the room of them ſucceed painful and deſtructive paſſions. The poor *woman* (*f*) herſelf, tho ſhe may be deluded (*g*), and not ſee at preſent her guilt, or the conſequences of it, uſually pays dear for her ſecurity and want of guard, the husband becoming cold (*h*) and averſe to her, and ſhe full of apprehenſions and fears (*i*), with a particular dread of his further reſentment. And their *affairs*, in this disjointed and diſtracted condition, are neglected; *innocent children* ſlighted, and left unprovided for, without ſo much as the comfort of any *certain* relations to pity them (*k*), &c.

The adulterer may not be permitted to extenuate his crime by ſuch impertinent *ſimile*'s and rakiſh talk, as are commonly uſed for that purpoſe (*l*). When any one

(*a*) *Is, qui nullius non uxorem concupiſcit,*-----*idem uxorem ſuam aſpici non vult: & fidei acerrimus exactor, eſt perfidus:* & mendacia *perſequitur, ipſe perjurus.* Sen. (*b*) His wife τὴν ἑαυτῆ γυναῖκα. (*c*) What a monſter in nature muſt he be, who, as if it was meritorious to dare to act againſt all theſe, (to uſe *Seneca*'s words again) *ſatis juſtam cauſam putat amandi, quod aliena eſt* [*uxor*]? (*d*) Οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶτ' ἐνεστιν ἰσασεῖν, ὡς τὸ σῶμα μόνον διαφθείρηται τῆς μοιχευομένης γυναικὸς, ἀλλ' ἡ δεῖ ταλη-θὲς εἰπεῖν, ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸ τῦ σώματος ἐις ἀλλοτρίωσιν ἐθίζεται, διδασκομένη πάντα τρόπον ἀποστρέφεσθαι ἢ μισεῖν τὸ ἄνδρα. ᾧ ἧττον ἂν ἦν δεινὸν, ἐι τὸ μῖσος ἐπεδείκνυτο ἐμφανὲς, κτλ. *Ph. Jud.* (*e*) Marriage is κοινωνία παντὸς τῦ βίυ, ------ οἰκειοτέρα ᾧ μείζων τῶν ἄλλων [κοινωνιῶν]. *Iſocr.* (*f*) Ἀπαλὸν ζῶον. *S. Baſ.* (*g*) Ἔπεισας, ἐξέθωψας, ſays the penitent woman in *Soph. ap. Plut.* (*h*) Ψυχρὸν παραλήλισμα-----Γυνὴ κακὴ ξύνευνος. *Soph.* (*i*) *Quid enim ſalvi eſt mulieri, amiſſa pudicitia?* Livy. (*k*) Οἱ μηδὲν ἠδικηκότες ἄθλιοι παῖδες μηδ' ὑπὲρῳ γένες προσειμηθῆναι δυνάμενοι, μή τε τῦ γήμαντος, μή τε τῷ τῦ μοιχῦ. *Ph. J.* (*l*) Such as *Ariſtippus* uſes to *Diogenes*, *ap. Athen.* Ἆρα γε μή τι σοι ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι Διογενὲς οἰκίαν οἰκεῖν, ἐν ᾗ πρότερον ᾤκησαν ἄλλοι; ἀ δ' ἔφη. τί δ' ναῦν, ἐν ᾗ πόλλοι πεπλεύκασιν; ἀδὲ τῦτο ἔφη. ἔπως--------. Senſeleſs ſtuff. Nor is that of the adulterous woman in *Prov.* 5. better: where the way of a man with a maid is placed with the way of an eagle in the air, of a ſerpent upon a rock, and of a ſhip in the ſea, which makes no trace in it, that may be known another time; and therefore ſhe wipeth her mouth juſt out of the bed, and then thinks, after that ſhe may ſay, I have done no wickedneſs. See *Zab. venaqi.*

wrongs

wrongs another of his property, he wrongs him of *what it is to him*, the proprietor: and the value muſt be ſet according to what *he* eſteems it to be, not what the injurer, who perhaps has no taſte of virtuous pleaſures, may think it to be. (See p. 33. obſ. 3, 4.) Nor may theſe thefts be excuſed from their ſecrecy. For 1. the injuſtice of the fact is the *ſame in itſelf*, whether known, or not. In either caſe *truth* is denied: and a *lie* is as much a lie, when it is *whiſperd*, as when it is *proclaimd* at the market-croſs. 2. It has been ſhewd (ſect. II.) that the rectitude of our actions and way to happineſs are coincident; and that ſuch acts, as are diſagreeable to *truth*, and wrong in themſelves, tend to make men ultimately *unhappy* (*a*). Things are ſo orderd and diſpoſed by the Author of nature, or ſuch a conſtitution of things flows from him, that it *muſt* be ſo. And ſince no *retreat* can be impervious to his eye, no *corner* ſo much out of the way, as not to be within his plan, no doubt there is to every wrong and *vitious* act a ſuitable degree of unhappineſs and *puniſhment* annext, which the criminal will be ſure to meet with *ſome time or other* (*b*). For his own ſake therefore he ought not to depend upon the darkneſs of the deed. But *laſtly*, it can hardly be, but that it muſt be *diſcoverd* (*c*). People generally *riſe* in vice, grow impudent and vain and careleſs, and diſcover themſelves (*d*): the opportunities contrived for it muſt be liable to *obſervation*: ſome *confidents* muſt be truſted, who may betray the ſecret, and upon any little diſtaſte probably *will* do it: and beſide, *love* is quick of apprehenſion (*e*).

It will be eaſily perceived from what has been ſaid, that if to *murder*, *rob*, &c. are unjuſt and crimes of a heinous nature, all thoſe things which have any *tendency* toward them, or *affinity* with them, or any way *countenance* them, muſt be in their degree criminal (*f*): becauſe they are of the ſame complexion with that which they tend to, tho not of the ſame growth, nor matured into the groſs act, or perhaps do not operate ſo preſently, apparently, or certainly. *Envy*, *malice*, and the like, are *conatus*'s toward the deſtruction or ruin of the perſon, who is the object of theſe unhappy paſſions. To *throw duſt* (*g*) upon a man's reputation by *innuendo*'s, ironies, *&c.* may not indeed ſully it all at once, as when *dirt* is thrown, or *groſs* calumnies; yet it infects the air, and may deſtroy it by a lingring poiſon. To *expoſe* another by the ſtrength of a jeſting talent, or harder temper of face, is to wound him, tho it

(*a*) *Nemo malus felix: minimè corruptor, &c.* Juv. (*b*) Ἀναπόδρας⊙ γὰρ ὁ θεῖ⊙ νόμ⊙. *Plat.* (*c*) Καὶ γὰρ ἂν παραυτίκα κρύψῃς, ὕστερον ὀφθήσ. *Iſocr.* Μαρτυρήσουσιν------ἡ κλίνη ᾗ ὁ λύχν⊙ ὁ Μεγαπένθυς. *Luc.* (*d*) Ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀλαζονίσατον. *Plato.* (*e*) *Quid non ſentit amor?* Ov. (*f*) Ἀγαθὸν ἐ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μηδὲ ἐθέλειν. A *gnome* of *Democrates*. (*g*) The duſt of an evil tongue.

be in an *inviſible* place (*a*). Many *freedoms* and reputed civilities of barbarian extract, and eſpecially gallantries (*b*), that proceed not to conſummate wickedneſs, nor perhaps are intended to be carried ſo far, may yet divert peoples affections from their proper object, and debauch the mind (*c*). By *ſtories* or *inſinuations* to ſow the *ſeeds* of diſcord and quarrels between men is to murder, or hurt them, by another hand. Even for men to *intermeddle* in other peoples affairs, as buſy bodies and ἀλλοτριεπίσκοποι do, is to aſſume a province, which is *not* theirs; to concern themſelves with things, in which they are *not* concernd; to make that *public*, which in itſelf is *private*; and perhaps to rob the perſon, into whoſe buſineſs they intrude themſelves, of his *quiet*, if of nothing elſe. For indeed this intermeddling looks like ſetting up a pretence to ſomething further; like an unjuſt attack begun at a diſtance. All which declares what an enemy, and how irreconcilable to *truth*, this pragmatical humour is. And ſo on.

If theſe things are ſo, how guilty muſt they be, who are deſignedly the *promoters* or *inſtruments* of injuſtice and wickedneſs; ſuch as mercenary ſwearers, and falſe witneſſes; traders in ſcandal; ſolicitors in vice; they who intend by their *converſation* to relax mens principles too much, and (as it ſeems) prepare them for knavery, lewdneſs, or any flagitious enterprize .(*d*)

There are other crimes, ſuch as *infidelity* to friends or them who intruſt us with any thing, *ingratitude*, all kinds of wilful *perjury*, and the like, which might have been *mentiond* in the propoſition, being great inſtances of injuſtice; but becauſe they are *viſibly* ſuch, and their nature cannot be miſtaken, I compriſe them in the *et cæt.* there. Any one may ſee, that he, who acts *unfaithfully*, acts againſt his promiſes and ingagements, and therefore denies and ſins againſt *truth*; does what it can never be for the *good of the world* ſhould become an univerſal practice; does what he would not have *done to himſelf*; and *wrongs* the man, who depends upon him, of what he juſtly might expect. So the *ungrateful* man treats his benefactor as not being *what he is*, &c. And the *falſe-ſwearer* reſpects neither things, nor himſelf, nor the perſons affected, nor mankind in general, nor God himſelf as being *what they are*. All this is obvious (*e*).

(*a*) He that publickly ſhames the face of his neighbour, has no ſhare in the world which is to come. *Maim. & ſim. paſſ.* For, according to the *Jewiſh* doctors, he who does this breaks the ſixth commandment. *Abarb.* (*b*) See how chaſt the *Romans* were once. *Quo matronale decus verecundiæ munimento tutius eſſet, in jus vocanti matronam corpus ejus attingere non permiſerunt, ut inviolata manûs aliena tactu ſtola relinqueretur.* Val. M. And it is told of *P. Manius*, that *triſti exemplo præcepit* [*filia ſua*], *ut non ſolum virginitatem illibatam, ſed etiam oſcula ad virum ſincera perferret.* Id. (*c*) *Quanto autem præſtantior eſt animus corpore, tanto ſceleratiùs corrumpitur.* S. Auſt. (*d*) Οὗτοι ἐισιν οἱ λοιμοὶ οἱ τὸ ἰδιον κακὸν ἐπὶ πάντας ἄγειν φιλονεικοῦντες, κλ. *S. Baſ.* (*e*) *Omnes enim immemores beneficii oderunt.* Cic. And the ſame may be ſaid of the unfaithful, perjured, &c.

SECT.

SECT. VII. *Truths reſpecting particular* Societies *of Men, or* Governments.

I. MAN *is a ſocial creature: that is, a ſingle man, or family, cannot ſubſiſt, or not well, alone out of all Society.* More things are neceſſary *to ſuſtain* life, or at leaſt to make it in any degree pleaſant and deſirable, than it is poſſible for any *one* man to make and provide for himſelf merely by his own labor and ingenuity. Meat, and drink, and clothing, and houſe, and that frugal furniture which is abſolutely requiſite, with a little neceſſary phyſic, ſuppoſe *many* arts and trades, *many* heads, and *many* hands. If he could make a ſhift in time of *health* to live as a wild man under the protection of trees and rocks, feeding upon ſuch fruits, herbs, roots, and other things, as the earth ſhould afford, and happen to preſent to him; yet what could he do in *ſickneſs*, or *old age*, when he would not be able to ſtir out, or receive her beneficence.

If he ſhould take from the *other ſex* ſuch a help, as the common appetite might prompt him to ſeek, or he might happen to meet with in his walks; yet ſtill if the *hands* are doubled, the *wants* are doubled too: nay more, additional wants, and great ones, attending the *bearing* and *education* of *children*.

If we could ſuppoſe all theſe difficulties ſurmounted, and a family grown up, and doing what a *ſingle* family is capable of doing by it ſelf; ſupporting themſelves by gardening, a little agriculture, or a few cattle, which they have ſome how got, and tamed (tho even this would be hard for them to do, having no markets, where they might exchange the produce of their husbandry, or of their little flock, or herd for other things; no ſhops to repair to for tools; no ſervant, or laborer to aſſiſt; nor any public invention, of which they might ſerve themſelves in the preparation of their grain, dreſſing their meat, manufacturing their wool, and the like); yet ſtill it is only the *cortex* of the man, which is provided for: what muſt become of the interior part, the *minds* of theſe people? How would thoſe be fed, and improved (*a*)? *Arts* and *ſciences*, ſo much of them as is neceſſary to teach men the uſe of their faculties, and unfold their reaſon, are not the growth of ſingle families ſo imployd. And yet

(*a*) *Quid ergo, anima nullane habet alimenta propria? an ejus eſca ſcientia nobis videtur?* S. Auſt.

for

for men to lay out all their pains and time in procuring only what is proper to keep the blood and humors in *circulation*, without any further views, or any regard to the *nobler* part of themſelves, is utterly incongruous to the idea of a being formed for *rational* exerciſes.

If all the *exceptions* againſt this ſeparate way of living could be removed; yet as mankind increaſes, the *little plots*, which the ſeveral families poſſeſs, and cultivate, muſt be inlarged, or multiplied: by degrees they would find themſelves ſtraitend: and there would ſoon be a *colliſion* of intereſts, from whence diſputes and quarrels would enſue. Other things too might miniſter matter for theſe. And beſide all this, ſome men are *naturally* troubleſome, vitious, thieviſh, pugnacious, rabid; and theſe would always be diſturbing and flying upon the next to them: as others are ambitious, or covetous, and, if they happen to have any advantage or ſuperiority in power, would not fail to make themſelves yet greater or ſtronger by eating up their neighbours, till by repeated incroachments they might grow to be *formidable* (*a*).

Under ſo many *wants*, and ſuch *apprehenſions*, or *preſent dangers*, neceſſity would bring ſome families into terms of *friendſhip* with others for mutual comfort and defence: and this, as the reaſon of it increaſed, would become ſtronger, introduce ſtricter ingagements, and *at laſt* bring the people to mix and unite. And then the weak being glad to ſhelter themſelves under the protection and conduct of the more able, and ſo naturally giving way for theſe to aſcend, the ſeveral ſorts would at length *ſettle* into their places, according to their ſeveral weights and capacities with reſpect to the common concern. And thus ſome form of a *ſociety* muſt ariſe: men cannot ſubſiſt otherwiſe.

But if it was poſſible for a man to preſerve life by *himſelf*, or with his *petit* company about him: yet no body can deny, that it would be infinitely *better* for him, and them, to live in a ſociety, where men are ſerviceable to themſelves and their neighbours at the ſame time, by *exchanging* their money, or goods, for ſuch other things as they want more; where they are capable of doing *good offices* each for other in time of need; where they have the *protection* of laws, and a public ſecurity againſt cheats, robbers, aſſaſſines, and all enemies to property; where a common force or *army* is ready to interpoſe between them and foreign invaders; and where they may injoy thoſe *diſcoveries* which have been made in arts and learning, may improve their faculties by *converſation* and innocent conflicts of reaſon, and (to ſpeak out) may be made *men*.

(*a*) *Alter in alterius exitium levi compendio ducitur.* Sen.

If,

If, when we have the *privilege* of ſociety and laws, we can ſcarce preſerve our own, or be ſafe, what a woful condition ſhould we be in *without them*; expoſed to the inſults, rapines, and violence of unjuſt and mercileſs men, not having any *ſanctuary*, any thing to take refuge in? So again, if notwithſtanding the help of *friends* and thoſe about us, and ſuch conveniencies as may be had in cities and peopled places, we are forced to bear many pains and melancholy hours, how *irkſome* would life be, if in ſickneſs or other trouble there was no body to adminiſter either *remedy* or *conſolation*?

Laſtly, ſociety is what men generally *deſire*. And tho *much* company may be attended with much vanity, and occaſion many evils (*a*); yet it is certain, that abſolute and perpetual *ſolitude* has ſomething in it very irkſome and hidious (*b*). Thus the ſocial life is *natural* to man; or, what his nature and circumſtances require.

II. *The end of ſociety is the common welfare and good of the people aſſociated.* This is but the conſequence of what has been juſt ſaid. For becauſe men cannot ſubſiſt *well*, or not *ſo well*, ſeparately, therefore they unite into greater bodies: that is, the *end* of their uniting is their better ſubſiſtence; and by how much their manner of living becomes better, by ſo much the more effectually is this *end* anſwerd.

III. *A ſociety, into which men enter for this end, ſuppoſes ſome rules or laws, according to which they agree all to be governed, with a power of altering or adding to them, as occaſion ſhall require.* A number of men met together without any *rules*, by which they ſubmit to be governed, can be nothing but an *irregular* multitude. Every one being ſtill *ſui juris*, and left intirely to his own private choice, by whatever kind of judgment or paſſion or caprice that happens to be determind, they muſt needs *interfere* one with another: nor can ſuch a concourſe of people be any thing different from an indigeſted *chaos* of diſſenting parts, which by their *confuſed* motions would damnify, and deſtroy each other. This muſt be true, if men *differ* in the ſize of their underſtandings, in their manner of thinking, and the ſeveral turns their minds take from their education, way of living, and other circumſtances; if the greateſt part of them are under the direction of *bodily affections*; and if theſe *differ* as much as their ſhapes, their complexions, their conſtitutions do (*c*). Here then we find nothing but *confuſion* and *unhappineſs*.

(*a*) *Ariſtotle* ſays a good man would be neither ἄφιλος, nor πολύφιλος. This is juſt. Therefore *Seneca* ſeems to go a little too far, when he writes *Omnes amicos habere operoſum eſſe, ſatis eſſe inimicos non habere.* (*b*) Ζῶον συναγελαστικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. *S. Baſ.* (*c*) Man is, in *Greg. Naz.*'s words, τὸ πολυλογοπώτατον ἢ ζώων, ἢ ποικιλώτατον.

Such

Such a combination of men therefore, as may produce their *common good* and *happineſs*, muſt be ſuch a one as in the firſt place, may render them *compatible* one with another: which cannot be without *rules*, that may direct and adjuſt their ſeveral motions and carriages towards each other, bring them to ſome degree of *uniformity*, or at leaſt reſtrain ſuch *excurſions* and *enormities*, as would render their living together inconſiſtent.

Then, there muſt be ſome expreſs declarations and *ſcita* to *aſcertain properties* and titles to things by common conſent: that ſo, when any altercations or diſputes ſhall happen concerning them (as be ſure many muſt in a world ſo unreaſonable and prone to iniquity), the appeal may be made to their *own ſettlements*; and by the application of *a general undiſputed rule* to the *particular* caſe before them it may appear, on *which ſide* the obliquity lies, the controverſy may be *fairly* decided, and all mouths eternally ſtopped. And then again, that they may be protected and perſevere in this agreeable life, and the injoyment of their reſpective properties be *ſecured* to them, ſeveral things muſt be forecaſted by way of precaution again foreign *invaſions*; puniſhments muſt be appointed for *offences* committed amongſt themſelves, which being known may deter men from committing them, *&c.* Theſe rules, methods, and appointments of puniſhments, being intelligibly and honeſtly drawn up, agreed to, and publiſhd, are the *mutual* compacts (*a*) under which the ſociety is confederated, and the *laws* of it.

If then to have the members of a ſociety capable of ſubſiſting *together*, if to have their reſpective properties *aſcertaind*, if to be *ſafe* and *quiet* in the poſſeſſion of them be for the *general good* of the ſociety, and theſe things cannot be had without *laws*; then a ſociety, whoſe foundation and cement is the public good, muſt have ſuch *laws*, or be ſuppoſed at leaſt to deſign ſuch.

As to the making of any *further* laws, when the public intereſt and welfare require them, that is but repeating the *ſame power* in other inſtances, which they made uſe of before in making their firſt laws: and as to *altering* or *repealing*, it is certain the power of making and unmaking here are *equal*. Beſide, when men are incorporated and live together for their mutual good, this *end* is to be conſiderd at *one* time as much as at *another*; not only in their firſt conſtitution and ſettlement.

IV. *Theſe laws and determinations muſt be ſuch, as are not inconſiſtent with natural juſtice.* For 1. To ordain any thing that interferes with truth is the ſame as to ordain, that what is *true* ſhall be *falſe*; or *v. v.* (*b*). which is abſurd. 2. To pretend by a law to make that to be *juſt*, which before and in itſelf was *unjuſt*, is the ſame as to ordain that which interferes with truth: becauſe juſtice is founded in

(*a*) Πᾶς ἐστι νόμος-----πόλεως σωτήριον κοινὴ *Demoſth.* (*b*) Νόμος ἐστὶ τοῦ ὄντος ὕφεσις. *Stob. è Plat.*

truth

truth (as before), and every where the ſame (*a*). Therefore, 3. by a law to enact any thing which is *naturally* unjuſt is to enact that which is abſurd; that which by ſect. I. is morally evil; and that which is oppoſite to *thoſe laws*, by which it is manifeſtly the will of our Creator we ſhould be governed (*b*). And to enact what is thus evil muſt be *evil indeed*. *Laſtly*, to eſtabliſh injuſtice muſt be utterly *inconſiſtent* with the general good and happineſs of any ſociety; unleſs to be unjuſtly treated, pilled, and abuſed can be happineſs (*c*). And if ſo, it is utterly inconſiſtent with the *end* of ſociety; or, it is to deny that to be the end of it, which is the end of it.

V. *A ſociety limited by laws ſuppoſes magiſtrates, and a ſubordination of powers: that is, it ſuppoſes a government of ſome form or other.* Becauſe, where men are to act by rules or laws for the public weal, ſome muſt of neceſſity be appointed to *judge*, when thoſe laws are tranſgreſt, and how far; to *decide* doubtful caſes, and the like: there muſt be ſome armed with authority *to execute* thoſe judgments, and to *puniſh* offenders: there muſt be perſons choſen not only to puniſh and *prevent* public evils, but alſo to do many other things, which will be required in *advancement* of the public good; and then the power of making *new laws*, and abrogating or mending *old ones*, as experience may direct or the caſe at any time require, as alſo of providing preſently and legally for the ſafety of the public in time of *ſudden danger*, muſt be lodged ſomewhere.

If there are no *executors* of the laws, the laws cannot be executed; and if ſo, they are but a dead letter, and equal to *none*: and if the ſociety has none, it is indeed *no ſociety*, or not ſuch a one as is the ſubject of this propoſition. Guardians and executors of laws are therefore the *vitals* of a ſociety, without which there can be no *circulation* of juſtice in it, no care of it taken, nor can it continue. And ſince men can be but in one place at once, there muſt be *numbers* of theſe proportionable to the bigneſs and extent of it.

(*a*) Δίκαιον φύσει, ἀκίνητον, ἢ παγταχῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν· ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ ἢ ἐνθάδε ἢ ἐν Πέρσαις κάει. *Ariſt.* (*b*) Even the Heathens believed, that above all human κηρύγματα there were ἄγραπτα κἀσφαλῆ θείων νόμιμα, which mortals ought not to tranſgreſs: ἃ γάρ τι τῶν γε κἀχθὲς ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε ζῇ τάυτα. *Soph.* Nec ſi regnante Tarquinio nulla erat Romæ ſcripta lex de ſtupris, idcirco non contra-----legem ſempiternam Sex. Tarquinius vim Lucretiæ----attulit. Erat enim ratio profecta à rerum natura, & ad rectè faciendum impellens, & à delicto avocans; quæ non tum demùm incipit lex eſſe, cùm ſcripta eſt, ſed tum cùm orta eſt. Orta autem ſimul eſt cum mente divinâ. Cic. (*c*) Si tanta poteſtas eſt ſtultorum ſententiis atq; juſſis, ut eorum ſuffragiis rerum natura vertatur; cur non ſancient, ut, quæ mala perniciosaq; ſunt, habeantur pro bonis, ac ſalutaribus? aut cur, cum jus ex injuriâ lex facere poſſit, bonum eadem facere non poſſit ex malo? Cic.

And further, ſince the concerns of a whole ſociety, and ſuch things as may fall within the compaſs of a ſtatute book, are *various*, requiring ſeveral ſorts and ſizes of *abilities*, and lying one *above* another in nature; ſince not only private men want to be *inſpected*, but even magiſtrates and officers themſelves, who (tho they oft forget it) are ſtill *but men*; and ſince the whole ſociety is to be *one*, one compact body: I ſay, ſince the caſe is thus, there muſt be men to act in ſeveral elevations and qualities as well as *places*, of which the *inferior* ſort in their ſeveral quarters muſt act immediately under their reſpective *ſuperiors*; and ſo this claſs of ſuperiors in their ſeveral provinces under *others above them*; till at laſt the aſcent is terminated in ſome *head*, where the legiſlative power is depoſited, and from whence ſpirits and motion are communicated through the whole body. An *army* may as well be ſuppoſed to be well diſciplined, well provided, and well conducted without either *general* or *officers*, as a ſociety without *governors* and their *ſubalterns*, or (which is the ſame) without *ſome form* of government, to anſwer the end of its being.

VI. *A man may part with ſome of his natural rights, and put himſelf under the government of laws, and thoſe, who in their ſeveral ſtations are intruſted with the execution of them, in order to gain the protection of them, and the privileges of a regular ſociety.* Becauſe by this he doth but exchange one thing for another, which he reckons *equivalent*, or indeed *preferable* by much: and this he may do without acting againſt *any truth*. For the liberties and natural rights, which he exchanges, are *his own*, and therefore no other man's property is *denied* by this: nor is the nature of happineſs *denied* to be what it is, ſince it is happineſs which he *aims at* in doing this. On the contrary, he would rather offend againſt *truth*, and deny *happineſs* to be what it is, if he did not do it; eſpecially ſeeing, that here his *own* happineſs coincides with the *general* happineſs and more convenient being of the kingdom or commonwealth, where his *lot* falls, or his *choice* determins him to live.

If the queſtion ſhould be asked, *what* natural rights a man may part with, or *how far* he may part with them; the *general* anſwer, I think, may be this. Some things are *eſſential* to our being, and ſome it is *not in our power* to part with. As to the *reſt*, he may depart from them ſo far as it is conſiſtent with the *end*, for which he does this: not further, becauſe beyond that lies a contradiction. A man cannot *give away* the natural right and property he has in any thing, in order to *preſerve* or *retain* that property: but he may conſent to contribute *part* of his eſtate, in order to preſerve the *reſt*, when otherwiſe it might *all* be loſt; to take his *ſhare* of danger in defence of his country, rather than *certainly* periſh, be inſlaved, or ruind by the conqueſt or oppreſſion of it; and the like.

VII. *Men*

VII. *Men may become members of a ſociety (i. e. do what is mentiond in the foregoing propoſition) by giving their conſent, either explicitly, or implicitly.* That a man may ſubject himſelf to laws, we have ſeen. If he does this, he muſt do it either in *his own perſon*; or he muſt do it by ſome *proxy*, whom he ſubſtitutes in his room to agree to public laws; or his conſent muſt be *collected* only from the conformity of his carriage, his adhering to the ſociety, accepting the benefits of its conſtitution, and acquieſcing in the eſtabliſhd methods and what is done by virtue of them. By the *two firſt* ways he declares himſelf *explicitly*, and *directly*: nor can he after that behave himſelf as if he was no member of the ſociety, without acting as if he had *not done* what he *has done*. And this is the caſe not only of them, who have been concerned in the *firſt formation* of any government, but alſo of them, who have in the ſa'd manners (*a*) given their conſent to any *ſubſequent* acts, by which they ownd, confirmed, and came into what their anceſtors had done, or who have by *oaths* put themſelves under obligations to the public. By the *laſt* of the three ways mentiond a man's conſent is given indeed *implicitly*, and leſs directly; but yet it is given, and he becomes a party. For ſuppoſe him to be *born* in ſome certain kingdom or commonwealth, but never to have been *party* to any law, never to have taken any *oath* to the government, nor ever formally to have ingaged himſelf by any *other act*. In this caſe he cannot methinks but have ſome *love* and *ſympathy* for that place, which afforded him the firſt air he drew; ſome *gratitude* towards that conſtitution, which protected his parents, while they educated and provided for him; ſome *regard* to thoſe obligations, under which perhaps they have laid him, and with which limitations as it were they (or rather the Governor of the world by them) conveyd to him his very life.

If he *inherits* or takes any thing by the laws of the place, to which he has no indefeaſible right in nature, or which, if he had a natural right to it, he could not tell how to *get*, or *keep*, without the aid of laws and advantage of ſociety; then, when he takes this inheritance, or whatever it is, *with* it he takes and owns the *laws* which give it him.

Indeed ſince the *ſecurity* he has from the laws of the country in reſpect of his perſon, and rights, whatever they either are, or may happen to be hereafter, is the general *equivalent* for his *ſubmiſſion* to them, he cannot accept *that* without being obliged in equity to pay *this*.

(*a*) In perſon, or by proxy.

Nay, laſtly, his very *continuing* and *ſettling* in any place ſhews, that either he *likes* the conſtitution, or likes it *better* than any other, or at leaſt thinks it better in *his circumſtances* to conform to it than to ſeek any other: that is, he conſents to be comprehended in it (*a*).

VIII. *When a man is become a member of a ſociety, if he would behave himſelf according to truth, he ought to do theſe things*: viz. to conſider *property* as founded not only in *nature*, but alſo in *law*; and men's *titles* to what they have, as ſtrengthend by that, and even by his *own conceſſion* and *covenants*; and therefore *by ſo much the more* inviolable and ſacred: inſtead of taking ſuch meaſures to do himſelf right, when he is moleſted, or injured, as his own prudence might ſuggeſt in a ſtate of nature, to confine himſelf to *ſuch ways* as are with his own conſent markt out for him: and, in a word, to behave himſelf according to his *ſubordination* or place in the community, and to obſerve the laws of it. For it is containd in the *idea* of a law, that it is intended to be *obſerved:* and therefore he, who is a party to any laws, or profeſſes himſelf member of a ſociety formed upon laws, cannot willingly tranſgreſs thoſe laws without denying laws to be *what they are*, or himſelf to be what he is ſuppoſed or profeſſes himſelf *to be:* and indeed without contradicting all or moſt of thoſe *truths* containd in the foregoing propoſitions.

IX. *In reſpect of thoſe things, which the laws of the place take no cognizance of, or when if they do take cognizance of them, the benefit of thoſe laws cannot be had* (for ſo it may ſometimes happen. I ſay, in reſpect of ſuch things), *he who is a member of a ſociety in other reſpects retains his natural liberty, is ſtill as it were in a ſtate of nature, and muſt endeavour to act according to truth and his beſt prudence.* For in the *former* caſe there is nothing to limit him, by the ſuppoſition, but truth and nature. And in the *other* it is the ſame as if there was nothing; ſince in *effect* there is no law, where no *effect* or benefit from it is to be had. As, for example, if a man ſhould be attacked by thieves or murderers, and has no *opportunity* or *power* to call the proper magiſtrate or officer to his aſſiſtance.

There is a *third* caſe, which perhaps may demand admiſſion here: and that is, when laws are plainly contrary to *truth* and *natural juſtice*. For tho they may paſs the uſual forms, and be ſtyled laws; yet, ſince no ſuch law can abrogate that law of nature and reaſon, to which the Author of our being hath ſubjected us, or make falſhood

(*a*) *Plato* ſays, when any man has ſeen our form of government, &c. and remains under it, ἤδη φαμὲν τοῦτον ὁμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν.

to

to be truth; and two inconſiſtent laws cannot *both* oblige, or ſubſiſt together; one of them muſt give way: and it is eaſy to diſcern, *which* ought to do it (*a*).

There remains one *truth* more to be annexed here, which may be contradicted by the practices and pretences of Enthuſiaſts (*b*).

X. *The ſocieties intended in this ſection, ſuch as kingdoms and commonwealths, may defend themſelves againſt other nations*: or, *war may lawfully be waged in defence and for the ſecurity of a ſociety, its members and territories, or for reparation of injuries.* For if *one* man may in a ſtate of nature have a right to defend himſelf, (ſee ſect. VI. prop. VII.), *two* may, or *three*, and ſo on. Nay, perhaps two may have a double right, three a threefold right, *&c.* At leaſt if the *right* be not *greater*, the *concern* is greater: and there will be more reaſon, that two, or three, or more ſhould be *ſaved*, than one only; and therefore that two, or three, or more ſhould *defend* themſelves, than that one ſhould. And if this may be done by men in a ſtate of nature, it may be done by them when confederated among themſelves: becauſe with reſpect to other nations they are ſtill in *that ſtate*. I mean, ſo far as they have not limited themſelves by *leagues* and *alliances*.

Beſide, if a man may defend himſelf, he may defend himſelf by what *methods* he thinks moſt *proper*, provided he treſpaſſes againſt no truth; and therefore, by getting the *aid* and aſſiſtance of others. Now when *war* is levied in defence of the public and the people in general, the thing may be conſiderd as if *every particular man* was defending himſelf with the aſſiſtance of *all the reſt*, and ſo be turned into the ſame caſe with that of a *ſingle man*.

In truth the condition of a nation ſeems to be much the ſame with that of a *ſingle perſon* when there is no law, or no benefit of law, to be had: and what one man may do to another in *that poſition*, may be done by one nation or politic body with reſpect to another: and perhaps by this rule, regard being had to what has been deliverd in ſect. VI. the *juſtice* of foreign wars may be not untruly eſtimated.

Mutual defence is one of the great ends of ſociety, if not the greateſt, and in a particular and eminent manner involves in it defence againſt *foreign enemies*. And whoever ſignalizes himſelf, when there is occaſion for his ſervice, merits the grateful acknowledgements and celebrations of his country-men: ſo far at leaſt as he acts generouſly and with a *public ſpirit*, and not in purſuance *only* of *private views*.

(*a*) *Illud ſtultiſſimum, exiſtimare omnia juſta eſſe, quæ ſcita ſint in populorum inſtitutis, aut legibus-----Si populorum juſſis, ſi principum decretis, ſi ſententiis judicum, jura conſtituerentur, jus eſſet latrocinari: jus, adulterare: jus, teſtamenta falſa ſupponere, ſi hæc ſuffragiis aut ſcitis multitudinis probarentur.* Cic. (*b*) Manicheans of old, and ſome moderns.

As

As to thoſe *wars*, which are undertaken by men out of ambition (*a*), merely to inlarge empire, or to ſhew the world, how terrible they are, how many men they are able to ſlay, how many ſlaves to make (*b*), how many families to drive from their peaceful habitations, and, in ſhort, how much miſchief and miſery they are able to bring upon mankind; theſe are founded upon falſe notions of glory: *imbelliſhd* indeed by ſervile wits and miſplaced eloquence, but *condemned* by all true philoſophy and religion.

SECT. VIII. *Truths concerning* Families *and* Relations.

THIS ſection ſhall begin as relation itſelf does, with *marriage*.

I. *The end of marriage is the propagation of mankind, and joint happineſs of the couple intermarrying, taken together; or the latter by itſelf* (*c*). The difference of the *ſexes*, with the ſtrong inclination they have each to the injoyment of the other (*d*), is plainly ordaind by the author of nature for the *continuance* of the *ſpecies*, which without that muſt be ſoon extinguiſhd. And tho people, when they marry, may have many times not ſo much the increaſe of their family in their deſign or wiſhes, as the *gratification* of an importunate appetite; yet ſince nature excites the appetite, and that tends to this end, *nature* (or rather its great Author) may be ſaid to make this an end of the marriage, tho the *bridegroom* and *bride* themſelves do not.

(*a*) Like thoſe particularly of *J. Cæſar*: of whom it is reported, that, *animadverſâ apud Herculis templum magni Alexandri imagine, ingemuit; quaſi pertæſus ignaviam ſuam, quod nihil dum à ſe memorabile actum eſſet in ætate quâ jam Alexander orbem terrarum ſubegiſſet.* Suet. (*b*) Some go to war ὥσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν ἢ κυνηγεσίαν ἀνθρώπων. *Plut.* Not out of neceſſity, and in order to peace; which is the true end of war. Πολεμοῦμεν, ἵνα εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. Ariſt. *Ita bellum ſuſcipiatur, ut nihil aliud quàm pax quæſita videatur.* Cic. (*c*) Οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὁ μόνον τὴν τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν εἰς τὸν βίον, κτλ. *Ariſt.* (*d*) Ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν. ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικον. Id. Ὡς γὰρ ἡ μαγνῆτις λίθος -------- πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τὸ σίδηρον ἕλκει· ἕτω τὸ τῦ θήλεος σῶμα -----, τὸ τῦ ἄῤῥενος σῶμα πρὸς τὴν μίξιν ἕλκει. *S. Baſ.*

And

And then as to that other thing, which either accompanies the aforesaid end of marriage, or is (as in many cases it can only be) the end *itself* (*a*), the joint happiness of the *conjuges*, no body can be supposed to marry in order and on set purpose to make him or herself *unhappy*: no nor without a presumption of being *more happy*. For without an apprehension of some *degree* of happiness to accrue, or what presents itself to the imagination as such, and is taken for such, what can induce people to alter their condition? Something there must be, by which (however things prove upon trial) they *think* to better it. And indeed if their *circumstances* are such, as may inable them to maintain a family, and provide for children, without difficulties and an over-burden of cares, and if they in *good earnest* resolve to behave themselves as they ought, and *reciprocally* to be helpful and loving each to other, *much* comfort and happiness (*b*) may justly be expected from this intimate union (*c*), the interchange of affections, and a conspiration of all their counsels and measures (*d*), the qualities and abilities of the one sex being fitted and as it were tallying to the wants of the other. For to pass over in silence those joys, which are truest when most conceald (*e*), many things there are, which may be useful, perhaps necessary to the *man*, and yet require the delicater hand or nicer management and genius of the *woman* (*f*): and so, *vicissim*,

(*a*) That sure is a hard law in *Plato*, which injoins ἀπίχεσθαι ἀρᾴρας θηλείας πάσης, ἐὰν ἡ μὴ ξυλλοιτο ἂν σοι φύεσθαι τὸ σπαρέν. That mentiond in *S. Hhared.* says otherwise: *Debitum conjugale, imò gravidâ uxore, Maritus persoluat.* Many opinions are taken up upon slight reasons. When *Ocellus Lucanus* says, Αὐλὰς τὰς δυνάμεις, ἢ τὰ ἔργατα, ἢ τὰς ὁρίξεις τὰς πρὸς τὴν μίξιν ὑπὸ θεῶν δεδομένας ἀνθρώποις, οὐχ ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα δεδόσθη συμβέβηκεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διαμονῆς τῷ γένει, how doth he know that they were not given for both these ends, in a regular way? And so when *Clemens Alex.* shews his zeal against τὰς ἀκάρπους σπορὰς, τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἰξύας ὁμιλίαν, &c. adding, ψιλὴ γὰρ ἡδονὴ, κἂν ἐν γάμῳ παρακληθῇ, παράνομός ἐστι, κλ. he does this because ὁ Μωσῆς ἀπάγει τῶν ἰξύων τὰς ἄνδρας; and then cites a text to prove this, which is nothing to the purpose, nor I believe any where to be found. Οὐκ οἶδα ἃ λαγὼν, οὐδὲ τὴν ὕαιναν. (*Quem interpretem secutus sit Clemens nescio. Gent. Herv.*) Certainly the *Jews* understand their lawgiver otherwise. See how that *Debitum Conjugale* mentiond in the law is explaind by *Maim. in hilk. isb.* Nor are the suffrages of Christians wanting, *Deus, cum cæteras animantes, suscepto fœtu, maribus repugnare voluisset, solam omnium mulierem patientem viri fecit; ------ ne feminis repugnantibus, libida cogeret viros aliud appetere,* &c. that is, that the man and wife might be kept inseparably together. *Lact.* (*b*) Καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἴσως δοκεῖ, ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. *Arist. Sicut viri convenire solent cum uxoribus; sicut eos inter se decet convenire. Resp. hhokm.* (*c*) Ἔρως------καθάπερ ἑνὸς ζῴου δύο τὰ τμήματα----εἰς ταυτὸν ἁρμόσαντα. *Ph. J.* (*d*) True love is to be found in marriage, or no where. Πόρνη γὰρ φιλεῖν οὐκ ἐπίσταται, ἀλλ' ἐπιζυλίνει μόνον. S. Chrys. *Nuditate detectâ cor tegit*; a homely, but true saying of a *jewish* commentator. (*e*) *Quod facere turpe non est modò occultè; id dicere obscœnum est.* Cic. (*f*) Ἐὰν γὰρ ἡ γυναῖκα ἢ ἐπιεικὴς, οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς κοινωνίας παραμυθίαν παρίξει τῷ ἀνδρὶ, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι πολλὴν τῆς ἑαυτῆς χρείαν ἐπιδείξεται, κλ. S. Chrys.

the

the *woman* cannot but want many things, which require the more robuſt and active powers or greater capacity of the *man* (*a*). Thus, in lower life, whilſt the wheel, the needle, &c. imploy *her*, the plough or ſome trade perhaps demands the muſcles and hardineſs of *him*: and, more generally, if *ſhe* inſpects domeſtic affairs, and takes care, that every thing be provided regularly, ſpent frugally, and injoyd with neatneſs and advantage, *he* is buſied in that profeſſion, or the overſight and improvement of that eſtate, which muſt ſuſtain the charge of all this; he preſides, and directs in matters of greater moment; preſerves order in the family by a gentle and prudent government, &c. (*b*).

As then I founded the *greater ſocieties* of men upon the mutual convenience, which attends their living regularly together: ſo may I found this *leſs*, but *ſtricter alliance* between the man and the woman in their *joint-happineſs* (*c*). Nature has a *further aim*, the preſervation of the kind.

II. *That marriages are made by ſome ſolemn contract, vow, or oath (and theſe perhaps attended with ſome pledge, or nuptial rites (d), by which the parties mutually ingage to live together*

(*a*) Διῄρηται τὰ ἔργα, ᾗ ἔστιν ἴτερα ἀνδρὸς, ᾗ γυναικὸς· ἴτερα γὰρ αὐτῶν ἑκατέροις ἐν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια. *Ariſt.* (*b*) See the converſation between *Iſchomachus* and his wife in *Xenophon*. (*c*) Tho *Plato* (like *moſt* of the old *Greeks* and *Romans*) among many *very* fine things hath now and then ſome that are weak, and even abſurd; yet I cannot think, that by his *community* of women he meant any thing like that, which is ſaid, *ap. Athen.* to have been practiſed παρὰ Τυῤῥηνοῖς ἐκτόπως τρυφήσασιν; or that his thought could be ſo groſs, as *Lactantius* repreſents it: *Scilicet ut ad eandem mulierem multi viri, tanquam canes, confluerent.* For thus, property being taken out of the world, a great part of virtue is extinguiſhd, and all induſtry and improvements are at an end. And beſide that, many of the moſt ſubſtantial *comforts* and innocent delights of this life are deſtroyd at once. *Si omnes omnium fuerint & mariti, & patres, & uxores, & liberi, quæ iſta confuſio generis humani eſt?------Quis aut vir mulierem, aut mulier virum diliget, niſi habitaverint ſemper unâ? niſi devota mens, & ſervata invicem fides individuam fecerit caritatem,* &c. *Id.* However it muſt be confeſt, that *Plato* has advanced more than was conſiſtent with his own gravity, or with *nature*. The beſt excuſe to be made for him, that I know of, is that in *Athenæus*, Ἔοικεν ὁ Πλάτων μὴ τοῖς οὖσιν ἀνθρώποις γράφαι τοὺς νόμους, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτῷ διαπλατομένοις: or perhaps to ſay, that he was ſo intent upon ſtrengthening and defending his common-wealth, that he forgot, if men muſt live after his manner, there would be little in it *worth defending*. After all, his meaning to me is not perfectly clear. (*d*) Every one knows how marriages were made among the *Romans*, *confarreatione*, *coemptioni*, *uſu*: of which ways the two former were attended with many ceremonies: and the *legitima tabellæ* or at leaſt conſent of friends (which could not be given without ſome ſolemnity) preceded all, *auſpicia* were uſually taken, public notaries and witneſſes aſſiſted, &c. Among the *Greeks* men and women were eſpouſed by mutual promiſes of fidelity: beſide which there were witneſſes, and dotal writings

προικῶα

together in love, and to be faithful, aſſiſting and the like, each to other, in all circumſtances of health and fortune, till death parts them (*a*), I take for granted. For all nations have ſome *form* or other upon theſe occaſions: and even private contracts cannot be made without ſome *words* in which they are containd, nor perhaps without ſome kind of ſignificant, tho private, *ceremony* between the lovers; which loſe nothing of force with reſpect to them by their being both *parties* and *witneſſes* themſelves. Something muſt paſs between them, that is *declarative* of their intentions, *expreſſes* their vows, and binds them each to the other. There is no coming together after the manner of *man* and *wife* upon any other foot.

III. *That intimate union, by which the* conjuges *become poſſeſt each of the other's perſon* (*b*), *the mixture of their fortunes* (*c*), *and the joint-relation they have to their children* (*d*), *all ſtrengthen the bonds and obligations of matrimony.* By every *act* done in purſuance of a covenant, ſuch as the matrimonial is, that covenant is ownd, ratified, and as it were made *de integro*, and repeted.

Poſſeſſion is certainly more than nothing. When this therefore is added to a former title, the title muſt needs be corroborated.

When *two* perſons throw their *all* into one ſtock as *joint-traders for life*, neither of them can conſiſtently with truth and honeſty take his ſhare out and be gone (*i. e.* diſſolve the partnerſhip) without the *concurrence* of the other; and ſometimes it may not be eaſie, perhaps poſſible, to do it at all. Each therefore is even by this bound, and becomes obnoxious to the other.

And as to the preſent caſe, if the marriage be not altogether unfruitful, ſince *both the parents* are immediately related to the *ſame child*, that child is the *medium* of a fixt, unalterable relation between them. For, being both of the *ſame blood* with the

(προικῶα); at the wedding, ſacrifices to *Diana* and other deities, and the γαμήλιοι ὠχαὶ; and after that, perhaps the being ſhut up together, eating the κυδώνιον, a formal λύσις ζώνης, ὥς. The eſpouſals of the *Jews* have been performed by mony, contract, and by conſummation: the ceremonies accompanying which may be ſeen particularly in *Shulhh. ar.* with the additions of *R. Mo. Iſerles* (*Eben. ez.*) And (to paſs by other nations) the form of ſolemnization of matrimony, and the manner, in which perſons married give their *troth* each to other among us, are extant in our public offices: where they may be ſeen by ſuch, as ſeem to have forgot what they are. (*a*) *Connubio ſtabili.* Virg. (*b*) And they ſhall be one fleſh, becauſe that is the way that male, and female are joined in nearneſs of fleſh.---becauſe it is an undivided thing. In *Reſh. hhokm.* (*c*) Αὔτη χρημάτων κοινωνία πρόσφορα μάλιστα τοῖς γαμοῦσιν ἰς μίαν οὐσίαν πάντα καταχωσάμενοις ἢ ἀναμίξασι, μὴ τὸ μέρος ἴδιον, ἢ τὸ μέρος ἀλλότριον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἴδιον ἡγεῖσθαι, ἢ μηδὲν ἀλλότριον. *Plut.* (*d*) Σύνδεσμος τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι. *Ariſt.*

child (*a*),

child (*a*), they themſelves come to be of the *ſame blood*: and ſo that *relation*, which at firſt was only moral and legal, becomes *natural*; a relation in nature, which can never ceaſe, or be diſannulled. It follows now that,

IV. *Marrying, when there is little or no proſpect of true happineſs from the match* (*b*), *and eſpecially if there are plain preſages of unhappineſs; after marriage adultery; all kinds of infidelity; transferring that affection, which even under the decays of nature ought to preſerve its vigor, and never to degenerate (at worſt) but into a friendſhip of a ſuperior kind* (*c*), *and the like, are all wrong* (*d*) Becauſe the *firſt* of theſe is belying ones own ſenſe of things, and has an air of *diſtraction*; or however it is to act as if that was the *leaſt* and moſt trifling of all tranſactions in life, which is certainly one of the *greateſt* and moſt delicate. And to offend in any of the *other* ways is to behave, as if the *end* of marriage was not what it is; as if no ſuch *league* had been made between the perſons married, as has been made, *actually*, and *ſolemnly*, and is ſtill *ſubſiſting* between them; as if they were not *poſſeſt* each of the other; their *fortunes* not intervowen; nor their children ſo equally related to them, as they are; and therefore the misbehaviour, being repugnant to *truth*, is a ſin againſt it, and the mighty Patron of it.

If the moſt *expreſs* and *ſolemn* contracts, upon which perſons, when they marry, do ſo far depend, as in confidence of their being *religiouſly* obſerved to *alter quite* their condition, begin a new *thred* of life, and *riſque* all their fortune and happineſs: I ſay, if ſuch ſacred compacts as *theſe* are allowd to be broken, there is an end of all *faith*; the obligation of *oaths* (not more binding than *marriage vows*) ceaſes; no *juſtice* can be adminiſterd; and then what a *direful influence* muſt this have upon the affairs of mankind upon *that*, and other accounts (*e*)?

(*a*) In reſpect of which that in *Plutarch* particularly is true. Ἡ φύσις μίγνυσι διὰ τῶν σωμάτων ἡμᾶς, ἵν' ἐξ ἑκατέρων μέρος λαβοῦσα, ἡ τυγχάσασα, κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδῶ τὸ γενόμενον (*b*) *Socrates ab adoleſcentulo quodam conſultus, uxorem duceret, an ſe omni matrimonio abſtineret, reſpondit, Utrum eorum feciſſet, acturum panitentiam. Hic te, inquit, ſolitudo, hic orbitas, hic generis interitus, hic hæres alienus excipiet: illic perpetua ſolicitudo, contextus querelarum,---incertus liberorum eventus.* Val. M. (*c*) Χρόνῳ σωμάτων ἐπιτυχόντες πάθει διαθέντας τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ φιλεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιτεινόμενον. *Plut.* (*d*) It is viſible that *polygamy, pellicate, &c.* muſt be included here. They are not only inconſiſtent with our forms and the very *letter* of the marriage-contract, but with the *eſſence* of marriage, which lies in ſuch a union and love as can *only* be between *two*. *Ariſtotle* doth not allow there can be even perfect *friendſhip* between more than two: much leſs therefore, perfect *love*. Πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον, κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα. Eth. Ἔστι γὰρ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός. *Ibid.* (*e*) *Facunda culpa ſæcula nuptias Primùm inquinavere, & genus, & domos. Hôc fonte derivata clades In patriam, populumque fluxit.* Hor.

Allowance

Allowance, by ſect. IV. ought to be made for inabilities, and involuntary failings. A perſon's age, health, eſtate, or other circumſtances may be ſuch, and without any *fault*, that he or ſhe cannot do what they would; or perhaps inſtead of that one of them may come to want the *pity* and *aſſiſtance* of the other. In this caſe (which requires the philoſophy and ſubmiſſion proper in afflictions) it is the duty of the one not only to *bear with*, but alſo to *comfort*, and do what may be done for the other. This is part of the happineſs *propoſed*, which conſiſts not only in *poſitive* pleaſures, but alſo in *leſſening* pains and wants; whilſt the pair have each in the other a refuge at hand.

N. I have deſignedly forborn to mention that *authority* of a husband over his wife, which is uſually given to him, not only by private writers, but even by laws; becauſe I think it has been carried *much too high*. I would have them live ſo far upon the *level*, as (according to my conſtant leſſon) to be governd *both* by reaſon (*a*). If the *man*'s reaſon be ſtronger, or his knowledge and experience greater (as it is commonly ſuppoſed to be), the *woman* will be obliged upon that ſcore to pay a *deference*, and ſubmit to him (*b*).

Having now conſiderd the *man* and *woman* between themſelves, I proceed in the order of nature to conſider them as *parents*; and to ſee (in a few propoſitions following) how things will be carried between *them* and their *children*, as alſo between other *relations*, coming at firſt from the ſame bed, if *truth* and *matters of fact* (to be named, where the argument ſhall call for them) are not denied.

V. *Parents ought to educate their children, take the beſt care of them they can, endeavour to provide for them, and be always ready to aſſiſt them.* Becauſe otherwiſe they do not carry themſelves towards their children as being what they are, *children* and *theirs*: they do not do what they would deſire to have done to *themſelves*, were they again to paſs through that feeble and tender ſtate; or perhaps what has been done to them (*c*): and beſide, they tranſgreſs the *law* eſtabliſhed by nature for the preſervation of the race, which, as things are, could not without a parental care and affection be continued; a *law*, which is in force among all the other tribes of *animals*, ſo far as there is occaſion for it.

(*a*) Κρατεῖν δεῖ ἡ ἀνδρα τ' γυναικὸς οὐχ ὡς δεσπότην κτήματος, ἀλλ' ὡς ψυχὴ σώματος, συμπαθοῦντα ἢ συμπεφυκότα τῇ εὐνοίᾳ. *Plut.* (A ſentence, which deſerves to be written in letters of gold.) Ὅπου σὺ Γάϊος, ἐγὼ Γαΐα·---ὅπου σὺ κύριος ἢ οἰκοδεσπότης, ἢ ἐγὼ κυρία ἢ οἰκοδέσποινα. *Ap. eund.* (*b*) Κατὰ φυσιν οἱ ἄρρενες ἀ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ἄρχουσι. *Plato. ap. Diog. L.* (*c*) Πολυπλήθρως δέ σοι γήρας Λείψω. πατρὸς γὰρ ταῦτ' ἰδιξάμην πάρα. Eur. *Parentes vos alendo nepotum nutriendorum debito (ſi quis eſt pudor) alligaverunt.* V. M.

Not to do what is here required, is not *barely* to act againſt truth and nature, not *only* ſuch an omiſſion as is mentiond in ſect. I. pr. V. but a henious inſtance of *cruelty*. If any one can deny this, let him better conſider the caſe of an *infant*, neglected, helpleſs, and having nothing ſo much as to ſolicite for him, but his *cries* and (that which will do but little in this world) his *innocence*: let him think what it would be to turn a *child*, tho a little grown up, out of doors, deſtitute of every thing, not knowing whither to fly (*a*), or what to do; and whether it is not the ſame thing, if he be left to be turned out by any body elſe *hereafter*, or (in general) to conflict with *want* and *miſery*: let him reflect a while upon the circumſtances of poor *orphans* (*b*) left unprovided for, to be abuſed by every body (*c*), &c. and then let him ſay, whether it is *poſſible* for a *parent* to be ſo void of bowels, as not to be moved with theſe conſiderations; or what *epithet* he deſerves, if he is not. If any of them who have been thus abandond, and turned adrift, have *done well*, thoſe inſtances ought to be placed among *particular providences*: as when a veſſel at ſea, without pilot or ſailor, happens to be blown into the port.

Not only the *care*, but the *early care* of parents is required, leſt death ſhould prevent them; death, which skips none, and ſurpriſes many. Not to remember this, and act accordingly, is in practice to contradict one of the moſt *certain* and *obvious* of all truths.

VI. *In order to the good of children, their education*, &c. *there muſt be ſome authority over them lodged by nature in the parents*: I mean, *the nature of the caſe is ſuch as neceſſarily requires there ſhould be in the parents an authority over their children in order to their good. At firſt* if ſome body did not nurſe, feed, clothe, and take care of *children*, the interval between their firſt and laſt breath would be very ſhort. They, on whom it is incumbent to do this, are undoubtedly their *parents*: to do this is their duty by the foregoing propoſition. But then they muſt do it as they can, and according to their judgment: and this is plainly an act of *authority*, to order and diſpoſe of another according to one's judgment, tho it be done according to the *beſt* of one's judgment.

As the child *grows up*, the caſe is ſtill the ſame in ſome degree or other, till he arrives at the age reckond *mature*; and very often longer. He is become able perhaps to walk by himſelf, but what *path* to chooſe he knows not; cannot diſtinguiſh

(*a*) *Incertus quò fata ferant, ubi ſiſtere detur*, in the poet's language. (*b*) See that moving deſcription of the Ἠμαϛ ὀρφανικὸν in *Homer*. (*c*) I could never think of that *Arabic* ſaying without pity, *The barber* [Alchagam] *learns to ſhave upon the head of an* orphan.

his

his ſafety and his danger, his advantages and diſadvantages; nor, in general, good and evil: he muſt be warned, and directed, and watched ſtill by his *parents*, or ſome body intruſted by them, or elſe it might have been poſſibly much better for him to have *expired* under the midwife's hands, and prevented the effects of his own ignorance.

When he not only runs about, but begins to fancy himſelf capable of *governing himſelf*, by how much the *more* he thinks himſelf capable, by ſo much the *leſs* capable may he be, and the *more* may he want to be governed. The avenues of *ſenſe* are opend: but the *judgment*, and *intellectual faculties* are not ripend but with time and much practice. The *world* is not eaſily known by perſons of *adult* abilities; and, when they become tolerably acquainted with it, yet they find things in it ſo intricate, dubious, difficult, that it is many times hard for *them* to reſolve, what meaſures are fitteſt to be taken: but they, who are not, or but lately, paſt their *nuts*, cannot be ſuppoſed to have any extent of knowledge, or to be, if they are left to themſelves, any thing elſe but a *prey* to the villain who firſt ſeizes upon them. Inſtead of judgment and experience we find *commonly* in youth ſuch things as are remoteſt from them, childiſh appetites, irregular paſſions, peeviſh and obſtinate humors; which require to be *ſubdued*, and taught to give way to wholſom counſels. Young people are not only obnoxious to their *own* humors and follies, but alſo to thoſe of their *companions*. They are apt to hearken to them, and to imitate one anothers miſconduct: and thus folly mingles with folly, and increaſes prodigiouſly. The judgment therefore of the *parents* muſt ſtill interpoſe, and preſide, and *guide* through all theſe *ſtages* of infancy, childhood, and youth; *according to their power* improving the minds of their children, breaking the ſtrength of their inordinate paſſions, cultivating rude nature, forming their manners, and ſhewing them the way which they *ought* to be found in.

Theſe things are ſo in *fact*, and a *parent* cannot acquit himſelf of the duty impoſed upon him in the preceding propoſition, if he acts ſo as to *deny* them: but then he cannot act ſo as *not to deny* them (*that is*, ſo as to ſubdue the paſſions of the child, break his ſtomach, and cauſe him to mind his inſtructions) without ſome ſort of *diſcipline*, and a proper ſeverity; at leaſt very rarely (*a*).

To all this, and much more that might be urged, muſt be ſuperadded, that the *fortunes* of children, and their manner of ſetting out in the world depending (com-

(*a*) For certainly, when it can be, *Hoc patrium eſt, potius conſuefacere filium ſua ſponte recte facere, quàm alieno metu.* Ter.

monly)

monly) upon their parents, their parents muſt upon this account be their *directors*, and *govern* their affairs.

N. 1. It appears now from the premiſſes, that even *parents* have not properly a *dominion* over their *children*, ſuch as is intended ſect. VI. prop. V. from which this *parental authority* is a very different thing. This only reſpects the *good* of the children, and reaches not beyond the means, which the *parents*, acting according to the beſt of their skill, abilities, and opportunities, find moſt conducive to *that end:* but dominion only reſpects the *will* of the lord, and is of the ſame extent with his *pleaſure*. Parents may not, by virtue of this authority, command their children to do any thing which is in itſelf *evil:* and if they do, the children ought not to obey (*a*). Nor may they do *any thing*, what they pleaſe, to them. They may not kill, or maim, or expoſe them (*b*): and when they come to be *men* or *women*, and are poſſeſt of eſtates, which either their parents (or any body elſe) have given them, or they have acquired by their own labor, management, or frugality, they have the ſame *properties* in theſe with reſpect to *their parents*, which they have with reſpect to *other people:* the parents have no more right to take them by force from them, than the reſt of the world have (*c*). So that what occurs in the place abovementiond remains *firm*, notwithſtanding any thing that may be objected from the caſe of *parents* and *children*. And moreover,

N. 2. They, who found *monarchy* in paternal authority, gain little advantage with reſpect to *deſpotic* or *abſolute* power. A power to be exerciſed for the *good* of ſubjects (like that of parents for the *good* of their children), and that principally, where they are *incapable* of helping themſelves, can only be derived from hence. The *father* of his country cannot by this way of reaſoning be demonſtrated to be the *abſolute lord* (*d*) of the lives, and limbs, and fortunes of the people, to diſpoſe of them as he *pleaſes* (*e*). The authority of parents goes *not this length*. Beſide, if a parent hath an authority over his children, it doth not follow, that the *eldeſt ſon* ſhould have the ſame authority, be it what it will, over his *brothers* and *ſiſters:* and much leſs, that

(*a*) Πρὸς πᾶσα μόνον ἀπειθοῦντες γονεῦσι, πρὸς ἃ ἢ αὐτοὶ τοῖς θείοις νόμοις ἐ πείθονται. *Hierocl.* (*b*) The barbarity of the thing at length put a ſtop to the cuſtom of expoſing children: but it had been practiſed by the *Perſians*, *Greeks*, &c. *Romulus*'s law only reſtraind it, but did not aboliſh it. For it injoind his citizens only, ἅπασαν, ἄρρενα γενέαν ἐκτρέφειν, ἢ θυγατέρων τὰς πρωτογόνους· ἀποκτιννύναι ἢ μηδὲν ἦ γενομένων ἡλίκων πεῖσαι, πλὴν εἴ τι γένοιτο παιδίον ἀνάπηρον, κλ. *Dion. Hal.* And beſide, ἅπασαν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἰδίαν ἐξουσίαν πατρὶ καθ' ὑῶ, ἢ παρὰ πάντα ἀ τῶ βίω χρόνον, κλ. *Id.* (*c*) Ῥωμαίοις οὐδὲν ἴδιον ἐστι κτῆμα ζώντων ἔτι ἦ πατέρων, ἀλλὰ ἢ τὰ χρήματα ἢ τὰ σώματα ἦ παίδων ἔ, τι ἂν ἕλωνται διατιθέναι τοῖς παιρράσιν ἀποδίδοται. *Id.* These are inſtances of ſuch laws, as ſhould not be, by prop. IV. ſect. vii. (*d*) *Roma patrem patriæ Ciceronem* libera *dixit.* Juv. (*e*) Ὡς ἀγαθῶν ἡμῶν ἄρξον. *Arr.*

the

the *heir* of the *firſt parent* ſhould in ſucceeding generations have it over all the *collaterals*. The very *relation* between them ſoon vaniſhes, and comes at laſt in effect to nothing, and this *notion* with it.

VII. *As parents are obliged to educate their children*, &c. *ſo children ought to conſider parents as the immediate authors* (*authors under the firſt and great Cauſe* (*a*) *of their being*; *or to ſpeak more properly*, *of their being born*. I know children are apt (not very reſpectfully, or prudently) to ſay; that their parents did not beget them for *their ſakes*, whom they could not know before they were born, but for their *own pleaſure*. But they, who make this a pretext for their diſobedience, or diſregard, have not ſufficiently thought, what *pain*, what *trouble*, how many *frights* and *cares* (*b*), what *charges*, and what *ſelf-denials* parents undergo upon the ſcore of their children: and that all theſe, if parents only ruſhd into pleaſure, and conſulted *nothing elſe*, might eaſily be avoided, by *neglecting* them and their welfare (*c*). For as to thoſe parents, who do this, let them ſpeak for themſelves: I ſhall not be *their* advocate.

VIII. *A great ſubmiſſion and many grateful acknowledgments*, *much reſpect and piety are due from children to their parents*. For if there is an authority in parents (as before) this muſt be anſwerd by a proportionable ſubmiſſion on the other ſide: ſince an authority, to which *no obedience* is due, is equal to *no authority*.

If the thought of *annihilation* be generally diſagreeable, as it ſeems to be, then merely to be conſcious of *exiſtence* muſt have in it ſomething deſirable (*d*). And if ſo, our parents muſt be conſiderd as the authors, or at leaſt the inſtruments of *that good* to us whatever it is: which cannot be done, unleſs they are treated with *diſtinction* and great regard, being to us what no other *is*, or *ever can be*.

God, as the firſt cauſe of all beings, is often ſtyled metaphorically, or in a large ſenſe of the word, the *Father* of the world, or of us all: and, if we behave our ſelves towards Him as *being ſuch*, we cannot (according to ſect. V. pr. XIX. n. 3.) but *adore* Him. Something *analogous*, tho in a low degree, to the caſe between God and his offspring there ſeems to be in the caſe between *parents* and *their children*. If that requires *divine worſhip*, this will demand a great *reſpect* and reverence (*e*). Nor can I

(*a*) Thoſe three things concur in the forming of them. *S. Hhared.* (*b*) *Vtinam oculos in pectora poſſent Inſerere, & patrias intus deprendere curas.* (*c*) I confeſs, in *Seneca*'s words, *minimum eſſe beneficium patris matriſq; concubitum, niſi acceſſerint alia, quæ proſequerentur hoc initium muneris, & aliis officiis hoc ratum facerent.* (*d*) Τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ τ ἡδ.ιον καθ' αὐτό· φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἡ ζωή. *Ariſt.* The ſenſe of life (of being alive) ſeems to be ſomething more than what *Seneca* calls *muſcarum ac vermium bonum.* (*e*) Οἱ πάλαιοι τ Ῥωμάιων νόμοι, κλ.----------οἱ ᾧ ἴτι παλαιότεροι τοσέτον τὲς γονέας ἰσίφθησαν, ὡς ᾧ θεὸς αὐτὲς ὁρμῆσαι καλεῖν. *Simpl.*

believe,

believe, that a child, who doth not honor his *parent*, can have any diſpoſition to worſhip his *Creator* (*a*). That precept of *honoring parents*, to be found in almoſt all nations and religions, ſeems to proceed from ſome ſuch ſentiment: for in books we meet with it commonly following, or rather adhering to that of *worſhipping the Deity* (*b*). In laying children under this obligation they have all conſpired, tho ſcarce in any thing elſe (*c*).

The *admonitions* of a parent muſt be of the greateſt weight with his children, if they do but remember, that he hath lived longer, and had repeted occaſions to *conſider things*, and *obſerve events*; hath *cooler paſſions*, as he advances in years, and ſees things more *truly* as they are; is able in a manner to predict what *they themſelves* will deſire to have done, when they ſhall arrive at his age; may upon theſe accounts, ordinarily, be preſumed to be a more competent *judge* than themſelves (*d*); and laſtly from his relation to them muſt be more *ſincerely* inclined to tell them truth, than *any other perſon* in the world can be ſuppoſed to be (*e*). I ſay, if young people reflect well upon theſe things, they cannot in *prudence*, or even kindneſs to *themſelves*, but pay the utmoſt *deference* to the advertiſements and directions of a parent.

And to conclude, if *parents* want the aſſiſtance of their *children*, eſpecially in the declenſion of their age, and when they verge towards a *helpleſs* condition again, they cannot deny or withhold it, but they muſt at the ſame time *deny* to requite the care and tenderneſs ſhew'd by their parents towards them in *their* helpleſs and dangerous years; that is, without being *ungrateful*; and that is, without being *unjuſt*, if there be injuſtice in ingratitude (*f*). Nor (which is more ſtill) can they do this without

(*a*) *Meo judicio pietas fundamentum eſt omnium virtutum.* Cic. The ſame author reckons among thoſe things, that are laudable, *parentem vereri ut* deum (*neq; enim multo ſecus parens liberis*). Οὐδ' ἂν πάλιν μείζων ἐπίδειξις ἀθέου γένοιτ' ἂν περὶ γονεῖς ὀλιγωρίας ἢ πλημμελείας. *Plut.* (*b*) Πάντες---- λέγουσι ἢ ᾄδουσιν, ὡς γονεῦσι τιμὴν μετὰ θεὸς πρώτην ἢ μεγίστην ἣ τε φύσις, ὅ, τε τὴν φύσιν σώζων νόμος ἀπέδωκε. *Plut.* Γονέων τιμὴν μετὰ τὴν πρὸς Θεὸν δευτέραν ἔταξε [Μωυσῆς]. *Joſ.* We indeed uſually divide the two tables of *Moſes*'s law ſo, that the fifth (*Honor thy father and thy mother*) falls in the ſecond: but the *Jews* themſelves divide them otherwiſe; ὡς εἶναι τ' μὲν μιᾶς γραφῆς τὴν ἀρχὴν Θεὸν ἢ πατέρα--------τῷ παντὸς, τὸ ᾗ τέλος γονεῖς, κλ. *Ph. Jud.* Agreeably to this, *Joſephus* ſays that οἱ δέκα λόγοι were written upon two tables, ἀνὰ πέντε μὲν εἰς ἑκατέραν [πλάκα]: *Abarbanel* reckons the fifth commandment the laſt of the firſt table; and ſays their *Hhakamim* do ſo: and in the offices of that nation theſe commandments are mentiond as written in the tables of the *Pentateuch.* (*c*) *Prima igitur & optima rerum natura pietatis eſt magiſtra*, &c. *Val. M.* (*d*) Ὁ χρόνος, τἄλλα πάντ' ἀφαιρῶν, τῷ γήρᾳ προσίθησι τὴν ἐπιστήμην. *Plut.* (*e*) Ask thy father, and he will tell thee: *ask thy* father, *and he will ſhew* thee Deut. (*f*) Δόξειε δ' ἂν προφὴς γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ' ἀπαγορεῦον, ὡς ὀφειλόντας, ἢ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι.----ἢ τιμὴν ἣ καθάπερ θεοῖς. *Ariſt.* Among the ancients θρεπτήρια and τροφῖα reckond *due*. And he, who doth not requite to his parents the good that they have done him, is called κατ' ἐξοχὴν by way of emphaſis, the wicked in *S. Hhar.*

denying

denying what they may *in their turn* require of *their* children (*a*). In effect they do thus by their actions *deny* that to have been, which has been; and thoſe things to be poſſible, which may be hereafter.

Not only *bodily* infirmities of parents, but ſuch decays of their *minds* as may happen, ought to pitied, their little haſtineſſes and miſtakes diſſembled, and their defects ſupplied, *decently* (*b*).

IX. That στοργὴ *or affection on both ſides, which naturally and regularly is in parents towards their children, and* viciſſim (*c*), *ought to be obſerved and followd, when there is no reaſon to the contrary.*

We have ſeen before, and it is evident from the terms, that *ſenſe* ought to govern, when *reaſon* does not interpoſe; *i. e.* when there is *no reaſon*, why it ſhould not. If then this στοργὴ or mutual affection be an inward *ſenſe* of the caſe between parents and children, which, without much thinking upon it, is *felt* by them, and fits upon their natures (*d*), it may be compriſed in prop. XIV, and XV. of ſect. III. But whether it is or not, the ſame may be ſaid (which muſt be repeted in another place) of every *affection*, paſſion, inclination in general. For when there is no reaſon, why we ſhould not comply with them, their own very ſollicitation, and the agreeableneſs we apprehend to be in complying, are *preponderating* arguments. This muſt be true, if *ſomething* is more than *nothing*; or that ought to be granted, which there is no reaſon to deny. So that if this στοργὴ be only taken as a kind of *attraction*, or *tendence*, in the mere matter of parents and children; yet ſtill this phyſical motion or *ſympathy* ought not to be over-ruled, if there be not a *good* reaſon for it. On the contrary, it ought to be taken as a *ſuggeſtion* of nature, which ſhould always be regarded, when it is not ſuperſeded by ſomething *ſuperior*; that is, by *reaſon*. But further, here reaſon doth not only not gainſay, by it's ſilence conſent, and ſo barely leave its right of commanding to this bodily inclination; but it comes in ſtrongly to *abet* and *inforce* it, as deſignd for a reaſonable end: and therefore not to act *according to* it is not to act according to reaſon, and to deny that to be which is.

X. *The ſame is true of that affection, which other relations naturally have, in ſome proportion or other, each for other.* To this they ought to accommodate themſelves

(*a*) Τοιῦτον γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς, οἷος ἂν ἑυρεῖο πρὸς σεαυτὸν γενόμϛ τοὺς σεαυτῦ παῖδας. *Iſocr.* (*b*) That epithet *pius* (*pius Æneas*) ſhines in *Virgil.* (*c*) *Poſita eſt inter parentes ac liberos honeſta contentio, dederint majora, an receperint.* Sen. (*d*) That is, methinks, a moving deſcription in *S. Baſil* (Περὶ πλεονεξ.) of a conflict which a poor man had within himſelf, when he had *no other* way left to preſerve life but by ſelling one of his children.

where reaſon does not prohibit. The proof of this aſſertion is much the ſame with that of the foregoing *mut. mutand.*

The foundation of all *natural relation* is laid in *marriage* (*a*). For the *husband* and *wife* having ſolemnly attachd themſelves each to other, having the ſame children, intereſts, &c. become ſo intimately related as to be reckond united, *one fleſh*, and in the laws of nations many times *one perſon* (*b*). Certainly they are ſuch with reſpect to their poſterity, who proceed from them jointly (*c*). The *children* of this couple are related between themſelves by the mediation of the parents. For every one of them being of the *ſame blood* with their common parents, they are all of the ſame blood (truly *conſanguinei*), the relations, which they reſpectively bear to their parents, meeting there as in their *center*. This is the *neareſt* relation that can be (*d*), *next* to thoſe of man and wife, parents and their children, who are *immediately* related by contract or rather continuity of blood, if one may ſpeak ſo. The relation between the children of theſe children grows more *remote* and *dilute*, and in time wears out. For at every *remove* the natural tincture or ſympathy may be ſuppoſed to be weakend; if for no other reaſon, yet for this. Every *remove* takes off *half* the common blood derived from the grand parents. For let C be the ſon of A and B, D the ſon of C, E of D, F of E: and let the *relation* of C to A and B be as 1: then the *relation* of D to A and B will be but $\frac{1}{2}$; becauſe C is but one of the parents of D, and ſo the *relation* of D to A and B is but the half of that, which C bears to them. By proceeding after the ſame manner it will be found, that the *relation* of E to A and B is $\frac{1}{4}$ (or half of the half), of F $\frac{1}{8}$: and ſo on. So that the *relation*, which *deſcendents* in a direct line have by blood to their grand parents, *decreaſing* thus in geometrical proportion (*e*), the *relation* between them of *collateral* lines, which paſſes and is made out through the grand parents, muſt ſoon be reduced to an inconſiderable matter (*f*).

(*a*) *Prima ſocietas in ipſo conjugio eſt: proxima in liberis, &c.* Cic. (*b*) *Mulier conjuncta viro conceſſit in* unum. *Luer.* She is reckond as one body. *Ap. R. Elaz. Azq. & paſſ.* (*c*) Ἡ συγγενικὴ [φιλία] φαίνεται πολυειδὴς εἶναι, ἐν ἀρχαῖς πᾶσα ἐκ τ' πατρικὴ· οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα, ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα· τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονέας, ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα ------ Ἀδελφοὶ δὲ ἀλλήλους [φιλοῦσι] τῷ ἐκ τ' αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι.-------- Ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς---- τῷ ἀπὸ τ' αὐτῶν εἶναι· γίγνονται δ' οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι, οἱ δ' ἀλλοτριώτεροι, κτλ. *Ariſt.* (*d*) *Quam copioſa ſuavitatis illa recordatio eſt! In eodem domicilio, antequam naſcerer, habitavi: in iiſdem incunabulis infantia tempora peregi: eoſdem appellavi parentes, &c. Val. M.* (*e*) There is no name for any deſcendent, who is more than *trinepos.* (*f*) It becomes ἀμυδρά. *Andr. Rhod.*

If

If then we ſuppoſe this *affection* or ſympathy, when it is permitted to act regularly and according to nature, no reaſon intervening to exalt or abate it, to operate with a ſtrength nearly *proportionable* to the quantity or degree of relation, computed as above, we may perhaps nearly diſcern the *degrees* of that obligation, which perſons related lie under, to aſſiſt each other, *from this motive.*

But there are many circumſtances and incidents in life capable of affecting this *obligation*, and altering the degrees of it. A man muſt weigh the wants of *himſelf* and his own *family* againſt thoſe of his *relations:* he muſt conſider their *ſex*, their *age*, their *abilities* and opportunities, how *capable* they are of good offices, how they will take them, what uſe they will make of them, and the like. He, who deſigns to act agreeably to *truth*, may find many ſuch things demanding his regard; ſome juſtly moving him to compaſſion, others holding back his hand. But however this may in general be taken as evident, that *next after* our parents and own offſpring (*a*) nature directs us to be helpful, in the *firſt place* to brothers and ſiſters, and *then* to other relations according to their reſpective diſtances in the genealogy of the family, *preferably* to all foreigners (*b*). And tho our power, or opportunities of helping them in their wants ſhould be but little; yet we ought to preſerve our affection towards them, and a diſpoſition to ſerve them, as far as we *honeſtly* and *prudently* can, and whenever the proper opportunity ſhall preſent itſelf. This *nature* and *truth* require.

SECT. IX. *Truths belonging to a* Private Man, *and reſpecting (directly) only himſelf.*

I. *EVery man knows (or may (c) know) beſt, what his own faculties, and perſonal circumſtances are, and conſequently what powers he has of acting, and governing himſelf.* Becauſe he only of all mankind has the *internal* knowledge of himſelf, and what he is; and has the only opportunity by *reflexion* and *experiments* of himſelf to find, what his own abilities, paſſions, &c. truly are (*d*).

(*a*) *Man* and *Wife* are ſuppoſed to be *one*, and therefore have no place here; any more than a *man* and his *ſelf.* Otherwiſe, conſiderd diſtinctly, the one of them ought always to be the *firſt* care of the other. (*b*) Μηδὲ καιγυήτῳ ἶσον ποιεῖσθαι ἑταῖρον. *Heſ.* (*c*) For many I acknowledge there are, who ſeem to be without reflexion, and almoſt thought. Τὶς ἀγνοεῖ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν; πολλοί, τάχα δὲ πάντες πλὴν ὀλίγων. S. Chryſ. (*d*) *Nec ſe quaſiverit extra.*

II. *He, that well examins himself, I suppose, will find these things to be true* (a).

1. That there are *some* things *common* to him not only *with sensitive animals* and *vegetables*, but also with *inanimate matter*: as, that his body is subject to the general law of gravitation; that its parts are capable of being separated, or dislocated; and that therefore he is in danger from falls, and all impressions of violence.

2. That there are *other* things *common* to him with *vegetables* and *sensitive animals*: as, that he comes from a seed (such the original *animalculum* may be taken to be); grows, and is preserved by proper matter, taken in and distributed through a set of vessels; ripens, flourishes, withers, decays, dies; is subject to diseases, may be hurt, or killed; and therefore wants, as they do, nourishment, a proper habitation, protection from injuries, and the like.

3. That he has *other* properties *common* only to *him* and the *sensitive tribe*: as, that he receives by his senses the notice of many external objects and things; perceives many affections of his body: finds pleasure from some, and pain from others; and has certain powers of moving himself, and acting: *that is*, he is not only obnoxious to hurts, diseases, and the causes of death, but also *feels* them (b); is not only capable of nourishment, and many other provisions made for him, but also *injoys* them; and, beside, may *contribute* much himself to either his injoyments, or his sufferings.

4. That *beside these* he has *other faculties*, which he doth not apprehend to be either in the inert mass of matter, or in vegetables, or even in the sensitive kind, at least in any considerable degree; by the help of which he investigates truth, or probability, and judges, whether things are agreeable to them, or not, after the manner set down in sect. III. or, in a word, that he is *animal rationale* (c).

5. That he is conscious of a *liberty* in himself to act or not to act; and that therefore he is *such a being* as is described sect. I. prop. I. a being, whose acts may be *morally good or evil*. Further,

6. That there are in him many *inclinations* and *aversions*; from whence flow such affections, as desire, hope, joy, hatred, fear, sorrow, pity, anger, &c. all which *prompt* him to act this or that way.

7. That he is sensible of *great defects* and *limitations* in the use of his rational faculties, and powers of action, upon many occasions: as also, that his passions are many

(a) *Illud γνῶθι σεαυτόν noli putare ad arrogantiam minuendam solùm esse dictum, verùm etiam ut bona nostra norimus.* Cic. ad. Qu. fr. (b) *Non sentire mala sua non est hominis: & non ferre non est viri.* Sen. who condescends here to be something like other men. As also, when he says, *Alia sunt, quæ sapientem feriunt, etiamsi non pervertunt; ut* dolor capitis, *&c. Hac non nego sentire sapientem,* &c. (c) *Qui se ipse norit, aliquid sentiet se habere divinum, &c.* Cic.

times

times apt to take wrong turns, to grow warm, irregular, exceſſive(*a*). In other words, that he is in many reſpects fallible, and infirm (*b*).

Laſtly, that he deſires *to be happy*: as every thing muſt, which underſtands what is meant by that word.

III. *If he doth find theſe things to be ſo, then if he will act as he ought to do (that is, agreeably to* truth *and* fact*) he muſt do ſuch things as theſe.*

1. *He muſt ſubject his ſenſual inclinations, his bodily paſſions, and the motions of all his members* (c) *to reaſon; and try every thing by it.* For in the *climax* ſet down he cannot but obſerve, that as the principle of *vegetation* is ſomething above the *inertia* of mere matter, and *ſenſe* ſomething above that again; ſo *reaſon* muſt be ſomething above all theſe (*d*): or, that his uppermoſt faculty is *reaſon* (*e*). And from hence it follows, that he is one of thoſe beings mentiond ſect. III, prop. XI. and that the great *law* impoſed upon him is to be *governed by reaſon*.

Any man may prove this to himſelf by experiment, if he pleaſes. Becauſe he cannot (at leaſt without great violence to his nature) do any thing, if he has a greater reaſon againſt the doing of it than for it. When men do err againſt reaſon, it is either becauſe they do not (perhaps *will not*) advert, and uſe their reaſon, or *not enough*; or becauſe their faculties are defective.

And further, by ſect. III. prop. X. to endeavour to act according to right reaſon, and to endeavour to act according to truth are in effect the ſame thing. We cannot do the one, but we muſt do the other. We cannot act according to truth, or ſo as *not to deny any truth*, and that is we cannot act *right*, unleſs we endeavour to act according to *right reaſon*, and are led by it.

Therefore not to ſubject one's *ſenſitive* inclinations and paſſions to *reaſon* is to *deny* either that he is rational, or that reaſon is the ſupreme and ruling faculty in his nature:

(*a*) A nature of clay, and evil concupiſcence are (in *Jewiſh* language) leaven in the lump. (*b*) Ἀμήχανον ἴσως ἀνθρωπόν τινα ἀναμάρτητον. Chryſ. (*c*) The author of *S. Hhared.* reckons *eight*, the right uſe of which comprehends all practical religion: the heart, the eye, the mouth, noſe, ear, hand, foot, and *membrum virile*. The duties reſpecting theſe are the ſubject of that (not bad) book. (*d*) *Cùm tria ſint hæc, eſſe, vivere, intelligere: & lapis eſt, & pecus vivit, nec tamen lapidem puto vivere, aut pecus intelligere; qui autem intelligit, cum & eſſe & vivere certiſſimum eſt. Quare non dubito id excellentius judicare, cui omnia tria inſunt, quàm id cui duo vel unum deſit. S. Aug.* Thus reaſon ſets man above the other viſible orders of beings, *&c.* (*e*) *Præſtò eſt domina omnium & regina ratio------. Hæc ut imperet illi parti animi, quæ obedire debet, id videndum eſt viro.* Cic.

and

and that is to deſert mankind (*a*), and to *deny* himſelf to be what he knows himſelf by experience and in his own conſcience upon examination to be, and what he would be very angry if any body ſhould ſay he was not.

If a *beaſt* could be ſuppoſed to give up his *ſenſe* and activity; neglect the calls of hunger, and thoſe appetites by which he (according to *his nature*) is to be guided; and refuſing to uſe the powers, with which he is indued in order to get his food and preſerve his life, lie ſtill in ſome place, and expect to grow, and be fed like a *plant*; this would be much the ſame caſe, only not ſo bad, as when a *man* cancels his *reaſon*, and as it were ſtrives to metamorphize himſelf into a *brute*. And yet this he does, who purſues only ſenſual objects, and leaves himſelf to the impulſes of appetite and paſſion. For as in that caſe the *brute* neglects the law of *his nature*, and affects that of the order *below* him: ſo doth the *man* diſobey the law of *his nature*, and put himſelf under that of the *lower* animals; to whom he thus makes a defection (*b*).

If this be ſo, how wretchedly do they violate the *order* of nature, and tranſgreſs againſt *truth*, who not only *reject* the conduct of reaſon to follow ſenſe and paſſion, but even make it *ſubſervient* to them (*c*); who uſe it only in finding out means to effect their wicked ends (*d*), but never apply it to the conſideration of thoſe ends, or the nature of thoſe means, whether they are juſt or unjuſt, *right* or *wrong*? This is not only to *deviate* from the path of nature, but to *invert* it, and to become ſomething *more* than brutiſh; *brutes with reaſon*, which muſt be the moſt enormous and worſt of all brutes. When the *brute* is governed by ſenſe and bodily appetites, he obſerves *his proper* rule; when a *man* is governed after that manner in defiance of reaſon, he *violates* his: but when he makes his rational powers to *ſerve* the brutiſh part, to aſſiſt and promote it, he heightens and increaſes the *brutality*, inlarges its field, makes it to act with greater force and effect (*e*), and becomes a *monſter*.

His duty then, who is *conſcious* to himſelf of the truth of thoſe things recounted under the foregoing propoſition, is to examine every thing carefully, and to ſee that he

(*a*) *Abjecto homine in ſylveſtre animal tranſire.* Sen. Ἐν τῷ λογικῷ τίνων χαριζόμεθα; τῶν θηρίων.---- Ὅρα ὅπως μή τι πῶς αὐς θηρίον ποιήσῃς. Arr. *Pertinet ad omnem officii queſtionem ſemper in promptu habere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquiſque belluis antecedat.* Cic. (*b*) Πρὸς τὴν τῶν θηρίων ἀλογίαν ἐκτρεπόν. Chryſ. (*c*) A thing too often done. *Quæ enim libido, quæ avaritia, quod facinus aut ſuſcipitur niſi conſilio capto, aut ſine---ratione perficitur?* Cotta, ap. Cic. (*d*) Something like him, who, in *Chryſoſtom*'s words, διὰ τῶν ὀδόντων κλαδεύει τὸ συκάμινον. (*e*) This makes *Cotta* ſay, *Satius fuit nullam omnino nobis à diis immortalibus datam eſſe rationem, quàm tanta cum pernicie datam:* with other bitter things. Tho an anſwer to this may be given in the words which follow afterward: *A deo tantùm rationem habemus, ſi modò habemus: bonam autem rationem, aut non bonam, a nobis.*

complies

complies with no *corporeal* inclination at the expenſe of his *reaſon*; but that all his *affections*, concupiſcible and iraſcible, be directed towards ſuch *objects*, and in ſuch *meaſure*, *time*, and *place*, as that allows. Every word (*a*) and action, every motion and ſtep in life ſhould be conducted by *reaſon* (*b*). This is the foundation and indeed the ſum of all virtue.

2. *He muſt take care not to bring upon himſelf* (*c*) *want*, *diſeaſes*, *trouble*; *but*, *on the contrary*, *endeavour to prevent them*, *and to provide for his own comfortable ſubſiſtence*, *as far as he can without contradicting any truth* (*d*) (that is, without denying *matters of fact*, and ſuch propoſitions, as have been already or will in the ſequel here be ſhewn to be true, concerning *God*, *property*, the ſuperiority of *reaſon*, &c.) To explain this limitation: if a man ſhould conſider himſelf as obnoxious to hunger, weather, injuries, diſeaſes, *and the reſt*; then, to ſupply his wants, take what is his neighbour's property; and at laſt, in vindication of himſelf, ſay, "I act according to what I am, a being obnoxi-"ous to hunger, *&c.* and to act otherwiſe would be incompliance with truth"; this would not be ſufficient to juſtify him. The *grand rule* requires, that what he does, ſhould *interfere with no truth*: but what he does interferes with *ſeveral*. For by taking that, which (by the ſuppoſition) is *his neighbour*'s, he acts as if it was not *his*

(*a*) This certainly excludes all that talk, which familiarizes vice, takes off thoſe reſtraints which men have from nature or a modeſt education, and is ſo utterly deſtructive of virtue, that *Ariſtotle* baniſhes it out of the commonwealth. Ὅλως μὲν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὥσπερ ἀλλό τι, δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν· ἐκ τῶ γὸ ἰυχερῶς λέγειν ὀτιοῦν τῶν ἀισχρῶν ἡ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς. (*b*) True, manly reaſon: which is a very different thing from that ſuperſtitious preciſeneſs, which carries things too far, As v. g. when the *Jews*, not contented to condemn fooliſh talking, or the folly of the mouth, and every where to expreſs a thing ſtrongly forbidden, go ſo far as to comprehend under it, Even that verbal converſation, which a man has with his wife, and to add, He that uttereth an idle word, is as if one emitted ſeed. There are other ſayings of this kind to be ſeen, many of them, among thoſe, which R. *El. de Vidas* has collected: as that particularly, the very act of looking ought not to be idle or frivolous. What *Ælian* reports of *Anaxagoras* and others, belongs to this place; *that they never laughed*: with many other unneceſſary auſterities, which might be added. (*c*) If I dont look to my ſelf, who will? *P. Ab* (*d*) Προσδεῖται τούτων [τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν] ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος· κύριαι δ' ἰσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς ἐυδαιμονίας. *Ariſt.* They, who treated the *body* and things pertaining to it as merely ἀλλότρια, diſtinguiſhing between τὰ ἡμέτερα and τὰ τῦ σώματος, making theſe latter to be ἄλλα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, and leaving the body as it were to itſelf (αὐτὸ [σωμάτιον] μεριμνάτως· --εἰ τι πάσχει): they, I ſay, might injoy their own philoſophy; but they would ſcarce gain many proſelytes now a days, or ever perſuade people, that the pains they feel are not *theirs*, or *any thing to them*. Nor indeed do I much credit many ſtories that are told of ſome old philoſophers: as that of *Anaxarchus*, when he was put to a moſt cruel death by *Nicocreon*; οὐ φροντίσαντα τῆς τιμωρίας, εἰπεῖν------ Πτίσατ τὸν Ἀναξάρχυ θύλακον, Ἀνάξαρχον δὶ ὐ πλήτλεις. See *Epict. Arr. Simpl. Anton. D. Laert.* and others.

neighbour's,

neighbour's, but *his own*, and therefore plainly contradicts *fact*, and those *truths* in sect. VI, VII. respecting property: when by not taking what is his neighbour's, he would contradict no truth, he would not deny himself to be obnoxious to hunger, &c. There are other ways of furnishing himself with conveniences, or at least necessaries, which are consistent with *property* and all *truth*: and he can only be said to deny himself to be *what he is* by *omitting* to provide against his wants, when he omits to provide against them by some of *those ways*; and then indeed he doth do it. (See p. 28. Ans. to Obj. 3).

So again, when a man does any thing to *avoid* present suffering or dangers *contrary* to the express dictates of reason, and the tenor of forementiond truths, he acts as a *sensitive* being only, not as being what he *really is*, *sensitivo-rationalis*. But when there is no good argument *against* his doing of any thing, that may gain him protection from evil, or a better condition of life, he may then look upon himself *only* as a being, who needs that which is to be obtaind by doing it: and *in that case*, if he should not do it, he would be false to himself, and deny the circumstances of his own nature.

Certainly when a man may *without transgressing* the limits prescribed consult his own safety, support, and reasonable satisfaction, and does not; and especially when he takes a counter-course, and exposes himself (*a*), he forgets *many* of the foregoing *truths*, and treats himself as *not being* what he is. This is true with respect to *futurity*, as well as the *present time*: and indeed by how much future time is more than the present, by so much the more perhaps ought *that* to be regarded. At least injoyments ought to be taken and adjusted in such a manner, that no one should preclude, or spoil *more*, or *greater* to come.

It may easily be understood here, that *those evils*, which it is not in a man's power to prevent, he must endeavour to bear *patiently* and *decently*, i. e. as such; and moreover, such as are made by this means *lighter* (*b*): for when they cannot be totally prevented, as much of the *effect* must be prevented, or taken off, as can be. And in order to this it is good to be prepared for all attacks; especially the *last*, *great* one (*c*).

3. *He must consider even bodily and sensual affections, passions, and inclinations as intimations, which* many times *he not only may, but ought to hearken to.* What is said before of the subjection of passions and appetites to *reason* must always rememberd. They are not to proceed from unjustifiable causes, or terminate in wrong objects; not be

(*a*) *Ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa: quo nihil potest esse stultius.---In tranquillo tempestatem adversam optare dementis est.* Cic. (*b*) *Levius fit patientia, Quicquid corrigere est nefas.* Hor. (*c*) Μελέτη θανάτου was a great man's definition of *philosophy*.

unseasonable

unſeaſonable or immoderate. Being *thus regulated*, ſet to a true biaſs, and freed from all eruptions and violence, they become *ſuch as are here intended*; gentle ferments working in our breaſts, without which we ſhould ſettle in inactivity (*a*); and what I think may be taken for juſt *motives* and *good* arguments to act upon.

For if a man finds, that he has *not only* a ſuperior faculty of reaſon, but *alſo* an inferior appetitive faculty, under which are containd many propenſions and averſions, *theſe* cannot be denied *to be* any more than *that*; tho they muſt be taken indeed for what they *really are*, and not *more*. When they are checked by reaſon and truth, or there lies a reaſon *againſt* them (as there always will, when they are not within the foreſaid reſtrictions), they muſt be taken *as clogd* with this circumſtance, as things *overruled* and *diſabled*: but when they are under no prohibition from the *ſuperior powers* and *truth*, then they are to be conſiderd as unſetterd and free, and become governing principles. For (as it has been obſerved upon a particular occaſion before p. 165) when there is *no reaſon againſt* the complying with our ſenſes, there is always *one for* it by prop. XIV. ſect. III. the inclination itſelf, being precluded by nothing above it, is in this caſe *uppermoſt*, and in courſe takes the commanding poſt: and then a man muſt act as being what he is in n. 3. under prop. II. of this ſection.

The *ſprings* of all human actions are in fact, either a ſenſe of *duty*, or a proſpect of ſome *pleaſure* or *profit* to be obtaind, ſome *evil* or *danger* to be avoided; that is, either the reaſonableneſs of what is done, or the manner, in which ſomething doth or is like to affect the agent: and that is again, human actions are founded either in *reaſon*, or *paſſion* and *inclination*. (I need not add they may be in both). This being ſo, what ſhould hinder, when *reaſon* does not work, but that the *inferior ſprings* ſhould retain their nature, and act.

Bodily inclinations and paſſions, when they obſerve their due *ſubordination* to reaſon, and only take place, where that leaves it open for them, or allows them to be as it were aſſeſſors to it upon the throne, are of admirable uſe in life, and tend *many times* to noble ends. This is applicable to the iraſcible, as well as the concupiſcible affections, and the whole animal ſyſtem. *Love* of that which is amiable, *compaſſion* (*b*) toward the miſerable and helpleſs, a natural *abhorrence* and reſentment (*c*) of that which

(*a*) Ἡ ὀργὴ-----ὑπηκόον ἡμῶν διηγάπρει. Chryſ. (*b*) When the Stoics ſay, that a wiſe man may relieve one, who wants his help, without *pitying* him; I own indeed he *may*, but I very much doubt whether he *would*. If he had not ſome compaſſion, and in ſome meaſure felt the ails or wants of the other, I ſcarce know how he ſhould come to take him for an object of his charity. (*c*) Ὁ μὲν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ὅτι ᾗ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτι, καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται. *Ariſt.* To be angry under theſe conditions is a different thing from *rage*, and thoſe *tranſports* which perhaps ſcarce comply with any one of them: ſuch as that of *Alexander*, who, becauſe his ἑταῖρος died, commanded the Ἀσκληπιεῖα to be all burnt. *Arr.*

is villainous or vitious or baſe (*a*), *fear* (*b*) of evils, are things, which *duly* temperd have laudable effects: and without them mankind could not well ſubſiſt. By which it appears, that the Author of nature has placed theſe *conatus*'s, theſe tendencies, and reluctancies in us, to diſpoſe us for action, when there are no arguments of a *higher nature* to move us. So far are they, *rightly managed*, from being mere infirmities. And certainly the *philoſopher*, who pretends to abſolute *apathy*, maims nature, and ſets up for a half-man, or I *don't know what* (*c*).

I muſt confeſs however, that our *paſſions* are ſo *very apt* to grow upon us, and become exorbitant, if they are not kept under an *exact diſcipline*, that by way of prevention or caution it is adviſable rather to affect a *degree* of apathy, or to recede *more* from the worſe extreme (*d*). This very propoſition itſelf, which, when *reaſon* is abſent, places *ſenſe* and *inclination* in the chair, obliges not to permit the reins to our paſſions, or give them their full career; becauſe if we do, they may (and will) carry us into ſuch *exceſſes*, ſuch *dangers* and *miſchiefs*, as may ſadly affect the ſenſitive part of us: that part itſelf, which now governs. They ought to be watched, and well examind; if *reaſon* is on their ſide, or ſtands neuter, they are to be heard (this is all, that I ſay): in *other caſes* we muſt be deaf to their applications, ſtrongly guard againſt their emotions, and *in due time* prevent their rebelling againſt the ſovereign faculty.

I cannot forbear to add, tho I fear I ſhall tire you with repetitions, that, from what is ſaid here and juſt before, not only the *liberty* men take in preferring what they like beſt, among preſent injoyments, meats, drinks, &c. ſo far as they are *innocent*; but all thoſe *prudential* and *lawful* methods, by which they endeavour to ſecure to themſelves a comfortable and pleaſant being, may be juſtified, and that obſ. under prop. XIII. in ſect. II. ſtrengthend.

(*a*) There is, according to *Tully*, *Civile odium, quo omnes improbos odimus.* (*b*) Φοβέμεθα δηλονότι τὰ φοβερά.----φοβέμεθα δ᾽ ὧν πάντα τὰ κακὰ· οἷον ἀδοξίαν, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀφιλίαν, θάνατον.---ὅτι γὰρ ᾗ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι, ᾗ καλὸν· τὸ δὲ μὴ, αἰσχρὸν, κλ. *Ariſt.* When one called *Xenophanes* coward, becauſe he would not play at dice with him, ὁμολόγει πάνυ δειλὸς εἶναι πρὸς τὰ αἰσχρὰ ᾗ ἀτολμᾷ. *Plut.* (*c*) A wiſe man is not ἀπαθὴς, but μετριοπαθής. *Ariſt. ap. Diog. L.* (*d*) Δεῖ δ᾽ φοχαζόμενον τῷ μᾶσσον ἐπιχωρεῖν τῷ μᾶλλον ἐναντίῳ.------ τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων, τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἁμαρτωλότερον· τὸ δὲ ἧττον. *Ariſt.*----In the ſame chapter he gives two other excellent rules, which I cannot but ſet down here. Σκοπεῖν δεῖ πρὸς ἃ αὐτοὶ ἐυκατάφοροί ἐσμεν·----εἰς τοὐναντίον δ᾽ ἑαυτὸς ἀφίλκειν·------ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διαγραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. And after, Ἐν παντὶ δ᾽ μάλιϛα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ, ᾗ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδίκως κρίνομεν αὐτήν.

If

If the gratification of an appetite be incompatible with *reaſon* and *truth*, to treat that appetite according to what it is, is to *deny* it: but if it is not, to uſe it as it is, is to conſider it as an appetite clear of all objections, and this muſt be to *comply* with it. The humoring of *ſuch appetites*, as lie not under the interdict of truth and reaſon, ſeems to be the *very means*, by which the Author of nature intended to *ſweeten* the journey of life: and a man may upon the road as well muffle himſelf up againſt ſun-ſhine and blue sky, and expoſe himſelf bare to rains and ſtorms and cold, as debar himſelf of the *innocent delights* of his nature for affected melancholy, want, and pain. Yet,

He muſt *uſe what means he can to cure his own defects, or at leaſt to prevent the effects of them; learn to deny temptations, or keep them at a proper diſtance* (*a*); *even mortify, where mortification is neceſſary* (*b*); *and alway carry about him the ſenſe of his being but a man.* He who doth not do this, doth not conform himſelf to the *ſeventh* particular under the preceding prop. (doth not own that to be *true*, which he is ſuppoſed to have found *true* in himſelf); denies a *defect* to be what it is, to be ſomething which requires to be ſupplied, or amended; and is guilty of an *omiſſion*, that will fall under ſect. I. prop. V.

I might here mention ſome *precautions*, with ſome kinds and degrees of *mortification* or *ſelf-denial*, which men will commonly find to be neceſſary. But I ſhall not *preſcribe*; leaving them, who beſt know their own weak places and diſeaſes, to ſelect for themſelves the proper *remedies*.

I ſhall only take notice, that ſince the *ſelf-denial* here recommended can only reſpect things in themſelves *lawful* and not unreaſonable, and in favor of ſuch our bare *inclinations* have been allowd to be taken for arguments and directions, it looks as if this advice to *deny ones ſelf* or *inclinations* inferred a contradiction. But this knot will be quickly untied. For when we deny our inclinations in order to better our natures, or prevent crimes, tho to follow theſe inclinations might *otherwiſe* be right; yet in *theſe circumſtances* and under this view there ariſes a good reaſon againſt it, and they, according to the *eſtabliſhd rule*, muſt therefore give way: which is all that is intended (*c*).

(*a*) Ἀγαπιλέψ μάχῃ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν προσιλθών ὁ ἴρας, ἐντᾶυθα ἕςω ἐπὶ θύραις τῆ ψυχῆς. *Max. Tyr.*— To appoint things, as the *Jewiſh* Doctors have done, to be the bulwark of the law, or to keep a man from tranſgreſſing it, would be right, if they were judiciouſly choſen, and not ſo very particular and trifling. Some of their cautions are certainly juſt: as that, a man ſhall not look upon another man's wife, nor on her nakedneſs, leſt he ſhould be inticed by them. *Paſſim.* (*b*) *What ſhould a man do to live?* let him mortify himſelf. *Miſn.* (*c*) No *monkery*, no ſuperſtitious or phantaſtical mortifications are here recommended.

The laſt clauſe of the propoſition takes in a *great compaſs*. It will oblige men, if they do but think well what *they* are, and conſequently what *others* of the ſame kind with themſelves alſo are, not to be proud, conceited, vain; but modeſt, and humble, and rather diffident of themſelves: not to cenſure the failings of others too hardly, not to be over-ſevere in puniſhing or exacting juſtice (*a*), and particularly not to be revengeful; but candid, placable, manſuete: and ſo forth.

5. *He ought to examine* (*b*) *his own actions and conduct, and where he finds he has tranſgreſſed* (*c*), *to repent*. That is, if the tranſgreſſion be againſt his neighbour, and the nature of it admits, to make *reparation*, or at leaſt as far as he can: in other caſes, when that which is done cannot be *recalled*, or *repaired*, or terminates in *himſelf* only, to live however under a ſenſe of his fault, and to prove by ſuch acts as are proper, that he deſires *forgiveneſs*, and heartily wiſhes it undone; which is as it were an eſſay towards the *undoing* of it (*d*), and all that now can be (*e*): and laſtly, to uſe all poſſible care not to *relapſe*. All this is involved in the *idea* of a fault, or action that is wrong, as it preſents itſelf to a rational mind. For ſuch a mind cannot approve what is unreaſonable, and repugnant to truth; that is, what is *wrong*, or a *fault*: nay more, it cannot but diſapprove it, deteſt it. No *rational* animal therefore can act according to *truth*, the *true* nature of himſelf and the idea of a crime, if he doth not endeavour not to commit it; and, when it is committed, to repair it, if he can, or at leaſt ſhew himſelf to be *penitent* (*f*).

If when a man is *criminal*, he doth not behave himſelf *as ſuch*, or, which is the ſame, behaves himſelf as being *not ſuch*, he oppoſes *truth* confidently.

And further, to act agreeably to what he is ſuppoſed to find himſelf *to be*, is to act as one who is in danger of *relapſing*: which is to be upon his guard for the future.

6. *He muſt labor to improve his rational faculties by ſuch means, as are* (*fairly*) *practicable by him, and conſiſtent with his circumſtances*. If it be a diſadvantage to be obnoxious to *error*, and act in the dark, it is an advantage to know ſuch *truths* as may prevent this: if ſo, it is a greater advantage to know, or be capable of knowing, *more* ſuch truths (*g*): and then again, not to endeavour to improve thoſe faculties, by

(*a*) A good man does good, before the meaſure of Judgment; *i. e.* without the compulſion of the law: (which words I underſtand in the ſenſe, that *Raſhi* ſeems to put upon them, *Gen.* 44. 10.) (*b*) Πῆ παρέβην; τί δ' ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη; *Aur. carm.* (*c*) Τίς γὰρ ἧς ἐ ἀγῶνα τῷ βίῳ παριδὼν ἔπεσεν ἄμεινος; τίς δ' οὐχ ὑποσκελισθείς; ἰυδαίμων ὁ μὴ πολλάκις. *Ph. Jud.* (*d*) *Quem panitet peccaſſe, penè eſt innocens.* Sen. (*e*) Even a Jew ſays, Repentance is preferable to all oblations. *S. Hhaſid.* (*f*) Ἐλοιδόρησας; ἰυλόγησον· ἐπλεονέκτησας; ἀπόδῳ. ἠμαθύσθης; νίζωσον. *S. Baſ.* (*g*) Ἐςὶ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι φιλοσοφία μέγιςον κτῆμα, *Juſt. M.*

which

which theſe *truths* are apprehended, is to ſhut them out, as being not what they are (*a*).

And moreover, by the inlargement of our rational faculties we become *more rational*; that is, we advance our natures (*b*), and become more attentive to *rational injoyments*.

The *ordinary* means indeed of improving our minds are the inſtruction of able men, reading, obſervation, meditation: but every man has not proper *opportunities*, or *capacity* for theſe, or but in ſome low degree; and no man is obliged beyond his abilities, and opportunities (by ſect. IV. prop. II.) Therefore that mollification is added, *by ſuch means*, &c.

Beſide *health*, a comfortable and ſuitable proviſion of *externals* is ſo neceſſary to the well-being of the *whole man*, that without it the rational part cannot dwell eaſy, all purſuits of knowledge will be liable to interruption, and improvements (commonly) imperfect (*c*). And ſo *reaſon* itſelf (which cannot betray its own intereſt) muſt for its own ſake concurr in ſeeking and promoting that, which tends to the preſervation and happineſs of the *whole*. But the doing of this ingroſſes time and induſtry; and before that which is ſought can be obtaind (if it is ever obtaind), probably the *uſe* of it is loſt: except where men live by the profeſſion of ſome part of learning.

And as to them who are *more free* from worldly cares, or whoſe buſineſs and imployment brings them into a ſtricter acquaintance with letters, after all their endeavours (ſuch is the great variety of human circumſtances in *other reſpects*) they muſt be contented with ſeveral *degrees* and *portions* of knowledge. Some are bleſt with clean and ſtrong conſtitutions, early inſtructions and other helps, ſucceeding incouragements, uſeful acquaintance, and freedom from diſturbance: whilſt others, under an ill ſtate of body, or other diſadvantages, are forced to be their own guides, and make their way as well as they can.

But notwithſtanding all this, every man may *in ſome degree or other* endeavour to cultivate his nature, and poſſeſs himſelf of uſeful truths. And not to do this is (again) to caſt off *reaſon* (which never can be *reaſonable*), apoſtatize from humanity, and recoil into the beſtial life (*d*).

(*a*) And perhaps as if our own minds were not what they are. For πάντες ἀνθρωποι τῦ ἰδίνας ἐξηγονται φύσες. *Ariſt.* (*b*) *Ariſtotle* being asked, *what he got by philoſophy*, anſwerd, Τὸ ἀνεπιτάκτως ποιῆν ἃ τινες δία τὸ δοκῦ τὸ νόμων φόβον ποιῦσιν. And another time, *how the learned differd from the unlearned*, ſaid, Ὅσῳ οἱ ζῶντες τὸ παιδευτικὸν τὴν παιδίαν ἔλεγεν ὡς μὲν ἀυτυχίας ἴναι κόσμον, ὡ δὲ ταῖς ἀτυχίαις καταφυγήν. *D. Laert.* (*c*) Ἀδύνατον γὰρ, ἢ ὡ ῥᾴδιον, τὰ καλὰ πράτλειν. ἀχορήγητον ὄντα· πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράτλεται καθάπερ δι ὀργάνων, κτλ. *Ariſt.* (*d*) *Nam fuit quoddam tempus, cum in agris homines paſſim beſtiarum more vagabantur, &c.* Cic.

7. *He*

7. *He muſt attend to inſtruction* (*a*), *and even ask advice*; *eſpecially in matters of conſequence.* Not to do this is to *deny*, that his faculties are limited and defective, or that he is fallible (which is *contrary* to that, which he is preſumed to be conſcious of); and perhaps, that it is poſſible for another to *know* what he *doth* not.

Advice every man is capable of hearing, and the meaner a man's own improvements are, the *more* doth truth preſs him to ſubmit to the counſel and opinions of others. Nor is every one only *capable*, but every one *wants* upon ſome occaſions to be informed. In how many country affairs muſt the *ſcholar* take the *ruſtic* for his maſter? In how many other men of buſineſs, *trader*, and *mechanics*? And on the other ſide in reſpect of how many things does the generality of the world want to be taught by them, who are *learned* and *honeſt*?

There is or ſhould be a *commerce* or interchange of counſel and knowledge, as well as of other things: and where men have not theſe of their *own growth*, they ſhould thankfully receive what may be imported from other quarters.

I do not mean, that a man ought *implicitly* and *blindly* to follow the opinion of another (*b*) (this other being *fallible* too, as well as himſelf), unleſs he has *in himſelf* a good reaſon ſo to do, which many times happens; but by the aſſiſtance of another, and hearing what he has to ſay, to *find out* more certainly on which ſide *reaſon*, *truth*, and *happineſs* (which always keep cloſe together) do lie. And thus it is indeed a man's *own reaſon* at laſt, which governs.

He, who is governed by what *another* ſays (or does), without underſtanding it and making the reaſon of it his own, is not governed by his *own reaſon*, and that is, by *no reaſon that he has*. To ſay one is led by the noſe (as we commonly ſpeak (*c*) gives immediately the idea of a brute (*d*).

(*a*) The effect, which *Xenocrates*'s lecture had upon *Polemo*, is remarkable: *unius orationis ſaluberrima medicina ſanatus, ex infami gantone maximus philoſophus evaſit.* Val. M. (*b*) Like them, who ſubmit to their viſemen, *Hhakamim*, tho they ſhould ſay, that the right hand is the left. In *S. Iqqar* Many more inſtances might eaſily be given. (*c*) Not only we. Τῆς ῥινὸς ἕλκεσθαι was uſed in the ſame ſenſe by the *Greeks*. (*d*) *Nihil magis præſtandum eſt, quàm ne, pecorum ritu, ſequamur antecedentium gregem, pergentes non qua eundum eſt, ſed qua itur.* Sen. Something may perhaps be expected in this place concerning *vogue* and *faſhion*, which ſeem to be public declarations of ſome general opinion; ſhewing how far they ought to ſway with us. I think, *ſo far* as to keep us from being contemned, derided, or marked, where that may lawfully and conveniently be done; eſpecially in reſpect of trifling and little matters. But *further* a wiſe man will ſcarce mind them. This is a good ſentence in *Demophilus*, Ποίει ἃ κρίνεις ἶναι καλὰ, κἂν ποιῶν μέλλῃς ἀδοξήσειν· φαῦλος γὰρ κριτὴς καλῶν πράγματος ὄχλος.

Laſtly,

Laſtly, *He muſt labor to clear his mind of thoſe preoccupations and incumbrances which hang about it, and hinder him from reaſoning freely, and judging impartially.* We ſet out in life from ſuch poor beginnings of knowledge, and grow up under ſuch remains of ſuperſtition and ignorance, ſuch influences of company and faſhion, ſuch inſinuations of pleaſure, *&c.* that it is no wonder, if men get habits of thinking only in *one way*; that theſe habits in time grow confirmed and obſtinate; and ſo their minds come to be overcaſt with thick *prejudices*, ſcarce penetrable by any ray of truth or light of reaſon. He therefore, who would uſe his rational faculties, muſt in the firſt place diſentangle them, and render them *fit* to be uſed: and he, who doth not do this, doth hereby declare, that he doth not *intend* to uſe them; that is, he proclaims himſelf *irrational*, contrary to truth, if ſuppoſition the fourth be *true*.

The ſum of all is this: it is the duty of every *man*, if that word expreſſes ſuch a being as is before deſcribed, to behave himſelf in all reſpects (which I cannot pretend to enumerate) as far as he is able according to reaſon. And from hence it will follow, further, that,

IV. *Every man is obliged to live virtuouſly and piouſly.* Becauſe to practiſe *reaſon* (*a*) and *truth* (*b*) is to live after that manner. For from the contents of the foregoing ſections it is apparent, that one cannot practiſe reaſon (or act according to truth) without behaving himſelf *reverently* and *dutifully* toward that Almighty being, on whom he depends; nor without *juſtice* and a tender regard to the properties of other men: that is, unleſs his injoyments be free from impiety, virtuous and harmleſs. And as to thoſe virtues, which reſpect a *mans ſelf*, the ſame thing (*c*) will be as apparent, when I have told what I mean by ſome of the *principal* ones.

Prudence, the queen of virtues, is nothing but chooſing (after things (*d*) have been duly weighd) and uſing the moſt reaſonable means to obtain ſome end, that is reaſonable. This is therefore *directly* the exerciſe of reaſon.

Temperance permits us to take meat and drink not only as phyſic for hunger and thirſt, but alſo as an *innocent cordial* and fortifier againſt the evils of life, or even ſometimes, reaſon not refuſing that liberty, merely as matter of *pleaſure*. It only confines us to ſuch *kinds*, *quantities*, and *ſeaſons*, as may beſt conſiſt with our health (*e*),

(*a*) *Ipſa virtus breviſſimè recta ratio dici poteſt.* Cic. *Quæ non aliud eſt quàm recta ratio.* Sen. (*b*) *Idem eſſe dicebat Socrates veritatem & virtutem.* Id. (*c*) *Viz.* That a man cannot practiſe reaſon without practiſing them. (*d*) Τὰ τ' ὄντα, τὰ τ' ἐσόμενα, πρό τ' ὄντα. (*e*) That ſaying of *Timotheus* to *Plato*, with whom he had ſupped the night before in the Academy, ſhould be remembered. Τμεῖς ἦν δειπνῦτε------ἰις τλὼ ὑστεραίαν------ἡμέραν. *Ap. Athen.*

the

the uſe of our faculties (*a*), our fortune, &c. and ſhew, that we do not think our ſelves made *only* to eat and drink here (*b*); that is, ſuch as ſpeak us to be *what we are*.

Chaſtity does not pretend to *extinguiſh* our tender paſſions, or cancel one part of our nature: it only bids us not to indulge them againſt *reaſon* and *truth* (*c*); not give up the *man* to humor the *brute* (*d*); nor hurt *others* to pleaſe *our ſelves*; to divert our inclinations by buſineſs, or ſome honeſt amuſement, till we can gratify them *lawfully*, *conveniently*, *regularly* (*e*); and even then to participate of the myſteries of love with *modeſty*, as within a veil or ſacred incloſure, not with a canine impudence (*f*).

Frugality indeed looks forward, and round about; not only conſiders the man *himſelf*, but compaſſionates his *family*; knows, that, when the exacteſt computation is made that can be beforehand, there will ſtill be found many unforeſeen *deſiderata* in the calendar of his expences; is *apprehenſive* of the world, and accidents, and new occaſions, that may ariſe, tho they are not *yet* in being (*g*); and therefore endeavours wiſely to lay in as much, as may give him ſome kind of ſecurity againſt *future* wants and caſualties, without which proviſion no man, whoſe ſenſe is not quite loſt, or circumſcribed within the preſent minute, can be very eaſy (*h*). To this end it not only cuts off all *profuſion* and *extravagance*, but even deducts ſomething from that, which according to the preſent appearance might be *afforded* (*i*); and chooſes rather that he ſhould live upon half allowance now, than be expoſed (or expoſe any body elſe) to the danger of ſtarving hereafter (*k*), when full meals and former plenty ſhall make *poverty* and *faſting* more inſupportable. But ſtill it forbids no inſtance of *generoſity*, or even *magnificence*, which is agreeable to the man's ſtation and circumſtances, or (which is tantamount) to the *truth* of his caſe (*l*).

(*a*) *Corpus onuſtum Heſternis vitiis animum quoq; prægravat unà, &c.* Hor. (*b*) *Quibus in ſolo vivendi cauſa palato eſt.* Juv. *Sic prandete commilitones tanquam apud inferos cænaturi* (*Leonid. ap. Val. M.*) may be turned to a general *memento*, no man knowing, how near his death may be. (*c*) Τί ἴδῃς;——καλήν; Ἐπαγὰ ἡ καλήνα. *Arr.* (*d*) *Venerem incertam rapiemus, more ferarum.* Hor. (*e*) In which words are comprehended *naturally* (Τὸ μὴ τὰς παρὰ φύσιν ἡδονὰς διώκειν). (*f*) Not as *Crates* and *Hipparchia* (of whom ſee *Diog. L. Sext. Emp. & al.*), and indeed the *Cynics* in general are ſaid to have done: *quibus in propatulo coire cum conjugibus mos fuit.* Laſt, Of whom therefore *Cicero* ſays with good reaſon, *Cynicorum ratio* [al. *natio*] *tota eſt ejicienda. Eſt enim inimica verecundiæ, ſine qua nihil rectum eſſe poteſt, nihil honeſtum.* Let a man cohabit privately with his wife. *S. Hbaſ.* That in *Herodotus*, Ἅμα κιθῶνι ἐνδυομένῳ σιωπηδύεται ἡ τὴν αἰδὼ γυνὴ, ought not to be true. *Verecundiâ naturali habent proviſum* lupanaria ipſa *ſecretum. Aug.* (*g*) Εἰς τὸ τῆς τύχης ἀτίμαρτον ἀφορῶσα. *Ph. J.* (*h*) *Simonides* was wont to ſay, Βελόμην ἂν ἀποθανὼν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς μᾶλλον ἀπολιπεῖν, ἢ ζῶν δεῖσθαι τῶν φίλων, *Stob.* (*i*) *Non intelligunt homines quàm magnum vectigal ſit parſimonia.* Cic. (*k*) Like them, who ἐν τῇ νεότητι τὰ τῷ γήρᾳ ἐφόδια προκαταναλίσκουσιν, as in *Athen.* (*l*) *Ea liberalitate utamur, quæ proſit amicis, noceat nemini.* Cic.

after

After the ſame manner I might proceed upon other *particular* virtues. But my notion of them muſt by this time be ſufficiently underſtood: and therefore I ſhall only give this *general* advice. That you may take the truer proſpect of any act, place your ſelf in your imagination *beyond it* (beyond it in time), and ſuppoſe it *already done*, and then ſee how it looks; always remembering, that a long *repentance* is a diſproportionate price for a *ſhort injoyment*. Or, fancy it done by ſome *other man*, and then view it in that *ſpeculum*: we are commonly ſharper ſighted in diſcerning the faults of others, than of our ſelves (*a*). And further, as to thoſe *virtues*, which are ſaid to conſiſt in the mean, it may be ſometimes ſafer to incline a *little more* to one of the *extremes* than to the other: as, rather to ſtingineſs, than prodigality; rather to inflexibility, and even a *degree* of ill nature, than to dangerous complaiſance, or eaſineſs in reſpect of vice, and ſuch things as may be hurtful; and ſo on (*b*).

Since then to live *virtuouſly* is to practiſe *reaſon* and act conformably to *truth*, he, who lives ſo, muſt be *ultimately happy*, by ſect. II. prop. XIV. and therefore not only the commands of reaſon, but even the deſire of happineſs (a motive, that cannot but work ſtrongly upon all who *think*) will oblige a man to live ſo.

It may be collected even from *experience*, that the *virtuous life* compared with the *contrary*, if one looks no further than the preſent ſtate, is the *happier life* (*c*); or, that the virtuous pleaſures, when the whole account is made up, are the truer (*d*). Who ſees not, that the *vitious* life is full of dangers and ſolicitudes, and uſually ends ill; perhaps in rottenneſs and rags, or at leaſt in a peeviſh and deſpicable diſcontent (*e*)?

I am not of opinion, that *virtue* can make a man happy upon a rack (*f*), under a violent fit of the ſtone, or the like (*g*); or that *virtue* and *prudence* can always exempt him from wants and ſufferings, mend a ſtrait fortune, or rectify an ill conſtitu-

(*a*) *Non eſt incommodum, quale quodq;*-----*ſit, ex aliis judicare: ut ſi quid dedeceat in aliis, vitemus & ipſi. Fit enim neſcio quo modo, ut magis in aliis cernamus, quàm in nobiſmet ipſis, ſi quid delinquitur.* Cic. (*b*) Ὅσον, ὲι δίπτυφ προπίνει τις ἄδην ἔχοντι; μὴ δυσωπηθῇς, μηδὲ προσβιάσῃ σεαυτὸν, ἀλλὰ κατάθου τὸ ποτήριον, κλ. *Plut.* (*c*) Even *Epicurus* himſelf ἀχώριστον φησὶ τ' ἡδονῆς τὴν ἀρετὴν μένειν· and διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰς ἀρετὰς δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι. *Diog. L.* (*d*) *Iſocrates* gives one reaſon for this, where he compares vitious pleaſures with virtue. Ἐκεῖ μὲν πρῶτον ἡσθέντες, ὕστερον ἐλυπήθημεν· ἐνταῦθα δ' μετὰ τὰς λύπας τὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχομεν. (*e*) Whereas virtue is ἐφόδιον πρὸς γῆρας. *Bias ap. S. Baſ.* (*f*) For who can bear ſuch rants as that, *Epicurus ait, ſapientem, ſi in Phalaridis tauro peruratur, exclamaturum, Dulce eſt, & ad me nihil pertinet?* Sen. *Tully* reports the ſame. (*g*) It is in the power of very few to act like him, *qui dum varices exſecandas præberet, legere librum perſeveravit:* or him, *qui non deſiit ridere, cum ob hoc ipſum irati tortores omnia inſtrumenta crudelitatis experirentur.* Sen.

tion: amidſt ſo many enemies to virtue, ſo many infirmities as attend life, he cannot but be *ſometimes affected*. But I have ſaid, and ſay again, that the *natural* and *uſual* effect of virtue is happineſs; and if a virtuous man ſhould in ſome reſpects be unhappy, yet ſtill his virtue will make him *leſs unhappy*: for at leaſt he injoys inward tranquillity, and a breaſt conſcious of no evil. And which kind of life I pray ought one to prefer: that, which *naturally* tends to *happineſs*, tho it may be diſturbed; or that, which *naturally* tends to *unhappineſs*? In brief, *virtue* will make a man *here*, in any given circumſtances, as happy as a man can be in thoſe circumſtances: or however it will make him happy *hereafter* in ſome other ſtate: for *ultimately*, all taken together, happy he *muſt be*.

Some may poſſibly wonder, why among virtues I have not ſo much as once named one of the *cardinal*, and the only one perhaps which they pretend to: I mean *fortitude*. That *that*, by which ſo many heroes have triumphed over enemies, even the greateſt, *death it ſelf*; *that*, which diſtinguiſhes nations, raiſes empires, has been the grand theme of almoſt all wits, attracts all eyes, opens all mouths, and aſſumes the name of *virtue* by way of excellence; that *this* ſhould be forgot!

To attone for this omiſſion I will make this *appendix* to the foregoing brief account. If *fortitude* be taken for natural courage (*i. e.* ſtrength, activity, plenty of ſpirits, and a contempt of dangers reſulting from theſe), this is conſtitution and the *gift of God* (*a*), not any *virtue* in us: becauſe if it be *our* virtue, it muſt conſiſt in ſomething, which *we* produce, or do our ſelves (*b*). The caſe is the ſame with that of fine features and complexion, a large inheritance, or ſtrong walls, which may indeed be *great advantages*, but were never called *virtues* (*c*). To *have theſe* is not virtue; but to *uſe them rightly*, or according to reaſon, if we have them.

That this is juſtly ſaid, may perhaps appear from what is to be ſaid on the *other ſide*. It may be a man's *misfortune*, that he has not more courage, a greater ſtock of ſpirits, firmer health, and ſtronger limbs, if he has a juſt occaſion to uſe them; but it never can be reckond a *vice* or fault not to *uſe* what he *has not*: for otherwiſe it might be a crime not to be able to carry ten thouſand pound weight, or outrun a cannon-ball.

(*a*) Εἰ μάλα καρτερὸς ἐσσι, θεός τοι σὸν τόγ' ἔδωκεν. *Hom.* (*b*) *Propter virtutem jure laudamur, & in virtute recte gloriamur. Quod non contigerit, ſi id* donum à deo, non à nobis *haberemus.* Cic. (*c*) As that word is uſed here. For when it is uſed as in that *ap. Luc.* Ἀρετὴ μὲν σώματος ἰσχύς, and the like paſſages, it has another meaning.

Fortitude

Fortitude conſiderd as a *virtue* conſiſts in ſtanding and endeavouring to overcome dangers and oppoſitions, when they cannot be avoided without the violation of *reaſon* and *truth*. Here it is, that he who is endowed with natural bravery, a healthful conſtitution, good bones and muſcles, ought to *uſe* them, and be *thankful* to the *Donor*: and he who is not ſo favord, muſt yet do *what he can*: if he cannot conquer, he muſt endeavour to be patient and prudent. And thus he, who is naturally timorous, or weak, or otherwiſe infirm, *may* have as much, or more of the *virtue* of fortitude, than the *hero* himſelf; who apprehends little, and feels little, compared with the other, or *poſſibly* may find pleaſure in a ſcene of dangerous action.

If a man can *prevent*, or *eſcape* any peril or trouble, *ſalvâ veritate*, he ought to do it: otherwiſe he neither conſiders *himſelf*, nor *them* as being what they are; them not as *unneceſſary*, himſelf not as capable of *being hurt* by them; and ſo daſhes againſt truth on the worſe ſide (*a*). But where that cannot be done, he muſt exert himſelf according to his *abilities*, whether *great* or *little*, and refer the ſucceſs to the Divine providence. This is the true *virtue* of *fortitude*, which is nothing but *endeavouring* firmly and honeſtly to act as *truth requires*; and therefore is directly deducible from that notion, on which we have founded the morality of human acts.

It has for its *object* not only adverſaries, noxious animals, and bold undertakings, but in general all the *evils of life* (*b*); which a man muſt labor by prudence to ward off, and where this cannot be done to bear with reſignation, decency, and an humble expectation of an adjuſtment of all events in a *future ſtate*: the belief of which I am now going to prove, *in my manner*, to be no vain nor groundleſs conceit.

V. *Every one, that finds himſelf as before in prop.* I. *finds in himſelf at the ſame time a conſciouſneſs of his own exiſtence and acts* (which is life), *with a power of apprehending, thinking, reaſoning, willing, beginning and ſtopping many kinds and degrees of motion in his own members*, &c. (*c*). He, who has not theſe powers, has no power to diſpute this with me: therefore I can perceive no room for any diſpute here, unleſs it be concerning the power of *beginning motion*. For they, who ſay there is always the ſame quantity of motion in the world, muſt not allow the production of any *new*; and therefore muſt ſuppoſe the animal ſpirits not to be put into motion by the mind, but only

(*a*) Κατὰ ᾗ κύματ' ἐκτὸς ἔεργε Νᾶα. Hom. (*b*) Εἰσὶ δ' οἱ ᾗ ἐν ὑλίᾳ διατρίβοντες. ἅ σωμάτων ἀυτοῖς ἢ μακρᾶις νόσοις ἢ ἐπιπόνῳ γήρᾳ κατεσκιλετευμένων,-------τῷ ὰληθῆ διαπονῆσαι ἀνδρίαν, ἀσκηταὶ σοφίας ὄντες. *Ph. J. Non in viribus corporis & lacertis tantummodo fortitudinis gloria eſt, ſed magis in virtute animi.----jure ea fortitudo vocatur, quando unuſquiſque ſeipſum vincit, iram continet, nullis illecebris emollitur atque inflectitur, non adverſis perturbatur, non extollitur ſecundis*, &c. S. Ambr. (*c*) *Qui ſe ipſe norit, primùm aliquid ſentiet ſe habere divinum*, &c. Cic.

being already in motion to receive from it their directions into these or those canals, according as it intends to move this or that limb. But to this may be answerd, that, if the mind can give these *new directions* and turns to the spirits, this serves my purpose as well, and what I intend will follow as well from it. And besides, it could not do this, if it could not excite those spirits being at rest.

It is plain I can *move* my hand upward or downward or horizontally, faster or slower or not at all, or stop it when it is in motion, *just as I will*. Now if my hand and those parts and spirits, by which it is put into motion, were left to be governed by the law of gravitation, or by any motions already impresst upon them, the effects would be *determind* by rules of mechanism, and be *necessary*: the motion or rest of my hand would not attend upon *my will*, and be alterable upon a thought at *my pleasure*. If then I have (as I am sensible I have) a *power of moving* my hand in a manner, which it would not move in by those laws, that mere bodies already in motion or under the force of gravitation would observe, this motion depends solely upon *my will*, and *begins* there (*a*).

VI. *That, which in man is the subject or* suppositum *of self-consciousness, thinks, and has the foresaid faculties, must be something different from his body or carcass.*

For, first, he doth not I suppose find himself to think, see, hear, &c. *all over*, in any part of his body: but the seat of cogitation and reflection he finds in his *head* (*b*): and the nerves, by which the knowledge of external objects are conveyd to him, *all* tend to the same place. It is plainly something, which resides *there* (*c*), in the region of the brain, that by the mediation of these nerves governs the body and moves the parts of it (as by so many reins, or wires) (*d*), feels what is done to it, sees through the eyes, hears through the ears, &c. (*e*).

(*a*) Ἐι μήτε ἴξασθαι κινεῖται [τὸ σῶμα] ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα, μήτε φυσικῶς ὡς τὸ πῦρ, δῆλον ὅτι ὑπὸ ψυχῆς κινεῖται, κλ. *Greg. Thaum.* (*b*) Which, ὡς ἐπεῖν, ὄικός ἐστι τῆ αἰσθήσεων. *Artem.* (*c*) Ὅτι ὁ Σασιλεὺς, ἐκεῖ ἐ ὁι θορυφόροι· θορυφόροι δὲ αἰσθήσεις τῶ νῶ, ὥσει κεφαλὴν ἕσαι. *Ph. J.* (*d*) Τὰ μέρη τῶ σώματος ἄλογά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ὁρμὴ γένηται, σείσαντος ὥσπερ ἡνίας τῶ λογισμῶ, πάντα τέτακται ἐ συμπνεῖται ἐ ὑπακούει. *Plut.* (*e*) *Nos ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea, qua videmus: neque enim est ullus sensus in corpore, sed---via quasi quædam sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares à sede animi perforatæ. Itaque sæpe aut cogitatione, aut aliqua vi morbi impediti, apertis atque integris & oculis & auribus, nec videmus, nec audimus: ut facilè intelligi possit, animum & videre, & audire, non eas partes, quæ quasi fenestræ sunt animi: quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat, & adsit.* Cic.

Upon

Upon amputation of a limb (*a*) this thing (whatever it is) is not found to be *diminiſhd* (*b*), nor any of its faculties *loſt*. Its *ſphere* of acting, while it is confind to the body, is only contracted, and part of its *inſtrument* loſt. It cannot make uſe of that which is not, or which it has not.

If the *eyes* be ſhut, or the *ears* ſtopt, it cannot then ſee, or hear: but remove the obſtruction, and it inſtantly appears that the *faculty*, by which it apprehends the impreſſions made upon the organs of ſenſation, remaind all that while intire; and that ſo it might have done, if the eyes, or ears had *never* been opend again; or, if the eyes had been out, or the ears quite diſabled. This ſhews in general, that, when any *ſenſe* or *faculty* ſeems to be impaird or loſt by any bodily hurt, after a fever, or through age, this doth not come to paſs, becauſe it is *the body* that perceives and has theſe faculties in itſelf; but becauſe the body loſes its *inſtrumentality*, and gives that which is the *true ſubject* of theſe faculties no *opportunity* of exerting them, or of exerting them *well*: tho it *retains* them as much as in the caſe before, when the eyes or ears were only ſhut (*c*). Thus diſtinct are it and its faculties from the body and its affections. I will now call it the *ſoul*.

Again, as a man peruſes and *conſiders* his own *body*, doth it not undeniably appear to be ſomething different from the *conſiderer*? And when he uſes this expreſſion *my body*, or *the body of me*, may it not properly be demanded, who is meant by *me*, or what *my* relates to? It cannot be the *body* itſelf: that cannot ſay of itſelf, *it is my body*, or *the body of me*. And yet this way of ſpeaking we naturally fall into, from an inward and habitual ſenſe of our ſelves, and what we are, even tho we do not advert upon it.

What I mean is this. A *man* being ſuppoſed a *perſon* conſiſting of *two* parts, ſoul and body, the *whole perſon* may ſay of this or that part of him, *the ſoul of me*, or *the body of me*: but if he was either *all ſoul*, or *all body*, and nothing elſe, he could not then ſpeak in this manner: becauſe it would be the ſame as to ſay *the ſoul of the ſoul*, or *the body of the body*, or *the I of me*. The pronoun therefore (in that ſaying *my body*, or *the body of me*) muſt ſtand for ſomething elſe, to which the body belongs (*d*); or at leaſt for ſomething, of which it is only a part, *viz.* the perſon of the *whole man* (*e*). And then even this implies, that there is another part of him, which is not *body*.

(*a*) Or even *detracto corpore multo*, as *Lucretius* ſpeaks. (*b*) Πολλάκις ἢ τῶν χειρῶν ἢ τῶν ποδῶν ἀκρωτηριασμένων, ὁλόκληρος ἐκείνη [ἡ ψυχὴ] μένει. Chryſ. (*c*) Therefore *Ariſtotle* ſays, if an old man had a young man's eye, βλέποι ἂν ὥσπερ ἢ ὁ νέος. Ὥστε τὸ γῆρας, οὐ τῷ τιλῷ ψυχὴν πεπονθέναι τι, ἀλλ' ὡ ᾧ καθάπερ ὡ μέθαις ἢ νόσοις, κτλ. (*d*) *Hierocles* (with others) accounts the ſoul to be the true man. Σὺ γὰρ εἶ ὁ ψυχή· τὸ δὲ σῶμα σόν. (*e*) So *Plato* uſes Αὐτὸς for the *whole* of the man; by which the ſoul, as one part of it, is called κλῆμα.

It

It is plain there are two *different intereſts* in men (*a*), on the one ſide reaſon, on the other paſſion: which, being many times directly *oppoſite*, muſt belong to *different ſubjects*. There are upon many occaſions conteſts, and as it were wars between the *mind* and the *body*: ſo far are they from being the *ſame* thing.

Laſtly, there is we may perceive *ſomething within us*, which ſupports the body (keeps it up), directs its motion for the better preſervation of it, when any hurts or evils befall it, finds out the means of its cure, and the like; without which it would fall to the ground, and undergo the fate of common matter. The *body* therefore muſt be conſiderd as being under the *direction* and *tuition* of ſome other thing, which is (or ſhould be) the governor of it, and conſequently upon this account muſt be concluded to be *different* from it.

7. *The ſoul cannot be mere matter.* For if it is, then either all *matter* muſt think; or the difference muſt ariſe from the different *modification*, *magnitude*, *figure*, or *motion* (*b*) of ſome parcels of matter in reſpect of others; or a faculty of thinking muſt be *ſuperadded* to ſome ſyſtems of it, which is not ſuperadded to others. But,

In the firſt place, that poſition, which makes *all matter* to be cogitative, is contrary to all the apprehenſions and knowledge we have of the nature of it; nor can it be true, unleſs our ſenſes and faculties be contrived only to *deceive* us. We perceive not the leaſt ſymptom of *cogitation*, or *ſenſe* in our tables, chairs, &c.

Why doth the ſcene of thinking lie in our *heads*, and all the miniſters of ſenſation make their reports to ſomething *there*, if *all* matter be apprehenſive, and cogitative? For in that caſe there would be as much thought and underſtanding in our *heels*, and every where elſe, as in our *heads*.

If *all matter* be cogitative, then it muſt be ſo *quatenùs matter*, and thinking muſt be of the eſſence and definition of it: whereas by *matter* no more is meant but a ſubſtance extended and impenetrable to other matter. And ſince, for this reaſon, it cannot be *neceſſary* for matter to think (becauſe it may be matter without this property), it cannot think as *matter only*.

If it did, we ſhould not only *continue* to think always, till the matter of which we conſiſt is annihilated, and ſo the aſſertor of this doctrine would ſtumble upon

(*a*) Φάνηται δ' ἀνιαῖς ἢ ἄλλό τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκὸς, ὃ μάχεται τι ἢ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. *Ariſt.*

(*b*) Whether any form, modification, or motion of matter can be a human ſoul, ſeems to be much ſuch another queſtion as in that one of Seneca's epiſtles, *An juſtitia, an fortitudo, prudentia, ceteraque virtutes, animalia ſint.*

immor-

immortality unawares; but we muſt alſo have thought always *in time paſt*, ever ſince that matter was in being; nor could there be any the leaſt intermiſſion of *actual thinking*: which does not appear to be our caſe.

If thinking, ſelf conſciouſneſs, *&c.* were *eſſential* to matter, *every part* of it muſt have them: and then no *ſyſtem* could have them. For a ſyſtem of material parts would be a ſyſtem of things conſcious *every one by itſelf* of its own exiſtence and individuality, and conſequently thinking *by itſelf*: but there could be no *one act* of ſelf-conſciouſneſs or thought common to the *whole*. Juxta-poſition in this caſe could ſignify nothing: the diſtinction and individuation of the ſeveral particles would be as much retaind in their vicinity, as if they were ſeparated by miles.

In the next place, the faculties of thinking, *&c.* cannot ariſe from the *ſize*, *figure*, *texture*, or *motion* of it: becauſe bodies by the alteration of theſe only become greater or leſs; round or ſquare, *&c.* rare, or denſe; tranſlated from one place to another with this or that new direction, or velocity; or the like: all which *ideas* are quite different from that of *thinking*; there can be *no relation* between them (*a*). Theſe modifications and affections of matter are ſo far from being *principles* or *cauſes* of thinking and acting, that they are themſelves but *effects*, proceeding from the action of ſome other matter or thing upon it, and are proofs of its paſſivity, deadneſs, and utter incapacity of becoming *cogitative*. This is evident to ſenſe.

They, who place the eſſence of the ſoul in a certain *motion* given to ſome matter (if any ſuch men there really be) ſhould conſider, among many other things, that to *move* the body ſpontaneouſly is one of the faculties of the ſoul (*b*); and that this, which is the ſame with the *power of beginning motion*, cannot come from *motion already begun*, and impreſt *ab extra*.

Let the materialiſt examine well, whether he does not feel ſomething within himſelf that acts from an *internal principle*: whether he doth not experience ſome *liberty* ſome power of *governing* himſelf, and *chooſing*: whether he does not injoy a kind of *inviſible empire*, in which he commands his own thoughts, ſends them to this or that place, imploys them about this or that buſineſs (*c*), forms ſuch and ſuch deſigns and

(*a*) Νῶν ἰδὲν σῶμα γινῇ· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἀνίσα νῶν γενέσει. *Salluſt.* (*b*) That the ſoul is the principle of motion, or that which begins it in us, is (tho it wants no teſtimony) often ſaid by the ancients. Φασὶ γὰρ ἔνιοι, ὃ μάλιστα, ὃ πρώτων ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν. *Ariſt.* Ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ἐνδοθεν κινοῦν τὰ σώματα, ὃ αὐτοκίνητον. *Simpl.* Ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, *Plotin.* (*c*) Ἡ ψυχὴ πορεύεται πᾶσαν, γῆν, ἐν γῆς ἐπ' ἄκρον, κλ. *Max. T.*

ſchemes,

ſchemes: and whether there is any thing like this in *bare matter* (*a*), however faſhiond, or proportiond; which, if nothing ſhould protrude or communicate motion to it, would for ever remain fixt to the place where it happens to be, an eternal monument of its own being dead. Can ſuch an *active* being as the *ſoul* is (*b*), the ſubject of *ſo many powers*, be itſelf nothing but an *accident*?

When I begin to *move* my ſelf, I do it for ſome *reaſon*, and with reſpect to ſome *end*, the *means* to effect which I have, if there be occaſion for it, concerted within my ſelf: and this doth not all look like motion *merely material* (or, in which *matter* is only concerned), which is all mechanical. Who can imagine *matter* to be moved by *arguments*, or ever placed *ſyllogiſms* and *demonſtrations* among levers and pullies?

We not only *move* our ſelves upon reaſons, which we find in our ſelves, but upon reaſons imparted by *words* or *writing* from others, or perhaps merely at their deſire or bare ſuggeſtion. In which caſe, again, no body ſure can imagine, that the *words* ſpoken or written (the ſound in the air, or the ſtrokes on the paper) can by any natural or mechanical *efficience* cauſe the reader or hearer to *move* in any determinate manner (or at all). The reaſon, requeſt, or friendly admonition, which is the true *motive*, can make no impreſſion upon *matter*. It muſt be ſome *other kind* of being, that apprehends the force and ſenſe of them.

Do not we ſee in converſation, how a pleaſant thing ſaid makes people break out into *laughter*, a rude thing in *paſſion*, and ſo on? Theſe affections cannot be the *phyſical effects* of the words ſpoken: becauſe then they would have the ſame effect, whether they were underſtood, or not. And this is further demonſtrable from hence, that tho the *words* do really contain *nothing*, which is either pleaſant, or rude; or perhaps words are thought to be ſpoken, which are not ſpoken; yet if they are *apprehended* to do that, or the ſound to be otherwiſe than it was, the effect will be the *ſame*. It is therefore the *ſenſe* of the words, which is an immaterial thing, that by paſſing through the *underſtanding* and cauſing that, which is the ſubject of the intellectual faculties, to influence the body, produces theſe *motions* in the ſpirits, blood, muſcles.

(*a*) What a ridiculous argument for the materiality of the ſoul is that in *Lucretius*? *Ubi propellere membra, Conripere ex ſomno corpus, &c. videtur* (*Quorum nil fieri ſine tactu poſſe videmus, Nec tactum porro ſine corpore*); *nonne fatendum eſt Corporeâ naturâ animum conſtare, animamq*; ? If nothing can move *the body*, but another body, what moves this? *The body* might as well move itſelf, as be moved by one that does. (*b*) Τάχιστον γὰρ διὰ παντὸς τρέχει. *Thal. ap. Diog. L.*

They,

They, who can fancy, that *matter* may come to live, think, and act ſpontaneouſly, by being reduced to a certain *magnitude*, or having its parts placed after a certain *manner*, or being inveſted with ſuch a *figure*, or excited by ſuch a particular *motion*: they, I ſay, would do well to diſcover to us that *degree* of fineneſs, that *alteration* in the ſituation of its parts, *&c.* at which matter may *begin* to find itſelf alive and cogitative; and which is the *critical minute*, that introduces theſe important properties. If they cannot do this, nor have their eye upon any *particular criſis*, it is a ſign they have no good reaſon for what they ſay. For if they have no reaſon to charge this change upon any *particular degree* or *difference*, one more than another, they have no reaſon to charge it upon *any* degree or difference *at all*; and then they have no reaſon, by which they can prove that ſuch a change is made *at all*. —— Beſides all which, ſince magnitude, figure, motion are but *accidents* of matter, not *matter*, and only the *ſubſtance* is truly matter; and ſince the *ſubſtance* of any one part of matter does not differ from that of another, if *any* matter can be by nature cogitative, *all* muſt be ſo. But this we have ſeen cannot be.

So then in concluſion, if there is any ſuch thing as *matter that thinks*, &c. this muſt be a particular *privilege* granted to it: that is, a *faculty of thinking* muſt be *ſuperadded* to certain parts or parcels of it. Which, by the way, muſt inferr the exiſtence of ſome Being able to confer this faculty; who, when the ineptneſs of matter has been well conſiderd, cannot appear to be leſs than *omnipotent*, or God. But the truth is, matter ſeems not to be *capable* of ſuch improvement, of being made to think. For ſince it is not of the *eſſence* of matter, it cannot be *made to be ſo* without making matter *another kind* of ſubſtance from what it is. Nor can it *be made* to ariſe from any of the modifications or accidents of matter; and in reſpect of what elſe can any matter *be made to* differ from other matter.

The *accidents* of matter are ſo far from being made *by any power* to produce cogitation, that ſome *even of them* ſhew it incapable of having a faculty of thinking ſuperadded. The very *diviſibility* of it does this. For that which is made to think muſt either be *one* part, or more *parts* joind together. But we know no ſuch thing as a part of matter purely *one* (or indiviſible). It may indeed have pleaſed the Author of nature, that there ſhould be *atoms*, whoſe parts are *actually* indiſcerpible, and which may be the *principles* of other bodies: but ſtill they conſiſt of *parts*, tho firmly adhering together. And if the ſeat of cogitation be in *more* parts than one, (whether they lie cloſe together, or are looſe, or in a ſtate of fluidity, it is the ſame thing), how can it be avoided, but that either there muſt be ſo many ſeveral minds, or *thinking ſubſtances*, as there are *parts* (and then the conſequence, which has been mentiond, would return upon us again); or elſe

that there must be *something else* superadded for them to center in, to unite their acts, and make their thoughts to be *one*? And then what can this be, but some other *substance*, which is purely *one*?

Matter by itself can never intertain *abstracted* and *general ideas*, such as many in our minds are (*a*). For could it reflect upon what passes within itself, it could possibly find there nothing but *material* and *particular* impressions; abstractions and metaphysical ideas could not be printed upon it (*b*). How could one abstract *from matter* who is himself nothing *but matter*? And then as to *material* images themselves, which are usually supposed to be impress upon the brain (or some part of it), and stock the *phantasy* and *memory*, that which peruses the impressions and traces there (or any where) must be something distinct from the *brain*, or *that* upon which these impressions are made: otherwise it must contemplate itself, and be both *reader* and *book*. And this other distinct contemplating *being* cannot be merely corporeal, any more than the body can perceive and think without a soul. For such a corporeal being must require *sense*, and suitable *organs*, to perceive and read these characters and *vestigia* of things; and so *another* organized body would be introduced, and the same questions and difficulties redoubled, concerning the soul of that body and its faculties (*c*).

If my *soul* was mere matter, external visible objects could only be perceived within me according to the *impressions* they make upon matter, and not otherwise. *Ex. gr.* the image of a *cube* in my mind (or my idea of a cube) must be always under some particular *prospect*, and conform to the rules of *perspective*; nor could I otherwise represent it to myself: whereas now I can form an idea of it as it is *in itself*, and almost view all its *hedræ* at once, as it were incompassing it with my mind.

I can within myself *correct* the external appearances and impressions of objects; and advance, upon the reports and hints received by my senses, to form ideas of things that are *not extant* in matter. By seeing a *material circle* I may learn to form the idea of a *circle*, or figure generated by the revolution of a ray about its center: but then recollecting what I know of matter upon other occasions, I can conclude there is no *exact* material circle. So that I have an idea, which perhaps was raised from the hints I received *from without*, but is *not truly* to be found there. If I see a *tower* at a great distance, which according to the impressions made upon my material organs seems

(*a*) *Diogenes*, tho he could see the *table*, and the *pot*, could not by his eyes see *Plato's* τραπεζότης, & κυαθότης. *Diog. L.* (*b*) *Plato*, & οἱ σοφοὶ (more generally) say, that the soul indeed perceives objects of sense by the mediation of the body; but there are νοητὰ, which it doth καθ' αὑτὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι. *Id.* (*c*) Such a soul must be indeed as *Greg. Thaum.* has it σῶμα ἔμψυχον. Ἄτοπον ἡ ψυχῆς ψυχὴν λέγειν.

little

little and *round*, I do not therefore conclude it to be *either*: there is ſomething within, that reaſons upon the circumſtances of the appearance, and as it were commands my ſenſe, and corrects the impreſſion: and this muſt be ſomething ſuperior to matter, ſince a *material ſoul* is no otherwiſe impreſſible itſelf, but as *material organs* are. Inſtances of this kind are endleſs. (*v.* p. 53, 54).

If we know any thing of *matter*, we know, that *by itſelf* it is a lifeleſs thing, inert, and paſſive only; and acts *neceſſarily* (or rather is acted) according to the laws of motion and gravitation. This paſſiveneſs ſeems to be *eſſential* to it. And if we know any thing of *our ſelves*, we know, that we are conſcious of our own exiſtence and acts (*i. e.* that we *live*); that we have a degree of *freedom*; that we can move our ſelves *ſpontaneouſly*; and in ſhort, that we can, in many inſtances, take off the effect of gravitation, and impreſs new motions upon our ſpirits (or give them new directions), *only by a thought*. Therefore to make *mere matter* do all this is to change the *nature* of it; to change death into life, incapacity of thinking into cogitativity, neceſſity into liberty. And to ſay, that God may *ſuperadd* a faculty of thinking, moving itſelf, *&c.* to matter, if by this be meant, that he may make matter to be the *ſuppoſitum* of theſe faculties (that ſubſtance, in which they inhere), is the ſame in effect as to ſay, that God may ſuperadd a faculty of *thinking* to *incogitativity*, of acting *freely* to *neceſſity*, and ſo on. What ſenſe is there in this? And yet ſo it muſt be, while matter continues to be matter.

That *faculty of thinking*, ſo much talked of by ſome as ſuperadded to certain *ſyſtems* of matter, fitly diſpoſed, by virtue of God's omnipotence, tho it be ſo called, muſt *in reality* amount to the ſame thing as another *ſubſtance* with the faculty of thinking. For a faculty of thinking *alone* will not make up the idea of a human *ſoul*, which is indued with *many faculties*; apprehending, reflecting, comparing, judging, making deductions and reaſoning, willing, putting the body in motion, continuing the animal functions by its preſence, and giving life; and therefore, *whatever it is* that is ſuperadded, it muſt be *ſomething* which is indued with all thoſe other faculties. And whether that can be a *faculty of thinking*, and ſo theſe other faculties be only *faculties of a faculty* (*a*); or whether they muſt not all be rather the faculties of ſome

(*a*) This is worſe than ψυχὴ ψυχῆς in *Max. Tyr.* and the place juſt before cited. The author of the *Eſſay conc. Hum. Underſt.* has himſelf exploded it, or what is very like it. *To ask*, ſays he, *whether the will has freedom, is to ask whether one power has another power, one ability another ability; a queſtion at firſt ſight too groſly abſurd to make a diſpute, or need an anſwer. For who is it that ſees not, that powers belong only to agents, and are attributes only of ſubſtances, and not of powers themſelves?* There is, if my memory does not deceive me, another paſſage ſome where in the ſame book as much (or more) to my purpoſe: but at preſent I cannot find it.

ſubſtance (*a*), which, being (by their own conceſſion) *ſuperadded* to matter, muſt be *different* from it, I leave to the unprejudiced to determin.

If men would but ſeriouſly look into themſelves, I am perſuaded the *ſoul* would not appear to them as a *faculty* of the body, or kind of *appurtenance* to it; but rather as ſome *ſubſtance*, properly placed in it, not only to uſe it as an inſtrument, and act by it, but alſo to govern it (or the parts of it; as the tongue, hands, feet, *&c.*) according to its own reaſon. For I think it is plain enough, that the *mind*, tho it acts under great limitations, doth however in many inſtances *govern* the body *arbitrarily*: and it is monſtrous to ſuppoſe this governor to be nothing but ſome fit *diſpoſition* or *accident* (ſuperadded) of that matter which is governed. A *ſhip* it is true would not be fit for *navigation*, if it was not built and provided in a proper manner: but then, when it has its proper form, and is become a *ſyſtem* of materials fitly diſpoſed, it is not this *diſpoſition* that governs it. It is the *man*, that other ſubſtance, who ſits at the helm, and they, who manage the ſails and tackle, that do this. So *our veſſels* without a proper organization and conformity of parts would not be capable of being acted as they are; but ſtill it is not the ſhape, or modification, or any other accident, that can govern them. The *capacity* of being governed or uſed can never be the *governor*, applying and uſing (*b*) that capacity. No there muſt be at the helm *ſomething diſtinct*, that commands the body, and without which it would run adrift, or rather ſink.

For the foregoing reaſons it ſeems to me, that *matter* cannot think, cannot *be made* to think. But if a *faculty of thinking* can be ſuperadded to a ſyſtem of matter, without uniting an immaterial ſubſtance to it (*c*); I ſay, if this *can be*, yet a *human body* is not ſuch a ſyſtem, being plainly void of thought, and organized in ſuch a manner as to tranſmit the impreſſions of ſenſible objects up to the brain, where the *percipient*, and that which *reflects* upon them, certainly reſides: and therefore that, which *there* apprehends, thinks, and wills, muſt be *that ſyſtem of matter* to which a faculty of thinking is ſuperadded. All the premiſſes then well conſiderd, judge I beſeech you, whether inſtead of ſaying, that this *inhabitant* of our heads (the *ſoul*) is a ſyſtem of matter, to which a faculty of thinking is ſuperadded, it might not be more reaſonable to ſay, it is *a thinking ſubſtance intimately united to ſome fine material vehicle, which has its reſidence in*

(*a*) If the ſoul is only an accident (or attribute) of the *body*, how comes this accident to have (or be the ſupport of) other accidents, contrary ones too? As when we ſay, a wiſe ſoul, and a fooliſh ſoul, *S. Haemun.* (*b*) Ἕτερον δὴ τότε χρώμενον ᾧ οὐ χρῆται. *Plato.* (*c*) Or, *if to a thinking ſubſtance can be ſuperadded the modification of ſolidity.* Which way of ſpeaking, tho I do not remember to have met with it any where, nor doth it ſeem to differ much from the other, yet would pleaſe me better.

the

the brain. Tho I underſtand not perfectly the manner, how a *cogitative* and *ſpiritual* ſubſtance can be thus cloſely united to ſuch a *material* vehicle; yet I can underſtand this union as well, as how it can be united to the body in general (perhaps, as how the particles of the body itſelf cohere together), and much better than how a thinking faculty can be ſuperadded to matter: and beſide, ſeveral *phænomena* may more eaſily be ſolved by this *hypotheſis*; which (tho I ſhall not pertinaciouſly maintain it) in ſhort is this. *Viz.* that the human *ſoul* is a *cogitative* ſubſtance, clothed in a *material* vehicle, or rather united to it, and as it were *inſeparably* mixt (I had almoſt ſaid *incorporated*) with it (*a*): that theſe act in *conjunction*, that, which affects the one, affecting the other: that the *ſoul* is detaind in the *body* (the head or brain) by ſome *ſympathy* or *attraction* between this material vehicle and it, till the habitation is ſpoild, and this mutual tendency interrupted (and perhaps turned into an averſion, that makes it fly off), by ſome hurt, or diſeaſe, or by the decays and ruins of old age, or the like, happening to the body: and that in the *interim* by means of this vehicle motions and impreſſions are communicated to and fro. But of this perhaps ſomething more by and by.

VIII. *The ſoul of man ſubſiſts after the diſſolution of his body*: or, *is immortal.* For,

1. If it is *immaterial*, it is *indiſcerpible*, and therefore *incapable* of being diſſolved or demoliſhd, as bodies are (*b*). Such a being can only periſh by *annihilation*: that is, it will continue to ſubſiſt and live, if ſome other being, able to do this, doth not by a particular act *annihilate* it. And if there is any reaſon to believe, that at the death of every man there is always ſuch a particular annihilation, let him that knows it produce it. Certainly to reduce any *ſubſtance* into *nothing* requires juſt the ſame power as to convert *nothing* into *ſomething*: and I fancy they, who deny the immortality of the ſoul, will be cautious how they admit any ſuch power.

2. If the ſoul *could be* material; that is, if there could be any *matter*, that might be the ſubject of thoſe faculties of thinking, willing, *&c.* yet ſtill, ſince we cannot but be ſenſible, that all theſe are faculties of the *ſelf-ſame thing*; and that all the ſeveral acts of the mind are acts of the *ſame thing*, each of them *individual* and truly *one*: I ſay, ſince it is ſo, this matter muſt be ſo *perfectly united* in itſelf, ſo abſo-

(*a*) *It is worth our conſideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of ſpirit, and paſſive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created ſpirits are not totally ſeparate from matter, becauſe they are both active and paſſive. Pure ſpirit,* viz. *God, is only active; pure matter is only paſſive; thoſe Beings, that are both active and paſſive, we may judge to partake of both.* Hum. underſt. (*b*) This is *Socrates*'s argument in *Plato.* The ſoul is altogether ἀδιάλυτον, and therefore ἀνώλεθρον. Which *Cicero* inteprets thus: *nec diſcerpi, nec diſtrahi poteſt; nec interire igitur.*

lutely

lutely *one*, as no matter knowable by us can be. And then the *leaſt* that can be allowd is that it ſhould be truly ſolid, and not *actually diviſible*; that is, ſuch as no *natural cauſe* could deſtroy.

To introduce matter with a faculty of thinking, or a *thinking matter*, is to introduce matter with a new and oppoſite property; and that is to introduce a *new ſpecies* of matter (*a*), which will differ as eſſentially from the other common *unthinking* kind, as any ſpecies whatſoever doth from its oppoſite in *ſcala prædicamentali*, even as *body* doth from *ſpirit*. For thinking and unthinking differ as corporeal and incorporeal. And if ſo, this *thinking matter* muſt always continue to think, till either it is *annihilated*, or there is a *tranſmutation* of one ſpecies into another: and to take refuge in either of theſe expectations is at leaſt to expect omnipotence ſhould interpoſe to help out a bad cauſe.

If any one ſhould ſay, that God might by virtue of his omnipotence ſuperadd to certain parcels of matter a *fourth dimenſion*, I ſhould not perhaps diſpute the Divine power: but I might ſay, that ſuch matter, exiſting under four dimenſions, would *eſſentially* differ from that, which cannot exiſt under four, or which can exiſt but *only under three*; and that this four-dimenſiond matter muſt *always* remain ſuch, becauſe no ſubſtance can be changed into or become another, eſſentially different, nor do we know of any, that by the courſe of nature ceaſes totally to be, or is reduced to nothing.

3. The next argument ſhall proceed by way of *objection* and *anſwer*. Becauſe a removal of the principal objection *againſt* any thing is a good argument *for it*. *Obj.* It ſeems as if *thinking* was not eſſential to the ſoul, but rather a *capacity of thinking* under certain circumſtances. For it doth *not think*, when it lies conceald in the primitive rudiment of the man, in the womb, perhaps in the beginnings of infancy, in ſleep, in a ſwoon: and the reaſon of this ſeems to lie in the circumſtances of the *body*, which either is not ſufficiently extended, and prepared; or for a while imploys the ſpirits wholly in the digeſtion of its aliment, and other offices in the animal œconomy; or by ſome external attack, or the working of ſome enemy got into it, hath its parts diſorderd, and the paſſages ſo poſſeſt, that the blood and other fluids can ſcarce break through; or after ſome ſuch manner is preternaturally affected. And therefore the queſtion to be reſolved is not, whether the ſoul is *material* or *immaterial*; and much leſs, whether it will be *annihilated* at death; but, whether that ſoul (be it what it will), which ceaſes to think, when the body is *not fitly diſpoſed*,

(*a*) *Lucretius* ſeems to be aware of this. *Jam triplex animi eſt natura reperta: Nec tamen hæc ſat ſunt ad ſenſum cuncta creandum*; &c. *Quarta quoq; his igitur* quædam natura *neceſſe eſt Attribuatur: ea eſt omnino* nominis expers.

can

can think at all, when the body is *quite diſſolved*, and leaves the ſoul no opportunity of actuating it any more, or operating by it (*a*). *Anſ.* If this objection cannot be fully anſwerd, till we know more of the nature of *ſpiritual* beings, and of that *vinculum*, by which the ſoul and body are connected, than we do at preſent, it muſt not therefore be lookd upon as certainly *unanſwerable* in it ſelf; and much leſs, if only it cannot be anſwerd *by me*. It may perhaps be poſſible to turn it even into an argument *for the immortality of the ſoul*.

The ſoul it cannot be denied is a limited being, or a being, which acts *under limitations*: theſe limitations at different times are *different*, its activity and faculties being more obſtructed or clogd at *one time* than *another*, and moſt of all in ſleep, or a *deliquium*: as theſe obſtructions are removed, it acts more *clearly* and *freely*: and therefore if the ſtate of the ſoul in the body (its confinement there) may be conſiderd as one *general* and *great limitation*, why, when this limitation ſhall be taken off (this great obſtruction removed), may it (*b*) not be allowed to act with ſtill *greater* freedom and clearneſs; the *greateſt* it is capable of? Whilſt it remains in the brain, it can as it were look out at a *few apertures*; that is, receive the notices of many things by thoſe nerves and organs, which are the inſtruments of *ſenſation*: but if any of thoſe avenues to it be ſtopt, that branch of its knowledge is for a time cut off. If thoſe tracks in the brain, or thoſe *marks*, whatever they are, and where ever they are imprinted upon which our *memory* and *images* of things ſeem to depend, are filled up or overcaſt by any vapor, or otherwiſe darkend, it can read them no more, till the cloud is diſperſed. (For it cannot *read* what is not *legible*, and indeed for the preſent not there.) And ſince even in *abſtracted reflections* the mind is obliged to make uſe of *words* (*c*), or ſome kind of ſigns, to fix its ideas, and to render them tractable and ſtable enough to be peruſed, compared, *&c.* and this kind of *language* depends upon *memory*; whilſt this is intermitted, the uſe of the other is taken away, with all that depends upon it. This is the *preſent ſtate* of the ſoul: and from hence the reaſon appears in ſome meaſure, why we do not think in ſound *ſleep*, &c. but it does not follow from hence, that the ſoul cannot ſubſiſt and act under *more inlarged circumſtances*. That, which, being confined to the body, and able to act only according

(*a*) If *Lucan* by *ſenſus* means all manner of apprehenſion and knowledge, there is no room for that disjunction: *Aut nihil eſt ſenſus animis à morte relictum, Aut mors ipſa nihil.* For if the former part be true, the other will follow. (*b*) *Velut è diutino carcere emiſſus* [*animus*]. Sen. (*c*) Thoſe kinds of animals, which do not *ſpeak*, do not *reaſon*: but thoſe, which do the one, do the other. Therefore a *ſpeaking animal* (or *Arab. Natak*) is a *rational animal*: and λόγος ſignifies both *ſpeech* and *reaſon*, as going together.

to

to the opportunities this affords, can now perceive viſible objects only with *two eyes* (at two windows (*a*), becauſe there *are no more*, might doubtleſs ſee with *four*, if there were ſo many properly placed and diſpoſed; or if its habitation were *all eye* (window all round), might ſee all round. And ſo, in general, that, which now can know many things by the impreſſions made at the ends of the nerves, or by the intervention of our preſent organs, and in this *ſituation* and *incloſure* can know them no other way, may for all that, when it comes to be *loeſed* out of that priſon (*b*), know them *immediately*, or by ſome *other medium*. That, which is now forced to make ſhift with *words* and *ſigns* of things in its reaſonings, may, when it ſhall be ſet at liberty and can come at them, reaſon upon the intuition of *things themſelves*, or uſe a language more *ſpiritual* or *ideal*. I ſay, it is not *impoſſible*, that this ſhould be the caſe; and therefore no one can ſay, *with reaſon*, that it is not: eſpecially, ſince we find by experience, that the ſoul is limited; that the limitations are variable; that we know not enough of the nature of ſpirit to determin, how theſe limitations are effected: and therefore cannot tell, how far they may be carried on, or taken off. This ſuffices to *remove the force* of the objection. But further,

A man, when he *wakes*, or *comes to himſelf* (which phraſe implies what I am going to ſay), immediately knows this, and knows himſelf to be the *ſame ſoul* that he was before his ſleep, or fainting away. I will ſuppoſe, that he is alſo conſcious to himſelf, that in thoſe intervals he thought *not at all* (which is the ſame the objector muſt ſuppoſe): *that is*, if his body had been cut to pieces, or mouldred to duſt, he could not have thought *leſs*: for there is no thinking leſs than thinking *not at all*. From hence then I gather, that the ſoul *preſerves* a capacity of thinking, *&c.* under thoſe circumſtances and indiſpoſitions of the body, in which it thinks *no more*, than if the body was *deſtroyd*; and that therefore it may, and will *preſerve* it, when the body is deſtroyd. And if ſo, what can this *capacity* be preſerved for? Certainly *not*, that it may *never* be exerted. The Author of nature doth not uſe to act after *that manner*. So that here is this *dilemma* to be oppoſed to the objection. In ſleep and ſwoonings the ſoul doth either *think*, or *not*. If it *does*, the objection has no foundation: and if it *doth not*, then all that will follow, which I have juſt now ſaid.

If we ſhould ſuppoſe the *ſoul* to be a being by nature made to inform ſome *body*, and that it cannot exiſt and act in a ſtate of *total ſeparation* from all body; it would not follow from hence, that what we call death, muſt therefore reduce it

(*a*) Θυρίδες γὰρ ἔντος ἡ ψυχῆς αἱ αἰσθήσεις. *Baſ.* τὸς θιάτρῳ διημειγμένα. *Ph. J.*

(*b*) Ἄσαρκος ἡ ἀσώματος ἐν τῷ τῶ παντὸς

to

to a ſtate of abſolute *inſenſibility* and *inactivity*, which to it would be equal to *non-exiſtence*. For that *body*, which is ſo neceſſary to it, may be ſome *fine vehicle*, that dwells with it in the brain (according to that *hypotheſis* p. 193.) and goes off with it at death. Neither the anſwers to the objection, nor the caſe after death will be much alterd by ſuch a *ſuppoſition*. And ſince I confeſs I ſee no abſurdity in it, I will try to explain it a little further. We are ſenſible of many *material* impreſſions (impreſſions made upon us by material cauſes, or bodies): that there are ſuch we are ſure. Therefore there muſt be *ſome matter* within us, which being moved or preſſed upon, the ſoul apprehends it *immediately*. And therefore, again, there muſt be *ſome matter* to which it is *immediately* and *intimately united*, and *related* in ſuch a manner, as it is *not related* to any other. Let us now ſuppoſe this ſaid *matter* to be ſome refined and ſpirituous *vehicle* (*a*), which the ſoul doth immediately inform; with which it ſympathizes; by which it acts, and is acted upon; and to which it is *vitally* and *inſeparably* united: and that this animated vehicle has its abode in the *brain*, among the heads and beginnings of the nerves. Suppoſe we alſo, that when any *impreſſions* are made upon the organs or parts of the body, the effects of them are carried by the *nerves* up to their fountain, and the place, where the ſoul in its vehicle is; and there they communicate their ſeveral motions or tremors to this material *vehicle* (or by their motions, or tendency to motion, preſs upon it); ſo that the *ſoul*, which inhabits it in a peculiar manner, and is throughly poſſeſt of it, ſhall be apprehenſive of theſe motions or preſſures: and moreover, that this *vehicle* ſo *guarded* and *incompaſſed* by the body as it is, can be *come at* or *moved* by external objects no other way, but by the mediation of the nerves; nor the *ſoul*, by conſequence, have any direct intelligence concerning them, or correſpondence with them, any *other* way. And as we ſuppoſe the *ſoul* to receive notices of things from without in this manner, ſo let us ſuppoſe, on the other ſide, that by moving its own *vehicle* it may produce motion in the contiguous *ſpi-*

(*a*) So *Hieroclet* diſtinguiſhes τὸ αὐγοειδὲς ἡμῶν σῶμα, ὁ ἐν ψυχῆς λεπτὸν ὄχημα, from that, which he calls τὸ θνητὸν ἡμῶν σῶμα, and to which the former communicates life. Τῷ αὐγοειδεῖ ἡμῶν σώματι προσέφυ σῶμα θνητὸν ὄν. *Id.* This fine body he calls alſo ψυχικὸν σῶμα, and πνευματικὸν ὄχημα. In *Niſhm. bhaiy.* there is much concerning that *fine body*, in which the ſoul is clothed, and from which it is never to be ſeparated, according to an old tradition. *Men. h Iſr.* gives us the ſum of it in ſuch words as theſe. There is a very thin or refined body, with which the ſoul is clothed before it comes into the world. The ſouls when they are firſt created, are joyned to their bodies naturally ſpiritual; heavenly things are not perceived by the bodily ſight. And the ſouls are never ſeparated from thoſe fine ſpiritual bodies, neither before they come into the body, nor whilſt they are in it, nor after they are parted from it. *Saadias* long before him joins to the ſoul, a fine ſubſtance; which he ſays is finer or purer than the chryſtal of the eye, *&c.*

 rits

rits and *nerves*, and ſo move the body: I mean, when nothing renders them unfit to be moved. Let us ſuppoſe further, that the *ſoul* by means of this *vehicle* feels or finds thoſe prints and portraits, or thoſe *effects* and *remains* left by objects on the mind in ſome manner or other, which cauſe the *remembrance* of words and things: I mean again, when they are not filled up, or obſcured by any thing; or, when there are any ſuch to be felt. And laſtly, let us ſuppoſe, that if the *ſoul* in its more *abſtracted* and *purer* reaſonings, or more ſpiritual acts, has any occaſion for *matter*, to ſerve it, the matter of this *vehicle* is that which is always with it, and ſerves it. All which it is eaſy to underſtand, and perhaps not very difficult to ſuppoſe. On the contrary, by many ſymptoms it appears moſt probable, that *that* matter, to which the mind is *immediately* preſent, and in which is its true *ſhekinah*, is not the whole groſs body, but ſome *ſubtile body*, placed (as I have ſaid) in the region of the brain. For *there* all the conveyances of ſenſible *ſpecies* conſpire to meet, and *there* in reflexion we find our ſelves: when a limb is loſt, the ſoul, 'tis true, loſes an *opportunity* of receiving intelligence from or by it, and of uſing it, but perceives no loſs *in itſelf*: and tho the *body*, many parts of it at leaſt, are in a perpetual flux and continually altering, yet I know that the ſubſtance, which *thinks* within me *now* (or rather, which is I), is, notwithſtanding all the changes my body has undergone, the *very ſame* which *thought* above fifty years ago, and ever ſince; when I playd in ſuch a field, went to ſuch a ſchool, was of ſuch a univerſity, performed ſuch and ſuch exerciſes, *&c.*(*a*). If you would permit me to uſe a ſchool term, I would ſay the *egoity* (*b*) remains. Now to *anſwer* the objection, and apply all this to our purpoſe. Why do we not perceive external objects in our *ſleep*, or a *ſwoon*? Becauſe the *paſſages* are become impracticable, the *windows* ſhut, and the *nerves*, being obſtructed, or ſome how renderd for the time uſeleſs, can tranſmit no information to it. Why however does it not reaſon and think about *ſomething or other*? Becauſe, all the *marks* by which things are rememberd being for the preſent choked up or diſorderd, the remembrance of thoſe *objects*, about which it is wont to employ itſelf, and even of the *words* (or other ſigns), in which it uſes to reaſon, and to preſerve the deductions and concluſions it makes, is all ſuſpended and loſt for the time; and ſo its tables being coverd, its books cloſed, and its tools lockd up, the requiſites for reaſoning are wanting, and no ſubject offers itſelf, to exerciſe its thoughts, it having yet had little or no opportu-

(*a*) *Cùm corpora quotidie noſtra fluant, & aut creſcant aut decreſcant, ergo tot erimus homines, quot quotidie commutamur? aut alius fui, cùm decem annorum eſſem; alius, cum triginta; alius cum quinquaginta, alius, cùm jam toto cano capite ſum?* S. Hier. So it muſt be, if our ſouls are nothing different from our bodies. (*b*) *Tully* has *Lentulitas* and *Appietas*; in the ſame form, tho not juſt the like ſenſe.

nity

nity to take in *higher objects*, and more *refined matter* for contemplation. And to conclude, if it be demanded, why any one ſhould imagin, that the *ſoul* may think, perceive, act *after death*, when it doth not do this *in ſleep*, &c. the anſwer is; becauſe thoſe *incloſures* and *impediments*, which occaſiond the forementiond intermiſſions, and thoſe great limitations under which it labors at all times, will be *removed* with its inlargement out of the body. When it ſhall in its *proper* vehicle be let go, and take its flight into the open fields of heaven, it will then be bare to the *immediate* impreſſions of objects: and why ſhould not thoſe impreſſions, which affected the *nerves* that moved and affected the vehicle and ſoul in it, *affect the vehicle immediately*, when they are *immediately* made upon it, without the interpoſition of the nerves? The *hand*, which feels an object at the end of a *ſtaff*, may certainly be allowd to feel the ſame much better by *immediate contact*, without the ſtaff. Nay, why ſhould we not think, that it may admit of *more* objects and the knowledge of more things, than it can now; ſince being expoſed *all round* to the influences of them, it may be moved not only by viſible objects juſt at the extremities of the *optic* nerves, by ſounds at the ends of the *auditory*, &c. but become as it were *all eye* to viſible objects, *all ear* to audible, and ſo on? And why ſhould we not think this the rather, becauſe then the *ſoul* may be alſo perceptive of *finer* impreſſions and *ethereal* contacts, and conſequently of *more kinds* of objects, ſuch as we are now incapable of knowing? And then, this being ſo, why ſhould we not preſage, that *other indowments*, as faculties of reaſoning, communicating thoughts, and the like, will be *proportionable* to ſuch noble opportunities of knowledge? There ſeems to be nothing in this account *impoſſible*; and therefore nothing, but what *may be*.

If we do but attend, we muſt ſee every where, that *many* things are by ways, which we *do not*, nor *can* underſtand; and therefore we muſt be convinced, even from hence, that *more* may be; and therefore that the objection before us, tho we could not ſalve the *difficulties* in it, and what is ſuppoſed here ſhould be all rejected as *chimerical*, yet ought to be no prejudice againſt the belief of the immortality of the ſoul, if there is *any* (*but one*) good reaſon for it.

But if we can in any *tolerable* manner (which in our preſent circumſtances is as much, as can be expected) account for the difficulties objected, and thoſe the *greateſt* belonging to this matter, and ſhew how it is *poſſible* that they may conſiſt with immortality, this will greatly *corroborate* the arguments for it, if not be one *itſelf*. This I hope is done: or if I have not ſpoke directly to *every part* of the objection, from what has been done that defect may eaſily be ſupplied.

4. We may conclude the ſouls of men to be immortal from the *nature of God*. For if he is (which ſure no body doubts) a perfect being, He, as ſuch, can do nothing in-

conſiſtent with *perfect* or *right reaſon*. And then no *being*, nor *circumſtance* of any being, can come from him as its cauſe, which it is not agreeable to *ſuch reaſon* ſhould be: or (which is the ſame), He cannot but deal *reaſonably* with all His dependents. And then again, if we are in the number of theſe, and the *mortality* of the human ſoul does not conſiſt with reaſon, we may be ſure it is *immortal*: as ſure as we can be of any thing by the uſe of our faculties; and that is, as ſure as we can be of any thing. Whether therefore that doth *conſiſt* with reaſon, or *not*, is to be inquired.

To produce a being into a ſtate of *clear happineſs*, in any degree, can be no injury to it; or into a ſtate of *mixt happineſs*, provided the happineſs certainly *overbalances* the contrary, and the unhappy or ſuffering part be not greater than what that being would *chooſe* in order to obtain the happineſs, or rather than loſe it. Nor, again, can any wrong be done by producing a being *ſubject* to more miſery than happineſs, if that being hath it in *his own power* to avoid the miſery, or ſo much of it, as may leave the remainder of miſery not greater, than what he would rather ſuſtain than miſs the proportion of happineſs. The only caſe then, by which wrong can be done in the production of any being, is, when it is *neceſſarily* and *irremediably* to be *miſerable*, without any recompenſe, or balance of that miſery (*a*): and this indeed is a caſe ſo grievous, ſo utterly irreconcilable to all *reaſon*, that the heart of a reaſoning and conſidering man can ſcarce bear the thought of it. So much every one muſt underſtand of the nature of reaſon and juſtice as to allow theſe things for truths inconteſtable.

Now then he, who ſays the *ſoul* of man is *mortal*, muſt ſay one of theſe *two* things: either that God is an unreaſonable, unjuſt, cruel Being; or that no man, in reſpect of this life (which according to him is *all*), has a greater ſhare of miſery, *unavoidable*, than of happineſs. To ſay the *former* is to contradict that, which I preſume has been proved beyond contradiction. To which I may add here, that this is to avow ſuch an unworthy, impious notion of the *Supreme being*, as one would not entertain without caution even of the *worſt of men*; ſuch a one, as even the perſon himſelf, who ſays this, muſt know to be *falſe*. For he cannot but ſee, and muſt own many inſtances of the *reaſonableneſs* and *beneficence* of the Deity: not *one* of which could be, if cruelty and unreaſonableneſs were His inclination; ſince He has power to execute His own inclinations *thoroughly*, and is a Being *uniform* in his nature. Then to ſay the *latter* is to contradict the *whole ſtory* of mankind, and even *ones own ſenſes*.

(*a*) That paſſage in *S. Iqquar.* imports much the ſame thing, that has been ſaid here: If the nature of a thing be declared to be good, then it is fit it ſhould exiſt. But if the nature of it be bad, then it is not fit, that it ſhould exiſt. And the thing whoſe nature is mixt of good and bad, if the good be greater, it is fit, it ſhould exiſt; but if the bad prevails, it is not fit, that it ſhould exiſt.

Conſi-

Conſider well the dreadful effects of many *wars*, and all thoſe barbarous deſolations, which we read of: what cruel *tyrants* there are, and have been in the world who (at leaſt in their fits) *divert themſelves* with the pangs and convulſions of their fellow-creatures (*a*): what *ſlavery* is (*b*), and *how* men have been brought into that lamentable ſtate: how many have been ruind by *accidents* unforeſeen: how many have ſuffered or been undone by *unjuſt* laws, judges, witneſſes, *&c.* (*c*). how many have brought *incurable diſeaſes*, or the *Cauſes* of them, and of great torments, into the world with them: how many more, ſuch bodily infirmitie sand diſadvantages, as have renderd their *whole lives* uneaſy: how many are born to no other inheritance but *invincible poverty* and trouble? Inſtances are endleſs: but, for a *little taſte* of the condition of mankind here, reflect upon that ſtory related by *Strabo* (from *Polybius*) and *Plutarch*, where, even by order of the *Roman* ſenate, *P. Emilius*, one of the beſt of them too, at one prefixt hour ſacked and deſtroyd *ſeventy* cities, unawares, and drove *fifteen myriads* of innocent perſons into *captivity*; to be ſold, only to raiſe pay for the mercileſs ſoldiers and their own executioners. Peruſe that account of the gold-works in the confines of *Egypt* given by *Diodorus:* and think over the circumſtances of the unfortunate laborers there, who were not only criminals, or men taken in war, but even ſuch as *calumny*, or *unjuſt* power had doomd (perhaps for being *too good*) to that place of torment; many times with

(*a*) *C. Cæſar---Senatores & Equites---cecidit, torſit, non quæſtionis, ſed* animi causâ. *Deinde quoſdam ex illis----ad lucernam decollabat.----Torſerat per omnia, qua in rerum natura triſtiſſima ſunt, fidiculis,* &c. Sen. *Homo, ſacra res, jam per* luſum *&* jocum *occiditur.* Id. (*b*) Slaves were reckond among beaſts of old. Οὔτε γὰρ γωὴ πίφυκας, οὔτ' ἂ ἀνδράσι σύγ' ἴσ. *Eurip.* And ſometimes as mere inſtruments and tools. Ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον· τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος. *Ariſt.* Their ſad condition I will ſet down in *Plato*'s words. Οὐκ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶ τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ ἀνδραπόδου τινὸς, ᾧ κρεῖττον τεθνάναι ἐστιν ἢ ζῆν· ὅστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος, μὴ ἔχοι ἐστὶν ἀυτὸς ἀυτῷ βοηθεῖν, μηδὲ ἄλλῳ ὅ ἂν κήδηται. (*c*) Thoſe ἄῤῥητοι καὶ ἄπιστοι δυσυχίαι, which the τελῶναι had brought upon the cities of *Aſia*, are too many to be tranſcribed: but ſome account of them is to be ſeen in *Plut. v. Luc.* which may ſerve for one inſtance out of thouſands. It may be reckond madneſs indeed *maximas virtutes, quaſi graviſſima delicta, punire*; as *Val. M.* ſays, ſpeaking of *Phocion*'s caſe: but ſuch madneſs has been very common, and men have ſufferd even for their virtue. *Ochus* cruelly put to death, *Ocham ſororem---, & patruum cum centum amplius filiis ac nepotibus----, nulla injuria laceſſitus, ſed quod in his maximam apud Perſas* probitatis *& fortitudinis laudem conſiſtere videbat.* Id. And *Seneca* having recommended the example of *Gracinus Julius* (*Julius Gracinus, ap. Tacit.* the father of *Julius Agricola*), adds, *quem C. Cæſar occidit ob hoc unum, quòd melior vir erat, quàm eſſe quemquam tyranno expediret.*

all

all their relations and poor *children* (*a*). Or, once for all, take a view of *ſervitude*, as it is deſcribed by *Pignorius*. To paſs over the *Sicilian* tyrants, him of *Pheræ*, *Appollodorus* (*b*), and the like, of which hiſtory ſupplies plenty; conſider thoſe terrible proſcriptions among the *Romans* (*c*); with the reigns of moſt of their *emperors*, more bloody than *Lybic* lion, or *Hyrcanian* tiger, even ſome of the *Chriſtian* emperors not excepted. Read the direful and unjuſt executions reported by *Amm. Marcellinus*: among hundreds of others that of *Euſebius* (*d*). Every *whiſper* in thoſe times or *light ſuſpicion* brought upon men the queſtion and tortures inconceivable. Men's very *dreams* were once interpreted to be treaſon; and they durſt ſcarce own, that they had ever ſlept (*e*). What inhuman puniſhments were uſed among the *Perſians* (*f*), in an arbitrary manner too; and many times extended to whole families, and all the kindred, tho not concerned (*g*)? But inſtead of enumerating here burnings, crucifixions, breakings upon the wheel, impalings, σκαφισμὸς, &c. I chooſe to refer you to thoſe authors, who have deſignedly treated of the *torments* and *queſtions* of the ancients. Look into the hiſtory of the *Chriſtian Church*, and her martyrologies: examin the priſons of the *inquiſition*, the *groans* of which thoſe walls are conſcious, and upon what *ſlight* occaſions men are rackd and tortured by the tormentors there: and, to finiſh this detail (hideous indeed, but too true) as faſt as I can, conſider the many maſſacres, perſecutions, and miſeries conſequent upon them, which *falſe religion* has cauſed, authorized, ſanctified. Indeed the *hiſtory* of mankind is little elſe but the hiſtory of uncomfortable, dreadful paſſages: and a great part of it, however things are palliated and gilded over, is ſcarcely to be red by a *good natured* man without amazement, horror, tears. One can ſcarce look into a *news-paper*, or out at his *window*, but hardſhips and ſufferings preſent themſelves, in one ſhape or other. Now among all *thoſe millions*, who have ſufferd *eminently*, can it be imagind, that there have not been *multitudes*, whoſe griefs and pangs have *far outweighd* all their injoyments; and yet who have not been able, either by their innocence, their

(*a*) Οἱ ἀδίκοις διαβολαῖς περιπεσόντες, ἢ διὰ θυμὸν εἰς φυλακὰς παραδεδομένοι, ποτὲ μὲν αὐτοὶ, ποτὲ δ' ἢ μετὰ πάσης συγγενείας. (*b*) Mentiond by *Cicero* with *Phalaris*. He was tyrant of *Caſſandria*, and is repreſented (out of *Polyænus*) as φονικώτατον ἢ ὠμότατον πάντων, ὅσοι παρ' Ἕλλησιν ἢ παρὰ Βαρβάροις ἐτυράννησαν. Yet *Ælian* ſays, Ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ὑπανθρωπότερον ἢ ὑπεξαπλόμενον, ἐγένετο φονικώτερος, κλ. (*c*) It is ſaid of *Sylla*'s *peace*, after *Marius*'s party were broken, *Pax cum bello de crudelitate certavit, & vicit.* S. Auſt. (*d*) *Qui ita eviſceratus, ut cruciatibus membra deeſſent, implorans cælo juſtitiam, torvùm renidens fundato pectore manſit immobilis*, &c. In the reign of *Conſtantius*. (*e*) *Marebantque docti quidam, quòd apud Atlanteos nati non eſſent, ubi memorantur ſomnia non videri.* (*f*) *V. Plut. in v. Artox.* (*g*) *Ob noxam unius omnis propinquitas perit.* Amm. Marc.

prudence

prudence, or any power in them, to eſcape that *bitter draught*, which they have drunk? And then, how can we acquit the *juſtice* and *reaſonableneſs* of that Being, upon whom theſe poor creatures depend, and who leaves them ſuch great loſers by their exiſtence, if there be no *future ſtate*, where the proper amends may be made? So that the argument is brought to this undeniable iſſue; if the *ſoul* of man is not *immortal*, either there is *no God*, upon whom we depend; or He is an *unreaſonable Being*; or there never has been *any man*, whoſe ſufferings in this world have exceeded his injoyments, without his being the cauſe of it himſelf. But ſurely *no one* of theſe three things can be ſaid. *Ergo*——

That, which aggravates the *hard caſe* of the poor ſufferers mentiond above, if there be no *future ſtate*, in which their paſt ſufferings may be brought into the account, and recompenſed, is, that many times their *perſecutors* and *tormentors* paſs their lives in plenty and grandeur: that is, the *innocent* have not only the portion, that properly belongs to the criminal and unreaſonable part of mankind, but the *guilty* have that, which belongs rather to the innocent (*a*). Such a *tranſpoſition* of rewards and puniſhments, ending in itſelf, without any reſpect to ſomething which is to follow hereafter, can never conſiſt with the nature of a Governor, who is not very much *below* rational: a thought, which *God forbid* any one ſhould dare to admit of Him. To ſuppoſe the *virtuous* and *wiſe* left ultimately but in the ſame ſtate with the unjuſt and profligate is to ſuppoſe ſuch a *conſtitution* of nature, as never can flow from a principle of reaſon, a God of *truth* and *equity:* and therefore ſuch a conſtitution, as leaves the former in a *worſe* condition than the other, can *much leſs* be ſuppoſed.

Obj. It hath been ſaid, that *virtue* tends to make men's lives happy even here, *&c.* and how then can the virtuous be ſuppoſed ever to be ſo *very miſerable*? *Anſ.* In ordinary caſes *virtue* doth produce happineſs: at leaſt it has indeed a *natural tendency* to it; is the mean, by which it is moſt likely to be attaind; and is therefore the way, which a wiſe man would chooſe for his own ſake. But then it doth not follow from hence, that there are no *perturbations* in human affairs; no caſes, in which the uſual effect of virtue may be *overpowerd* by diſeaſes, violence, dyſaſters. It doth not render men *invulnerable*; cannot command the *ſeaſons*; nor prevent many great calamities, under which virtue and vice muſt fall *undiſtinguiſhd*. (There may be a *direct road* to a place, and ſuch a one, as he, who ſets out for that place, ought to be found in, and yet it is poſſible he may meet with *robbers* or *accidents* in it, that may incommode, or hurt him in his journey.) On the other ſide, *vice* and *wickedneſs* may be ſo circumſtan-

(*a*) *Dies deficiet, ſi velim numerare, quibus bonis malè evenerit: nec minùs, ſi commemorem, quibus improbis optimè*, Cic. This is juſtly ſaid; tho I account his inſtances not the moſt appoſite.

tiated

tiated as to be attended with much greater *pleaſure* than *pain*, contrary to the tendency of its nature; that is, a *wicked man* may be of a healthful make, born to riches or power, or fortunately placed for attaining them; and from the advantage of a ſtrong body, an ample fortune, many friends, or lucky hits, he may derive *pleaſures*, which ſhall exceed the preſent *inconveniences* and *ſufferings* naturally following from his vices (*a*).

Men's *circumſtances* have a natural influence with reſpect to the preſent pleaſures or ſufferings, as well as their *virtue* or *vice*. No body ſure ever ſaid, that *all* depends *only* upon theſe: nor, when the natural tendence of *them* is aſſerted, is the natural tendence or effect of the *other* denied. Therefore indeed, when it is ſaid that virtue *naturally* tends to make men happy even here, the meaning only is, that it tends, to make men happy in *proportion* to their circumſtances; and vice does the *contrary*. It is naturally productive of that part of happineſs, which is in our *own power*, and depends upon *our ſelves*; makes men more truly happy, whatever their circumſtances are, than they could be *without it*; and *commonly* tends to mend their worldly circumſtances too; but it is not aſſerted, that virtue can *always intirely* correct them, or make men ſo *compleatly* happy in this life, as that their injoyments ſhall exceed their mortifications; no more than the vices of ſome particular men, tho they bereave them of many ſolid pleaſures, and bring troubles upon them too, do hinder their worldly injoyments from being greater than their preſent ſufferings. Not only our *being*, but our *place*, with the *time*, and *manner* of our being in this world depend upon the Author of the ſcheme: the manner of *behaving our ſelves* in our ſtation (according to our indowments, and the talents we have) only depends upon us. And perhaps (which has been hinted already) He has ſo orderd things on purpoſe, that from the *various compoſitions* of men's circumſtances with the natural effects of their virtues and vices, and the many *inequalities* ariſing thence, they might ſee the *neceſſity* and *certainty* of another ſtate: and that for this reaſon there ſhould always be ſome remarkable inſtances of *oppreſt innocence* and *flouriſhing wickedneſs*.

The upſhot is, that upon comparing *thoſe pleaſures*, which are the natural effects of virtue with *thoſe ſufferings*, which are the natural effects of ill conſtitution or other calamity, *theſe* are many, very many times found to exceed: and *ē contrario*, upon balancing *thoſe evils*, which are the genuin effects of vice, againſt the *advantages* re-

(*a*) Yet according to *Ariſtotle*, he cannot be happy for all that. His opinion *Diog. L.* repreſents thus: τὸν ἀρετὴν μὴ εἶναι αὐτάρκη πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν· προσδεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ τοῦ περὶ σῶμα καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν.--------τὴν μὲν τοι κακίαν αὐτάρκη πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα παρῇ αὐτῇ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ περὶ σῶμα

ſulting

ſulting from a fortunate eſtate, *theſe* may often be found to outdo the other. *Both contrary to reaſon*, if all ends with this life, and after death be nothing. For my part, if there were only ſome *few*, nay but *one* inſtance of each kind in the world (unfortunate virtue, and proſperous wickedneſs), it would be to me a ſufficient argument for a *future ſtate:* becauſe God cannot be unjuſt or unreaſonable in any *one* inſtance. It muſt not be forgot here, that many times men of *great vices* have alſo *great virtues*, and the natural effect of theſe may qualify that of the other, and being added to their favourable circumſtances may help to turn the ſcale.

If there is no other beſide the preſent being, the *general* and *uſual* ſtate of mankind is ſcarce conſiſtent with the idea of a *reaſonable* Cauſe. Let us conſider it a little (*a*). Not to mention what we muſt ſuffer from the *very ſettlement* and *condition* of this world by hunger, thirſt, heat, cold, and indiſpoſitions; like *leaves* one generation drops, and another ſprings up, to fall again, and be forgotten (*b*). As we come into the world with the labor of our *mothers*, we ſoon go out of it with *our own*. *Childhood* and *youth* are much of them loſt in inſenſibility or trifling, vanity and rudeneſs; obnoxious to many pains and accidents; and, when they are ſpent in the beſt manner, are attended with *labor* and *diſcipline*. When we reach that *ſtage of life*, which uſually takes us from our neareſt relations, and brings us out into the world, with what difficulty are proper *imployments* and ſtations found for us? When we are *got out*, and left to ſcramble for ourſelves, how many *hardſhips* and *tricks* are put upon us, before we get the ſagacity and dexterity to ſave ourſelves? How many *chances* do we ſtand? How troubleſom is *buſineſs* made by unreaſonableneſs, ill nature, or trifling and want of punctuality in the perſons with whom we deal? How do we find ourſelves inſtantly ſurrounded with *ſnares* from deſigning men, knaves, enemies (of which the beſt men have ſome), oppoſite intereſts, factions, and many times from a miſchievous breed, whoſe *childiſh* or *diabolical* humor ſeeks pleaſure in the uneaſineſs of other people? Even in many of thoſe *injoyments*, which men principally propoſe to themſelves, they are greatly *diſappointed*, and experience ſhews, how unlike they are to the antecedent images of them. They are commonly mixt (*c*): the *apparatus* to moſt of them is too operoſe: the completion of them ſeldom depends upon

(*a*) *Et valet annales* noſtrorum *audire laborum.* For, as *Seneca* ſays, *Nulli contigit impunè naſci.* (*b*) Ὁποίηπερ φύλλων γενεὴ, τοίηδε καὶ ἀνδρῶν.---- ἡ μὲν φύει, ἡ δ' ἀπολήγει. *Hom.* This is true not only of ſingle men, but even of cities (famous ones), kingdoms, empires. One may ſay the ſame concerning many of them, that *Florus* ſays of *Veii: Laborat annalium fides, ut Veios fuiſſe credamus.* (*c*) *Labor voluptaſq; diſſimillima naturâ, ſocietate quadam inter ſe naturali ſunt junctæ,* Liv.

our ſelves alone, but upon a concurrence of things, which rarely hit *all* right (*a*): they are generally not only leſs in practice, than in theory, but die almoſt as ſoon as they are: and perhaps they intail upon us a tax to be paid after they are gone. To go on with the hiſtory of *human life*: tho affairs go proſperouſly, yet ſtill perhaps a *family* is increaſing, and with it new occaſions of *ſolicitude* are introduced, accompanied with many *fears* and *tender apprehenſions*. At length, if a man, through many cares and toils and various adventures, arrives at *old age*, then he feels moſt commonly his *preſſures* rather increaſed, than diminiſhd, and himſelf *leſs able* to ſupport them (*b*). The buſineſs he has to do grows *urgent* upon him, and calls for *diſpatch*: moſt of his *faculties* and active powers begin now to fail him apace: *relations* and *friends*, who might be helpful to him (and among them perhaps the dear Conſort of all his joys, and all his cares (*c*) leave him, *never to return more*: wants and *pains* all the while are multiplying upon him: and under this *additional load* he comes melancholy behind, tottering, and bending toward the earth; till he either ſtumbles upon ſomething which throws him into the grave (*d*), or fainting falls of himſelf. And muſt he *end here*? Is this the *period* of his being? Is this *all*? Did he come into the world only to *make his way* through the preſs, amidſt many juſtlings and hard ſtruggles, with at beſt only a few deceitful, little, fugacious pleaſures interſperſed, and ſo *go out of it* again? Can this be an end worthy a firſt Cauſe *perfectly reaſonable*? Would even any *man*, of common ſenſe and good nature, ſend another upon a *difficult journey*, in which, tho he might perhaps now and then meet with a little ſmooth way, get an interval for reſt and contemplation, or be flattered with ſome verdures and the ſmiles of a few daiſies on the banks of the road; yet upon the whole he muſt travel through much dirt, take many wearieſom ſteps, be continually inquiring after ſome clew or directions to carry him through the turnings and intricacies of it, be puzzled how to get a competent *viaticum* and pay his reckonings, ever and anon be in danger of being loſt in deep waters, and beſide forced all the while to fence againſt weather, accidents, and cruel robbers, who are every where lying in wait for him: I ſay, would any one ſend a man upon *ſuch a journey* as this, *only* that the man might faint and expire at the end of it, and all his thoughts periſh; that is, either for *no end* at all, or for the *puniſhment* of one, whom I ſuppoſe never to have hurt him, nor ever to have been

(*a*) Senſible of this, *Socrates* uſed to ſay, δεῖν τὰς ἀδονὰς μὴ παρ' ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ παρ' ἡμῶν πράττ. *Stob.* (*b*) *Senex, & leviſſimis quoq; curis impar*: as *Seneca*, of himſelf, in *Tac.* (*c*) *Rogus aſpiciendus amatæ Conjugis, &c.* Juv. (*d*) Σμίκρα παλαιὰ σώματ' ἐυτάζει ῥοπή. *Soph.*

capable

capable of hurting him? And now can we impute to God that, which is below the common ſize of *men* (*a*)?

I am apt to think, that even among thoſe, whoſe ſtate is beheld with envy, there are *many*, who, if at the end of their courſe they were put to their *option*, whether, without any reſpect to a *future ſtate*, they would repeat all the pleaſures they have had in life, *upon condition* to go over again alſo all the ſame diſappointments, the ſame vexations and unkind treatments from the world, the ſame ſecret pangs and tedious hours, the ſame labors of body and mind, the ſame pains and ſickneſſes, would be *far from accepting* them at that price (*b*).

But here the caſe, as I have put it, only reſpects them, who may be reckond among the *more fortunate* paſſengers: and for *one*, that makes his voyage ſo well, *thouſands* are toſt in tempeſts, and loſt (*c*). How many never attain any comfortable ſettlement in the world? How many fail, after they have attaind it, by various miſfortunes? What melancholy, what diſtractions are cauſed in families by inhumane or vitious husbands, falſe or peeviſh wives, refractory or unhappy children; and, if they are otherwiſe, if they are good, what ſorrow by the loſs of them? How many are forced by neceſſity upon drudging and very ſhocking imployments for a poor livelihood? How many ſubſiſt upon begging, borrowing, and other ſhifts, nor can do otherwiſe? How many meet with ſad accidents, or fall into deplorable diſeaſes? Are not all companies, and the very ſtreets filled with complaints, and grievances, and doleful ſtories? I verily believe, that a great part of mankind may aſcribe their deaths to want and dejection. Seriouſly, the *preſent ſtate* of mankind is unaccountable, if it has not ſome connexion with *another*, and be not as it were the porch or entry to it (*d*).

There is one thing more, of which notice ought to be taken. To one, who carefully peruſes the ſtory and face of the world, what appears to *prevail* in it? Is it not corruption, vice, iniquity, folly at leaſt? Are not debauching (*e*), getting *per fas aut nefas*, defaming one another, erecting tyrannies of one kind or other, propagating

(*a*) Πάντες ἴσμεν ἐν ὁδῷ.-------ἴδες ἐπὶ τῇ ὁδῷ φυτὸν ἢ πίαν ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ ὃ, τι ἂν τυχὸν τῆ ἀξίαν ἀνθρώπου μικρὸν ἐτίρφθης; ἴσια παρίδραμες. πάλιν ἐνίτυχες λίθοις ἢ φάραγξιν ἢ κρημνοις ἢ σκοπέλοις, ἢ που ἢ θηρίοις, κλ. Τοῦτο ὁ βίος. *Baſ.* (*b*) *Non mehercule quiſquam acceppiſſet* [vitam], *niſi daretur inſciis.* Sen. (*c*) *Paulliſper te crede ſubduci in montis ardui verticem celſiorem; ſpeculare inde rerum infra te jacentium facies; & oculis in diverſa porrectis, fluctuantis mundi* turbines *intuere. Jam ſeculi & ipſe miſeraberis, &c.* Cypr. (*d*) The world is like a porch to the world which is to come. *P. Aboth.* (*e*) *O ſi poſſis in illa ſublimi ſpecula conſtitutus oculos tuos inſerere ſecretis, recludere cubiculorum obductas fores, & ad conſcientiam luminum penetralia occulta reſerare, &c.* Cypr.

empty and ſenſeleſs opinions with bawling and fury the great buſineſs of *this world*? And are not all theſe contrary to *reaſon*? Can any one then with reaſon imagine, that *reaſon* ſhould be given, tho it were but to a few, only to be run down and trampled upon, and then *extinguiſhd*? May we not rather conclude, that there muſt be *ſome world*, where *reaſon* will have its turn, and prevail and triumph? Some kingdom of *reaſon* to come (*a*)?

5. In the laſt place, that *great expectation*, which men have, of continuing to live in another ſtate, *beyond the grave*, has I ſuppoſe been commonly admitted as one proof, that they *ſhall live*; and does ſeem indeed to me to add ſome weight to what has been ſaid. That they generally have had ſuch an *expectation*, can ſcarce be denied. The hiſtories of mankind, their deifications, rites, ſtories of apparitions, the frequent mention of a *hades*, with rewards and puniſhments hereafter, &c. all teſtify, that even the Heathen world believed, that the *ſouls* of men *ſurvived* their bodies. Their ignorance indeed of the ſeats and circumſtances of the departed has begot many *errors* and *ſuperſtitions*; and theſe have been multiplied by licentious *poets* and idle *viſionairs*: but this, being no more than what is uſual in the like caſes, ought to be no prejudice againſt the *fundamental opinion itſelf*.

Cicero (*b*), tho he owns there were different opinions among the *Greek* philoſophers about this matter; that, *quod literis extet, Pherecydes Syrus primum dixit, animos hominum eſſe ſempiternos*; that *Pythagoras* and his ſchool confirmed this opinion; that *Plato* was the man, who brought a reaſon for it, &c. yet tells us plainly, *naturam ipſam de immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare*; that *neſcio quomodo inhæret in mentibus quaſi ſæculorum quoddam augurium*; that *permanere animos arbitramur conſenſu nationum omnium*; and more to this purpoſe. Now if this conſent was only the effect of ſome *tradition*, handed from parents to their children; yet ſince we meet with it in *all the quarters* of the world (where there is *any* civility or ſenſe), and in *all ages*, it ſeems to be *coeval* to mankind itſelf, and born with it. And this is ſufficient to give a great *authority* to this opinion of the ſoul's immortality. But this is not all. For it is ſupported by all the foregoing arguments, and many other reaſonings and ſymptoms which we may find within ourſelves. All which, put together, may at leaſt *juſtify* an expectation of a future ſtate: that is, render it a juſt or reaſonable expectation: and then this *reaſonable expectation* grows, by being ſuch, into a further argument, that there *will be* ſuch a ſtate.

(*a*) Beſide, there being no ſatiety of knowledge in this life, we may hope for future opportunities, when our faculties ſhall be exalted, &c. Τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ θέα τῶ ὄντ' ἰδεῖν ἐντᾶυθα ἢ ἐμπίπλησιν ἑαυτὸν ἐκαγῶς. κτλ. *Plut.* (*b*) *In Tuſc. diſp.*

Fancy

Fancy a man walking in ſome *retired field*, far from noiſe, and free from prejudice, to debate this matter with himſelf: and then judge, whether ſuch *meditations* as theſe would not be juſt. " I think I may be ſure, that neither *lifeleſs matter*, nor the " *vegetative tribe*, that ſtone, that flower, that tree have any reflex thoughts: nor do " the *ſenſitive animals*, that ſheep, that ox, ſeem to have any ſuch thing, or but in " the loweſt degree, and in reſpect of preſent objects only. They do not *reaſon*, nor " *diſcourſe*. I may therefore certainly pretend to be ſomething *much above* all theſe " things (*a*). I not only apprehend and conſider theſe *external objects* acting at preſent " upon my nerves, but have *ideas* raiſed within my ſelf of a higher order, and many: " I can, not only repreſent to my ſelf things, that *are*, or *have been*, but *deduce* many " other from them, make excurſions into *futurity*, and foreſee much of what will be, " or at leaſt may be; by ſtrict thinking I had almoſt ſaid, get into *another world* " beforehand: and, whether I ſhall live in ſome other ſtate after death, or not, I am " certainly *a being* capable of ſuch an *expectation*, and cannot but be ſolicitous about " it: none of which things can be ſaid of theſe *clods*, or thoſe *brutes* (*b*). Can I then be " deſignd for *nothing further*, than juſt to eat, drink, ſleep, walk about, and act " upon this earth (*c*); that is, to have no further being, than what theſe brutes have, " ſo far beneath me? Can I be made capable of ſuch *great expectations*, which thoſe " animals know nothing of (happier by far in this regard than I am, if we muſt die " *alike*), only to be *diſappointed at laſt*? Thus placed, juſt upon the confines of ano- " ther better world, and fed with hopes of penetrating into it, and injoying it, " only to make a *ſhort appearance* here (*d*), and then to be *ſhut out*, and *totally ſunk*? " Muſt I then, when I bid my laſt farewell to theſe walks, when I cloſe theſe lids, " and yonder blue regions and all this ſcene darken upon me and go out, muſt I *then* " only ſerve to furniſh duſt to be mingled with the aſhes of theſe *herds* and *plants*, " or with this *dirt* under my feet? Have I been ſet *ſo far above them* in life, only " to be *leveld with them* at death?

This argument grows *ſtronger* in the apprehenſion of one, who is conſcious of abilities and *intellectual improvements*, which he has had no opportunity here of ſhewing and uſing, through want of health, want of confidence (*e*), want of proper place, want

(*a*) Methinks thoſe philoſophers make but an odd appearance in ſtory, who, looking big and ſtuous, at the ſame time profeſſed, that their own ſouls were not ſuperior to thoſe of gnats, *&c.* ὡς τὰς ὀφρῦς ἀνασπαίοντες μηδὲν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν διαφέρειν ἀπεφήναντο ἐμπίδος τι ἢ ἰυλῆς, ἢ μύιας,——ἢ συὸς ψυχῆς——τὴν σφῶν αὐτῶν φιλοσοφωτάτων ψυχὴν, as *Euſeb.* (*b*) *Alexander* after death might be in the ſame ſtate with his *muleter* (*M. Anton.*) but ſure not with his *mule*. (*c*) *Brevis eſt hic fructus homullis*, may be juſtly ſaid for all *Lucretius*. (*d*) Ὁ κόσμος σκηνὴ, ὁ βίος πάροδος· ἦλθες, ἴδες, ἀπῆλθες. *Democrat.* (*e*) With the lowly is wiſdom, *Prov.*

of

of liberty. Such improvements, and the knowledge conſequent upon them, cannot ultimately reſpect *this ſtate* : they can be only an inlargement, and *preparation* for another. That is all they *can be* : and if they are not that, they are *nothing*. And therefore he may be ſuppoſed thus, further, to argue within himſelf. " Can the Au-" thor of my *reaſoning* faculties be Himſelf ſo *unreaſonable* as to give me them, ei-" ther not to employ them, or only to weary my ſelf with *uſeleſs* purſuits, and " then drop me ? Can He, who is privy to all my *circumſtances*, and to theſe very " *thoughts* of mine, be ſo inſenſible of my caſe, as to have *no regard* to it, and " not provide for it ?

It grows *ſtronger ſtill* upon the mind of one, who reflecting upon the hard treatment he has met with from this world, the little cauſe he has given for it, the pains and ſecret uneaſineſs he has felt upon that ſcore, together with many other ſufferings which it was not in his power to prevent, cannot but make a *ſilent, humble appeal* to that Being, who is his *laſt* and *true refuge*, and who he muſt believe will not *deſert him thus*.

Laſtly, it is *ſtrongeſt of all* to one, who, beſides all this, *endeavours* in the conduct of his life to obſerve the laws of *reaſon* (that is, of *his nature* ; and that is, of the *Author of nature*, upon whom he depends) ; laments, and labors againſt his own *infirmities* ; implores the Divine *mercy* ; prays for ſome *better ſtate* hereafter ; acts and lives in the *hopes* of one ; and *denies* himſelf many things upon that view : one, who by the exaltation of his *reaſon* and upper faculties, and that which is certainly the effect of real and uſeful philoſophy, the practice of *virtue*, is ſtill approaching toward a higher manner of being, and doth already taſte ſomething ſpiritual and above this world. To ſuch a one there muſt be a ſtrong expectation *indeed*, and the argument built upon it muſt be proportionable. For can he be indowd with ſuch capacities, and have as it were *overtures* of immortality made him, if after all there is no ſuch thing ? Muſt his *private* acts and *conceald* exerciſes of religion be all loſt (*a*) ? Can a perfect Being have ſo little regard to one, who however inferior and *nothing* to Him, yet regards Him according to *his beſt abilities* in the government of himſelf ?

Are ſuch *meditations* and reflections as theſe well founded, or not ? If they are, it muſt be reaſonable to think, that God will ſatisfy a *reaſonable expectation*.

There are *other arguments* for the immortality of the ſoul, *two* of which I will leave with you, to be at your leiſure ponderd well. The *one* is, that, if the *ſouls* of men are *mortal* (extinguiſhd at death), the caſe of *brutes* is by much preferable to that of *men*. The *pleaſures* of brutes, tho but ſenſual, are more ſincere, being palled or di-

(*a*) *Hic piratis bonus ?*

miniſhd

miniſhd by no diverting conſideration : they go *wholly* into them ; and when they have them not, they ſeem leſs to want them, not thinking of them. Their *ſufferings* are attended with no reflexion (*a*), but are ſuch as they are ſaid to be p. 34. obſ. 8. They are void of *cares*; are under no apprehenſion for families and poſterity; never fatigue themſelves with vain inquiries, hunting after *knowledge* which muſt periſh with them , are not anxious about their *future ſtate* (*b*), nor can be diſappointed of any hopes or expectations; and at laſt ſome ſudden blow (or a few minutes of *unforeſeen* pain) finiſhes them, having never *ſo much as known* that they were mortal.

The *other* is, that the ſoul is a *principle of life :* that, which brings vitality to the body. For how ſhould that, which has been proved to be a ſubſtance, and at the ſame time is alſo a principle of life, and *as ſuch* (as being what it is) is *alive* ; I ſay, how can that *die* (*c*), unleſs it is annihilated ?

Here I begin to be very ſenſible how much I want a *guide*. But as the religion of *nature* is my theme, I muſt at preſent content my ſelf with that light which *nature* affords ; my buſineſs being, as it ſeems, only to ſhew, what a heathen *philoſopher* without any other help, and almoſt αὐτοδίδακτος, may be ſuppoſed to think. I hope that neither the doing of this, nor any thing elſe containd in this *Delineation*, can be the leaſt prejudice to any other *true* religion. Whatever is immediately *reveald from God*, muſt, as well as any thing elſe, be treated as being *what it is* : which cannot be, if it is not treated with the higheſt regard, *believed* and *obeyd*. That therefore, which has been ſo much inſiſted on by me, and is as it were the burden of my ſong, is ſo far from undermining true *reveald religion*, that it rather paves the way for its reception. This I take this opportunity to remark to you once for all. And ſo returning to my *philoſopher*, I cannot imagin but that *even he* would have at leaſt ſome ſuch general thoughts as theſe, which make up almoſt the remainder of this laſt ſection.

(*a*) *Fera pericula, quæ vident, fugiunt : cum effugere, ſecura ſunt*, &c. Sen. (*b*) They are not uneaſy, like men, while they live, from any thought, that their end is to die, *S. Iqquar.* (*c*) *Sic mihi perſuaſi, ſic ſentio, cùm-------ſemper agitetur animus, nec principium motus habeat, quia ſe ipſe moveat ; ne finem quidem habiturum eſſe motus, quia nunquam ſe ipſe ſit relicturus.* Cic. That in *Greg. Thaum.* is like this thought of *Tully* : Ἡ ψυχὴ, αὐτοκίνητος οὖσα, ἀδιάστατος τῷ εἶναι διαλείπειν· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ ἀυτοκινήτῳ τὸ ἀεὶ κινητὸν εἶναι· τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ κινητὸν ἄπαυστόν ἐστι, κλ. But that in *S. Auſtin* comes ſomething nearer to my meaning : *Eſt animus vita quædam, unde omne quod animatum eſt vivit. ------ Non ergo poteſt animus mori. Nam ſi carere poterit vita, non* animus *ſed* animatum *aliquid eſt.*

IX. *The ſoul, when it parts from this groſs body, will paſs by ſome law into ſome new ſeat, or ſtate, agreeable to the nature of it* (*a*). Every ſpecies of beings muſt belong to *ſome* region, or ſtate. Becauſe nothing can be, but it muſt be *ſome where*, and *ſome how*: and there being different kinds of abodes and manners of ſubſiſting in the univerſe, and the natures of the things, that are to exiſt in them, being alſo different, there will be a greater *congruity* between theſe ſeveral *natures* reſpectively and ſome particular *places*, or *ſtates*, than there is between them and others; and indeed ſuch a one, that out of thoſe perhaps they cannot ſubſiſt, or not *naturally*. To thoſe therefore muſt be their reſpective *tendences*: to thoſe they are *adjudged* by the courſe of nature, and conſtitution of things, or rather by the Author of them (*b*).

While the ſoul is in the body, it has ſome powers and opportunities of moving it ſpontaneouſly, or otherwiſe than it would be moved by the meer laws of gravitation and mechaniſm. This is evident. But yet, notwithſtanding this, the weight of that *body*, to which at preſent it is limited (among other cauſes) conſtrains it to act for a while upon *this ſtage*. That general law, to which bodies are ſubjected, makes it ſink in this fluid of air, ſo much lighter than itſelf; keeps it down; and ſo determines the ſeat of it, and of the ſoul in it, to be upon the ſurface of this *earth*, where, or in whoſe neighbourhood it was firſt produced. But then, when the ſoul ſhall be diſengaged from the groſs matter, which now incloſes and incumbers it, and either become *naked ſpirit*, or be only veild in its own fine and obſequious *vehicle*, it muſt at the ſame time be either freed from the *laws* of bodies, and fall under *ſome other*, which will carry it to ſome *proper* manſion, or ſtate (*c*); or at leaſt by the *old ones* be capable of mounting upwards (*d*), in proportion to the volatility of its vehicle, and of emerging out of theſe regions into ſome *medium* more ſuitable, and (if the philoſopher may ſay ſo) equilibrious. Thus much as to the *general ſtate* of ſouls after death. But then,

(*a*) The *tranſmigration* of ſouls has been much talked of: but *ea ſententia,---quoniam ridicula, & mimo dignior quàm ſcholâ, ne refelli quidem ſeriò debet; quod qui facit, videtur vereri, ne quis id credat.* So *Lactantius*. Indeed who can but laugh, when he reads in *Lucian* of *Homer*'s having been a camel in *Bactria*, &c. (*b*) Χωρεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον. *Hierocl.* (*c*) *Ex humili atque depreſſo in eum emicabit locum, quiſquis ille eſt, qui ſolutas vinculis animas beato recipit ſinu.* Sen. Ἡ τῶν θνητῶν προσπαθείας ἀποζολὴ, ἢ ἡ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅσον πλησῶν τινων, ἰκφυσις πρὸς τὸ τῶν καλῶν καθαρὸν τόπον, εἰς τὸν θείαν ἰυζωΐαν ἡμᾶς ἀνάξει. *Hierocl.* (*d*) *Depoſitâ ſarcinâ, levior volabit ad cœlum.* S. Hier.

X. *In*

X. *In this new ſtate, or place of abode, there may be different ſtations befitting the differences of particular ſouls among themſelves, as they are more or leſs perfect in their kind.* We ſee even inanimate bodies, which have different gravities, figures, impulſes, *&c.* ſettle into ſome *order* among themſelves, agreeable to theſe *differences*. And ſo by the ſame univerſal rule in nature (*viz.* that differences in things are attended with anſwerable relations and effects) *ſouls* muſt alſo take their ſituation in *ſome kind* of order according to *their* differences.

XI. *The great difference of human ſouls, with reſpect to perfection and imperfection, lies in their different degrees and habits* (a) *of reaſonableneſs or unreaſonableneſs* (b). That is to ſay, not only in men's different *improvements*, or neglects and abuſe of their rational faculties; but alſo in the greater or leſs influence of theſe upon their actions, and by conſequence in their different degrees of *virtue*, or *vice*. For a man is accounted a *reaſonable* man, when he reaſons rightly, and follows his reaſon: in which expreſſion virtue muſt be included, being (as p. 179, *&* *al.*) nothing but the *practice of reaſon and truth*.

That men are reaſonable, or the contrary, in *different degrees* is plain. Some reaſon well upon *ſome* ſubjects, but in reſpect of *others*, to which they have not been accuſtomd, are dim and confuſed: or they are partial to their vices and paſſions, their old impreſſions and parties; and ſo their reaſon is not *general*, nor has its due *extent*, or *influence*. Others, whoſe reaſon is uncultivated and weak, tho they have virtuous inclinations, many times fall into *ſuperſtition* and *abſurdities*; miſled by authorities, and over-awed by old or formal modes of ſpeaking, and *grave non-ſenſe*. Many, if not the moſt, ſeem to have ſcarce any *notion* of reaſon or virtue *at all*, but act fortuitouſly, or as they ſee other folks act; moved either by bodily propenſions, or by example. Some *few* there are, who *endeavour* to improve their underſtandings, to diſcover what is agreeable to reaſon, and to fix their *opinions*; and conduct their *lives* accordingly. And in all theſe *ſeveral kinds* there are various degrees of elevation in knowledge and virtue, and of immerſion in vice and ignorance, and new differences ariſing endleſly. All this is viſible.

(*a*) The *Jews*, who generally ſay, that by the practice of religion the ſoul acquires perfection and life eternal, lay ſuch a ſtreſs upon *habits* of piety, that R. *Albo* makes the effect of giving 1000 *zuzin* in charity at once by no means equal to that of giving one *zuz* and repeating it 1000 times. The doing of a thing at ſeveral times, will certainly acquire a higher degree, than the doing the whole at once. (*b*) Every one that performs the commandments of the Creator, ſhall be bleſſed; he ſhall find good underſtanding----and the retribution, which is the conſequence of true underſtanding, is all that remains to the ſoul after the body is conſumed, and it adheres to the mind of the doer and doth exiſt for ever. *Iſ. Lev.*

Now the ſoul, reflecting, finds in itſelf *two* general faculties, *one*, by which it underſtands, and judges, and reaſons (all which I comprehend under the term *rational faculties*, or *reaſon*); and *another*, by which it wills, or determins to act, according to the judgments and concluſions made in the upper part of it. And the more *perfectly* it performs theſe operations (*i. e.* the more *truly* it reaſons, and the more *readily* it wills and executes the deciſions of reaſon), the more *perfect* certainly it muſt be in its kind; and the more imperfectly, the more imperfect. The accompliſhments therefore and *perfections* of human ſouls, and the *contrary*, muſt be in proportion to the forementiond *differences*.

XII. *According to theſe differences then it is reaſonable to think the ſouls of men will find their ſtations in the future world* (*a*). This is but a corollary from what goes before.

Obj. Why ſhould we think, that God cauſes things to be in ſuch a manner, as that in the *future ſtate* men ſhall be placed and treated according to their merit, and the progreſs they have made in reaſon and virtue, when we ſee the caſe to be widely different *in this*? *Anſ.* It muſt be rememberd, that this is one of thoſe very *reaſons* on which the belief of the ſoul's immortality is founded. Now, if it be reaſonable to believe there is a future ſtate, becauſe things are dealt *unequally* now, upon that very ſcore it will be reaſonable to think, that they are dealt *equally* (*b*) in that other ſtate.

Here *bodily* wants and affections, and ſuch things as proceed from them, do intermix with human affairs, and do confound *merit* with *demerit*, *knowledge* with *ignorance*: and hence it comes to paſs many times, that bad men injoy much, and good men ſuffer, and both are, if there is no other ſtate, in their wrong places. But, when the *corporeal cauſes* of miſplacing ſhall be removed, *ſpirits* (or ſpirits and their σώματα πνευματικὰ) may be ſuppoſed more regularly to take their *due* poſts and privileges: the impudent and vitious will have no ſuch *opportunities* of getting into circumſtances, of which they are unworthy, nor improved and virtuous minds find ſuch *obſtructions* to keep them down in circumſtances unworthy of them. Be ſure the more advanced and pure any ſtate is, the more *properly* will the inhabitants be ranked, and the *juſter* and more *natural* will the ſubordination of its members be.

Even *here* we commonly find men in that kind of buſineſs, for which they are educated and *prepared*; men of the ſame profeſſions generally keeping together; the virtuous and reaſonable *deſiring* to be (tho they not always can be) with *their like* (*c*);

(*a*) Τὸνς προσήκοντας τῇ ἀξιτῇ. *Plato.* (*b*) With an equal or impartial regard to every man's deſerts: equitably. (*c*) Ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν Ἀυτόματοι ἀγαθοὶ. *E. Plat.*

and

and the vitious (as they ſcarcely cannot be) with *theirs*. And why ſhould we not think, that an *aſſociation* and *communion* of ſouls with thoſe of their own ſize, diſpoſition and habits may be more *univerſal* and *compleat*, when thoſe things, which in great meaſure hinder it here, ſhall be no more? If we may think this, certainly thoſe fields or ſtates, in which the *virtuous* and *wiſe* (*a*) ſhall meet, muſt be different from thoſe in which the *fooliſh* and *wicked* ſhall herd together (*b*). The very difference of the *company* will itſelf create a vaſt difference in the manner of their living.

XIII. *The manſions, and conditions of the virtuous and reaſoning part muſt be proportionably better than thoſe of the fooliſh and vitious.* The propoſition cannot be inverted, or the caſe be otherwiſe, if the conſtitution of things depends upon a reaſonable cauſe: as I have endeavourd to ſhew it does.

Cor. Hence it follows, that *the practice of reaſon* (in its juſt extent) *is the great preparative for death, and the means of advancing our happineſs through all our ſubſequent duration.* But moreover,

XIV. *In the future ſtate reſpect will be had not only to men's reaſoning, and virtues, or the contrary, but alſo to their injoyments and ſufferings here* (*c*). Becauſe the forementiond *inequalities* of this world can by no means be redreſt, unleſs men's injoyments and ſufferings, taken together with their virtues and vices, are compared and balanced. I ſay, *taken together:* becauſe no reaſon can be aſſignd, why a vitious man ſhould be recompenſed for the pains and miſchiefs and troubles, which he *brings upon himſelf* by his vices, as the natural conſequences of them; nor, on the other ſide, why any deductions ſhould be made from the future happineſs of a good man upon the ſcore of thoſe *innocent* injoyments, which are the genuin fruit of his moderation, regularity, other virtues, and ſound reaſoning.

Cor. Wicked men will not only be leſs happy than the wiſe and virtuous, *but be really unhappy in that ſtate to come.* For when all the happineſs, that anſwers to thoſe degrees of virtue, which they had, and thoſe ſufferings, which they underwent, above what was the natural effect of their wickedneſs; I ſay, when that is ſubſtracted, what

(*a*) Οἱ πφιλοσοφκότες ὀρθῶς, or οἱ ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι, in *Plato*'s ſtyle. (*b*) Τελευτήσαντας αὐτὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ τ κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὐ δέξεται, ἐνθάδε ἢ τὸν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τ διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ ἕξουσι, κακὸι κακοῖς συνόντες. *Plato.* (*c*) Εἰ πλέον τ ἁμαρτημάτων κολάζεται [ὁ δίκαιος], προσθήκη δικαιοσύνης αὐτῷ λογίζεται. *Chryſ.*

remains upon the account will be ſomething below no-happineſs: which muſt be ſome quantity of *poſitive unhappineſs*, or miſery.

Thus there will be *rewards*, and *puniſhments* hereafter: and men will be *happy*, or *unhappy*, according to their behaviour, injoyments, and ſufferings in this preſent life. But,

XV. *If the immortality of the ſoul cannot be demon rated, yet it is certain the contrary cannot* (*a*). To ſay, when a *houſe* is ruinous and faln, that it once had an *inhabitant*, and that he is eſcaped out of it, and lives in ſome other place, can involve no contradiction, or abſurdity (*b*). And,

XVI. *If the immortality of the ſoul ſhould be conſidered only as a probability, or even as a chance poſſible, yet ſtill a virtuous life is to be preferred before its contrary.* For if the ſoul be *mortal*, and all preception periſhes for ever at our death, what in this caſe does a good man *loſe* by his virtue? Very rarely more than ſome acts of *devotion*, and inſtances of *mortification*, which too by cuſtom grow habitual and eaſy (*c*), and it may be *pleaſant* by being (or ſeeming at leaſt to be) reaſonable. On the other hand, what does a vitious man *gain*? Only ſuch injoyments, as a virtuous man *leaves*: and thoſe are ſuch, as moſt commonly owe their being to a vitiated taſte; grow inſipid in time; require more trouble and contrivance to obtain them, than they are worth; go

(*a*) Sure thoſe arguments in *Lucretius* can convince no body. *Nunc quoniam, quaſſatis undique vaſis, Diffluere humorem, & laticem diſcedere cernis; Crede animam quoque diffundi*, &c. And *Præterea gigni pariter cum corpore & unà Creſcere ſentimus, pariterque ſeneſcere mentem*, &c. *Quare animum quoque diſſolvi fateare neceſſe eſt; Quandoquidem penetrant in eum contagia morbi.* Nor thoſe in *Pliny* (N. H. 7. 55.): if there really are any at all. For to plead the *antegenitale experimentum* is to beg the queſtion; which may be put thus, Whether we ſhall after death be more conſcious of our exiſtence, than we were before we were born. And if *Dicæarchus*'s *Lesbiaci* were extant, I believe we ſhould find nothing ſtronger in them. The truth ſeems to be, Οὐ βέλτιαι ὁ κακὸς ἀθάνατον εἶναι τὸν αὐτῷ ψυχήν: but he comforts himſelf with this thought, that ἡ μετὰ θάνατον ἀδύνεια ἑαυτῷ will prevent future ſufferings. This is εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι καταφυγή. *Hieracl.* (*b*) Nor, that the ſoul ſtill exiſts ἔρημον καταλιπῶσα ζωῆς τὸ ἡμίτερον δίκον. *Ph. J.* *Domus ab habitatore deſerta dilabitur:* ------ & *corpus, reliſtum ab anima, deſluit.* Lact. (*c*) Μακρὸς ἦ ἐς ἀρετὴν [ἀρετὴν], Καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον. ἐπὴν δ' ἐς ἄκρον ἵκηαι, Ῥηϊδίη δ' ἔπειτα πέλει. *Heſ.*

off

off diſagreeably; are followd many times by ſharp reflexions and bitter penances in the rear; and at beſt after a ſhort time end in nothing, *as if they had never been*. This is all (*a*). But then if the ſoul prove to be *immortal* (as we have all the reaſon in the world to think it will), what does the virtuous man *gain*? His preſent pleaſures (if not ſo many) are more *ſincere* (*b*) and *natural* (*c*); and the effect of his ſelf-denials and ſubmiſſion to reaſon, in order to prepare himſelf for a future ſtate, is the happineſs of that ſtate: which, without pretending to deſcribe it, may be preſumed to be *immortal*, becauſe the ſoul is ſo; and to be purer and of a more exalted nature (*i. e. truer*, and *greater*) than any of theſe low injoyments here, becauſe that ſtate is every way in nature above this. And again, what does the wicked man *loſe*? That happineſs, which the virtuous gain *as ſuch*; and he ſinks, beſide, into ſome degree of the *unhappineſs* of that future ſtate: of which one may ſay in general, that it may be as much greater than the unhappineſs or ſufferings of this world, as the happineſs and joys of that are above thoſe of this.

In a ſtate that is *ſpiritual* and clear every thing will be purer, and operate more directly and ſtrongly, and (if the expreſſion may be tolerated) *with more ſpirit*: there will be fewer obſtructions to either happineſs or unhappineſs: the ſoul will lie *more open*, and have more *immediate* and acute perceptions of either: ſo that each of them in their kind will be more *intenſe*, the one nearer to pure or mere happineſs, the other to the contrary (*d*). But to enter further into the nature and oeconomy of the yet unknown world is too arduous an undertaking for my *philoſopher*.

I ſhall only add, that the *reaſoning* and *virtuous* man has at leaſt this advantage over the *fooliſh* and *profligate*, that, tho his wiſdom and virtue cannot *always* rectify that which is amiſs in himſelf or his circumſtances, they will find means to *alleviate* his preſſures and diſadvantages, and ſupport him under all the anomalies of life, with *comforts* of which the other knows nothing: particularly this, the injoyment of an humble, but well grounded expectation of *felicity hereafter*, ſincere and durable (*e*).

(*a*) *Calo præfertur Adonis.* (*b*) Ὁ ἀρετῇ διαπρέπων ἡδονὰς ἀμεταμελήτους καρπᾶται. *Hierocl.* (*c*) If the ſoul was mortal, yet the virtuous man πῶς ἑαυτῷ τελειότητα ἀπολαμβάνων, τὸ οἰκεῖον καρπούμενος ἀγαθὸν, εὐδαίμων ὄντως ἐστὶ καὶ μακάριος. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, κτλ. (*d*) Ὥστε μὴ μόνον τῷ καλῷ περιεῖναι τὸ σπουδαῖον τῆς φαύλης, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ἡδονῇ νικᾷν, δι' ἣν μόνην δοκεῖ ἅπασι κακίαν ὁ φαῦλος ὑπάγεσθαι. *Hier.* (*e*) Οἱ γὰρ δίκαιοι τῶν ἀδίκων, ἐν μηδὲν ἄλλο πλεονεκτοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι γε ἁπάσαις ὑπερίχουσιν. *Iſocr.*

XVII. *He therefore, who would act according to truth, muſt* in the laſt place, *not only conſider what he is, and how circumſtantiated in this preſent ſtate, and provide accordingly; but, further, muſt conſider himſelf alſo as one whoſe exiſtence proceeds on into another, and provide for that too.* How *I think* this is to be done, by this time I hope you fully apprehend.

For a *concluſion* of the whole matter; let our converſation in this world, ſo far as we are concernd, and able, be ſuch as acknowledges every thing to be *what it is* (what it is in *itſelf*, and what with regard to *us*, to other *beings*, to *cauſes*, *circumſtances*, *conſequences)*: that is, let us by no act *deny* any thing to be *true*, which is *true:* that is, let us act according to *reaſon:* and that is, let us act according to the *law of our nature.* By *honeſtly endeavouring* to do this we ſhall expreſs our duty (*a*) to *Him*, who is the Author of it, and of that law; and at the ſame time proſecute our own *proper* happineſs (the happineſs of *rational* beings): we ſhall do what tends to make us eaſy here, and be qualifying our ſelves and preparing for our removal hence to our long home; that great *revolution*, which, at the fartheſt, cannot be very far off.

And now, *Sir*, the trouble is almoſt over for the preſent, not properly which I give you, but which you have brought upon yourſelf, theſe being the *Thoughts*, which you *deſired*: unleſs I have any where miſrepreſented myſelf through *inadvertence*; which I own may be. At the foot of the page I have in ſome places ſubjoind a *few little* ſtrictures principally of *antiquity*, after the manner of annotations: ſuch as, when I came to reviſe theſe ſheets, I could recollect upon the ſudden (*b*); having no common-place book to help me, nor thought of any ſuch thing before that time. They may ſerve perhaps ſometimes a little to explain the text; and ſometimes to add weight; but chiefly to *divert* you, who know very well how to improve any the *leaſt hint* out of the Ancients, and I fear will *want* to be diverted. I have alſo printed a few copies of this *Sketch*, not with any deſign to make it public, but merely to ſave the trouble of *tranſcribing* (*c*); being minded, ſince I have made it, to leave it not only with *you*, but perhaps alſo with two or three other *friends:*

(*a*) Τρόπος γὰρ θεῷ διαπείσας ἕπος ὁσιώτατος [ἀσκεῖν ἀρετήν]. Joſ. (*b*) Some more were added in the ſecond impreſſion. (*c*) Nothing more was intended at firſt. See the *adverti ſement.*

or

or however, with my *Family*, as a *private monument* of one that meant well. Tho, as to the diſpoſal and fate of it, much will depend upon your judgment and manner of acceptance.

WILLIAM WOLLASTON.

Who is like unto Thee, O GOD! and Praiſe be to GOD!

4
57
JUN

Thomas Cooper

Thomas Cooper

Tho. Cooper

Tho: Cooper